

Selected Bibliography on Indian Logic and Ontology. Second Part: M - Z

Index of the Section: "Philosophy Study Guides: Non-Western Philosophy"

- Study Guide for Comparative Philosophy (a selection of reference works about non-Western ontology and logic)
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Bibliography on Indian Logic and Ontology: A - L

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Matilal Bimal Krishna, "A note on the Nyaya fallacy Sadhyasama and petitio principii," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 2: 211-224 (1974).
 "When H. N. Randle (in 1930) interpreted 'sadhyasama' as petitio principii, he made a mistake. Unfortunately, many scholars accepted Randle's interpretation. It has been shown that Randle was wrong about this interpretation. 'Sadhyasama' can be correctly translated as a fallacy of being in the same predicament with yet-to-be-proven proposition. Petitio is a different fallacy, as it has been described by Aristotle. Some general comments have been made on the notion of fallacy, and on the distinction between 'formal' and 'non-formal' fallacies."

2. Matilal Bimal Krishna, "Causality in the Nyaya-Vaisesika School," *Philosophy East and West* 25 (1): 41-48 (1975).
 "The meaning of "cause" is much wider in some Indian philosophical schools than in the West. the Buddhist terms, "hetu" and "pratyaya", cover an unusual variety of causal notions. The Vaisesika notion of cause is said to be closer to commonsense. A causal substrate in this system approximates the notion of "material" cause in Aristotle, but the "non-substantial" cause is a unique notion in this system. The Nyaya critique of causation (in Udayana) can be profitably compared and contrasted with that of David Hume. It has been further argued in the paper that Mill was a poor defender of Hume against Reid, and that the Navya-Nyaya analysis of the 'unconditionality' criterion was slightly better than that of Mill."
3. Matilal Bimal Krishna. *Epistemology, logic, and grammar in Indian philosophical analysis*. The Hague: Mouton 1971.
 Second revised edition with a new preface by Jonardon Ganeri and the additions and changes made by Matilal in his personal copy: Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005.
4. Matilal Bimal Krishna, "Error and truth. Classical Indian theories," *Philosophy East and West* 31 (2): 215-224 (1981).
 "Classical Indian theories of error are discussed to show their relevance to the philosophical problems of the Cartesian epistemologists in general and the British empiricists in particular. The concept of "alambana" and "pratibhasa" as discussed by the Sautrantika-Yogacara School is explained and the views of the "sense-data" philosophers are discussed in this connection."
5. Matilal Bimal Krishna, "Indian theories of knowledge and truth," *Philosophy East and West* 18: 321-333 (1968).
6. Matilal Bimal Krishna. *Logic, language and reality. An introduction to Indian philosophical studies*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1985.
7. Matilal Bimal Krishna. *Mind, language, and world*. New York: Oxford University Press 2002.
 Edited by Jonardon Ganeri
8. Matilal Bimal Krishna. *Nyaya-Vaisesika*. Wiesbaden: O. Harrasowitz 1977.
 A history of Indian literature: vol. 6, II.
9. Matilal Bimal Krishna, "Ontological problems in Nyaya, Buddhism and Jainism: a comparative analysis," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 5: 91-105 (1977).
 "The Nyaya-Vaisesika believed that we can achieve a satisfactory explanation of 'what there is' if we can analyse and classify the concrete objects of our experience into 'substance', 'quality' and 'action'. The Buddhist thought reality to be in perpetual flux and thus the objects of experience are synthetic and analysable into what they called "dharmas". The Jainas compromised by saying that reality is 'many-sided', both substantial (when we take the Nyaya point of view) and ever fluctuating (when we take the Buddhist position). In Whiteheadian terms, it is a combination of 'process' and 'reality'. A comparison, in some details, of these three Schools is attempted in the paper."
10. Matilal Bimal Krishna. *Perception. An essay on classical Indian theories of knowledge*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986.
11. Matilal Bimal Krishna, "Reference and existence in Nyaya and Buddhist logic," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 1: 83-108 (1970).
 "This Nyaya-Buddhist controversy over the empty subject term may well recall to a modern mind the Meinong-Russell controversy about 'existence' and 'denotation'. The Nyaya and the Buddhist logicians worried over the logical and the epistemological problem connected with the issue. The Nyaya interpreted "the rabbit's horn" not as a singular term but as a predicate complex attributing 'hornness' to something that belonged to the rabbit. "The rabbit's horn does not exist" ascribes the absence of hornness to something belonging to a rabbit, and is true. This analysis is closer to Russell's theory of description. The Buddhist, on the other hand, is prepared to allow some sort of 'fictional existence' to "the rabbit's horn" which is perhaps not very different from Meinong's 'theory of objects'. In epistemology the Nyaya believed that any object of cognition (which is expressible in words) must be either real or analyzable into constituents which are ultimately identifiable with some real entity or other. Only a complex object can be fictional. The Buddhists, however, hold that the objects of erroneous cognition are fictional."
12. Matilal Bimal Krishna. *The character of logic in India*. Albany: State University of New York Press

1998.

Edited by Jonardon Ganeri and Heeraman Tiwari

13. Matilal Bimal Krishna. *The Navya-Nyaya doctrine of negation. The semantics and ontology of negative statements in Navya-Nyaya philosophy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1968.
14. Matilal Bimal Krishna. *The word and the world. India's contribution to the study of language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990.
15. McCrea Lawrence, "The hierarchical organization of language in Mimamsa interpretive theory," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 28: 429-459 (2000).
16. Mehta Mohan Lal. *Outlines of Jaina philosophy. The essential of Jaina ontology, epistemology and ethics*. Bangalore: Jain Mission Society 1954.
17. Mejer Marek, "Contribution of Polish Scholars to the study of Indian logic," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 31: 9-20 (2003).
18. Misra Ganewar. *Language, reality, and analysis. Essays on Indian philosophy*. Edited by Mohanty Jitendra Nath. Leiden: E. J. Brill 1990.
19. Mohanty Jitendra Nath. *Classical Indian philosophy*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 2000.
From the Preface: "This is a book that I always wanted to write, but the project had to be postponed up until this stage in my life. Having learned Indian philosophy under two great Sanskrit Pandits -- the late Mm. Yogendranâth Tarkavedântatirtha and the late Pandit Ananta Kumar Tarkatirtha -- I wanted to convey to Western scholars something of the education I had received. Hopefully, I have succeeded in doing so in some measure. There are gaps that I would like to fill, and there are topics on which I would like to elaborate, should there be an opportunity to do so in the future. For the present, I am glad to be able to send this manuscript to the press."

Contents: Preface IX; 1. Indian philosophy: a historical overview 1; Part 1: Theory of knowledge (*Pramana Sastra*) 2. Theory of knowledge (*Pramana-Theory*) 11; Part 2: Metaphysics (*Prameya Sastra*) 3. The Categories (*Padharta-s*) 41; 4. the Self (*Atman*) 59; 5. Central metaphysical issues 73; Part 3: Philosophy of politics, law and morals (*Dharma Sastras*) 6. State, society, and law 95; 7. Moral philosophy 105; Part 4: Religion and art: 8. Philosophy of religion 125; 9. Aesthetics of *Rasasasta* 133; Part 5: Beyond the *Pramana-Prameya* distinction 10. Beyond the *Pramana-Prameya* distinction 141; Appendix 1: A note on Navya-Nyaya analysis of cognition 147; Appendix 2: Some general features of the Indian theories of knowledge 149; Appendix 3: The classical *Darsanas* (Systems) 153; Appendix 4: Glossary of important Sanskrit terms 159; Bibliography 167; Index 175; About the Author 181.

20. Mohanty Jitendra Nath. *Explorations in philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press 2001.
Two volumes: 1. Indian philosophy; 2. Western philosophy
21. Mohanty Jitendra Nath et al. Indian Logic. In *The Development of Modern Logic*. Edited by Haaparanta Leila. New York: Oxford University Press 2009. pp. 903-961
22. Mohanty Jitendra Nath, "Indian theories of truth: thoughts on their common framework," *Philosophy East and West* 30 (4): 439-451 (1980).
"The peculiar features of Indian theories of truth, according to this paper, are: (I) a theory of cognitive occurrent; (II) absence of a theory of meaning as distinct from reference; (III) a consequent position that avoids the extremes of logicism and psychologism; (IV) a restricted theory of necessary truths, a fallibilism with regard to empirical truths and infallibilism with regard to moral truths; (V) a close connection between cognitive enterprise and practice; and (VI) reliance on reflective analysis of the cognitive situation."
23. Mohanty Jitendra Nath, "On Matilal's understanding of Indian philosophy," *Philosophy East and West* 42 (3): 397-406 (1992).
24. Mohanty Jitendra Nath, "Pramanya and workability -- Response to Potter," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 12: 329-338 (1984).
25. Mohanty Jitendra Nath. *Reason and tradition in Indian thought. An essay on the nature of Indian philosophical thinking*. New York: Oxford University Press 1992.
26. Mohanty Jitendra Nath, "Reflections on the Nyaya theory of Aavayavipratyaksa," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 1: 30-41 (1961).
27. Mohanty Jitendra Nath, "Understanding some ontological differences in Indian philosophy," *Journal*

of *Indian Philosophy* 8: 205-218 (1980).

"Taking up the pluralistic realism of Nyaya Vaisesika and monistic idealism of Advaita Vedanta, the paper enquires into the origins of this ontological difference. While the theory of "Pramanas" (or theory of knowledge) was used to certify the ontology, the epistemology itself was incorporated into the ontology. No absolute point of beginning is available for a system, both the systems claim to give accounts of ordinary language and ordinary experience. The search for an extra-systemic evidence is frustrating."

28. Mukherjea A.K., "The definition of pervasion ("vyapti") in Navya-Nyaya," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 4: 1-50 (1976).
29. Mullick Mohini, "Implication and entailment in Navya-Nyaya logic," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 4: 127-134 (1976).
"My attempt is to produce some evidence to show that the notions of implication and entailment are clearly distinguished in Navya-Nyaya logic. This is done by examining the nature of the Navya-Nyaya syllogism and showing that the Naiyayikas were aware of various definitions of material implication but rejected them as definitions of vyapti (implication), not because they led to inferential paradoxes but to semantic ones; they in fact never confused implication with entailment. The entailment relation is contained in their notion of "paramarsa" and appears as the last premise in the argument which immediately precedes and thus 'causes' the conclusion."
30. Nicholson Hugh R., "Specifying the nature of substance in Aristotle and Indian philosophy," *Philosophy East and West* 54 (4): 533-554 (2004).
"Aristotle struggles with two basic tensions in his understanding of reality or substance that have parallels in Indian metaphysical speculation. The first of these tensions, between the understanding of reality as the underlying substrate (*to hupokeimenon*) and as the individual "this" (*tode ti*), finds a parallel in the concept of *dravya* in Patanjali's *Mahābhāṣya*. The second tension, between the understanding of reality as the individual this and as the intelligible essence of the individual this (*to ti en einai*), corresponds to an ambiguity in the concept of *vastu* in Kumarila's *Slokavarttika*."
31. Nieuwendijk Arthur, "Semantics and comparative logic," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 20: 377-418 (1992).
"The paper takes up the question as to which logical framework is most suitable for a formal interpretation of Navya-Nyaya logic. It is claimed that, for this purpose, the framework offered by extensional first-order predicate logic is inadequate. This claim is established by discussing three well-known difficulties: the interpretation of the notion of Jnana, the question whether contraposition is a law of NavyaNyaya logic, and the interpretation of the Navya-Nyaya scheme of inference. Next, the interrelatedness of these difficulties is pointed out, and, carrying through the analysis, it is examined whether situation semantics offers a suitable alternative framework."
32. Oetke Claus, "Ancient Indian logic as a theory of non-monotonic reasoning," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 24: 447-539 (1996).
"The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that the most ancient varieties of "Indian logic" are significantly related to theories associated with the term "non-monotonic logic" in so far as they try to account for reasoning relying on the ability to use general rules subject to exceptions and indicate a conception of context-dependent validity implying that valid inferences or arguments can lose this status in the context of additional information. On that background it is possible to give a theoretical justification for a number of features of Indian theories of inference which previously appeared theoretically ill motivated and which were often explained by historical coincidences."
33. Oetke Claus, "Indian logic and Indian syllogism," *Indo-Iranian Journal* 46 (1): 53-69 (2003).
34. Padmarajah Y.J. *A comparative study of the Jaina theories of reality and knowledge*. Bombay: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal 1963.
35. Pandey Sangam Lal. *Pre-Samkara Advaita philosophy*. Allahabad: Darshan Peeth 1974.
Second edition 1983
36. Pandeya Ram Chandra. *The problem of meaning in Indian philosophy*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1963.
37. Perrett Roy W., "A note on the Navya-Nyaya account of number," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 13: 227-234 (1985).
"I maintain (contra Ingalls) that the Navya-Nyaya account of number as a property of classes

should be understood intensionally, not extensionally. Such a theory is closer to Frege's earlier views than to Russell's and also has certain advantages over Russell's theory. However it seems that Navya-Nyaya cannot provide a criterion of identity for such intrinsically intensional properties; and this difficulty is particularly important for Navya-Nyaya, given its epistemological and metaphysical realism."

38. Perrett Roy W., "Is whatever exists knowable and nameable?," *Philosophy East and West* 49 (4): 401-414 (1999).
"Naiyayikas are fond of a slogan, which often appears as a kind of motto in their texts: "Whatever exists is knowable and nameable". What does this mean? Is it true? The first part of this essay offers a brief explication of this important Nyaya thesis; the second part argues that, given certain plausible assumptions, the thesis is demonstrably false."
39. Perrett Roy W., "Self-refutation in Indian philosophy," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 12 (3): 237-264 (1984).
40. Perszyk Kenneth J., "'Virtue is not blue': Navya-Nyaya and some Western views," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 11: 325-338 (1983).
"The primary aim is to construct, within the Navya-Nyaya system, an analysis of sentences such as 'virtue is not blue', which they would claim are meaningful. There is a discussion of their important distinction between meaningful sentences and sentences which generate or have the ability to generate a cognition, and their concept of negation. The secondary aim is to compare their analysis with certain Western philosophers, especially those who follow the theory of types."
41. Perszyk Kenneth J., "Negative entities and negative facts in Navya-Nyaya," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 12: 265-276 (1984).
"The purpose of this article is to discuss the Navya-Nyaya's thesis that absence is an ontological category, which is to say that there are negative entities, and its corollary that there are negative facts. The Nyaya resists all attempts to eliminate negative facts in favour of positive facts. In addition, we see that no atomic sentence can have a negative subject-term."
42. Perszyk Kenneth J., "The Nyaya and Russell on empty terms," *Philosophy East and West* 34 (2): 131-146 (1984).
"The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how the Navya-Nyaya school of Indian philosophy determines the truth or falsity of a sentence which contains an empty term, and to point out some similarities and differences between its method of analysis and truth-value determinations of such sentences and that of Bertrand Russell."
43. Phillips Stephen H. *Classical Indian metaphysics. Refutation of realism and the emergence of "new logic"*. Chicago : Open Court 1995.
44. Phillips Stephen H. and Chakrabarti Arindam. *Epistemology of perception: Gangesa's Tattvacintamani, Jewel of reflection on the truth /about epistemology). The perception chapter (Prataksa-khanda)*. New York: American Institute of Buddhist Studies 2004.
Transliterated text, translation, and philosophical commentary.
45. Phillips Stephen H., "There's nothing wrong with raw perception: a response to Chakrabarti's attack on Nyaya's *Nirvikalpaka Pratyaksa*," *Philosophy East and West* 51 (1): 104-113 (2001).
"As part of its direct realism in the epistemology of perception, classical Indian Nyaya posits indeterminate perception where a qualifier is grasped immediately without being grasped as qualifying its qualificandum, the thing whose property it is. Contemporary philosopher, Arindam Chakrabarti, argued in *Philosophy East and West* 50, no. 1 (January 2000) that Nyaya would best eschew such "indeterminate perception." This paper offers a defense drawing on the classical texts. It is explained in particular that while there is no claim of direct, apperceptive evidence for raw perception, there is an argument that ties up all verbalizable cognition, including verbalizable perception, as having the qualifier it presents as available through previous experience. But with a first-time perception of something as, say, a cow, the cognizer's memory not informed by previous cow experience could not possibly provide the qualifier, cowhood, and the best candidate seems its perception in the raw."
46. Potter Karl H., "Are the Vaśeśika "Gunas" qualities?," *Philosophy East and West* 4 (3): 259-264 (1954).
47. Potter Karl H., "Does Indian epistemology concern justified true belief?," *Journal of Indian*

Philosophy 12: 307-328 (1984).

"I endeavor to show that J. N. Mohanty's claim of incommensurability among Indian epistemological theories is based on a justified true belief account of knowledge; that "Pramanya" doesn't mean truth but rather workability; that Indian theories of knowledge are not predicated on noncognitivism in values as Western ones are; that the claim incommensurability among Indian epistemological theories is a result of imposing on them shortcomings in contemporary Western ways of thinking."

48. Potter Karl H., "On the realistic proclivities of Navya-Nyaya as explicated by Bhattacharyya," *Philosophy East and West* 24 (3): 343-347 (1974).
49. Potter Karl H. *Presuppositions of India's philosophies*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall 1963.
50. Potter Karl H., "Some thoughts on the Nyaya conception of meaning," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 3: 209-216 (1975).
51. Pradyot Kumar Mukhopadhyay. *Indian realism. A rigorous descriptive metaphysics*. Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi 1984.
52. Prasad Jwala. *History of Indian epistemology*. Delhi: Munshiram Monoharlal 1958.
53. Prets Ernst, "Futile and false rejoinders, sophistical arguments and early Indian logic," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 29: 545-558 (2001).
54. Raja Kunhan C. *Some fundamental problems in Indian philosophy*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1960.
55. Ranade Ramachandra Dattatraya. *A constructive survey of Upanishadic philosophy being a systematic introduction to Indian metaphysics*. Oriental Book Agency: Oriental Book Agency 1926.
56. Randle Herbert Niel. *Indian logic in the early Schools. A study of the Nyayadarsana in its relation to the early logic of other Schools*. London : Oxford University Press 1930.
Reprinted New Delhi, Oriental Books Reprint Corp., 1976.
57. Rao K.L.Seshagiri, "On truth: A Hindu perspective," *Philosophy East and West* 20 (4): 377-382 (1970).
"The article shows how the Hindu tradition and specially Vedanta has come to express its own experience of truth. It views the problem of truth ontologically: ultimate truth cannot be 'known' like a finite object; it is in fact the 'knower' himself, Atman, the unconditioned being. Both absolutistic and theistic interpretations of Atman/Brahman are considered. It concludes: truth is spiritual reality, being of our being and the meaning of all finite existence."
58. Rastogi, Maharaj Narain. *The theories of implication in Indian and Western philosophy. A critical study*. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan 1983.
Foreword by Irving M. Copi
59. Ratnakirti Dharendra Sharma. *The Differentiation Theory of Meaning in Indian Logic*. The Hague: Mouton 1969.
60. Reyna Ruth. *Dictionary of Oriental philosophy*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers 1984.
61. Riga Peter J., "On truth: a Catholic perspective," *Philosophy East and West* 20: 369-376 (1970).
62. Sastri Kuppaswami. *A primer of Indian logic according to Annambhatta's Tarkasamgraha*. Mylapore: The Kuppaswami Sastri Research Institute 1932.
Second edition 1951; Third edition 1961; Fourth edition 1998
63. Sastri Pothukuchi Subrahmanya. *Indian idealism. Epistemology and ontology*. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan 1975.
64. Scharf Peter M. *The denotation of generic terms in ancient Indian philosophy. Grammar, Nyaya and Mimamsa*. Philadelphia : American Philosophical Society 1996.
65. Schuster Nancy, "Inference in the Vaisesikasutras," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 2: 341-386 (1972).
"Conflicting statements appear in the Vaisesikasutras about how knowledge of imperceptible entities is attained. Passages from the Sutras are compared with the Samkhya Sastitantra, the Nyayasutras, Nyayabhasya, and other early texts. Impact of the Sastitantra on Vaisesikasutras and Nyayabhasya was strong. Contradictions within Vaisesikasutras reveal the compilers' grappling with the Samkhya theory over a period of time. Bias in favor of direct perception dominates the Vaisesika text."
66. Seshagiri Rao K.L., "On truth: a Hindu perspective," *Philosophy East and West* 20: 377-382 (1970).

67. Sharma Chandradhar. *A critical survey of Indian philosophy*. London: Rider & Company 1960.
68. Shastri Dharmendra Nath. *Critique of Indian realism. A study of the conflict between the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Buddhist Dignaga school*. Agra: Agra University 1964.
69. Shastri Dharmendra Nath. *The philosophy of Nyaya Vaisesika and its conflict with the Buddhist Dignaga School (A critique of Indian Realism)*. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidy Prakashan 1976. Third edition 1997.
70. Shastri Gaurinath Bhattacharyya. *The philosophy of word and meaning. Some Indian approaches with special reference to the philosophy of Bhartrhari*. Calcutta: Sanskrit College 1959.
71. Shaw Jaysankar Lal, "Conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence: The Nyaya and the Advaita Vedanta," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 28: 273-293 (2000).
72. Shaw Jaysankar Lal. *Some logical problems concerning existence*. Calcutta: Punthi Pustak 2003.
73. Shaw Jaysankar Lal, "The Nyaya on cognition and negation," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 8: 279-302 (1980).
"The aim of this paper is to discuss the Nyaya concept of negation and the different types of negation. This discussion involves a discussion of the Nyaya concept of cognition, relation and meaning. The Nyaya has drawn a distinction between qualificative and non-qualificative cognition. A qualificative cognition can be represented by the form "arb". The Nyaya concept of negation cannot be said to be a term-negation, or a sentence-negation, or a propositional function negation. The conclusion is that the Nyaya concept of negation does not correspond to any Western concept of negation."
74. Shaw Jaysankar Lal, "The Nyaya on existence, knowability and nameability," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 5: 255-266 (1978).
"One of the aims of this paper is to discuss the different senses of the term 'existence' as used by the Nyaya philosophers. This discussion leads us to a discussion on absence or negation and its role in logic. A discussion on empty terms has also been introduced in this context. According to the Nyaya, existence, knowability and nameability are considered as universal properties. The distinction between these universal properties has been discussed in this context. I have also discussed the question whether the Nyaya has used redundant terms in designating the same imposed property by using three different terms. A distinction between different senses of the term 'property' has also been discussed in this context."
75. Shaw Jaysankar Lal. *The Nyaya on meaning: a commentary on Pandit Visvabandhu*. Calcutta: Punthi Pustak 2003.
76. Shaw Jaysankar Lal, "Universal sentences: Russell, Wittgenstein, Prior, and the Nyaya," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 19: 103-119 (1991).
"The aim of this paper is to discuss I) whether the following sentences have the same meaning, II) whether they have the same truth-value, III) whether there is some assertion common to all of them, and IV) if there is some such assertion, whether it can be defined. 1) all men are mortal, 2) whoever is a man is mortal, 3) wherever there is humanity, then there is mortality, 4) if anyone is a man, then he is mortal, 5) if humanity is present somewhere, then mortality is also present there."
77. Siderits Mark. *Indian philosophy of language. Studies in selected issues*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991.
78. Siderits Mark, "The sense-reference distinction in Indian philosophy of language," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 14: 331-355 (1987).
79. Sinha Jadunath. *A history of Indian philosophy*. Calcutta: Sinha Publishing House 1952. Two volumes: 1952-1956.
80. Sinha Jadunath. *Indian realism*. London: Kegan Paul 1938. Reprint: Dehli, Motilal Banarsidass, 1999.
81. Smart Ninian. *Doctrine and argument in Indian philosophy*. London: Allen and Unwin 1964. Reprinted: Atlantic Highland, Humanities Press, 1976; Second revised edition: Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1992.
82. Staal Frits, "The concept of 'paksa' in Indian logic," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 2: 156-165 (1973).
"The customary assumption that the Indian concepts of hetu, sadhya and paksa correspond to the Aristotelian middle, major and minor terms, respectively, is incorrect. The concept of paksa is used

ambiguously in Indian logic, where it denotes either the term whose property is the sadhya, or the relation between that term and the sadhya. Another ambiguity of the Sanskrit originals, between paksa as used and paksa as mentioned, is resolved in a Chinese translation."

83. Staal Frits, "The concept of metalanguage and its Indian background," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 3: 315-354 (1975).
 "In Indian culture the concept of metalanguage originated early in the context of linguistics and speculations on language; in the West, late in the context of logic. This is related to the grammatical character of Indian culture and the mathematical character of Western culture. Connections are made between metalinguistic notions and technical, in particular poetic and ritual languages; Mantras; the origin of phonetic writing; communication and metacommunication among animals and men; and the origin of language."
84. Staal Frits. *Universals. Studies in Indian logic and linguistics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1988.
85. Taber John A., "Is Indian logic nonmonotonic?," *Philosophy East and West* 54 (2): 143-170 (2004).
 "Claus Oetke, in his "Ancient Indian logic as a theory of non-monotonic reasoning," presents a sweeping new interpretation of the early history of Indian logic. His main proposal is that Indian logic up until Dharmakirti was nonmonotonic in character-similar to some of the newer logics that have been explored in the field of Artificial Intelligence, such as default logic, which abandon deductive validity as a requirement for formally acceptable arguments; Dharmakirti, he suggests, was the first to consider that a good argument should be one for which it is not possible for the property identified as the "reason" (hetu) to occur without the property to be proved (sadhya) -- a requirement akin to deductive validity. Oetke's approach is challenged here, arguing that from the very beginning in India something like monotonic, that is, deductively valid, reasoning was the ideal or norm, but that the conception of that ideal was continually refined, in that the criteria for determining when it is realized were progressively sharpened"
86. Taber John A., "The theory of the sentence in Purva Mimansa and Western philosophy," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 17: 407-430 (1989).
 "The Mimansa school of Indian philosophy developed two distinct theories of the relation of the meaning of a sentence to the meanings of the words that comprise it, the Anvitabhidhana or "qualified designation" theory and the Abhivahanvaya or "designated relation" theory. Both of these theories, I attempt to show, turn on the observation that the meanings of individual words change in different sentences. I go on to suggest that an appreciation of this fact can lead to a solution of the problem, first raised by Frege, of the change of meaning of terms in intensional contexts."
87. Tachikawa Musashi, "A Sixth-century manual of Indian logic," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 1: 111-145 (1971).
 "This article consists of four parts: explanations of basic technical terms as an introduction, a translation of the Nyayapravesa, notes to the translation, and a romanized text based upon Dhruva's edition. This work is Samkarasvamin's introduction to Dignaga's logic, and deals with means of proof, fallacious means of proof, means of refutation, perception, inference, fallacious perception and fallacious inference."
88. Tarkatirtha Visvabandhu, "The Nyaya on the meaning of some words," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 20: 41-88 (1991).
 Translated by Jaysankar Las Shaw.
 "The aim of this paper is to discuss the views of Nyaya philosophers on meaning. This paper deals with the meaning and reference of proper names, and general terms. It also deals with the meanings of homonymous expressions, and discusses the question whether demonstrative pronouns are homonymous terms. Different uses of personal pronouns have been mentioned. The section on the quantifier 'all' deals with different uses of it. Similarly, the section on interrogative pronoun deals with as many as seven uses of an interrogative pronoun. This paper ends with the discussion of the meaning of a sentence."
89. Tiwari Heeraman, "One and many: the early Naiyayikas and the problem of universals," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 22: 137-170 (1994).
 "The problem of universals in Indian philosophy is as old as c. 400 b. C. In his great work,

Astadhyayi, the grammarian Panini introduced the problem of universals while discussing the meaning of a noun. Later, the Nyaya and Vaisesika systems of Indian philosophy discussed the universals in great detail. The present article deals with the early Nyaya view of universals. The article is divided in two parts: one gives a brief general introduction to the problem; the other contains a fresh translation of the Nyaya-Sutras 2.2.58-70 and Vatsyayana's commentary on them. The translation is also supplied with discussions and analysis. The article tries to demonstrate that the Nyaya system extends the debate about word and meaning which was inaugurated by early Sanskrit grammarian (viz., Panini, Patanjali etc.)."

90. Tripathi R.K., "The central problem of Indian metaphysics," *Philosophy East and West* 19 (1): 39-43 (1969).
 "The main argument of my article is to show that the question regarding the metaphysical status of relation is the central problem of Indian metaphysics as it is this that determines the nature of the major systems. four possible alternatives have been discussed: a) relation is as real as the terms (pluralistic realism like the Nyaya etc.), b) the terms are real but the relation (between Prakrti and Purusa) is false (Samkhya dualism), c) the falsity of relation means the falsity of one of the terms also (Advaita Vedanta and Vijnanavada), d) the falsity of relation entails the falsity not only of one term but of both the terms (Madhyamika). I have treated the relation between identity and difference as most basic."
91. Umesha Mishra. *History of Indian philosophy*. Allahabad: Tirabhukti Publications 1957.
92. Van den Bossche Frank, "Existence and non-existence in Haribhadra Suri's Anekanta-jaya-pataka," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 23: 429-468 (1995).
 "In part I of the article the author explains how the problem of negation has led the Jains to accept non-existence as well as existence as constituents or 'Dharmas' of every real object in the world and to formulate the first dialectical principle of the "Anekanta-vada" doctrine: 'Sad-asad-rupam vastu' or 'every real object possesses a mode as an existent and as a nonexistent'. In part II of the article the author explains, using mereology as a logical tool, how Haribhadra Suri defends the Jain viewpoint in his 'Anekanta-jaya-pataka'."
93. Vattanky John. *A system of Indian logic: the Nyaya theory of inference. Analysis, text, translation and interpretation of the anumana section of Karikavali, Muktavali and Dinakari*. London: RoutledgeCurzon 2003.
 "Nyaya is the most rational and logical of all the classical Indian philosophical systems. In the study of Nyaya philosophy, Karikavali with its commentary Muktavali, both by Visvanatha Nyayapancanana, with the commentaries Dinakari and Ramarudri, have been of decisive significance for the last few centuries as advanced introductions to this subject. The present work concentrates on inference (anumana) in Karikavali, Muktavali and Dinakari, carefully divided into significant units according to the subject, and translates and interprets them. Its commentary makes use of the primary interpretation in Sanskrit contained especially in the Ramarudri and Subodhini. The book begins with the Sanskrit texts of Karikavali and Muktavali; followed by English translation of these texts. Next is given the Sanskrit text of Dinakari which comments on the first two texts, followed by its English translation. Lastly, the book contains a commentary on all the texts included."
94. Vattanky John. *Nyaya philosophy of language. Analysis, text, translation and interpretation of Upamana and Sabda sections of Karikavali, Muktavali and Dinakari*. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications 1995.
95. Vattanky John, "The referent of words: universal or individual, the controversies between Mimansakas and Naiyayikas," *Journal of Indian Philosophy*: 51-78 (1993).
 "One of the most important problems discussed in Nyaya philosophy of language is whether words denote an individual or a universal. On this point there are basically two schools of thought which oppose one another, i.e., the Mimansakas and the Naiyayikas. The texts of Muktavali, Dinakari and Ramarudri dealing with this topic give a brilliant summary of the long drawn out conflict between the two Schools. The authors of these texts established the Nyaya position that the denotative function of words is in the individual as qualified by the universal and the present essay examines these arguments and counterarguments."
96. Vidyabhusana Satis Chandra. *A history of Indian logic (ancient, mediæval and modern Schools)*.

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Reprint: Dehli, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2002.
97. Vidyabhusana Satis Chandra. *History of the mediaeval School of Indian logic*. Calcutta: 1909.
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 98. Wada Toshihiro, "The analytical method of Navya-Nyaya," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 29: 519-530 (2001).
 99. Wayman Alex, "Two traditions of India -- truth and silence," *Philosophy East and West* 24: 389-403 (1974).
 100. Williams Paul. Indian philosophy. In *Philosophy 2. Further through the subject*. Edited by Grayling Anthony C. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999. pp. 793-847
 101. Zilberman David B. *Analogy in Indian and Western Philosophical Thought*. Edited by Gourko Helena and Cohen Robert S. Dordrecht: Springer 2006. pp.
 102. Zilberman David B. *The Birth of Meaning in Hindu Thought*. Dordrecht: Reidel 1988.
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