

Annotated Bibliography on the Concept of Truth in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy

A) GENERAL STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH

1. *La vérité. Antiquité - Modernité*. Edited by Aenishanslin Jean-François, O'Meara Dominic, and Schüssler Ingeborg. Lausanne: Payot 2004.
2. *Die Geschichte des philosophischen Begriffs der Wahrheit*. Edited by Szaif Jan and Enders Markus. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2006.
3. Allen Barry. *Truth in philosophy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1993.
See in particular *Part One. Historical introduction 1. Classical philosophy of truth* pp. 9-28; 2. *Modern truth* pp. 29-37, for a brief sketch of the history of theories of truth.
"I begin with a historical introduction. What I call the classical philosophy of truth is an ensemble of four interdependent ideas in ancient philosophy (Greek and Christian) concerning truth's relation to nature, language, being, and the good. Together they define the historical discourse on truth I call onto-logic. The first principle of onto-logic is that the "logical" possibility of sentential truth-value derives from the "ontological" possibility of beings that "are what they are," that have an identity of their own. For onto-logic, truth is true to such beings; it takes its measure from what is, whose nature truth discloses.
In Part One, I look at versions of onto-logic first in Greek and Christian sources, then in modern philosophy. But it is not my intention to write the history of Western truth. The historical studies in Part One merely establish some context for the discussion of six philosophers which follows: Nietzsche and William James (Part Two); and Heidegger, Derrida, Wittgenstein, and Foucault (Part Three)."
4. Annas Julia E. Truth and knowledge. In *Doubt and dogmatism. Studies in Hellenistic epistemology*. Edited by Schofield Malcolm, Burnyeat Myles, and Barnes Jonathan. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1980. pp. 84-104
5. Bague Rémi et al. Vérité. In *Vocabulaire Européen des Philosophies. Dictionnaire des intraduisibles*. Edited by Cassin Barbara. Paris: Le Robert - Seuil 2004. pp. 1342-1364
6. Campbell Richard. *Truth and historicity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992.
Contents: 1. Introduction: Our contemporary intellectual predicament 1; 2. Doing philosophy historically 7; 3. Truth as Divine norm 18; 4. Timeless truth 40; 5. Truth and the Divine Intellect 75; 6. Doing the truth 101; 7. Truth and Judgements 120; 8. The forms fracture 145; 9. Truth as the positive reality of ideas 170; 10. Truth and the new way of ideas 203; 11. Truth in a contingent world 222; 12. The emergence of historicity 251; 13. The True as a historical result 269; 14. Individual existence and the appropriation of truth 292; 15. Truth as a social construct 322; 16. Truth and the analysis of logical form 355; 17. The historicity of truth 395; 18. Truth in action 412; Select bibliography 441; Index 449-463.
7. Colish Marcia L. The Stoic theory of verbal signification and the problem of lies and false statements from Antiquity to St. Anselm. In *Archéologie du Signe*. Edited by Brind'Amour Lucie and Vance Eugène. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1983. pp. 17-43
8. Fleischer Margot. *Wahrheit und Wahrheitsgrund. Zum Wahrheitsproblem und zu seiner Geschichte*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1984.
9. Florensky Pavel Aleksandrovich. *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997.
See: *III. Letter Two: Doubt* (on the words for "truth" in Hebrew, Greek, Latin and Russian).
10. Nuchelmans Gabriel. *Theories of proposition. Ancient and medieval conceptions of the bearers of truth and falsity*. Amsterdam : North-Holland 1973.
11. Pisani Vittore, "Parole indo-europee per "vero" e "falso", " *Rivista Indo-Greco-Italica di Filologia*,

Lingua, Antichità 20: 111-112 (1936).

12. Schaerer René. *Alétheia*. Héritage antique et vérité d'aujourd'hui. In *Actes du XIIe Congrès des Sociétés de Philosophie de langue française (Bruxelles et Louvain 22-24 août 1964. Thème principal: la vérité*. Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts 1964. pp. 87-106
Vol. II
13. Williams Bernard. *Truth and truthfulness. An essay in genealogy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 2002.
See: *Endnote. The vocabulary of truth: an example* pp. 271-278.
14. Wolenski Jan. Contributions to the history of the classical truth-definition. In *Logic, methodology and philosophy of science Vol. IX*. Amsterdam: Elsevier 1994. pp. 481-495
Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Uppsala, Sweden, August 7-14, 1991.
Reprinted in: Jan Wolenski - *Essays in the history of logic and logical philosophy* - Cracov - Jagiellonian University Press 1999 pp. 139-149.

"Although truth belongs to the family of crucial philosophical categories, writing its general history still remains a serious challenge for historians of philosophy. Also historical accounts of particular truth-theories are rather fragmentary. Since the classical (also called 'the correspondence') theory of truth has become the most popular and influential among all hitherto proposed answers to the philosophical problem of truth, a lack of its written history is specially strange, more than in the case of their various rivals; this theory maintains, roughly speaking, that truth consists in a relation of correspondence (agreement, adequacy or conformity) which holds between so-called bearers of truth (judgements, ideas, thoughts, propositions, statements or sentences) and reality.

This paper presents a sketch of how the gap could be filled with respect to the classical concept of truth (*CCT* for briefly). It is just a sketch which by no means pretends to any completeness. The history of the classical (as well as every other) theory of truth requires taking into account at least four points, namely:

(A) Statements which have been explicitly intended as definitions (or other explications) of *CCT*.

(B) Formulations which could be interpreted as definitions (or rather explications) of *CCT* independently of the intentions of their authors.

(C) The philosophical environment of formulations collected under (A) and (B); it is especially important for cases falling under (B).

(D) Criticism of *CCT* and its defenses against raised objections.

I would like to touch each of (A)-(D) but my principal goal is to contribute to (A) and (B)." p. 139 of the reprint.

B) THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY

1. Barnes Jonathan. *Truth, etc.* New York: Oxford University Press 2007.
2. Basset Louis. *La syntaxe de l'imaginaire. Étude des modes et des négations dans l'Iliade et l'Odyssée*. Lyon: Maison de l'Orient 1989.
3. Boeder Heribert, "Der frühgriechische Wortgebrauch von *Lógos* und *Alétheia*," *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte. Bausteine zu einem Historischen Wörterbuch der Philosophie* 4: 82-112 (1959).

Reprinted in: Heribert Boeder - *Das Bauzeug der Geschichte. Aufsätze und Vorträge zur griechischen und mittelalterlichen Philosophie* - (Edited by Gerald Meier) - Würzburg, G. Meier, 1994.

"Die folgenden Untersuchungen beabsichtigen eine Klärung des Wortgebrauchs von *Lógos* und *Alétheia* in den frühgriechischen Sprachwerken - die philosophischen ausgenommen. Gemäß der Eigenart der Zeugnisse und der entsprechenden zeitlichen Verteilung ist die Darstellung in zwei Abschnitte gegliedert, deren erster den Bereich des frühgriechischen Epos behandelt, der andere die Folgezeit bis zur Mitte des fünften Jahrhunderts etwa. Dabei wird das Wort *Lógos* jeweils vor dein

Wort *Alétheia* erörtert, weil es so der innere Zusammenhang beider nachleget." p. 82

4. Böhm Thomas. Das Wahrheitsverständnis in Bibel und Früher Kirche. In *La verité. Antiquité - Modernité*. Edited by Aenishanslin Jean-François, O'Meara Dominic, and Schüssler Ingeborg. Lausanne: Payot 2004. pp. 49-64
 5. Bultmann Rudolf, "Untersuchungen zum Johannesevangelium," *Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 27: 113-163 (1928).
Reprinted in: R. Bultmann - *Exegetica. Aufsätze zur Erforschung des Neuen Testaments* - Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr P. Siebeck, 1967, pp. 124-173.
- See in particular the section: "*Alétheia* in der griechischen und hellenistischen Literatur" pp. 134-163 (144-173 of the reprint).
6. Bultmann Rudolf. *Alétheia*. In *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. Vol. I*. Edited by Kittel Gerhard. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1964. pp. 232-247
Original German edition 1933.
 7. Cassin Barbara. Les Muses et la philosophie. Éléments pour une histoire du *pseudos*. In *Études sur le Sophiste de Platon*. Edited by Aubenque Pierre. Napoli: Bibliopolis 1991. pp. 291-316
 8. Cherubin Rose. *Aletheia* from poetry into philosophy. Homer to Parmenides. In *Logos and Muthos. Philosophical essays in Greek literature*. Edited by Wians William. Albany: State University of New York Press 2009. pp. 51-72
 9. Cole Thomas, "Archaic truth," *Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica* 64: 7-28 (1983).
 10. Darbo-Peschanski Catherine. *Le discours du particulier. Essai sur l'enquête hérodotéenne*. Paris: Seul 1987.
Préface de Paul Veyne.
Table: Introduction 11; 1. Le domaine de l'enquête. 1. Les dieux, les hommes, l'enquêteur 23; 2. Les limites de l'information 84; 2. La voix de l'enquêteur; 1. L'enquêteur et les autres 107, 2. Les raisonnements 127; 3. Le règne de l'opinion 154; 1. La part de la vérité 165; 2. L'opinion 184; Conclusion 193; Notes 197; Bibliographie 223; Index 239-240.

Voir en particulier 3.1 La part de la vérité. L'*aletheia* et les autre façons de dire la vérité pp. 165-183

11. Denyer Nicholas. *Language, thought and falsehood in ancient Greek philosophy*. London: Routledge 1991.
12. Detienne Marcel, "La notion mythique d'*Alétheia*," *Revue des Études Grecques* 73: 27-35 (1960).
13. Detienne Marcel. *The masters of truth in Archaic Greece*. New York: Zone Books 1996.
Foreword by Pierre Vidal-Naquet; translated by Janet Lloyd.
With a new preface to the American edition.
Original French edition: *Les Maîtres de vérité dans la Grèce archaïque* - Paris. Maspéro 1967 (reprinted 1981, 1990).
Translated in Italian as: *I maestri di verità nella Grecia arcaica* - Bari, Laterza 1983.
14. Detienne Marcel. *The Greeks and us. A comparative anthropology of Ancient Greece*. Boston: Polity 2007.
See Chapter 4: *The wide-open mouth of truth* pp. 60-75
15. DuBois Page. *Torture and Truth*. New York: Routledge 1991.
Chapter 9: *Some Presocratics* 93-106; Chapter 10: *Plato's Truth* 107-122; Chapter 12: *Plato and Heidegger* 127-140.
"The truth of the pre-Socratics is not the truth of integrity, of the monumental wholeness of the text of Homer and Plato. In fact, we now know the monumental Homeric corpus to have its own fragmentariness, not the fragmentation of the Analysts, who wanted to discard parts of the received text as interpolations, but a sedimentation, a complicated series of origins, an unevenness due to its oral composition that prevents it from being what was once considered the seamless, intentional production of an "author." So from the beginning, as we approach the pre-Socratics' work, their aphorisms, bits and pieces recorded in later philosophers, traces of their reputation shaping even in their absence the work of others, we cannot yet-perhaps we can never- achieve a sense of coherence, of systematic development of philosophical ideas, such as is perhaps possible with the works of Kant or Hegel.

I want to approach the notion of truth in the pre-Socratics fragmentarily, then, by looking at truth in the fragmentary remains of the work of Herakleitos and Parmenides, two radically different thinkers. I have not attempted here to present an encyclopedic survey of all occurrences of *alêtheia* in Homer, Hesiod, all the pre-Socratics. Rather, I want to give a sense of a cultural paradigm, of the ways in which the word *alêtheia* works within a semantic field, in its contrasts, for example, with other words for truth, and as it fits into a cultural and social field of seeking out the genuine, the true. Herakleitos seems to offer a suggestive and idiosyncratic notion of truth that has certain affinities with the dialogical practices of the later democracy, while Parmenides' sense of truth is more compatible with the traditions of epic and of the consultation of oracles." p. 96

"Plato returns to the pre-classical notion of the *basanos* as a proof of loyalty and truth; but even more importantly, he presents both a paradigm of truth as recollection, the recalling of time -- buried truth -- and a paradigm of the production of truth through the *elegkhos*, the philosophical conversation, a version of truth as dialectic, as process, as the making of a truth in time, between people, not as the revelation of something lost in the past but as the production of something in the present. This latter element seems to me the trace of the democratic in Plato, a trace that may be represented only to be disavowed within the larger corpus of Plato's arguments." p. 107

16. Finkelberg Margalit. *The birth of literary fiction in ancient Greece*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998. See Chapter V: 'Lies resembling truth' pp. 131-160.
17. Fiorentino Fernando. *Il problema della verità nei filosofi antichi*. Napoli: Editrice Domenicana italiana 2002.
18. Fiorentino Fernando, "Il problema della verità in Plotino," *Sapienza* 57: 145-184 (2004).
19. Fladerer Ludwig. Der Wahrheitsbegriff im griechischen Neuplatonismus. In *Die Geschichte des philosophischen Begriffs der Wahrheit*. Edited by Szaif Jan and Enders Markus. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2006. pp. 33-48
20. Frisk Hjalmar. *"Wahrheit" und "Lüge" in den indogermanischen Sprachen. Einige morphologische Beobachtungen*. Göteborg: Wettergren & Kerbers Förlag 1936.
With an Appendix: "Anhang: die Wörter für 'Lüge' und 'Wahrheit' in den Dard- und Kafirsprachen" (p. 35-38) by Georg Morgenstierne.
Reprinted in: Hjalmar Frisk - *Kleine Schriften zur Indogermanistik und zur griechischen Wortkunde* - Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1966 pp. 1-35.
21. Galluzzo Gabriele, "Il tema della verità in Plotino, fonti platoniche e presupposti filosofici," *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 10: 59-88 (1999).
22. Heitsch Ernst, "Die nicht philosophische *Alêtheia*," *Hermes* 90: 24-33 (1962).
23. Heitsch Ernst, "Wahrheit als Erinnerung," *Hermes* 91: 36-53 (1963).
24. Heitsch Ernst, "Das Wissen des Xenophanes," *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 109: 193-235 (1966).
Contains a brief history of *alêtheia* from Hesiod to Parmenides
25. Heitsch Ernst. Der Ort der Wahrheit. Aus der frühgeschichte der Wahrheitsbegriffs. In *Parmenides und die Anfänge der Erkenntniskritik und Logik*. Donauwörth: Ludwig Auer 1979. pp. 33-69
Reprinted in: Ernst Heitsch - *Gesammelte Schriften* - vol. II. *Zur griechischen Philosophie* - München / Leipzig - K. G. Saur, 2001 pp. 89-116
26. Hoffmann Philippe. La triade Chaldaïque *eros, aletheia, pistis*: de Proclus à Simplicius. In *Proclus et la Théologie platonicienne*. Edited by Segonds Alain-Philippe and Steel Carlos. Paris: Les Belles Lettres 2000. pp. 459-489
Actes du colloque international de Louvain (13-16 mai 1998) en l'honneur de H. D. Saffrey et L. G. Westerink
27. Hommel Hildebrecht, "Wahrheit und Gerechtigkeit. Zur Geschichte und Deutung eines Begriffspaares," *Antike un Abendland. Beiträge zum Verständnis der Griechen und Römer und ihres Nachlebens* 15: 159-186 (1969).
28. Jens Walter, "Das Begreifen des Wahrheit im frühen Griechentum," *Studium Generale* 4: 240-246 (1951).
29. Kahn Charles H. *The verb 'be' in ancient Greek*. Dordrecht: Reidel 1973.
Volume 6 of: John W. M. Verhaar (ed.) - *The verb 'be' and its synonyms: philosophical and*

grammatical studies - Dordrecht, Reidel

Reprinted by Hackett Publishing, 2003 with new introduction and discussion of relation between predicative and existential uses of the Greek verb *einai*.

30. Kahn Charles H., "A return to the theory of the verb *Be* and the concept of Being," *Ancient Philosophy* 24: 381-405 (2004).
31. Käetzer Joachim, "*Pseudos, dolos, mechanema* in der griechischen Tragödie", 1959. PH. D. dissertation.
32. Krischer Tilman, "*Etymos und Aléthes*," *Philologus* 109: 161-174 (1965).
33. Kurz Dietrich. *Akribeia. Das Ideal der Exaktheit bei den Griechen bis Aristoteles*. Göttingen: A. Kümmerle 1970.
34. Ledbetter Grace M. *Poetics before Plato. Interpretation and authority in early Greek theories of poetry*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 2003.
35. Lee Mi-Kyoung. *Epistemology after Protagoras. Responses to relativism in Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2005.
Chapter 2: Protagora's *Aletheia* - pp. 8-29.
36. Levet Jean-Pierre. *Le vrai et le faux dans la pensée grecque archaïque. Étude de vocabulaire*. Paris: Belles Lettres 1976.
Tome I. Présentation générale. Le vrai et le faux dans les épopées homériques.
"Ce livre est la première partie d'une thèse de doctorat d'État qui a été soutenue le 11 mai 1974 en Sorbonne" (Avant-propos).
37. Levet Jean-Pierre. L'expression du vrai et de la vérité dans les *Posthomerica* de Quintus de Smyrne. In *Des Géants à Dionysos. Mélanges offerts à Francis Vian*. Edited by Accorinti Domenico and Chuvin Pierre. Alessandria: Edizioni dell'Orso 2003. pp. 357-384
38. Levet Jean-Pierre. *Le vrai et le faux dans la pensée grecque archaïque d'Hésiode à la fin du Ve siècle*. Paris: Belles Lettres 2008.
"Ce livre forme un ensemble avec la première partie d'une thèse de doctorat d'État soutenue à la Sorbonne en 1974 et parue en 1976." (Avant-Propos).
"L'analyse lexicale de la conception et de l'expression du vrai et du faux fait apparaître, dans *Illiade* et dans *Odyssée*, l'existence d'un système ancien, qui repose sur des énoncés subjectifs se révélant conformes au réel objectif (familles d'*etéos, etmos, et etétumos, d'atrekéos et de ypertés*) ou procédant de l'invention de pures fictions (*pseudos, pseudomai*).
Indépendamment de lui, l'*alethein* ancienne correspond à une révélation véridique prenant la forme d'un *non-voilé-dévoilant*.
Avec des prodromes déjà perceptibles chez Homère, la mutation de la psychologie de la connaissance tend progressivement à conduire à voir dans la vérité, dont le faux devient une déformation, le réel objectif connu, convenablement interprété par l'intelligence et fidèlement transmis.
Les catégories du faux et du vrai qui apparaissent alors relèvent dans le lexique de *pseudos* et d'*aletheia*, le terme, compatible, dès l'origine, avec la démarche décrite (un contenu objectif est communiqué), étant pourvu de nouvelles valeurs sémantiques. L'évolution est lente et considérable. Elle se fait par une série d'étapes successives.
D'Hésiode au Ve siècle, traits anciens et caractères nouveaux coexistent, mais petit à petit ceux-ci éliminent ceux-là. Un équilibre relatif est encore perceptible chez Hésiode, mais rapidement notions et mots archaïques s'effacent au profit de ce que représentent *alethés* et *aletheia, pseudos* et *pseudomai*, ainsi que les termes qui leur sont apparentés, tandis que se développent parallèlement des concepts et des vocables nouveaux. Ils entrent dans les structures évoluées de la cognition et de la communication du *vrai* et du *faux* telles que *alethés* et *aletheia, pseudos* et *pseudomai* en montrent l'existence et la nature.
C'est l'histoire de cette évolution majeure, considérée comme formant un ensemble cohérent, que décrit le présent livre, dans la continuité de l'apport homérique, sur le fondement d'une étude sémantique menée à partir d'une analyse des textes littéraires, rédigés en vers ou non, d'Hésiode à la fin de l'âge archaïque et avant la grande floraison de la prose classique.
Le critère permettant d'opposer *archaïque* et *classique* est celui que fournit, au moins en ce qui concerne l'attique, la disparition de l'usage vivant des concepts les plus anciens et de leurs supports

- linguistiques." (Présentation Générale).
39. Lotz Johannes B., "Aletheia und Orthotes. Versuch einer Deutung im Lichte der Scholastik," *Philosophische Jahrbuch* 68: 258-268 (1960).
Reprinted in: Johannes B. Lotz - *Sein und Existenz. Kritische Studien in systematischer Absicht* - Freiburg, Herder, 1965, pp. 120-134
 40. Luther Wilhelm. "*Wahrheit*" und "*Lüge*" im ältesten Griechentum. Leipzig: Verlag Robert Noske 1935.
 41. Luther Wilhelm. *Weltansicht und Gestesleben. Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Grundlegung der philosophischen Sprachanalyse an Beispielen aus der griechischen Geistesgeschichte von Homer bis Aristoteles*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1954.
 42. Luther Wilhelm, "Der frühgriechische Wahrheitsgedanke im Lichte der Sprachen," *Gymnasium* 65: 75-107 (1958).
 43. Luther Wilhelm, "Wahrheit, Licht und Erkenntnis in der griechischen Philosophie bis Demokrit. Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung des Zusammenhangs von Sprache und philosophischen Denken," *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte. Bausteine zu einem Historischen Wörterbuch der Philosophie* 10: 1-240 (1966).
 44. Marincola John. Alétheia. In *Lexicon Historiographicum Graecum et Latinum (LHG&L)*. Edited by Porciani Leone. Pisa: Edizioni della Normale 2007. pp. 7-29
Fascicle II.
 45. Martínez Marzoa Felipe, "Einai, physis, logos. aletheia," *Emerita* 42: 159-175 (1974).
 46. Matthen Mohan, "Greek ontology and the 'Is' of truth," *Phronesis* 28: 113-135 (1983).
 47. Mette Hans Joachim. *Alethein, alethes*. In *Lexicon des frühgriechischen Epos. Vol. I*. Edited by Snell Bruno. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1955. pp. 476-477
 48. Mielert Ernest. *Ausdrücke für Wahrheit und Lüge in der attischen Tragödie*. München: Otto Brunn 1958.
 49. Nagy Gregory. The crisis of performance. In *The ends of rhetoric: history, theory, practice*. Edited by Bender John B. and Wellbery David E. Stanford: Stanford University Press 1990. pp. 43-59
On *Aletheia* see pp. 47-53.
 50. Perceau Sylvie. *La parole vive. Communiquer en catalogue dans l'épopée homérique*. Louvain: Peeters 2002.
Voir le Chapitre III. *Une éthique et une approche du monde* § 2.3 *Katalegein et alétheia* pp. 279-287
 51. Pratt Louise H. *Lying and poetry from Homer to Pindar. Falsehood and deception in archaic Greek poetics*. Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press 1993.
 52. Prier Raymond Adolph. *THAUMA IDESTHAI. The phenomenology of sight and appearance in archaic Greek*. Tallahassee: The Florida State University Press 1989.
"This work is a study of the archaic phenomenology of Homer. Particular attention is paid to linguistic and stylistic characteristics of signification. Comparisons are made between Homeric and Aristotelian thought.
Also the author critically examines contemporary readings of Homer including those of Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida."
 53. Puelma Mario, "Der Dichter und die Wahrheit in der griechischen Poetik von Homer bis Aristoteles," *Museum Helveticum* 46: 65-100 (1989).
 54. Ruggenini Mario, "Veritas e aletheia. La Grecia, Roma e l'origine della metafisica cristiano-medioevale," *Quaestio. The Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics* 1: 83-212 (2001).
 55. Santos José Trinidad, "El nacimiento de la verdad," *Méthexis* 17: 7-23 (2004).
"This paper aims to outline the course of 'truth' in Plato's and Aristotle's works, where it begins as the veridical reading of *einai*, and ends as a function of *logos*. In Plato's Socratic dialogues truth has no methodological implications. The dialogues on the theory of forms sustain the polysemy of being, using truth as a means of establishing the consistency of arguments *Phaedo* 100a). The difficult coexistence of truth with infallibility (*Theaetetus* 152a-179c) leads to its emergence as a *poion* of *logos* (*Sophist* 263b). Aristotle's *De interpretatione* 1-6 points to a correspondence theory of truth, showing that only by affirming or denying *logos* is true or false."
 56. Scalera McClintock Giuliana, "*Alétheia* nel pensiero orfico. II. *Alétheia* nelle tavolette di Olbia

Pontica," *Filosofia e Teologia* 4: 78-83 (1990).

"II. In the context of the Bacchic mysteries, the bone tablets from Pontic Olbia open up space for theological meditation, documenting with direct sources from the mid-fifth century B.C. the belief in immortality seen darkly in the mania, the disembodiment of the concept of the soul, and an idea of truth so strong that it cannot be attributed only to a religion which defines itself in respect to others. Thus a new tessera can be added to the comprehension of the relation between Orphic thought and the initiation rites in which the first philosophy takes root."

57. Segal Charles, "Naming, truth, and creation in the poetics of Pindar," *Diacritics* 16: 65-83 (1986). Reprinted in: C. Segal - *Aglaiia. The poetry of Alcman, Sappho, Pindar, Bacchylides, and Corinna* - Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, as Chapter 6 pp. 105-132
58. Simondon Michèle. *La Mémoire et l'oubli dans la pensée grecque jusqu'à la fin du 5. siècle avant J.-C. Psychologie archaïque, mythes et doctrines*. Paris: Belles Lettres 1982.
59. Siorvanes Lucas. The problem of truth in the *Platonic Theology*. In *Proclus et la Théologie platonicienne*. Edited by Segonds Alain-Philippe and Steel Carlos. Paris: Les Belles Lettres 2000. pp. 47-63
Actes du colloque international de Louvain (13-16 mai 1998) en l'honneur de H. D. Saffrey et L. G. Westerink
60. Snell Bruno, "Aletheia," *Würzburger Jahrbucher für die Altertumswissenschaft* 1: 9-17 (1975). Festschrift Ernst Siegmann
61. Snell Bruno. *Der Weg zum Denker und zur Wahrheit. Studien zur frühgriechischen Sprache*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1978.
Chapter 5: "Der Entwicklung des Wahrheitsbegriffe bei den Griechen" pp. 91-104.
Translated in Italian as: *Il Cammino del pensiero e della verità: studi sul linguaggio greco delle origini* - Ferrara, Gallio Editori 1991 pp. 105-120.
62. Spicq Ceslas. Alétheia. In *Theological Lexicon of the New Testament*. Peabody: Endrickson 1994. pp. 1-67
Translated and edited by James D. Ernest from: *Notes de lexicographie neo-testamentaire. Vol. III: Supplément*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982, pp. 16-37.
63. Starr Chester G., "Ideas of truth in early Greece," *La Parola del Passato* 23: 348-359 (1968). Reprinted in: C. G. Starr - *Essays on ancient history. A selection of articles and reviews* - Edited by Arther Ferrill and Thomas Kelly - Leiden, Brill, 1979 pp. 163-174.

"In the modern world truth is a fundamental intellectual and moral virtue. Courts of law demand, in a famous phrase, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; statesmen must appear to be devoted to the truth; scholarly work is judged first on its truth and only thereafter for other qualities. The historian, for example, seeks to say true things, and hopes to guarantee the reputation of his work by amassing verified, precise detail, the hallmark of which is the learned footnote.

Recently I have been investigating the origins of this attitude along with other aspects of the incipient historical spirit, during the archaic period of Greek history (700-500 B.C.). (1) To my surprise there seems to have been only limited consideration of what the Greeks in this era generally meant by truth'. Correspondingly, the fact that their ideas of truth often differed markedly from modern concepts has not been stressed, even though early Greek views on the matter had a lasting influence not only on ancient historiography but also on classical thought. The following remarks are intended as a sketch of the evidence which may hopefully encourage more intensive discussion; my intent, let me be clear, is to suggest how varied were the meanings of truth at the time, not to analyze their relations to modern epistemological theories.

A cynic, indeed, might argue that here as elsewhere, the Greeks were simply more honest; for truth only slowly became a conscious, abstract virtue in Greek civilization, and never gained that unquestioned priority which we theoretically assign to it today. While Homer assessed the reality of events and distinguished' true statements from prevarications, the words which he and other early Greeks used to express these ideas initially lacked the absolute quality implicit in the modern truth ' and lie '. In time the verbal distinctions became theoretical and general; otherwise history and philosophy could scarcely have emerged. Yet thinkers had a cankering fear that only the gods could really know the truth, and rarely felt passionately the need for truth.

By 400 B.C. - the boundary of this essay - two modes of establishing verity, the speculative and the empirical, had emerged, but so too had conscious intellectual scepticism; only thereafter did epistemological analysis begin to develop. Perhaps even more devastating in its effects, as regards the mastery of the ideal of truth, was the emphasis upon form as a mode of evaluating the truth of a work."

(1) Chester G. Starr, *The Awakening of the Greek Historical Spirit* (New York, 1968).

64. Storz Gerhard. *Gebrauch und Bedeutungsentwicklung von Alétheia und begriffsverwandten Wörtern in der griechischen Literatur von Platon*. Tübingen: 1922.
Ph.D. Dissertation
65. Striker Gisela. *Kriterion tes aletheias*. In *Essays on hellenistic epistemology and ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996. pp. 22-76
Originally published in German: Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften zur Göttingen, I. Philosophische-historische Klasse, 2, 1974 pp. 48-110.
66. Szaif Jan. Die Geschichte des Wahrheitsbegriffs in der klassischen Antike. In *Die Geschichte des philosophischen Begriffs der Wahrheit*. Edited by Szaif Jan and Enders Markus. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2006. pp. 1-32
67. Thiselton Anthony C. Truth. In *The New international dictionary of New Testament theology. Vol. III*. Edited by Brown Colin. Exeter: Paternoster Press 1978. pp. 874-902
68. Thiselton Anthony C. Does lexicographical research yield "Hebrew" and "Greek" concepts of truth? (1978) and How does this research relate to notions of truth today? (New summary). In *Thiselton on hermeneutics. Collected works with new essays*. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans 2006. pp. 267-286
"Although this was originally written as a dictionary article, this work is neither merely didactic nor merely a lexicographical survey. With the editor's agreement it entirely replaced the German-language article that it was first designed only to supplement, The article in the German edition had presupposed the dichotomy between "Hebrew" and "Greek" concepts of truth in ways that were open to question in the light of both semantic theory (not least in the work of James Barr), and actual lexicographical research, which invited fresh evaluation. The inclusion of the classical and Old Testament backgrounds makes the fallacies of the older approach clearer. (...)
The article, comes from Colin Brown (ed.), *The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology*, volume 3 (Exeter Paternoster Press, 1978), pp. 874-902, but has been abbreviated in order to omit material that may not bear directly on the argument. The breadth of lexicographical data might seem at times to verge on the tedious, but the argument depends on covering a fair range of specific cases and evidence, The original article concluded with a substantial discussion of modern philosophical theories of truth. This is too lengthy to retain here, but a brief summary has been rewritten for this volume (2004) to demonstrate the role of the argument for the "second horizon" of hermeneutics."
69. Tortorelli Ghidini Marisa, "Alétheia nel pensiero orfico. I. "Dire la verità": sul v. 7 della laminetta di Farsalo," *Filosofia e Teologia* 4: 73-77 (1990).
"I. The Homeric formula 'to tell the truth' involves the idea of starting from beginning and proceeding, point by point, to the end. In the Orphic Pharsalos tablet, that epic formula occurs again but the meaning turns out to be completely modified. According to this religious context 'telling the truth' and 'drinking at the spring of Mnemosyne' are identical: the truth, associated with a cosmic Memory, becomes a fundamental religious virtue. The link between religious and logical truth arises here."
70. Wolenski Jan, "Aletheia in Greek thought until Aristotle," *Annals of Pure and Applied Logic* 127: 339-360 (2005).
"This paper investigates the concept of *aletheia* (truth) in ancient philosophy from the pre-Socratics until Aristotle. The meaning of *aletheia* in archaic Greek is taken as the starting point. It is followed by remarks about the concept of truth in the Seven Sages. The author discusses this concept as it appears in views and works of philosophers and historians. A special section is devoted to the epistemological and ontological understanding of truth. On this occasion, influential views of Heidegger are examined. The paper is concluded by a review of various meanings of truth in

Aristotle."

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