

Selected Bibliography on Abelard's Logic and Ontology. Second Part M - Z

Bibliography on Abelard: A - L

Index:

- I. Logic, Semantics and Ontology in the Work of Abelard
- II. Theories of the Copula in the Logical Works of Abelard
- III. Editions and Translations of the Logical Works

Selected Bibliography on His Logic and Metaphysics:

- IV. First Part: A - L
- V. Second Part: M - Z

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Malcolm John, "A Reconsideration of the Identity and Inherence Theories of the Copula," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 17: 383-400 (1979).
2. Maloney Christopher J., "Abailard's Theory of Universals," *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 23: 27-38 (1982).
"This paper attempts to fill these lacunae with a formal reconstruction of Abailard's theory of the relation between statuses, concepts and individuals. As such, this essay is a contribution not only to the history of medieval logic but also to the theory of universals and the philosophy of mind."
3. Marenbon John. Abelard's Concept of Possibility. In *Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Festschrift für Kurt Flasch zu seinem 60. Geburtstag. (vol. II)*. Edited by Mojsisch Burkhard and Pluta Olaf. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner 1991. pp. 595-609
Reprinted as Essay X in: John Marenbon, *Aristotelian Logic, Platonism, and the Context of Early Medieval Philosophy in the West*.
4. Marenbon John, "Abelard, *ens* and Unity," *Topoi* 11: 149-158 (1992).
"Although Abelard arrived at a view of "ens" nearer to Aristotle's than his sources would suggest, unlike Thirteenth-century thinkers he did not work out a view of transcendentals in terms of "ens", its attributes and their convertibility. He did, however, regard unity (though not goodness or truth) as an attribute of everything. At first, Abelard suggested that unity, being inseparable, could not be an accident according to Porphyry's definition ('that which can come and leave a subject without the subject being corrupted') either it is some type of form not classified by Porphyry, or not a form at all. In his later logical work, Abelard argued differently. Unity, he said, is an accidental form, but Porphyry's definition of an accident must be understood negatively, not as asserting something about what could happen in reality (since the form of unity could never leave its subject) but rather something about an absence of connection: were it, per impossible, to occur, the loss by a subject of its form of unity would not lead to the loss of its specific or generic status."
5. Marenbon John, "Vocalism, Nominalism and the Commentaries on the *Categories* from the Earlier Twelfth Century," *Vivarium* 30: 51-61 (1992).
Reprinted as Essay XIII in: John Marenbon, *Aristotelian Logic, Platonism, and the Context of Early Medieval Philosophy in the West*.
6. Marenbon John. Medieval Latin Commentaries and Glosses on Aristotelian Logical Texts, Before c. 1150 A.D. In *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and*

Medieval Latin Traditions. Edited by Burnett Charles. London: Warburg Institute, University of London 1993. pp. 77-127

Reprinted as Essay II in: John Marenbon, *Aristotelian Logic, Platonism, and the Context of Early Medieval Philosophy in the West*.

7. Marenbon John. Glosses and Commentaries on the *Categories* and *De interpretatione* before Abelard. In *Dialektik und Rhetorik im früheren und hohen Mittelalter. Rezeption, Überlieferung und gesellschaftliche Wirkung antiker Gelehrsamkeit vornehmlich im 9. und 12. Jahrhundert*. Edited by Fried Johannes. München: Oldenbourg 1997. pp. 21-49
Reprinted as Essay X in: John Marenbon, *Aristotelian Logic, Platonism, and the Context of Early Medieval Philosophy in the West*.
8. Marenbon John. *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997. Paperback edition, with corrections and bibliographical note, 1999.
9. Marenbon John. The Platonisms of Peter Abelard. In *Néoplatonisme et philosophie médiévale*. Edited by Benakis Linos G. Turnhout: Brepols 1997. pp. 109-129
Actes du Colloque international de Corfou, 6-8 octobre 1995 organisé par la Société internationale pour l'étude de la philosophie médiévale.
Reprinted as Essay XII in: John Marenbon, *Aristotelian Logic, Platonism, and the Context of Early Medieval Philosophy in the West*.
"When, in 1966, Father Chenu published *Les platonismes au XII siècle*, twelfth-century Platonism had already been a topic of scholarly interest for nearly a century. (1) Chenu's novelty lay in his plural: not «Platonism» but «Platonisms». He distinguished a strand going back to Augustine, another deriving from the *Timaeus* and Boethius, one linked to pseudo-Dionysius and another to Arab writers. Chenu's is a useful analytical method which allows the scholar to avoid broad, oversimplifying labels whilst continuing to see the history of medieval philosophy in the neat terms of interrelated and interacting traditions. No doubt it could be fruitfully applied to Abelard -- but that is not my intention here. The Platonisms I shall be discussing are not those of the historian, but Abelard's own: some of the diverse ways in which he used a notion of Plato and Platonic teaching to formulate, structure and convey his own thought (2). At the end of this paper, I shall return to the question of method, and ask what my procedure has to offer by contrast with other ways of discussing Platon- or any other -ism."
- (1) In M.-D. Chenu, *La théologie au douzième siècle* (Études de philosophie médiévale, 45). Paris, 1966, pp. 108-141. For a sketch of the historiography of twelfth-century Platonism, see J. Marenbon, "Platonismus im zwölften Jahrhundert: alte und neue Zugangsweisen" (translation by A. Snell and O. Summerell), in T. Kobusch and B. Moisisch (eds.), *Platon in der abendländischen Geistesgeschichte, neue Forschungen zum Platonismus*, Darmstadt, forthcoming. [Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1997 pp. 101-119]
- (2) In my general presentation of Abelard's use of Plato and attitude to him, I summarize arguments put forward in various places and different contexts in my *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard*. Cambridge, 1997. But in my longer and more detailed discussions here -- of Plato universals, the *Timaeus* and optimism, and «the Platonism of the *Republic*» -- I develop and extend what I have written in the book.
10. Marenbon John. The Twelfth Century. In *Routledge History of Philosophy. Volume III: Medieval Philosophy*. Edited by Marenbon John. New York: Routledge 1998. pp. 150-187
On Abelard see pp. 155-166.
11. Marenbon John. Abélard, la predication et le verbe "être". In *Langage, sciences, philosophie au XIIIe siècle*. Edited by Biard Joël. Paris: Vrin 1999. pp. 199-215
12. Marenbon John. *Aristotelian Logic, Platonism, and the Context of Early Medieval Philosophy in the West*. Aldershot: Ashgate 2000.
13. Marenbon John. *Dicta*, Assertion and Speech Acts: Abelard and Some Modern Interpreters. In *Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Language*. Edited by Maierù Alfonso and Valente Luisa. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki 2004. pp. 59-80
Acts of the 14th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics - Rome, June 11-15, 2002.
14. Marenbon John, "The Rediscovery of Peter Abelard's Philosophy," *Journal of the History of*

Philosophy 44: 331-351 (2006).

"My article surveys philosophical discussions of Abelard over the last twenty years. Although Abelard has been a well-known figure for centuries, his most important logical works were published only in the twentieth century and, so I argue, the rediscovery of him as an important philosopher is recent and continuing. I concentrate especially on work that shows Abelard as the re-discoverer of propositional logic (Chris Martin); as a subtle explorer of problems about modality (Simo Knuuttila, Herbert Weidemann) and semantics (Klaus Jacobi); as a metaphysician before the reception of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (Peter King); and as an ethical thinker who echoes the Stoics (Calvin Normore) and anticipates Kant (Peter King)."

15. Marenbon John, "Abelard's Changing Thoughts on Sameness and Difference in Logic and Theology," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 81: 229-250 (2007).

16. Marenbon John. Was Abelard a Trope Theorist? In *Compléments de Substance. Études sur les propriétés accidentelles offertes à Alain de Libera*. Edited by Erismann Christophe and Schniewind Alexandrine. Paris: Vrin 2008. pp. 85-101

"It was Christopher Martin who, in 1992, first made the link between Abelard's views on accidents and *differentiae* and what are usually called, in contemporary analytical ontology, 'tropes'. Myself apart, Alain de Libera is the only writer I know who has taken serious notice of this idea, discussing it both on its own, and in the wider context of truth-makers and empty reference.(1) De Libera does not think that Abelard can illuminatingly be described as a trope-theorist. I still disagree, and although our disagreement is based on matters of detail, it may illustrate, as I suggest in the conclusion, a wider difference in approach."

I. C. Martin, 'The Logic of the *Nominales*, or, The Rise and Fall of Impossible *Positio*', *Vivarium* 30 (1992), 110-26; J. Marenbon, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard*, Cambridge; CUP, 1997, 119-30; A. de Libera, 'Des accidents aux tropes. Pierre Abélard', *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 4 (2002) 509-30; *La Référence vide. Théories de la proposition*, Paris; PUF, 2002, 122-6, 269-97.

17. Markowski Mieczyslaw. *Burydanizm w Polsce w Okresie Przedkopernikanskim*. Warsaw: Zaklad Narodowy Imienia Ossolinskich (Ossolineum) 1971.

The book is in Polish, but with Contents (pp. 635-637) and Summary (pp. 531-539) in English: *Buridanism in Poland in the Pre-Copernican Times*.

18. Martin Christopher J., "William's Machine," *Journal of Philosophy* 83: 564-572 (1986). William of Soissons and Abelard's theory of entailment.

19. Martin Christopher J. Embarrassing Arguments and Surprising Conclusions in the Development of Theories of the Conditional in the Twelfth Century. In *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains: aux origines de la Logica Modernorum*. Edited by Jolivet Jean and Libera Alain de. Napoli: Bibliopolis 1987. pp. 377-400

20. Martin Christopher J., "Something Amazing about the Peripatetic of Pallet: Abelard's Development of Boethius' Account of Conditional Propositions," *Argumentation* 1: 419-436 (1987).

"Mediaeval logicians inherited from Boethius an account of conditional propositions and the syllogisms which may be constructed using them. In the following paper it is shown that there are considerable difficulties with Boethius' account which arise from his failure to understand the nature of compound propositions and in particular to provide for their negation. Boethius suggests that there are two different conditions which may be imposed for the truth of a conditional proposition but he really gives no adequate account of how such propositions may be obtained. The true greatness of Peter Abaelard as a philosophical logician is revealed in what he is able to do with the material which he found in Boethius. It is shown that he developed a precise theory of conditionals giving an account of how true conditionals may be obtained and principles which may be used to reject others as false. Unlike Boethius Abaelard properly appreciates that conjunctions must be treated as logical units. Even he, however, falls victim to difficulties which arise when this connective is brought into contact with negation and the conditions which he lays down for the truth of a conditional."

21. Martin Christopher J., "The Logic of the "Nominales", or the Rise and Fall of Impossible *Positio*," *Vivarium* 30: 110-126 (1992).

22. Martin Christopher J., "Theories of Inference and Entailment in the Middle Ages (Boethius,

Philoponus, Peter Abelard, John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham)", Princeton University, 1999. Ph.D. dissertation available at ProQuest Dissertation Express.

23. Martin Christopher J. Abaelard on Modality: Some Possibilities and Some Puzzles. In *Potentialität und Possibilität. Modalaussagen in der Geschichte der Metaphysik*. Edited by Buchheim Thomas, Kneepkens Corneille Henri, and Lorenz Kuno. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog 2001. pp. 97-125
- "In his monumental study of William of Sherwood's modal theory Klaus Jacobi (2) surveys the treatment of modality by philosophers in the preceding century and shows that their concern was for the most part to calculate the logical relations between the various forms of modal proposition which they recognised. Although theology demanded that they take an interest in the nature of divine power, without the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, to prompt them, twelfth century philosophers generally had little to say on the relationship of modal propositions and their structures to the various sources of modal claims, to claims, for example, about the nature of potentiality, physical causation, or action.(3) Some progress was made, however, and in the present paper I will consider the contribution of Peter Abaelard to the development of theories of modality and the curious attitude of one of his followers to his work on modal logic.

Although Abaelard had no access to the *Physics* or *Metaphysics* and precious little, if any, to the *Prior Analytics*,(4) he did find in the *Categories* and *De Interpretatione* texts which posed interpretive problems whose solution demanded that he discuss the nature of possibility and necessity. What follows is for the most part an examination of certain points made by Abaelard in his discussion of these problems. It is divided into two parts.

In the first part of the paper I propose an account of Abaelard's theory of possibility and its application both to creatures and to God.(5) Abaelard's claims about divine power are rather well known and I mention them only very briefly at the end. His treatment of creaturely potentiality in commenting on various claims made by Aristotle in the *Categories* has, on the other hand, barely been noticed and my concern in the first part of the paper is to thus set them out in some detail. The failure to take into account the full range of Abaelard's thinking about potentiality has led to some very misleading claims about his views on possibility. What my investigation shows is that Abaelard employs three different but related notions of potentiality. The first is the potentiality that an individual has for future action and it is constrained by its species nature, its particular constitution, and its present circumstances. The second and third are both introduced to explain how we may legitimately say, as authority requires, that an amputee is bipedal. They are different but both reduce all unqualified possibility to potentiality and all potentiality to compatibility with species nature. The unqualified possibilities open for an individual creature of a given natural kind are thus for anything which is not incompatible with its species nature.

In the second part of the paper I first examine the account of modal propositions that Abaelard insists upon in discussing chapter 12 of *De Interpretatione*. I show that this account of the semantics of such propositions is completely in agreement with his treatment of the source of modal properties in natures. In his treatment of modal propositions Abaelard famously distinguishes between two different interpretations of propositions such as '*S* is possibly *P*'. A personal, or '*de re*' reading, in which *S* is said to possess a power to be *P*, and an impersonal, or '*de sensu*' reading in which '*S*'s being *P*' is claimed to be possible where the nominal phrase is held to refer to a proposition, propositional content, or some other kind of entity. Abaelard argues that only the *de re* reading yields a modal claim and that nominal modes are to be resolved into the corresponding adverbial modes. The truth conditions of modal propositions are thus always, according to Abaelard, ultimately to be given in terms of what is compatible and what is not with the specific nature of the subject of the *de re* reading of them.

Information about the fate of Abaelard's theories and the views of his followers is unfortunately very limited and it is pleasant to be able to add here to our knowledge. The texts that we have on divine and creaturely power agree with Abaelard's teaching in reducing unqualified potentiality to compatibility with species nature. In the concluding part of my paper, however, I show that the author of the *Summa Dialectice Artis* attributed to William of Lucca, otherwise an extremely devoted follower of Abaelard in logic, explicitly rejects his master's *de re* account of modality in favour of the alternative *de sensu* reading which Abaelard had gone to great lengths to refute. The *Summa* thus leaves us with a considerable puzzle about the commitment of Abaelard's followers in

logic to his theory of modality. As compensation for this, we will see that the *Summa* also provides us with a solution to a small puzzle raised by Jacobi and Knuuttila concerning Abaelard's views on the logical relations between quantified modal propositions." pp. 97-99

(2) Klaus Jacobi, *Die Modalbegriffe in den logischen Schriften des Wilhelm von Shyreswood*, Leiden 1980.

(3) The outstanding exception is St. Anselm's discussion of the logic of action sentences in the Lambeth Fragments printed in R. W. Southern and F. S. Schmitt, *Memorials of St. Anselm*, London 1969, 333-354.

(4) Cf. *Dialectica*, Introduction, XIII-XIX. The evidence that Abaelard had direct access to the *Prior Analytics* is extremely slight. The *Dialectica* contains what appear to be two quotations from the *Prior Analytics*, the definition of the syllogism from *An. Pr. I 1, 24b 18-22* at *Dialectica*, 232.5-8 and the distinction between perfect and imperfect syllogisms from *An. Pr. I 1, 24b 22-25* at *Dialectica*, 233.36-234.3. In the discussion following the definition of the syllogism, however, Abaelard refers not to the definition which he apparently quotes from Aristotle but rather to the definition given by Boethius in *De Syllogismo Categorico* II (PL 64, 821A 7 - 822C 12).

(5) Hermann Weidemann, 'Zur Semantik der Modalbegriffe bei Peter Abaelard', in: *Medioevo* 7 (1981), 1-40, argues that Abaelard thinks of possibility in this way but he does so very much the hard way by attempting to show that Abaelard's remarks on temporally determined modal sentences commit

him to it. Here I take the very much easier course of pointing out Abaelard's explicit statement of the theory of synchronous possibility in terms of alternative world histories.

24. Martin Christopher J. The Role of Categories in the Development of Abelard's Theory of Possibility. In *La tradition médiévale des Catégories (XII-XV siècles)*. Edited by Biard Joël and Rosier-Catach Irène. Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters 2003. pp. 225-242
Actes du XIII Symposium européen de logique et sémantique médiévales (Avignon, 6-10 juin 2000).
25. Martin Christopher J. Logic. In *The Cambridge Companion to Abelard*. Edited by Brower Jeffrey E. and Guilfooy Kevin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004. pp. 158-199
"A great deal of Peter Abelard's writing is concerned with what he regarded as logic, but which we would now classify as ontology or philosophical semantics. Following Cicero and Boethius, Abelard holds that properly speaking the study of logic has to do with the discovery and evaluation of arguments (*LI Isag.* 3.10). A necessary preliminary for this is an examination of the issues dealt with by Porphyry in the *Isagoge* and by Aristotle in the *Categories*, and *De interpretatione* (*LI Cat.* 113.26-114.30). In the present chapter, however, I will ignore most of this material and concentrate on the central issue of logical theory both for Abelard and for us, that is, on the nature of the relation of consequence, or following. Even with this limitation there is a great deal of ground to cover. Abelard sets out his theory of entailment and argument in two very extended and dense discussions both of which have suffered considerable textual corruption. The treatment of topics and hypothetical syllogisms in the *Dialectica*, is apparently the earlier. The other is the surviving fragment of Abelard's commentary on Boethius's *De topicis differentiis*, *Glossae super De topicis differentiis*, which seems to belong with his other commentaries on the works of the *logica vetus* published as the *Logica "ingredientibus"*. The two expositions disagree on some crucial questions, but here I will restrict myself almost entirely to the discussion in the *Dialectica*."
26. Martin Christopher J., "Denying Conditionals: Abaelard and the Failure of Boethius' Account of the Hypothetical Syllogism," *Vivarium* 45: 153-168 (2007).
27. Martin Christopher J. Imposition and Essence: What's New in Abaelard' Theory of Meaning? In *The Word in Medieval Logic, Theology and Psychology. Acts of the XIIIth International Colloquium of the Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, Kyoto, 27 September - 1 October 2005*. Edited by Shimizu Tetsuro and Burnett Charles. Turnhout: Brepols 2009. pp. 173-212
28. McLaughlin Mary Martin. Abelard's Conceptions of the Liberal Arts and Philosophy. In *Arts libéraux et philosophie au Moyen Age*. Paris: Vrin 1969. pp. 523-530
29. Meinhardt Helmut. Die Philosophie des Peter Abaelard. In *Die Renaissance der Wissenschaften im 12. Jahrhundert*. Edited by Weimar Peter. Zürich: Artemis Verlag 1981. pp. 107-121

30. Mews Constant J., "A Neglected Gloss on the *Isagoge* by Peter Abelard," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 31: 35-55 (1984).
Reprinted as Essay II in: Constant J. Mews, *Abelard and his Legacy*.
"The authorship is examined of the anonymous "Glossae secundum vocales" on the "Isagoge" of Porphyry in m s Milan, Bibl. Ambrosiana m63 sup. ff. 73-81v along side known glosses of Abelard ("Logica ingredientibus"). Geyer's attribution of the work of a pupil is questioned. It is shown to contain a recension of Abelard's glosses on Porphyry transitional between "Ingredientibus" and "Nostrorum petitioni". Its discussion of identity and difference influences that of the "Theologia summi boni". "
31. Mews Constant J., "On Dating the Works of Peter Abelard," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 60: 73-134 (1986).
Reprinted as Essay VII in: Constant J. Mews, *Abelard and his Legacy*.
32. Mews Constant J., "The *Sententiae* of Peter Abelard," *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 52: 130-183 (1986).
Reprinted as Essay VI in: Constant J. Mews, *Abelard and his Legacy*.
33. Mews Constant J. Aspects of the Evolution of Peter Abaelard's Thought on Signification and Predication. In *Gilbert de Poitiers et ses Contemporains. Aux Origines de la 'Logica Modernorum'*. Edited by Jolivet Jean and Libera Alain de. Napoli: Biblioplis 1987. pp. 15-41
Actes du septième Symposium Européen d'histoire de la logique et de la sémantique médiévales, Poitiers, 17-22 Juin 1985.
Reprinted as Essay VIII in: Constant J. Mews, *Abelard and his Legacy*,
34. Mews Constant J. and Jolivet Jean. Peter Abelard and His Influence. In *Contemporary Philosophy. Vol. 6.1: Philosophy and Science in the Middle Ages*. Edited by Guttorm Floistad. Amsterdam: Kluwer 1990. pp. 105-140
"This chronicle is based on one prepared by Jean Jolivet, reviewing literature on Abelard up to 1972; I have updated it to take into account publications which have appeared 1972-1985" (p. 105).
35. Mews Constant J., "Nominalism and Theology before Abaelard: New Light on Roscelin of Compiègne," *Vivarium* 30: 4-33 (1992).
Reprinted as Essay VII in: C. J. Mews, *Reason and Belief in the Age of Roscelin and Abelard*.
36. Mews Constant J. Philosophy and Theology 1100-1150: The Search for Harmony. In *Le XIIIe siècle: Mutations et renouveau en France dans la première moitié du XIIIe siècle*. Edited by Gasparri Françoise. Paris: Léopard d'Or 1994. pp. 159-203
Reprinted as Essay II in: C. J. Mews, *Reason and Belief in the Age of Roscelin and Abelard*.
See in particular: *William of Champeaux and Peter Abelard* pp. 168-173.
37. Mews Constant J. Peter Abelard. In *Authors of the Middle Ages. Vol. II n° 5-6*. Edited by Geary Patrick J. Aldershot: Ashgate 1995. pp. 1-88
38. Mews Constant J. *Abelard and his Legacy*. Aldershot: Ashgate 2001.
Contents: I. The development of the *Theologia* of Peter Abelard; II. A neglected gloss on the *Isagoge* by Peter Abelard; III. Man's knowledge of God according to Peter Abelard; IV. The lists of heresies imputed to Peter Abelard; V. Peter Abelard's *Theologia Christiana* and *Theologia 'Scholarium'* re-examined; VI. The *Sententie* of Peter Abelard; VII. On dating the works of Peter Abelard; VIII. Aspects of the evolution of Peter Abaelard's thought on signification and predication; IX. Un lecteur de Jérôme au XIIe siècle: Pierre Abélard; X. Peter Abelard and the Enigma of *Dialogue*; Addenda; Indexes.
39. Mews Constant J. *Reason and Belief in the Age of Roscelin and Abelard*. Aldershot: Ashgate 2002.
40. Mews Constant J. Peter Abelard on Dialectic, Rhetoric, and the Principles of Argument. In *Rhetoric and Renewal in the Latin West 1100-1540. Essays in Honour of John O. Ward*. Edited by Mews Constant J., Nederman Cary J., and Thomson Rodney M. Turnhout: Brepols 2003. pp. 37-53
41. Mews Constant J. *Abelard and Heloise*. Oxford : Oxford University Press 2005.
See the following Chapters:
2. The early years: Roscelin of Compiègne and William of Champeaux pp-21-42
"This chapter examines Abelard's intellectual debt to both the vocalist theories of Roscelin of Compiègne and William of Champeaux's teaching about dialectic in shaping his philosophical nominalism. By looking at the earliest records of Abelard's teaching of dialectic and glosses on

Aristotle, Porphyry and Boethius, it observes how students identified him as an iconoclast teacher, who quickly provoked laughter by the examples that he chose. It traces how Abelard's early conflict with his teachers laid the foundation for the subsequent difficulties he would experience in his career."

3. Challenging the Tradition: the *Dialectica* pp. 43-57

"This chapter examines Abelard's *Dialectica*, his first major treatise on dialectic. The treatise is structured around an analysis both of the major parts of speech, categories and of different kinds of argument, categorical and hypothetical. It argues that a driving theme is Abelard's desire to counter the philosophically realist arguments presented by William of Champeaux."

5. Returning to *Logica* pp. 81-100

"This chapter examines the *Logica 'Ingredientibus'*, a series of commentaries on Porphyry, Aristotle, and Boethius more profound than any of his earlier glosses. I argue that in these commentaries Abelard adopts a much more profound theory of universals and of other parts of speech than in the *Dialectica*. Rather than emphasizing differences of opinion with William of Champeaux, they demonstrate how far Abelard had come to distance himself from the arguments of Boethius. Instead of speaking uniquely about dialectic, he is now interested in *logica*, the arts of language in general."

42. Moonan Lawrence, "Abelard's Use of the *Timaeus*," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 56: 7-90 (1989).
43. Nicolau d'Olwer Lluís, "Sur la date de la *Dialectica* d'Abélard," *Revue du Moyen Âge Latin* 1: 375-390 (1945).
44. Normore Calvin G., "Abelard and the School of the *Nominales*," *Vivarium* 30: 80-96 (1992).
45. Nuchelmans Gabriel. *Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity*. Amsterdam: North-Holland 1973.
 "This is the first part of a history of those problems and theories in the domain of philosophical semantics which nowadays are commonly referred to as problems and theories about the nature and the status of propositions."
 See in particular chapter 9.
46. Panaccio Claude. Le Nominalisme au XIIe siècle. In *Signs and signification. Vol. I*. Edited by Gill Harjeet Singh and Manetti Giovanni. New Delhi: Bahri Publications 1999. pp. 17-33
47. Pinzani Roberto, "*Homerus est poeta - An non*. Questioni di presupposizione esistenziale nella logica di Abelardo," *Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia. Università di Bologna* 4: 87-96 (1983).
48. Pinzani Roberto. Le "propositiones coniunctae temporales" nel *De Ypoteticis* di Abelardo. In *Atti del convegno internazionale di storia della logica*. Edited by Abrusci Michele, Casari Ettore, and Mugnai Massimo. Bologna: CLUEB 1983. pp. 253-257
49. Pinzani Roberto, "Temi filosofici nella logica di Abelardo," *Annali di Discipline Filosofiche dell'Università di Bologna* 8: 165-188 (1986).
50. Pinzani Roberto. Un approccio semantico alla dialettica di Abelardo. In *Le teorie delle modalità. Atti del Convegno internazionale di storia della logica*. Edited by Corsi Giovanni, Mangione Corrado, and Mugnai Massimo. Bologna: CLUEB 1989. pp. 265-270
51. Pinzani Roberto, "Oggetto e significato nella dialettica di Abelardo," *Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale* 17: 125-138 (1991).
52. Pinzani Roberto. *La grammatica logica di Abelardo*. Parma: Università degli Studi di Parma 1992.
53. Pinzani Roberto, "Linguaggio e teoria in Abelardo," *Philo-Logica* 1: 79-94 (1992).
54. Pinzani Roberto, "La sintassi logica di Abelardo," *Philo-Logica* 2-3: 91-112 (1993).
55. Pinzani Roberto. *The Logical Grammar of Abelard*. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2003.
56. Reiners Jos. *Der Nominalismus in der Frühscholastik. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Universalienfrage im Mittelalter; nebst einer neuen Textausgabe des Briefes Roscelins an Abälard*. Ascshendorff: Münster 1910.
57. Rijk Lambertus Marie de. La signification de la proposition (*dictum propositionis*) chez Abélard. In *Pierre Abélard - Pierre le Vénérable. Les courants philosophiques, littéraires et artistiques en Occident au milieu du XII siècle*. Edited by Jolivet Jean and René Louis. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique 1975. pp. 547-555
 Actes et mémoires du Colloque International, Abbaye de Cluny, 2 au 9 juillet 1972.
 Published also in: *Studia Mediewistyczne* 16, 1975 pp. 155-161.

Reprinted as chapter IV in: L. M. de Rijk - *Through language to reality: studies in medieval semantics and metaphysics* - Edited by Bos Egbert. Northampton: Variorum Reprints 1989.

"Cette communication se borne a un bref examen de la signification de la phrase complète (*propositio*) dans la logique de Pierre Abélard.

Il paraît utile de commencer par la définition du verbe signifier (*significare*) chez ce logicien.

'signifier' dit des mots (*dictiones*) c'est produire une intellection dans l'âme de l'auditeur (*Logica ingredientibus* 307, 30 ss.), tandis que le même verbe est également appliqué à la dénotation des choses extérieures (*ibid.*); dans ce dernier sens, le verbe est synonyme de *appellare, nominare, demonstrare, designare*.

'signifier' dit des phrases complètes (*propositiones*) c'est produire une intellection laquelle est formée par la liaison des intellections de ses parties (*dictiones*)." p. 547

"On peut conclure que selon Abélard le *dictum* n'est pas un objet qui serait indépendant de la pensée, mais plutôt le contenu de la pensée, c'est-à-dire une *intellection objectivée*, qui correspond soit à un état de choses réel, soit à un état de choses seulement possible (*Dial. II, 205, 28-30: id dicimus quod id quod dicit hec propositio 'Socrates est homo', est unum de his que natura patitur esse*), soit un état de choses tout à fait impossible (*Dial. II, 158, 7-9: la proposition 'Socrates est lapis' ne reflète pas une inherentia de Socrate et de pierre, ni 'Socrates non est lapis' leur rémotion*). (...)

Ainsi, l'existence qu'établit la proposition en parlant, n'est pas une existence réelle, mais, pourrait-on dire, une existence *parlée*, ou plutôt, une existence *pensée* ou *logique*.

Employant la distinction bien connue du XIV siècle (présentée notamment par Jacques d'Ascoli, Thomas d'York, Pierre Thomae):

res: 1) extra animam (chose extérieure); 2) in anima: a) subjective (= acte de l'intellection comme tel) b) objective (*contenu* de l'intellection).

on peut dire qu'Abélard a essayé, à sa façon, de montrer que le *dictum*, de la proposition, loin d'être une chose extérieure (*res extra animam*) est une chose qui doit son existence à l'âme ou à l'intellection (*res in anima*), mais qu'il faut en même temps bien le distinguer de l'acte de l'intellection pris comme tel (*res in anima subjective*), et reconnaître, sa propre identité dans le *contenu objectif* de l'intellection. Par là, le *dictum* du grand logicien du XII siècle semble être d'une nature logique par excellence." pp. 554-555. (notes omitted)

58. Rijk Lambertus Marie de. Peter Abälard (1079-1142), Meister und Opfer des Scharfsinns. In *Petrus Abaelardus, 1079-1142. Person, Werk und Wirkung*. Edited by Thomas Rudolf. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag 1980. pp. 125-138

Conference at the Trierer Theologischen Fakultät in Trier (18 April 1979).

Reprinted as chapter II in: L. M. de Rijk - *Through language to reality: studies in medieval semantics and metaphysics* - Edited by Bos Egbert. Northampton: Variorum Reprints 1989.

59. Rijk Lambertus Marie de. The Semantical Impact of Abailard's Solution of the Problem of Universals. In *Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142). Person, Werk und Wirkung*. Edited by Thomas Rudolf. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag 1980. pp. 139-151

Reprinted as chapter III in: L. M. de Rijk, *Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics*, Edited by Bos Egbert, Northampton: Variorum Reprints 1989.

60. Rijk Lambertus Marie de. Abailard's Semantic Views in the Light of Later Developments. In *English Logic and Semantics from the End of the 12th Century to the Time of Ockham and Burleigh*. Edited by Braakhuis Henk A.G., Kneepkens Corneille Henri, and Rijk Lambertus Marie de. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1981. pp. 1-58

Acts of the 4th European Symposium of medieval logic and semantics. Leiden-Nijmegen, 23-27 April 1979.

Reprinted as chapter VI in: L. M. de Rijk, *Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics*, Edited by Bos Egbert, Northampton: Variorum Reprints 1989.

61. Rijk Lambertus Marie de, "Martin M. Tweedale on Abailard: Some Criticisms of a Fascinating Venture," *Vivarium* 23: 81-97 (1985).

"Mr. Tweedale's study is bound to give any of his readers the firm impression that, as logician, Peter Abailard has accomplished a tremendous achievement. Unfortunately, however, Tweedale, (...) is on the wrong track in claiming-throughout his study that the modern interpreter has to 'ferret'

Abailard's answers out of 'rather obscure passages' (p. 7), and that he is inconsistent (p. X and *passim*). Tweedale has failed to appreciate Abailard's lucidity and clear language. He has missed the point several times and more than once this is due to his defective knowledge of Latin. However, let me not move too hurriedly to my conclusion.

In writing this book, the author had two main objectives in mind, as we learn from the *Preface*. First, 'to present in a form easily accessible to professional philosophers, theologians and historians those scattered portions of Abailard's logical writings which seem to record a very original scrutiny of the foundations of logic and in particular the problem of universals'. Secondly, 'to interpret the texts in a way that would connect them with the ancient tradition and also make them intelligible to contemporary philosophers.' So chapters I and II try to give an insight into the classical and post-classical background. The core of the essay is to be found in Chapters III-V; Chapter VI contains a comparison between Abailard and Frege.

Without doubt, the author has succeeded in enlarging the modern scholar's acquaintance with, and admiration of, Abailard as a logician and early Medieval philosopher and theologian. Even someone who has had only a glimpse of the contents of this rich essay, cannot help experiencing a kind of thrill on realising that he is meeting in Peter Abailard a remarkable and original thinker.

However, to write a successful book something more is needed. To my mind the author was heavily hampered in realising the two objectives he had set himself, as a result of his poor knowledge of (both classical and Medieval) Latin grammar and syntax. Sometimes his judgment of Abailard's achievements is incorrect, for no other reason than his inability to correctly read Abailard's concise language." pp. 81-82

62. Rijk Lambertus Marie de, "Peter Abelard's Semantics and His Doctrine of Being," *Vivarium* 24: 85-127 (1986).
63. Rijk Lambertus Marie de. Peter Abelard (1079-1142). In *Philosophy of language/Sprachphilosophie/La philosophie du langage. Eine internationale Handbuch zeitgenössischer Forschung*. Edited by Dascal Marcelo et al. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1992. pp. 290-296
First volume
64. Rijk Lambertus Marie de. The Logic of Indefinite Names in Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, and Radulphus Brito. In *Aristotle's Peri hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages. Essays on the Commentary Tradition*. Edited by Braakhuis Henk A.G. and Kneepkens Corneille Henri. Groningen: Ingenium Publishers 2003. pp. 207-233
65. Rosier-Catach Irène. La notion de *translatio*, le principe de compositionnalité et l'analyse de la prédication accidentelle chez Abélard. In *Langage, sciences, philosophie au XIIIe siècle*. Edited by Biard Joël. Paris: Vrin 1999. pp. 125-164
66. Rosier-Catach Irène, "La sémantique d'Abélard en contexte (1) : la notion de 'translatio'," *Annuaire de l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (Section des Sciences Religieuses)* 107: 361-367 (2000).
67. Rosier-Catach Irène, "La sémantique d'Abélard en contexte (2) : sur le verbe substantif et la prédication," *Annuaire de l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (Section des Sciences Religieuses)* 108: 361-367 (2001).
68. Rosier-Catach Irène. Abelard and the Meaning of the Propositions. In *Signification in Language and Culture*. Edited by Gill Harjeet Singh. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study 2002. pp. 23-49
Acts of the colloquium held at Shimla, India, October 2001.
69. Rosier-Catach Irène. Abélard et les grammairiens: sur la définition du verbe et la notion d'inhérence. In *La tradition vive. Mélanges d'histoire des textes en l'honneur de Louis Holtz*. Edited by Lardet Pierre. Turnhout: Brepols 2003. pp. 143-159
70. Rosier-Catach Irène, "Abélard et les grammairiens: sur le verbe substantif et la prédication," *Vivarium* 41: 175-248 (2003).
71. Rosier-Catach Irène, "Priscien, Boèce, les *Glosulae in Priscianum*, Abélard: les enjeux des discussions autour de la notion de consignification," *Histoire Épistémologie Langage* 25: 55-84 (2003).

"The term syncategorema, translated by consignificantia, only exists in Greek in the Latin Institutiones of the grammarian Priscien, and is introduced in the XIIth century in the grammatical

commentaries, the couple of terms syncategorema / categorema emerging even later, at the end of the XIIth century. Thus the discussions first focus on the terms connected to consignificare. The antique heritage is multiple and diversified. Priscien uses, in a contradictory way, a functional criterium (a part which is not one of the main parts of speech is consignifying), a semantic criterium (to be a part of speech is to indicate a concept of the mind), a criterium of autonomous meaning (something is said to consignify if it does not signify by itself). Boethius uses the notion in five different ways, applying to various terms or morphemes: prepositions and conjunctions, parts of a compound, tense, the verb to be, quantifiers. The *Glosulae* on Priscian, at the end of the XIth century, and especially in the later revision by William of Champeaux, claim that the consignifying parts signify the thing signified by the word to which they are attached. Abelard, reading those gloses, hesitates: the grammarian's solution is not satisfactory, but if, as Boethius wants it, the consignifying parts did not have any meaning, then it would not be possible to explain the semantic role they have in the intellection of the whole proposition. He will thus devise a really innovative solution, which he applies first to the copula and then extends to the other consignifying parts: they correspond to a mental act."

72. Rosier-Catach Irène. Variations médiévales sur l'opposition entre signification "ad placitum" et signification naturelle. In *Aristotle's Peri hermeneias in the Latin middle ages. Essays on the commentary tradition*. Edited by Braakhuis Henk A.G. and Kneepkens Corneille Henri. Groningen: Ingenium Publishers 2003. pp. 165-205

73. Rosier-Catach Irène. Les discussions sur le signifié des propositions chez Abélard et ses contemporains. In *Medieval theories on assertive and non-assertive language*. Edited by Maierù Alfonso and Valente Luisa. Firenze: Olschki 2004. pp. 1-34
Acts of the 14th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics - Rome, June 11-15, 2002

74. Rosier-Catach Irène, "Priscian on Divine Ideas and Mental Conceptions: the Discussions in the *Glosulae in Priscianum*, the *Notae Dunelmenses*, William of Champeaux and Abelard," *Vivarium* 45: 219-237 (2007).

"Priscian's *Institutiones Grammaticae*, which rely on Stoic and Neoplatonic sources, constituted an important, although quite neglected, link in the chain of transmission of ancient philosophy in the Middle Ages. There is, in particular, a passage where Priscian discusses the vexed claim that common names can be proper names of the universal species and where he talks about the ideas existing in the divine mind. At the beginning of the 12th century, the anonymous *Glosulae super Priscianum* and the *Notae Dunelmenses*, which heavily quote William of Champeaux (as master G.), interpret the passage in the context of a growing interest in the problem of universals, raising semantic as well as ontological questions, and introducing a Platonic view on universals in the discussions on the signification of the noun. Moreover, this same passage will be used by Abelard to elaborate one of his opinions about the signification of universal or common names-that they signify "mental conceptions".

75. Schüssler Ursula, "Das Verhältnis der Dialektik Peter Abaelards zur modernen Logik," *Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch* 9: 39-47 (1973).

76. Seuren Pieter Albertus Maria. *Language in Cognition*. New York: Oxford University Press 2009. Volume I of *Language from Within*.

Summary of the two volumes: "Volume I begins by setting up certain central principles of the natural ontology according to which humans develop a theory of the actual world with the help of nonactual, thought-up 'worlds' or, better, situations. It then presents a view of how language expresses thoughts developed in terms of this natural ontology, with an emphasis on the mechanism of reference not only to extensional, actually existing objects but also to intensional, thought-up objects. An important aspect, elaborated in Chapter 4, is the fact that human communication does not, as is usually thought, consist in the transfer of propositionally structured information, but, rather, in a socially binding form of position-taking with respect to such information.

We then go on to a discussion of the general semantic aspects of language in the context of the total ecological 'architecture' of language, mind, and world.

This leads to a cursory tour of lexical meaning and of the ways lexical meanings are structured so as to make linguistic utterances fit into given contexts or discourses.

Concentrating again on propositional content, basic principles of logic are introduced in Volume II,

although not in the traditional fashion. A new and unconventional view of logic is developed there, in which the logical constants are treated as lexical items, in fact as lexical predicates, with the special property that their meanings allow for the computation of entailments. It is argued that this reduction of logic to lexical meaning shows better than anything else the relevance of logic and logical analysis for the study of linguistic meaning. This point of view is reinforced in Chapter 10 of Volume II, where it is shown that presuppositions are a general semantic property of lexical predicates and where it is argued that a proper theory of presuppositions requires a trivalent presuppositional logic. We then concentrate, in Chapter 3 of Volume II, on a reconstruction of the natural logic which nature may be taken to have instilled into human cognition.

This reconstructed logic is then placed in a historical perspective, which shows that basic natural predicate logic is, in fact, largely but not entirely identical with the logic proposed and defended by the Edinburgh philosopher William Hamilton in the nineteenth century. Aristotelian predicate logic is dissected in Chapter 5 of Volume II and reconstructed on the basis of Aristotle's own texts, whereby it is found that Aristotle was not guilty of the logical error of undue existential import but left his logic incomplete. It is also found that the twelfth-century French philosopher Abelard completed Aristotelian predicate calculus in Aristotle's spirit, avoiding undue existential import in a way that leads to a logically sound system that is more powerful than standard modern predicate logic.

Chapter 4 of Volume II shows that traditional predicate logic, with its undue existential import, has maximal logical power, in stark contrast to standard modern predicate logic, which has hardly any logical power left. It also shows that the logically sound Abelardian system of predicate logic has much greater logical power than standard modern predicate calculus, while still staying within the bounds of a strictly extensional ontology - a fact which raises questions regarding the status of standard modern predicate calculus in mathematics and mathematical logic.

In Chapter 6 of Volume II it is shown that traditional predicate logic is also much more functional from the point of view of transmitting information than its standard modern counterpart. The fact that, as a matter of principle, linguistic utterances need anchoring in context before they can be keyed to a given situation and the objects in it, is first discussed in Chapter 3, in the context of Aristotle's concept of proposition.

Chapters 7 to 9 of Volume II are devoted to a further theoretical elaboration of the context-sensitivity of natural-language sentences and utterances. The notion of presupposition is central in this respect. Chapter 10 of Volume II is devoted to the logical aspects of the context-sensitivity of language. A presuppositional logic is developed for both the propositional operators and the universal and existential quantifiers. In this logic, a distinction is made between, on the one hand, a default, discourse-restricted area of metalogical relations, which is taken to have some degree of psychological reality, and a purely theoretical area which has no psychological reality but is presented merely to show the character and properties of the logic involved." (pp. 7-8).

77. Seuren Pieter Albertus Maria. *The Logic of Language*. New York: Oxford University Press 2010. Volume II of *Language from Within*.
78. Shimizu Tetsuro, "From Vocalism to Nominalism: Progression in Abaelard's Theory of Signification," *Didascalía* 1: 15-46 (1995).
79. Shimizu Tetsuro. Words and Concepts in Anselm et Abelard. In *Langage, sciences, philosophie au XIIIe siècle*. Edited by Biard Joël. Paris: Vrin 1999. pp. 177-197
80. Shimizu Tetsuro. The Place of *Intellectus* in the Theory of Signification by Abelard and *Ars Meliduna*. In *Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale / Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy / Intelecto e imaginação na filosofia medieval / Actes du XIe Congrès international de philosophie médiévale de la Société internationale pour l'Étude de la philosophie médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.),: Porto, du 26 au 31 août 2002*. Edited by Pacheco Maria Cândida and Meirinhos José F. Turnhout: Brepols 2006. pp. 927-939

"The main concern of the present paper is with some theories of *significatio* in the 12th century, and how *intellectus* and *imaginatio* play a role in them, but not in others. In the present paper, I shall restrict my attention to Abelard and *Ars meliduna*, hoping to contrast them.

ABELARD'S THEORY OF SIGNIFICATION

As for Abelard's theory, I will make some comments concerning the present subject, with a summary of the conclusions that I have described elsewhere (1). In *Glosse super Porphyrium*

("Ingredientibus"), Abelard's theory of signification bound up with his explanation and revision of the vocalist theory of a universal. He starts with the definition of the universal, which involves the idea of *impositio* and *nominatio*, and so far the theory contains the name-things relationship only. Abelard, however, also shows its difficulties, by raising the two cardinal aspects of signification: the first concerns *nominatio*, or *significatio* in the broader sense, while the second, the *intellectus* that a name produces in the hearer, and this act of a name is *significatio* in the strict sense. Then he tries to solve the difficulties and presents his revision of the theory regarding each of the two aspects (2)." (p. 927)

(...)

CONCLUSION

In sum, we can contrast Abelard and the *Ars meliduna* as for how *intellectus* are treated with reference to signification. For both of them, a *status* is some thing or some fact in the world, independent of *intellectus*, though it might be an object of *intellectus*, but by no means a mental entity. This is the only point on which both will agree. To begin with, they oppose each other as for what is the *status*. For Abelard, *status* is *causa impositionis*, while for the *Ars meliduna*, it is the object of signification. On the contrary, *intellectus* is the object of signification for Abelard, while it is the *causa impositionis* for the *Ars meliduna*. Abelard thinks of *intellectus* from the hearer's point of view basing himself on Aristotle's *De interpretatione*, so that he attends to the act of producing *intellectus* in the hearer, while the *Ars meliduna* thinks of *intellectus* from the speaker's point of view, basing itself on Priscian's grammar, so that it attends to the vocal words as revealing the speaker's *intellectus*. Thus the *Ars meliduna* insists on the reverse of what Abelard insisted on." (p. 939).

(1) Shimizu, T., From Vocalism to Nominalism: Progression in Abaelard's Theory of Signification, *Didascalica*, 1,15-46.

(2) Abaelardus, *Glossae super Porphyrium*, hrsg. von Geyer, B., *Peter Abaelards philosophische Schriften* I,1933: 16, 25-30; 18,4-19,20.

81. Shimizu Tetsuro. Word and *Esse* in Anselm and Abelard. In *Anselm and Abelard. Investigations and juxtapositions*. Edited by Gasper Giles E.M. and Kohlenberger Helmut. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 2006. pp. 179-195

"The medieval controversy about the nature of universals was about nothing other than the relationship between word and thing. In order to understand the history and essence of the controversy, it is most important to examine the thoughts of the two key figures: Anselm and Abelard, respectively the revered authority among the realists (*reales*), and the founder of the nominalists (*nominales*). Though there certainly lies a crucial divergence in their views, nevertheless Abelard, as well as contemporary realists, owes many of his ideas, conceptions and terms to Anselm. Having examined elsewhere their views on the relationship between word and concept, I would like to examine here those on the relationship between word and the world. Through this examination I shall show how Anselm's metaphysical investigation about God's locution was transformed into Abelard's logical one about human words.

In the following, I shall first examine Anselm's theory of God's locution, showing how he explains it in terms of human language and in its relationship with created things, by examining some passages from his *Monologion* and *De grammatico*.

Secondly, I shall focus my attention on Abelard's corresponding theories in his two commentaries on Porphyry, *Glosse 'ingredientibus'* and *Glossule 'nostrorum petitioni sociorum'*." p. 179

"Conclusion. The terms and concepts that Anselm proposed in his meditation on God's locution as the origin of created things constitute a common vocabulary for the controversy about universals. Even Abelard, the founder of nominalism, when refuting the realists, uses these terms and concepts to differentiate himself from them. Such terms, among others, are *essentia*, *esse hominem*, and *status hominis*, which is Abelard's substitute for Anselm's *esse hominis*. Again, Anselm's idea of *significatio* as an act of producing understanding in the hearer becomes the main idea in Abelard's semantics. We can, however, recognize elements of discrepancy between them as well as these

examples of agreement. Abelard excludes *essentia* from his theory of universals, separating it from *esse hominem*, and shifts the idea of *esse hominis* to the one of *status hominis*. Again, Anselm's *intellectus* produced by a word is the understanding by which an *essentia*, or something's *esse*, is understood, and the latter is based on the *principalis essentia* in God, while Abelard's is separated from *essentia* and even from the facts in reality (*status*), in his later theory, though connected in his earlier one. It seems that Abelard cultivates a new realm of conceptions independent of things' *essentia*; this realm is properly for human beings, not for God, the creator. In this sense, 'Deus homo' happened between Anselm and Abelard." p. 195

82. Spruyt Joke. The Semantics of Complex Espressions in John Duns Scotus, Peter Abelard and John Buridan. In *Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages. Essays on the Commentary Tradition*. Edited by Braakhuis Henk A.G. and Kneepkens Corneille Henri. Turnhout: Brepols 2003. pp. 275-303
83. Strub Christian. *Propositio una / multiplex* in Abelard: A Note on the Relationship of Dialectic and Grammar. In *Aristotle's Peri hermeneias in the Latin middle ages. Essays on the Commentary Tradition*. Edited by Braakhuis Henk A.G. and Kneepkens Corneille Henri. Turnhout: Brepols 2003. pp. 257-273
84. Stump Eleonore. Logic in the Early Twelfth century. In *Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy*. Edited by Kretzmann Norman. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1988. pp. 31-55
 "A radical change took place in the treatment of logic in general and of dialectical topics in particular in the Twelfth century. In this paper I try to shed some light on the nature of that change by looking at discussions of dialectic in a particular group of Twelfth-century treatises. On the basis of that analysis I make some suggestions about Abelard's influence on and originality in the developments of logic in the Twelfth century."
85. Stump Eleonore. *Dialectic and Its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1989.
 Chapter 5: *Abelard on the Topics* (pp. 89-109) and Chapter 6: *Logic in the Early Twelfth Century* (pp. 111-133).
86. Sweeney Eileen C. *Logic, Theology, and Poetry in Boethius, Abelard, and Alan of Lille. Words in the Absence of Things*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2006.
 Chapter 2: *Abelard: a Twelfth-Century Hermeneutics of Suspicion* pp. 63-126.
 "If Boethius's goal in his logical commentaries is to distinguish in order to unite, Abelard's goal seems simply to distinguish. Boethius's construction of a narrative from Aristotle's cryptic remarks in the *Peri hermeneias* is one Abelard follows carefully and also criticizes, finding Boethius's connections more a confusion than a synthesis of the elements in Aristotle's text. He argues that Boethius constructs a unity that is inauthentic, which asserts a happy ending, a union between language, understanding, and the world that is not quite achievable. His own corpus of commentaries breaks down this narrative to consider its parts much more carefully. Abelard's perception of gaps in Boethius's narrative and his desire to take it apart is signaled in many ways. It comes across at a general and formal level in his account of the relationship between the *Categories* and *Peri hermeneias* in his later glosses on Porphyry (known as the *Logica nostrorum petitioni sociorum*). In these later glosses, he argues that Aristotle's two works are not two pieces of a single narrative, an account of words leading to one of sentences, as Boethius claims (and as was a tradition Abelard himself Follows in his earlier glosses), but the separate consideration of words insofar as they signify things (the *Categories*) and words insofar as they signify *intellectus* (the *Peri hermeneias*) (LNPS 508. 32-37). Beginning with this division, then, I would like to consider Abelard's account of the distinction between words and things in the earlier *Glosses on Porphyry* and the later gloss on Porphyry, and between words and understanding in the *Commentary on the Peri hermeneias*. (10) I will attempt to examine the kind of a narrative Abelard constructs, insofar as he constructs any, of the processes of abstraction and sentence construction." (pp. 66-67)

(10) See Constant Mews, "On Dating the Works of Peter Abelard," ADHLMA 52 (1985): 73-134; Marenbon, *Peter Abelard*, pp. 40-53; and L. M. de Rijk, "Peter Abelard's Semantics and His Doctrine of Being," *Vivarium* 24, 2 (1986): 103-108. It is widely agreed that the *Glosses on*

Porphyry and Commentary on the Peri hermeneias, both part of the *Logica ingredientibus*, are earlier (1118-20) than the later glosses on Porphyry (here: *LNPS*) and *De intellectibus* (from the mid-1120s).

87. Swinarski John, "Theories of Supposition in Medieval Logic. Their Origin and Their Development from Abelard to Ockham", State University of New York at Buffalo, 1971.
Ph.D. dissertation available at ProQuest Dissertation Express.
88. Thom Paul. La logique abélardienne des modales *de rebus*. In *Pierre Abelard. Colloque international de Nantes*. Edited by Jolivet Jean and Habrias Henri. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes 2003. pp. 321-338
Conférence internationale "Pierre Abélard, à l'aube des universités" 3-4 octobre 2001 Nantes
89. Thom Paul. *Medieval Modal Systems. Problems and Concepts*. Aldershot: Ashgate 2006.
Chapter 3: Abélard pp. 43-64
90. Thompson Augustine, "The Debate on Universals before Peter Abelard," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 33: 409-429 (1995).
91. Tweedale Martin, "Abailard and Non-Things," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 5: 329-342 (1967).
"I explain how Abailard thinks he can justify saying that certain items, particularly what is said by a sentence, are not things. His grounds are that they are never referred to by any noun. He holds that nominalizations of sentences and of verbs, which appear to be nouns with such a reference, are not logically speaking nouns, and sentences which have a nominalization for a grammatical subject do not have any logical subject."
92. Tweedale Martin. *Abailard on Universals*. Amsterdam: North-Holland 1976.
"This work shows how Abailard elaborated and defended the view that universals are words, avoided the pitfalls of an image theory of thinking, and propounded a theory of "status" and "dicta" as objects of thought without treating them as subjects of predication. His defense of these views is shown to depend on certain fundamental departures from the Aristotelian term logic of his day, including a proposal for subjectless propositions, the treatment of copula plus predicate noun as equivalent to a simple verb, and a transformation of the 'is' of existence into the 'is' of predication."
93. Tweedale Martin, "Abailard and Ockham: Contrasting Ddefences of Nominalism," *Theoria* 46: 106-122 (1980).
"Although both Ockham and Abailard admit that science is of necessary truths and is about what is common to many rather than concrete particulars, Ockham claims knowledge has genuine objects, namely mental signs, while Abailard denies that knowledge has genuine objects. Ockham's position, it turns out, cannot do justice to the objectivity of science and is in difficulties when it comes to explaining how we know these mental signs. Neither problem afflicts Abailard's view."
94. Tweedale Martin. Abelard and the Culmination of the Old Logic. In *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100-1600*. Edited by Kretzmann Norman, Kenny Anthony, and Pinborg Jan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982. pp. 143-157
95. Tweedale Martin, "Reply to Professor de Rijk's "Martin M. Tweedale on Abailard: some criticisms of a fascinating venture", " *Vivarium* 25: 3-22 (1987).
"I reply to professor de Rijk's criticisms of my book "Abailard on universals". First I admit serious errors in some of my translations and offering some revisions of those. Second, I defend some of my other translations as well as my interpretation of what Abailard intends by "'essentia'" and my contention that Abailard's doctrine on universals is not a form of conceptualism."
96. Tweedale Martin. Logic (I): from the Late Eleventh Century to the Time of Abelard. In *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy*. Edited by Dronke Peter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992. pp. 196-226
97. Urbani Ulivi Lucia. *La psicologia di Abelardo e il "Tractatus de intellectibus"*. Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura 1976.
Indice: Prefazione di Sofia Vanni Rovighi 7; Introduzione 11; I. *Sensus e imaginatio* 21; II. *Existimatio, scientia, ratio* 33; III. Gli *intellectus* e le loro distinzioni 45; IV. Altri tipi di *Intellectus* 69; V. *Sermo e significatio* 85; XConclusionione 95; *Tractatus de intellectibus* [testo latino] 101; Bibliografia 129-137.

98. Vanni Rovighi Sofia. Intentionnel et universel chez Abélard. In *Abélard: Le 'Dialogue'. La philosophie de la logique. Actes du Colloque de Neuchâtel, 16-17 novembre 1979*. Neuchâtel : Secrétariat de l'Université 1981. pp. 21-28
99. Vignaux Paul. Note sur le nominalisme d'Abélard. In *Pierre Abélard - Pierre le Vénérable. Les courants philosophiques, littéraires et artistiques en Occident au milieu du XII siècle*. Edited by Jolivet Jean and René Louis. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique 1975. pp. 523-527
100. Wade Francis C. Abelard and Individuality. In *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter: ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung. Vorträge des 2. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie, Köln, 31. August-6. September 1961*. Edited by Wilpert Paul. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1963. pp. 165-171
Miscellanea Mediaevalia, vol. II.
"Peter Abelard in his "Logica ingredientibus" proposed to solve the problems of genus and species which Porphyry had refused to answer in his introduction to the "Categories" of Aristotle. The thesis of this paper is that Abelard, in spite of his diligent enquiry, could not explain genus and species owing to his unanalyzed conception of an individual. Though Abelard failed in his inquiry, he did not fail philosophy, for he held firmly to the data: that existents are individuals, that we have universal knowledge, and that universal knowledge is valid knowledge."
101. Weidemann Hermann, "Zur Semantik der Modalbegriffe bei Peter Abaelard," *Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale* 7: 1-40 (1981).
102. Weidemann Hermann. Modalität und Konsequenz. Zur logischen Struktur eines theologischen Arguments in Peter Abaelards *Dialectica*. In *Argumentations-theorie. Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns*. Edited by Jacobi Klaus. Leiden: E. J. Brill 1993. pp. 695-706
103. Wenin Christian, "La signification des universaux chez Abélard," *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 80: 414-448 (1982).
"The text in which Abelard attempts to reply, before 1120, to the questions left open by Porphyry on the statute of genera and species furnished a reflection on the meaning of the universal term, understood since Aristotle as the possible predicate of a proposition true of several subjects taken individually. Abelard refuses all the kinds of realism which he knows. The universal word ("vox, simplex sermo") has, however, more than the physical aspect of an uttered sound; it has the three meanings of: the individual things to the extent that they resemble each other, the intellectual activity of man and the common conception with the aid of which it can function."
104. Wilks Ian, "The Logic of Abelard's *Dialectica*", University of Toronto, 1993.
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation in Philosophy.
105. Wilks Ian, "Peter Abelard and the Metaphysics of Essential Predication," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 36: 365-385 (1998).
106. Wilks Ian, "Abelard on Context and Signification," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 81: 189-208 (2007).
"Abelard maintains that individual words in a sentence represent distinct semantic units of its overall meaning. He employs two strategies to defend this position in the face of troublesome counterexamples. One strategy-the earlier of the two-sacrifices normal intuitions about what a word is, often labeling what seem to be words as non-signifying syllables. The later strategy invokes a rather fluid conception of what the signification of a word is, allowing this signification considerable latitude to alter under the contextual influence of other words. This evolution of strategy is linked to a new willingness on Abelard's part to adopt the principle of charity in interpreting sentences; this approach presumes the truth of the statement, and tries to find an interpretation which bears that presumption out. This new willingness to adopt the principle is in turn linked to Abelard's developing vocation as an interpreter of biblical texts."
107. Wilks Ian. Peter Abelard and His Contemporaries. In *Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic*. Edited by Gabbay Dov and Woods John. Amsterdam: Elsevier 2008. pp. 83-156
Handbook of the History of Logic, Vol. 2.
"It is standard practice to develop an account of categorical logic which starts with a discussion of words, and moves through categorical propositions to the categorical syllogisms themselves."

Abelard consciously adopts a parallel course for the logic of hypotheticals by beginning with a treatment of topics and hypothetical propositions. In general we can think of Abelard's development of material as falling along these two axes: discussion of words and categorical propositions leading to categorical syllogisms; and then discussion of topics and hypothetical propositions leading to hypothetical syllogisms. This way of organizing material is overtly embraced by Abelard in the *Dialectica*, in his attempt to depart from the commentary format. So it can be taken as representing his most basic intuitions on how the subject matter of logic should be organized. I will structure my discussion below accordingly. Part 1 deals with words, categorical propositions and categorical syllogisms. Part 2 deals with topics, hypothetical propositions and hypothetical syllogisms. These two parts complete the treatment of Abelard, and Part 3 turns to his contemporaries and their schools." (pp. 84-85).

108. Wöhler Hans-Ulrich, "Zur philosophischen Position des Nominalisten Petrus Abaelard. Aus Anlass seines 900. Geburtstag," *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 27: 673-683 (1979).

Last updated: Friday, November 25, 2011