

Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects. Selected Bibliography (M - Z)

First Part of the Bibliography: A - L

Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects

Alexius Meinong: Editions, Translations, Bibliographic Resources and Selected Texts

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3. Mally Ernst. *Grundgesetze des Sollens: Elemente der Logik des Willens*. Graz: Leuschner & Lubensky 1926.
Reprinted in: *Logische Schriften. Grosses Logikfragment - Grundgesetze des Sollen* - Dordrecht, Reidel 1971
4. Manotta Marina, "L'obiettivo di Meinong fra proposizione e stati di cose," *Discipline Filosofiche* 7: 211-237 (1997).
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8. Marc-Wogau Konrad. *Die Ontologie Axel Hägerströms*. In *Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein*. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 47-54
9. Marek Johann Christian, "Zwei Gegenstände und ein Inhalt: Zur Intentionalität bei Meinong," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 50: 341-364 (1995).
10. Mari Laura, "Frege contra Meinong: a new possible outlook," *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* 3: 37-72 (2009).
11. Martinelli Riccardo, "Meinong and music. On musical objects of higher order," *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* 2: 39-71 (2006).
"Music represents a crucial issue in nineteenth-century philosophy and science. Scholars generally possessed a good musical competence and contributed to the explanation of sound perception and aesthetic enjoyment in music. Reflexions on musical psychology, in turn, influenced general theories of mind, sometimes in an impressive way. Meinong plays a remarkable role within this context. Together with Mach, Ehrenfels and Stumpf, Meinong contributed to overtake Helmholtz' physiological theory, supporting a more comprehensive approach. He was repeatedly concerned with problems such as tonal fusion, tone quality (*Klangfarbe*) and melodic perception. Although Meinong did not develop musical problems systematically, he assumed a quite original and interesting position. His ideas have been developed by some of his followers in the School of Graz."
12. Marty Anton, "Über Annahmen," *Zeitschrift für Psychologie* 40: 1-54 (1906).
13. Michaelis Anne, "The conception of possibility in Meinong's "Gegenstandstheorie"," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 2: 394-403 (1942).
14. Miscevic Nenad. *L'à priori intuitionnel: Meinong contre Kant*. In *La philosophie autrichienne de Bolzano à Musil*. Edited by Cometti Jean-Pierre and Mulligan Kevin. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin 2001. pp. 171-188

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16. Modenato Francesca, "A. Meinong: fenomeno, noumeno e percezione esteriore," *Axiomathes*: 361 (1994).
17. Modenato Francesca, "Meinong's theory of objects: an attempt at overcoming psychologism," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 50: 87-112 (1995).
 "I intend to take into account Meinong's theory of objects from a point of view allowed by the author himself, when he agrees that the proper "place" for such a doctrine is the theory of knowledge. According to this suggestion, I think it convenient to explain the doctrine at issue in the light of the definition of knowing as a "double" act, in which the object known is "in front of" the knowing act itself as something comparatively autonomous. From this point of view a comparison with Husserl's "pure logic" - as Meinong again suggests - as well as a valuation of the part played by our philosopher in their common opposition to psychologism seem to be of interest.
 Pure logic seems to answer in the most adequate way the demands that induce Meinong to elaborate a theory of pure objects: such objects are taken into consideration as to their positivity and possibility founded on equally pure operations of a subject. At the same time pure logic provides us with a clue to the ambiguity of *Aussersein*: as a matter of fact, Meinong, freeing himself from the prejudice in favor of what is actual, remains involved in what I would call a prejudice "in favor of what has being"; he thinks it necessary to resort to an assumption, that is to a simulation of being in order to explain our thinking of a non-being object. Furthermore according to him an assumption is in general demanded in order to think of an object as to his so-being, that is of the outside-being object.
 There are two orders of questions: the first one regards the "formal" generality of the fundamental gnosiological problems, leaving out of consideration every "matter" of knowledge, the second refers to the gnosiological-phenomenological foundation of the concepts and of the laws of pure logic. They are absolutely inseparable, and yet strictly distinct. The first order should be the right place for the *Aussersein* of pure objects."
18. Modenato Francesca, "A. Meinong: how to get into touch with things," *Axiomathes*: 61-74 (1996).
19. Modenato Francesca, "Meinong and Husserl on objects and meaning of expressions," *Axiomathes*: 143 (1997).
20. Modenato Francesca, "L'obiettivo e la fattualità secondo Meinong," *Rivista di Storia della Filosofia* 56: 437-464 (1999).
21. Modenato Francesca, "Gli oggetti incompleti e il principio del terzo escluso secondo Meinong," *Rivista di Storia della Filosofia* 56: 63-90 (2001).
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23. Modenato Francesca. *La conoscenza e l'oggetto in Alexius Meinong*. Padova: Il Poligrafo 2006.
24. Morscher Edgar. Von Bolzano zu Meinong: zur Geschichte des logischen Realismus. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 69-102
25. Morscher Edgar, "Meinongs Bedeutungslehre," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 27: 178-206 (1973).
26. Morscher Edgar. Die Geburt der Gegenstandstheorie aus einem Missverständnis? In *Phenomenology and analysis. Essays on Central European philosophy*. Edited by Chrudzimski Arkadiusz and Huemer Wolfgang. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2004. pp. 89-104
27. Mulligan Kevin. Dispositions, their bases and correlates. Meinong analysis. In *Philosophy and logic. In search of the Polish tradition. Essays in Honour of Jan Wolenski on the Occasion of his 60th Birthday*. Edited by Kijania-Placek Katarzyna. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003. pp. 193-212
28. Mulligan Kevin, "Facts, formal objects and ontology," *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* 2: 31-46 (2006).
29. Nef Frédéric. *L'objet quelconque. Recherches sur l'ontologie de l'objet*. Paris: Vrin 1998.
30. Nef Frédéric. La théorie modale de Meinong. In *La philosophie autrichienne de Bolzano à Musil*. Edited by Cometti Jean-Pierre and Mulligan Kevin. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin 2001. pp.

81-100

31. Oliver Alex, "A few remarks on logical form," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 99: 247-272 (1999).
 "Grammar (and the bad old traditional logic) says that quantifier phrases such as 'nobody', 'everyone', 'all women', 'some men' and 'a man' are in the same category as names such as 'Milly', 'Molly' and 'Mandy'. So, prior to their first corrective lessons, students are awfully muddled, the first and fundamental problem being the Woozle hunt for somebody called 'nobody'. Hoorah for modern logic and logic teachers!
 The story used to justify our current logics is entirely fictional. The claims about names and quantifier phrases in English are wildly false. Two of the heroes of modern logic, Russell and Hilbert, make the very mistakes which are falsely blamed on traditional logic. The villain, Meinong, turns out to have been working a different patch. Ideas ascribed to traditional grammar are modern inventions. Neither logicians nor grammarians can be trusted to tell the history of either grammar or logic."
32. Orilia Francesco. *Il dibattito Meinong-Russell e l'influenza di Meinong sulla filosofia analitica contemporanea*. Palermo: Mazzone 1984.
33. Orilia Francesco, "Type-free property theory, Bradley's regress and Meinong and Russell reconceiled," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 39: 103-125 (1991).
34. Orilia Francesco, "States of affairs: Bradley vs. Meinong," *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* 2: 213-238 (2006).
35. Parsons Terence, "A prolegomenon to Meinongian semantics," *Journal of Philosophy* 71: 561-580 (1974).
 "Meinong's philosophy is at present mostly unknown; where it is known it is mostly regarded as unacceptable. This is partly due to its obscurity, and partly to the apparently devastating criticisms directed at it by Bertrand Russell in 1905. In the present paper I attempt to provide a reconstruction of some of Meinong's philosophy which is simultaneously clear, faithful to the original, and immune from Russell's criticisms. Sections 1, 2 and 4 concentrate on his theory of objects; section 3 sketches how to relate such objects to a canonical symbolism."
36. Parsons Terence, "A Meinongian analysis of fictional objects," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 1: 73-76 (1975).
 "Meinong is best known as the loser of the Russell-Meinong debate of 1905. Russell had the last word then, and (unfortunately) most of us know only his version of Meinong's views.' But there is more to be said on Meinong's side. In an earlier paper I tried to develop a version of Meinong's ontology which is clear, consistent, and immune to Russell's attacks. Most importantly, that theory preserves - rather than analyses away - Meinong's radical and exciting ontological views: that there are non-existent objects; that there are impossible objects; etc.
 So what? We want more of a theory than clarity and consistency; we also want reason to believe that it's true. How might we offer evidence in favor of such a theory? I think that the only evidence that we ever have in favor of a general metaphysical theory is that it has many interesting applications. The Meinongian theory agrees with more orthodox theories in its treatment of existing objects, so any evidence in its favor will consist of applications to issues concerning non-existent objects. The present paper contains one of these; it's an application of the Meinongian theory to an analysis of fictional objects.
 By "fictional" I do not mean "non-existent", but rather "occurring in fiction". Many fictional objects are indeed non-existent, and it is their non-existence that in some sense causes all the problems, but fictional works also abound in reference to real objects, and this fact must be taken into account. I will begin by giving an exposition of the Meinongian ontology." p. 73
37. Parsons Terence, "Nuclear and extranuclear properties, Meinong and Leibniz," *Noûs* 12: 137-151 (1978).
 "In *A Prolegomenon to Meinongian Semantics* (1974) and in *A Meinongian analysis of fictional objects* (1975) I attempted to develop a theory of objects for a Meinongian ontology. That theory presupposed an account of two sorts of properties, called "nuclear" and "extranuclear" properties. This paper is an attempt to provide such an account. The theory developed here is a rich and parochial one, based on the notion of "possible world." In the last section I will show how, relative

to this account of properties, Leibniz's ontology of monads (on one construal, anyway) corresponds to a fragment of Meinong's ontology of objects.

Since most of this paper utilizes the controversial notion of a "possible world," the Editor has requested that I include a defense of this line of approach. Is it really useful to base a theory of properties on such a notion?

I don't believe that this question can be answered with any degree of certainty by anyone right now. In my view, "possible worlds" are theoretical entities, and as such they are as useful or useless as the theories within which they appear. At present, theories using possible worlds are both varied and controversial. Some have a long tradition; for example, probability theory, where possible worlds typically appear under the title "possible cases". More recently they have been used in theories dealing with necessity, possibility, essence, belief, knowledge, proposition, intension, freedom, etc. This is a fruitful tradition, and I don't believe that we know at present whether it will last, or whether it is a blind alley which will eventually be seen as an historical aberration. But even in the latter case there is hope for theories based on possible worlds. For even when scientific or philosophical progress leads to the abandonment of an earlier tradition, many of the "results" of that earlier tradition tend to be preserved in some new guise. So in spite of the controversial nature of possible worlds, I think we have learned enough of lasting value from their employment to justify not terminating their tradition yet."

38. Parsons Terence, "The methodology of nonexistence," *Journal of Philosophy* 76: 649-662 (1979). "There is apparent evidence that some objects do not exist; i. e., that there are objects that do not exist. "Naive object theory" (sometimes attributed to Meinong) takes this evidence at face value, but leads to contradiction. Several ideas about how to develop a more sophisticated account have been proposed, but not worked out in detail. The paper discusses some issues that will be encountered by any theory of nonexistent objects, using the theory of my forthcoming book, *Nonexistent objects*, as an example."
39. Parsons Terence. *Nonexistent objects*. New Haven/London: Yale University Press 1980.
40. Parsons Terence, "Are there nonexistent objects?," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 19: 365-371 (1982).
41. Parsons Terence, "Meinongian semantics generalized," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 50: 145-161 (1995).
"It is tempting to think that Meinong overlooked the "specific/nonspecific" distinction. For example, "I am looking for a grey horse" may either mean that there is a specific horse I am looking for (e.g., one I lost), or just that I am grey-horse-seeking.
The former reading, and not the latter, requires for its truth that there be a grey horse. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether it is defensible to maintain Meinong's theory here: to take nonspecific reading of *any* verb concerning a possibly nonexistent but incomplete object. This requires essential appeal to the distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties. Included is a discussion of criticisms of Meinong's own theory and of the Medieval theory of ampliation, according to which psychological discourse can "ampliate" a term such as 'chimera' so as to stand for one or more things that cannot exist, yet are chimeras. The paper concludes inconclusively."
42. Pasniczek Jacek. The Meinongian logic vs. the classical logic. In *Theories of objects: Meinong and Twardowski*. Edited by Pasniczek Jacek. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Słodowskiej 1992. pp. 105-112
43. Pasniczek Jacek, "The simplest Meinongian logic," *Logique et Analyse* 143-144: 329-342 (1993). "The Meinongian logic is a logic which accommodates main principles of Meinong's theory of objects. This principles give rise to a very extensive ontology which contains various kind of nonexistent entities (e.g., incomplete and impossible ones). In the paper quite a simple Meinongian logic is developed. This logic has the following features: 1) it is extensional, 2) it differs slightly from the classical first-order logic, 3) it is a first-order system, 4) it is closer to the natural language than classical logic, 5) it is much more simple than Meinongian systems created by T. Parsons and E. Zalta."
44. Pasniczek Jacek, "Ways of reference to Meinongian objects: ontological commitments of Meinongian theories," *Logic and Logical Philosophy* 2: 69-86 (1994).
"Meinong's views are usually associated with an highly inflated ontology including various kinds of

nonexistent objects, incomplete and impossible ones among others. Around the turn of the century B. Russell strongly criticised this ontology accusing it of inconsistency. And perhaps because of this criticism Meinong's views have been forgotten for a long time. Only recently some philosophers have created theories of objects which are formalisations of Meinong's ontology or which are directly inspired by the ontology. However there still remains a need to discuss the problem of ways of reference to Meinongian objects regarding their specific structure of predication, and the interrelated problem of ontological commitment of those theories.

Meinong's ontological theory seems to be not so bizzare if we interpret it as a theory of *possible intentional objects*, i.e. possible objects of consciousness. And this interpretation perfectly agrees with phenomenological tradition from Brentano to Husserl and with the contemporary philosophy of mind. Needless to say reference is a special form of intentional relation so semantical investigations into these objects are of great relevance for general theory of intentionality."

45. Pasniczek Jacek, "Are contradictions still lurking in Meinongian theories of objects?," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 50: 293-303 (1995).

"Contemporary formalizations of Meinong's theory of objects prove that Russell's accusation of inconsistency of the theory is not valid.

However, in the same formalizations there has appeared a new source of potential inconsistency. Theories of objects inspired by Meinong's ontology usually include, in addition to basic principles of the ontology, abstraction-axioms for defining objects and properties (relations). Although these axioms seem to be perfectly acceptable, they lead to paradoxes when adopted without any restrictions. These paradoxes may be understood as paradoxes of size (not of self-referentiality): too many objects or too many properties are defined by the axioms. We can avoid them at the cost of counterintuitive stipulations, some of them similar to those applied in set theory or in higher-order logics (like a stratification of formulas). We need, however, to look for phenomenologically well-grounded protections against paradoxes. This search can deepen our understanding of the nature of Meinongian objects."

46. Pasniczek Jacek, "Meinong's ontology vs. Lesniewski's ontology (Toward a Meinongian calculus of names)," *Axiomathes*: 279 (1996).
47. Pasniczek Jacek. *The logic of intentional objects: a Meinongian version of classical logic*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997.
48. Pasniczek Jacek. The Meinongian logic of fiction. In *The School of Alexius Meinong*. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana, Jacqueline Dale, and Poli Roberto. Aldershot: Ashgate 2001. pp. 457-476
49. Pelletier Francis Jeffry and Zalta Edward, "How to say goodbye to the Third Man," *Noûs* 34: 165-202 (2000).
50. Perszyk Kenneth J., "What's wrong with impossible objects?," *Philosophical Papers* 18: 241-251 (1989).

"Meinongians claim that in addition to objects which exist (at some time), there are possible and impossible objects. With the developments of various versions of possible-worlds semantics and modal logics, one might say that hostility to possible objects has abated somewhat, though Meinongian claims that they do not exist or have being in any sense and that some of them are concrete individuals or particulars are highly contentious. Hostility to impossible objects, on the other hand, remains undiminished, if it has not intensified."

51. Perszyk Kenneth J. *Nonexistent Objects. Meinong and Contemporary Philosophy*. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1993.
Contents: Preface XI-XIX; 1. Introductory Considerations 1; 2. Meinong's Theory of Objects 39; 3. The Nature of Meinong's Objects: Existent and Nonexistent 92; 4. Two Main Arguments for Nonexistents 151; 5. Main Arguments Against Nonexistents 224; Bibliography 286-303.
52. Pichler Hans. *Über Christian Wolffs Ontologie*. Leipzig: Dürr 1910.
The first contribution to the history of the theory of objects.
53. Poli Roberto, "Object and measurement in Mally's Untersuchungen," *Axiomathes*: 173-186 (1996).
54. Poli Roberto. General theses of the theory of objects. In *The School of Alexius Meinong*. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana, Jacqueline Dale, and Poli Roberto. Aldershot: Ashgate 2005. pp. 347-372
55. Poser Hans. Der Möglichkeitsbegriff Meinongs. In *Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein*. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 187-204

56. Potrc Matjaz and Vospernik Miklavz, "Meinong on psychophysical measurement," *Axiomathes*: 187-202 (1996).
57. Potrc Matjaz and Strahovnik Vojko, "Meinongian scorekeeping," *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* 1: 309-330 (2005).
 "Some commitments at the interface of semantics and ontology, such as numbers, symphonies, incomplete objects, values, oughts or possibilities tend to appear problematic. The scorekeeping approach to semantics introduces contextually shifting parameters that allow for construal of truth as indirect correspondence.
 Meinong did recognize diversity and richness that is made possible by the non-reductionist engagement of the scorekeeping approach. Because of his commitment to the deep presupposition of direct correspondence construal of truth though, Meinong had to interpret richness of normative discursive scorekeeping commitments as richness of ontological strata, features and engagements. Once as Meinong's theory is adapted to the construal of truth as indirect correspondence, many problems related to his objects dissolve, naturally placing his scorekeeping discovery into discursive normative setting. A translation of Meinongian objects into discursive scores confirms that his discovery aims at these indeed, which is obscured by his sticking to the construal of truth as direct correspondence."
58. Pouivet Roger, "Lukasiewicz: de l'aristotélisme autrichien à l'aristotélisme polonais," *Philosophiques* 26: 263-277 (1999).
 "En 1910, Jan Lukasiewicz publiait *Du principe de contradiction chez Aristote* (1). Dans cet article, on explique les points principaux du livre de Lukasiewicz. Ce dernier affirme qu'Aristote n'a pas réussi dans sa tentative pour justifier le principe de contradiction. En fait, ce principe est moins logique qu'éthique, selon Lukasiewicz, et cela explique bien des difficultés posées par la théorie d'Aristote. On discute également de la façon dont Lukasiewicz utilise la notion d'« objets contradictoires », empruntée à la Théorie des Objets de Meinong; on montre que Lukasiewicz se situe dans le cadre d'une version Brentanienne de l'aristotélisme. Certaines connexions entre Lukasiewicz et la conception Wittgensteinienne de la nécessité ou le conservatisme logique de Quine sont indiquées. Le but de mon article est essentiellement d'encourager une lecture attentive du livre qui n'a pas reçu l'attention qu'il mérite parce qu'il a été écrit à l'origine en polonais. Souvent, les philosophes croient connaître son contenu à travers le résumé que Lukasiewicz écrivit en allemand en 1910, et qui a été traduit en anglais. Mais, en fait, il y a bien des choses importantes dans le livre qui n'apparaissent nullement dans le résumé."
- (1) Traduction française par Dorota Sikora: Paris, Editions de l'éclat, 2000, avec une préface de R. Pouivet.
59. Priest Graham, "Meinongianism and the philosophy of mathematics," *Philosophia Mathematica* 11: 3-15 (2003).
 "If meinongianism isn't dead, nothing is', Gilbert Ryle is reputed to have said, in the heyday of Oxford Philosophy. (1) I think that Ryle was exactly right. No idea in philosophy is ever past its use-by date, at least, no idea of any substance. We may always come back and find new depths in it, new applications for it, new answers to objections that were taken to be decisive. Thus, for example, platonism has re-emerged many times in the history of Western philosophy, most recently in a perhaps unexpected place: in connection with technical results in the foundations of mathematics. Aristotelian virtue ethics has reappeared recently after a long period in which ethics has been dominated by Kantianism and utilitarianism. And so the list goes on.
 Of course, this is not how Ryle intended his words to be understood. What he meant was that meinongianism was dead for all time. It would perform no Lazarus-like return. For many years I shared Ryle's view. Educated about thirty years ago in Britain, I took it for granted that Russell had shown that meinongianism was little more than superstition (though one that he himself had subscribed to for quite a long time), and that Quine had shown that it was all just simple obfuscation. That which exists is that over which one can quantify; and that's that.
 Thus it was that I was outraged when I met Richard Routley (Sylvan as he later became) in the mid-1970s, and found him stoutly defending a version of meinongianism. (Richard never defended a view in any other way!) I could not understand how the view could possibly be taken seriously. It

was my good fortune not just to have met Richard, but to have been able to 4 talk with him about the matter over many years. He persuaded me that all the knock-down arguments that I thought I had were lame or just begged the question. He persuaded me that meinongianism is a very simple, natural, and common-sense view. He persuaded me that the theory has many applications to areas of philosophy where more orthodox views creak at the seams. I am still not sure whether or not I believe it.; but I certainly lean towards it in certain areas."

(1) I have not been able to track down the source of this quote; so it may just be hearsay. [Note added by Raul Corazzon: "Let us frankly concede from the start that *Gegenstandstheorie* itself is dead, buried and not going to be resurrected." Gilbert Ryle - *Intentionality-theory and the nature of thinking* (1972) - p. 7]

60. Priest Graham and Read Stephen, "Intentionality: Meinongianism and the medievals," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 82: 421-442 (2004).
 "Intentional verbs create three different problems: problems of nonexistence, of indeterminacy, and of failure of substitutivity.
 Meinongians tackle the first problem by recognizing nonexistent objects; so too did many medieval logicians. Meinongians and the medievals approach the problem of indeterminacy differently, the former diagnosing an ellipsis for a propositional complement, the latter applying their theory directly to non-propositional complements.
 The evidence seems to favor the Meinongian approach. Faced with the third problem, Ockham argued bluntly for substitutivity when the intentional complement is non-propositional; Buridan developed a novel way of resisting substitutivity. Ockham's approach is closer to the Meinongian analysis of these cases; Buridan's seems to raise difficulties for a referential semantics. The comparison between the Meinongian and medieval approaches helps to bring out merits and potential pitfalls of each."
61. Purtil Richard, "Meinongian deontic logic," *Philosophical Forum* 4: 585-592 (1973).
 "In modal logic we can think of ourselves as dealing with four "truth values": 1) necessarily true, 2) factually true, 3) factually false, and 4) necessarily false. It turns out that it is not possible to regard modal logic merely as a four-valued logic; what we need in fact is an infinite number of values. But to a limited extent, a four-valued interpretation of modal logic is useful and suggestive. (1) This being so, it is tempting to look for a four-valued interpretation of deontic logic, which has so many parallels with modal logic. But what four values are we to take, and how are they to be related? In this paper I would like to develop a suggestion made by Meinong, and relate it to some modern problems, giving at least the beginnings of a "Meinongian" deontic logic."
- (1) For a fuller discussion of these points, see my *Four valued tables and modal logic*, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic [11, 1970 pp. 505-511].
62. Rapaport William J., "Intentionality and the structure of existence", Indiana University, Bloomington, 1976.
63. Rapaport William J., "Meinongian theories and a Russellian paradox," *Noûs* 12: 153-180 (1978).
 "This essay presents a re-examination of Alexius Meinong's article *Über Gegenstandstheorie* (*On the Theory of Objects*) and undertakes a clarification and revision of it which, I hope, is both faithful to Meinong and capable of overcoming the various objections to his theory that have appeared in the literature. (1) I then turn to a discussion of a historically and technically interesting Russell-style paradox that arises in the modified theory. I also examine the alternative Meinong-inspired theories of Hector-Neri Castañeda and Terence Parsons, using the modified theory as a sharper tool for investigating their worth than that provided by unaided intuitions or less comprehensive, ad-hoc theory fragments.
 As with all theories, many of my claims are not susceptible of proof but, rather, gain their plausibility and value from their ability to deal with data and to provide solutions to various problems. The two main problems which, I believe, a properly constructed Meinongian theory ought to be capable of handling are, first, a linguistic problem of long-standing philosophical concern: that of providing a foundation for a semantics of natural languages, and, second, the problem of intentionality and the analysis of the structure of psychological discourse. Even Quine, ordinarily no

friend of intentional language, attests to the importance of the latter problem, considering such discourse to be "less clearly dispensable" than other modalities (*Replies* [to Follesdal] in: D. Davidson and J. Hintikka (eds.) - *Words and objections* - Dordrech, Reidel, 1969, p. 336). For this problem, the theory must embody a characterization of the objects of thought (in the sense of that which is thought about). In order to account for the psychological phenomenon illustrated by puzzles concerning objects considered under different descriptions (e.g., the morning star and the evening star), the objects of thought must be "non-substitutable"; i.e., it must be possible for a person to believe that an entity, a, has a property, F, without believing (or being committed to the belief) that an entity, b, has F, even when a and b are said to be the same entity.

To serve as a foundation for a natural-language semantics, the theory must account for the uniformity of thought and language with respect to fact and fiction, i.e., our ability to think and talk about anything. This observation, incidentally, is common to all philosophers who countenance non-existing objects. The theory ought also to provide for a total semantic interpretation function by supplying "referents" for all "non-referring" expressions. By means of such a function, the theory can account for the truth values, taken as part of the initial data, of sentences containing "non-referring" expressions (e.g., 'The golden mountain is golden'). To do this, properties must be meaningfully (i.e., truly and falsely) predicable, in some sense, of non-existents. Finally, a means of quantifying over the "referents" of "non-referring" terms will require an underlying "free" logic in which 'exists' will be an informative predicate not embodied in the quantificational machinery of the theory."

(1) Gustav Bergmann - *Meaning and existence* - Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1959.

64. Rapaport William J., "An adverbial Meinongian theory," *Analysis* 39: 75-81 (1979).
 "A fundamental assumption of Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects (1904) is the act-content-object (ACO) analysis of psychological experiences. I suggest that Meinong's theory *need not* be based on this analysis, but that an *adverbial* theory might suffice. I then defend the adverbial alternative against a recent objection raised by Roderick Chisholm, and conclude by presenting an apparently more serious objection based on a paradox discovered by Romane Clark."
65. Rapaport William J., "How to make the world fit our language: an essay in Meinongian semantics," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 14: 1-21 (1981).
 "Natural languages differ from most formal languages in having a partial, rather than a total, semantic interpretation function; e.g., some noun phrases don't refer. the usual semantics for handling such noun phrases (e.g., Russell, Quine) require syntactic reform. The alternative presented here is semantic expansion, viz., enlarging the range of the interpretation function to make it total. a specific ontology based on Meinong's theory of objects, which can serve as domain on interpretation, is suggested, and related to the work of Castañeda, Frege, Katz and Fodor, Parsons, and Scott."
66. Rapaport William J., "Meinong, defective objects and (psycho)-logical paradox," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 18: 17-40 (1982).
 "Alexius Meinong developed a notion of "defective objects" in order to account for various logical and psychological paradoxes. The notion is of historical interest, since it presages recent work on the logical paradoxes by Herzberger and Kripke. But it fails to do the job it was designed for. However, a technique implicit in Meinong's investigation is more successful and can be adapted to resolve a similar paradox discovered by Romane Clark in a revised version of Meinong's Theory of Objects (W. J. Rapaport *Meinongian theories and a Russellian Paradox* - *Noûs*, 12, 1978 pp. 153-180; Errata *Noûs*, 13, 1979 p. 125). One family of paradoxes remains, but it is argued that they are unavoidable and relatively harmless."
67. Rapaport William J., "To Be and Not To Be," *Noûs* 19: 255-271 (1985).
68. Rapaport William J., "Non-existent objects and epistemological ontology," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 25/26: 61-95 (1986).
 "This essay examines the role of non-existent objects in "epistemological ontology" - the study of the entities that make thinking possible. An earlier revision of Meinong's Theory of Objects is reviewed, Meinong's notions of *Quasisein* and *Aufiersein* are discussed, and a theory of Meinongian

objects as "combinatorially possible" entities is presented."

69. Raspa Venanzio, "Su ciò che non esiste. Da Bolzano a Meinong: un *excursus* nella filosofia austriaca," *Studi Urbinati.B: Scienze Umane e Sociali* 67: 115-201 (1996).
70. Raspa Venanzio, "Signs, shadow-like expression and fictional objects: Meinong's observations of a semiotics of fiction," *Zeitschrift für Semiotik* 23 (2001).
71. Raspa Venanzio, "Phantasie, Phantasieerlebnisse und Vorstellungsproduktion bei Meinong," *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* 1: 95-128 (2005).
72. Raspa Venanzio, "Fictional and aesthetic objects. Meinong's point of view," *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* 2: 47-80 (2006).
73. Raspa Venanzio, "Thinking with and on Meinong in Italy," *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* 2: 7-38 (2006).
Introduction to Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien vol. 2: *Meinongian issues in contemporary Italian philosophy*
74. Reibenschuch Gernot. Über den Begriff des Wertes bei Meinong. In *Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein*. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 245-260
75. Reicher Maria Elisabeth, "Gibt es unvollständige Gegenstände? Unvollständigkeit, Möglichkeit und der Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten bei Meinong," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 50: 217-232 (1996).
76. Reicher Maria Elisabeth, "Gibt es Gegenstände, die nicht existieren?," *Metaphysica.International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics* 1: 135-162 (2000).
"Those who are -- in the tradition of Meinong -- willing to accept the claim that there are objects that do not exist usually argue that the ontological commitment to nonexistent objects allows to resolve a variety of problems of reference and intentionality. The aim of this paper is to show that the commitment to nonexistents does not resolve any of these problems and that, consequently, problems of reference and intentionality do not provide a reason for the assumption that there are objects that do not exist."
77. Reicher Maria Elisabeth. Die Logik der Intentionalität: Meinongs Eigenschaftsarten und Mallys duale Kopula. In *Bausteine zu einer Geschichte der Philosophie an der Universität Graz*. Edited by Binder Thomas. Amsterdam: Rodopi 2001. pp. 219-234
"The paper deals with Alexius Meinong's theory of "auxiliary objects", which, according to Meinong, provide us with a link between our thoughts and the (extramental) reality our thoughts are directed upon.
In its original form, this theory is contradictory. There are two strategies to free the theory from contradictions: (1) a distinction between "nuclear" and "extranuclear" properties (adopted by Meinong); (2) a distinction between "satisfying" a property and "being determined by" a property (adopted by Mally). It is argued that Meinong's strategy works only if it is interpreted in such a way that it can be reduced to Mally's strategy."
78. Reicher Maria Elisabeth. Russell, Meinong, and the problem of existent nonexistents. In *On denoting 1905-2005*. Edited by Imaguire Guido and Linsky Bernard. München: Philosophia Verlag 2005. pp. 167-193
"In "On Denoting" Russell attacked Alexius Meinong's so-called "theory of objects" (*Gegenstandstheorie*), arguing, among other things, that according to Meinong's theory both the sentence "The existent present King of France exists" and "The existent present King of France does not exist" is true, which would render Meinong's theory inconsistent. Some Neo-Meinongians have claimed that one could avoid this consequence by making use of a distinction between two kinds of properties ("nuclear" and "extranuclear" ones), which Meinong worked into his theory several years after "On Denoting". My aim in this paper is to re-evaluate this contemporary attempt to defend Meinong's theory against Russell's attack and to offer an alternative solution."
79. Reicher Maria Elisabeth. Alexius von Meinong: Über Gegenstände, Annahmen und Werte. In *Geschichte der österreichischen Humanwissenschaften. Vol 6.2: Philosophie und Religion: Gott, Sein und Solle*. Edited by Acham Karl von. Wien: Passagen 2006. pp. 187-205
Vol. 6.2:
80. Reicher Maria Elisabeth. Die Grazer Schule der Gegenstandstheorie. In *Bausteine zur Geschichte der Philosophie an der Universität Graz*. Edited by Binder Thomas. Amsterdam: Rodopi 2007. pp.

173-207

81. Rescher Nicholas and Brandom Robert. *The logic of inconsistency. A study in non-standard possible worlds semantics and ontology*. Oxford: Blackwell 1980.
82. Rollinger Robin D. *Meinong and Husserl on Abstraction and Universals. From Hume Studies I to Logical Investigations II*. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1993.
83. Rollinger Robin D., "Meinong on perception: two-questions concerning propositional seeing," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 50: 445-455 (1995).
"While Meinong makes scattered remarks about perception in various writings, the one text in which he makes a concentrated effort to work out a theory of perception is *Über die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens* (1905). This paper is a critical examination of the theory which is presented there, but also some other texts are taken into account. Special attention will be given to Meinong's views on the object (Gegenstand) of perception, both the propositional object (Objektiv) and the non-propositional object (Objekt) which is allegedly "part" of the propositional object. Also, some contrasts and parallels between these views and those of other members of the Brentano School, e.g. Husserl's notion of categorial perception are discussed."
84. Rollinger Robin D., "Meinong and Husserl on Assumptions," *Axiomathes* 7: 89-102 (1996).
85. Rollinger Robin D. *Austrian Theories of Judgment: Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl*. In *Phenomenology and Analysis. Essays on Central European Philosophy*. Edited by Chrudzimski Arkadiusz and Huemer Wolfgang. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2004. pp. 257-284
Reprinted in: R. D. Rollinger, *Austrian Phenomenology. Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object*, Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2009, pp. 233-262.
86. Rollinger Robin D., "Meinong and Brentano," *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* 1: 159-198 (2005).
"Meinong, like other noteworthy philosophers from central Europe, began his career in philosophy under the guidance of Franz Brentano. Though Meinong's philosophical investigations from early on were very Brentanian in character, he came to develop views that diverged from certain doctrines of his mentor. In epistemology Meinong introduced the notion of immediate evidence of surmise in his views on memory and perception, whereas Brentano found this notion unacceptable. In descriptive psychology Meinong regarded feelings and desires as two distinct classes and introduced an additional class of mental phenomena called "assumptions". Thus he opposed Brentano's classification of mental phenomena into presentations, judgments, and acts of love and hate. In ontology Meinong allowed for non-real objects. In value theory he even introduced the notion of special irrealia corresponding to feelings and desires. Brentano, however, came to reject irrealia altogether. Such differences are discussed here, but attention is also given to the underlying and enduring philosophical affinity between Meinong and Brentano, namely their commitment to the ideal of scientific philosophy as attainable through descriptive psychology (what might be called "descriptive phenomenology"), which is concerned with intentionally directed consciousness as its subject matter and does not in any way differ methodologically from natural science."
87. Routley Richard and Routley Valerie, "Rehabilitating Meinong's theory of objects," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 27: 224-254 (1973).
88. Routley Richard, "Another "fatal" objection to Meinongian objects," *Philosophical Studies. An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition* 25: 131-134 (1974).
89. Routley Richard, "The durability of impossible objects," *Inquiry. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy* 19: 247-250 (1976).
"Meinong's theory of impossible objects is defended against a number of objections, In particular against Karel Lambert's argument (see "Impossible objects," "Inquiry", Volume 17, 1974, pages 303-14) that no objects are impossible."
90. Routley Richard. *Exploring Meinong's jungle and beyond: an investigation of noneism and the theory of items*. Canberra: Australian National University 1979.
91. Routley Richard, "The (logical) importance of not existing," *Dialogue* 18: 129-165 (1979).
92. Routley Richard, "The theory of objects as commonsense," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 9: 1-22 (1979).
"Meinong's theory of objects offers an alternative to entrenched logical theory which is non-reductionist, anti-verificationist and commonsense. A beginning is made on proving that the

theory is a commonsense one. This involves characterizing refined commonsense and commonsense philosophy, upon sharpening the theses of the theory of objects, And indicating how these theses can, and do, fit into a commonsense position."

93. Russell Bertrand, "Meinong's theory of complexes and assumptions," *Mind* 13: 204-219; 336-354; 509-524 (1904).
Reprinted in: *Essays in Analysis* - edited by Douglas Lackey (1973) pp. 21-76
94. Russell Bertrand, "On denoting," *Mind* 14: 479-493 (1905).
Reprinted in: *Essays in Analysis* - edited by Douglas Lackey (1973) pp. 103-119
95. Russell Bertrand, "Review of: A. Meinong, Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie," *Mind* 14: 530-538 (1905).
Reprinted in: *Essays in Analysis* - edited by Douglas Lackey (1973) pp. 77-88
96. Russell Bertrand, "Review of: A. Meinong, Uber die Stellung der Gegestandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften," *Mind* 16: 436-439 (1907).
Reprinted in: *Essays in Analysis* - edited by Douglas Lackey (1973) pp. 89-93
97. Ryle Gilbert. Intentionality theory and the nature of thinking. In *Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein*. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 7-14
Reprinted in: *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* - 27, 1973 pp. 255-265
98. Sajama Seppo, "Meinong on the foundations of deontic logic," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 32: 69-81 (1988).
"Traditional moral theories appear to be unable to give a credible account of the relationship between deontic and axiological concepts, i.e., Duty and Value. Of the two traditional solutions to this problem, One emphasises the independence of the two realms, Whereas mill argues that duty is definable in terms of goodness. In this paper I present Meinong's law of omission which offers, In my opinion, a promising alternative to these two traditional views."
99. Salice Alessandro, "Il concetto di *Aussersein* nella Teoria degli Oggetti di Alexius Meinong", 2002. Tesi di Laurea inedita sostenuta all'Università di Torino, Anno Accademico 2001-2002, Relatore: Maurizio Ferraris.
100. Salice Alessandro, "Alexius Meinong: oggetto e *Aussersein*," *Rivista di Estetica* 44: 201-214 (2004).
101. Santambrogio Marco, "Meinongian theories of generality," *Noûs*: 647-673 (1990).
"It is not widely appreciated that Meinong's non-existent objects are closely related with Twardowski's general objects and Locke's general abstract triangle. The latter is usually thought to be an incoherent notion. In order to disprove that, a formal semantics for such objects is outlined. The adequacy conditions it satisfies are discussed in detail. It is argued that general objects are needed e.g., in order to account for such uses of definite descriptions as in 'The whale is a mammal'. The central section of the paper is devoted to discussing which notion of reference is appropriate for general objects."
102. Schermann Hans. Husserl II Logische Untersuchung und Meinongs Hume-Studien I. In *Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein*. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 103-116
103. Schock Rolf. *Logics without existence assumptions*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 1968.
104. Schubert Kalsi Marie-Luise, "On Meinong's pseudo-objects," *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* 11: 115-124 (1980).
"Consequences of Meinong's theory of pseudo-objects are discussed, in the context of *On emotional presentation* chapter 2, they are essential for Meinong's theory of knowledge and for the solving of paradoxes pertaining to self-referential thoughts or expressions. Pseudo-objects are mental entities corresponding directly to presentational experiences. The relationship of pseudo-objects to perceptual and conceptual objects is discussed and also their relationship to idea (contents) and language."
105. Schubert Kalsi Marie-Luise. Meinong's criticism of Husserl's "Ideas I". In *Phenomenology dialogues and bridges*. Edited by Bruzina Ronald and Wilshire Bruce. Albany: State University of New York Press 1982. pp. 213-227
106. Schubert Kalsi Marie-Luise, "On evidence according to Meinong and Chisholm," *Philosophical Topics* 13: 77-86 (1985).

"The concept of 'evident' (and 'evidence') in Meinong's and Chisholm's writings are investigated. Meinong's term is studied in only one of its several meanings. It was found that 'evident' is a relation holding between a proposition and a person. Its presence is indicated and known by the person by a feeling of justification (Meinong) and sensibly taking (Chisholm). 'evident' is a psychological epistemological concept and the presence of the relation cannot be objectively ascertained. The relationship between evident and its mark is pre-given and unexplained."

107. Schubert Kalsi Marie-Luise. *Meinong's Theory of Knowledge*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1987.

108. Schubert Kalsi Marie-Luise, "Incompleteness and *Tertium Non Datur*," *Conceptus. Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 27: 203-218 (1994).

"The article investigates Meinong's claim that the *tertium non datur* does not hold for objects which he calls "incompletely determined" and for objects which have a peculiar kind of deficient or pseudo-being which he calls "Aussersein" as e.g., inherently contradictory objects.

Both, objects and kinds of being are examined: first, existence; second, subsistence and Aussersein; third, completely versus incompletely determined objects. They will be discussed on the basis of Meinong's theory of presentation together with the completeness of fictional objects. It is shown that incomplete determination is not ontologically pre-given. An object is incompletely determined if it is intended to be so. The *tertium non datur* fails to apply as a consequence of our intentional attitude. Finally, the exceptional status of objectives in respect to incompleteness is acknowledged."

109. Schuhmann Karl, "Der Wertbegriff beim frühen Meinong," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 50: 521-535 (1995).

110. Schuhmann Karl, "Daubert and Meinong," *Axiomathes*: 75-88 (1996).

111. Sierszulska Anna. *Meinong on Meaning and Truth*. Frankfurt am Main: Ontos Verlag 2005.

Introduction: "Most studies of Meinong's philosophy concentrate on ontological issues and they are often accompanied by providing a logical system of so called Meinongian logic. The epistemological problems are raised rarely and primarily in the light of historical considerations. The purpose of this study is to provide a presentation of the views of Alexius Meinong upon truth and related issues, in such a way as to expose the points which may be interesting for analytic philosophers.

Part I contains an outline of Meinong's theory of objects and his account of intentionality. The subjective "contents" of mental acts are contrasted with "objects" of different kinds. Chapter 2 focuses upon objects of higher order and the notion of an objective. Meinong's notion of Aussersein is introduced and it is claimed that objectives are abstract entities belonging to Aussersein.

Part II presents Meinong's theory of meaning and his views related to truth and cognition. The conception of meaning is discussed especially in relation to the views of Husserl and Frege upon this issue. Meinong's theory of truth is shown to be a version of logical realism, where identity of logical structure between an objective intended and reality is the basic idea but no facts as entities in reality are postulated. A Fregean interpretation of Meinong's theory of objectives as function-like entities, and not as states of affairs, is proposed. Factuality of objectives is interpreted non-objectually as the "obtaining" of objectives. The notion of self-evidence of judgments is presented in the role of Meinong's substitute criterion of truth. The problem with subjectivity of the experience of self-evidence is solved in Meinong's conception by means of probability attribution in uncertain epistemic contexts.

Part III contains a discussion of the reception of Meinong's ideas related to truth, since Russell until the present time. This part contains a chapter concerning Russell's interpretation of Meinong's objectives as complexes, in agreement with Russell's early theory of singular propositions. It is shown why this is not a correct interpretation. The issues addressed are the accusations of psychologism directed at Meinong and the mutual misunderstandings about ontological questions between these philosophers. Meinong's reaction to these criticisms is presented, mainly as expressed in the second edition of *On Assumptions*. Next, there is a polemical discussion with these critics who regard Meinong's objectives either as complexes or as states of affairs. And finally, some objections related to Meinong's understanding of truth and cognition are attended to. These objections concern mainly the traces of Kantian idealism in Meinong's epistemological views. In the case of empirical judgments, there is no certainty whether they are true in the objective sense, but such uncertainty in the process of cognition does not imply that we have no possibility to acquire objective knowledge. Scepticism is overcome, because we know that many of our judgments are

highly probable.

Part IV is devoted to an analysis of some typical features of Meinongian-style semantics. Chapters 8 and 9 present Meinong's original views by way of comparing his ideas to later developments within Meinongian semantic theories. It is observed that if a semantic domain is understood in the characteristic Meinongian way, it contains both real and meaning-objects of different kinds. This feature of a Meinongian-style semantics is responsible for what is proposed to be called a "double theoretical approach" to objects. It is shown that two senses of being, of quantification, of predication, of extension and of linguistic reference are required, in order to provide a theoretical framework which applies both to real objects and to abstract sense-entities. The main questions discussed in this part are related to the consequences of introducing "merely semantic" objects into a semantic theory.

The study ends with a conclusion which sums up the results of the discussions with respect to their relevance for the issue of epistemological realism. Meinong's suggestion for developing a probabilistic semantics for undetermined contexts is considered to be a positive way to counterweight scepticism in scientific discourse."

112. Sierszulska Anna, "Meinongian extensions of predicates," *Logic and Logical Philosophy* 14: 145-163 (2005).
113. Simons Peter M. Lukasiewicz, Meinong and many valued logic. In *The Veinna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School*. Edited by Szaniawski Klemens. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989. pp. 249-292
Reprinted in: Peter Simons - *Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Selected essays* - Dordrecht, Kluwer 1992 pp. 193-225
114. Simons Peter M. On what there isn't: the Meinong-Russell dispute. In *Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992. pp. 159-191
Translated from: *Über das, was es nicht gibt: Die Meinong-Russell Kontroverse* - Zeitschrift für Semiotik, 10, 1988 pp. 399-426
115. Simons Peter M., "Meinong's contribution to the development of non-classical logic," *Conceptus. Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 27: 187-202 (1994).
"Though himself no logician, Meinong, by his iconoclastic philosophical views, indirectly contributed significantly to the development of nonclassical logic, notably modal, many-valued, probability, deontic, free, paraconsistent and dialectical logics. After outlining Meinong's mature object theory, emphasizing his views on existence, modality and probability, I show how he influenced the younger logical pioneers Lukasiewicz and Mally, as well as more recent logicians such as Parsons, Routley and Lambert."
116. Simons Peter M., "Meinong's theory of sense and reference," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 50: 171-186 (1995).
"Gilbert Ryle wrote that "Meaning-theory expanded just when and just in so far as it was released from that 'Fido'-Fido box, the lid of which was never even lifted by Meinong." This paper sets out to relieve Ryle's oversimplification about Meinong and the role of meaning theory in his thought. One step away from canine simplicity about meaning is the recognition of a distinction between sense and reference, such as we find in Frege, Husserl, and the early Russell. In *Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit* (1915) Meinong seems to corroborate Ryle when he writes, "Word-meanings are objects," but immediately after this, he qualifies it: "Word-meanings are very often auxiliary objects." The distinction between auxiliary and target objects in Meinong's later work allows us to attribute to him a theory of sense and reference which shows him to have indeed lifted the box-lid."
117. Simons Peter M. Bolzano, Brentano and Meinong: three Austrian realists. In *German philosophy since Kant*. Edited by O'Hear Anthony. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999. pp. 109-136
118. Simons Peter M. and Morscher Edgar. Meinong's theory of meaning. In *The School of Alexius Meinong*. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana, Jacqueline Dale, and Poli Roberto. Aldershot: Ashgate 2001. pp. 427-455
119. Simons Peter M. Meinong und Modalität. In *Bausteine zu einer Geschichte der Philosophie an der Universität Graz*. Edited by Binder Thomas. Amsterdam: Rodopi 2001. pp. 209-217
"Meinong's theory of modality (which is also a theory of probability) is an unexplored alternative to

standard views. Meinong's ontology allows him a rich and arguably modernizable account which eschews the notion of possible worlds. It is based on his concepts of *Objective* (state of affairs) and incomplete object. An *Objective* ascribing a property to an incomplete object is possible if some actual completion of the object has the relevant property, and is possible to degree w , where $0 \leq w \leq 1$, if the proportion of actual completions having the property to all actual completions is w ."

120. Simons Peter M., "Meinong, consistency and the absolute totality," *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* 1: 233-254 (2005).

"Since Russell, Meinong's ontology has often been accused of inconsistency.

By accepting impossible objects, Meinong appears to play into the hands of his opponents. But his distinction between nuclear and extra-nuclear properties enables him to avoid Russell's criticism, and can be employed to deflect other charges of inconsistency. Meinong accepts a single, absolute totality of objects, including a totality of all truths. This seems also to commit him to paradoxical conclusions, but I show he can avoid these. Within the absolute totality, there should be numerous subcollections constituting alternative possible worlds.

The problem is that we can have no way to construct or evaluate the consistency of such collections, which means we have at best inductive assurance that Meinong's ontology is consistent."

121. Smith Barry, "Ingarden vs. Meinong on the logic of fiction," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 41: 93-105 (1980).
122. Smith Barry. *Austrian philosophy. The legacy of Franz Brentano*. Chicago: Open Court 1994. See Chapter Five: *Alexius Meinong and Stephan Witasek: on art and its objects* - pp. 125-154.
123. Smith Barry, "More things in Heaven and Earth," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 50: 187-201 (1995).

"Philosophers in the field of analytic metaphysics have begun gradually to come to terms with the fact that there are entities in a range of categories not dreamt of in the set-theory and predicate-logic-based ontologies of their forefathers. Examples of such *entia minora* would include: boundaries, places, events, states holes, shadows, individual colour- and tone-instances (tropes), together with combinations of these and associated simple and complex universal species or essences, states of affairs, judgment-contents, and myriad abstract structures of the sorts which are studied by the mathematical sciences. How, as hunter-gatherer ontologists, are we to bring order into this vast array? How are we to gauge the ontological merits of given candidate entities, and how are we to understand their relation to entities of more humdrum sorts? Meinong, it turns out, offers a very simple answer to all of these questions."

124. Smith David Woodruff, "Meinongian objects," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 1: 43-71 (1975).

This is a study of Meinongian "objects" - specifically, individual objects - and their motivations in intentionality theory. Others have dwelt on their "indifference to being" (*Aussersein*). Principally, I shall argue that, contrary to what we might have hoped for them, Meinongian objects must be intensional entities if, as asked, they are to serve as objects of thought in an appropriately Meinongian, "object-theoretic" account of intentionality. Briefly, the argument is as follows. (The roman numerals mark off roughly the content of parts I through V of the paper.)

I. Meinong's theory of objects can in general be seen as motivated by the theory of intentionality, for "objects" are assumed to serve as the objects of thought or "intention". What seems largely to distinguish a Meinongian approach to intentionality is the attempt to account for the peculiarities of intention in terms of peculiarities of the objects "intended".

II. One class of objects Meinong propounded are "incomplete", or "incompletely determined", objects. An example is the golden mountain, which is golden and mountainous but otherwise "undetermined".

III. For Meinong, incomplete objects serve to mediate the intention (or apprehension) of complete objects. Meinong believed we cannot properly "intend" complete objects. We intend them only indirectly insofar as we intend incomplete objects which are "embedded" in them. This is Meinong's account of how, as best he thought we can, we intend everyday existing physical individuals, which are complete. (As stated, this is not quite gospel Meinong, which treats of "Soseinsmeinen".)

IV. This theory of the indirect intention of complete objects via incomplete objects also explains

another familiar fact about intention, though Meinong himself probably did not put it to this use. It explains in a straightforward way the distinction between, for instance, one's conceiving the morning star and one's conceiving the evening star - and hence, in the "formal mode" the failure of the logical law of substitutivity of identity for terms in intentional contexts. For, on Meinongian lines these intentions would be indirect intentions of the same complete object (Venus, we would say) but intentions proper of distinct incomplete objects ("The Morning Star" and "The Evening Star", as we shall call them), and so they would be distinct intentions.

V. Different sorts of entities have been considered intensional, including Frege's "senses" and Carnap's "intensions". What seems to qualify them as intensional is their role *vis a vis*, specifically, ordinary physical individuals in a Frege like semantics. Further, it is intensional entities that determine the "directedness" or intentionality of mental acts. Meinong's incomplete objects fill these bills and so, I argue, are intensional. However, since complete objects are continuous in kind with incomplete objects, complete objects too - including ordinary physical individuals - must be intensional.

Generalizing, the genre of Meinongian intentionality theory is characteristically "extensionalist", treating intention straightforwardly as a relation and thus accounting for its peculiarities in terms of the objects intended. We may conclude that any such approach to intentionality must render the objects of intention intensional.

I conclude (in part VI) that such a Meinongian view of intentionality leaves the intensional playing the wrong role in intention. This can be remedied by replacing incomplete objects with something like individual concepts or senses (which are not themselves incomplete) and making them the mediators rather than the objects of intention.

I should stress that this essay is not an historical study in the interpretation of Meinong's writings. It is rather a critical study of the genre of Meinongian object-cum-intentionality theory, of what happens if we make certain assumptions apparently fundamental to Meinong's program. I shall here largely rely on Findlay's lovely book' as a convenient and well-received gathering of Meinong's views. At a few indicated points I shall extend, to some extent modify, or reconstruct Meinong's views as I know them." pp. 43-44.

125. Smith Janet Farrell. Meinong's theory of objects and assumptions. In *Phenomenology: dialogues and bridges*. Edited by Bruzina Ronald and Wilshire Bruce. Albany: State University of New York Press 1982. pp. 205-212

126. Smith Janet Farrell, "The Russell-Meinong Debate," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 45: 305-350 (1985).

"The debates between Bertrand Russell and Alexius Meinong from 1904 to 1920 dealt with some fundamental issues in philosophy: reference, nonexistent objects, intentionality. Along with the enduring influence of Russell's philosophy, some misapprehensions about these exchanges have persisted. One is that Russell's objections to Meinong were definitive. The other stems from taking too seriously Russell's casual remark in 1918 that Meinong's theories evidenced a deficient "sense of reality." Contrary to the impression left by this comment, Russell, during the most intensive years of the debate (1904-1907), felt a real respect for Meinong's theories,' and his main concern lay elsewhere. The exchange did not center on "reality" or "realism," as is often believed, but on the classical laws of logic (noncontradiction, excluded middle) and the correct analysis of logical form, for instance, of existence statements. Russell also took a dim view of the modal concepts Meinong used to support the canons of object theory, but his main concern was that Meinong's overall analysis appeared to threaten the foundation of Russell's philosophical logic. Russell and Meinong's disagreement thus came down to competing logical frameworks tied to different notions of what it is to be an object.

In claiming that Russell's main objection to Meinong's theory was logical, I do not mean to deny that ontology and metaphysics were in the forefront of Russell's concerns up to 1910 or that for him a correct foundational view of logic would tell us much about the way the world is. Russell's motivation for criticizing Meinong may well have been a concern with what is 'real', but his philosophical reasons for rejecting Meinong's object theory in 1905-1907 had to do with which logical principles and their reputed violations. Interestingly, during the years Russell was debating with Meinong most intensively (1904-1907) he was also struggling to find the solution to his paradox of

classes. With his 1905 invention of the theory of descriptions, Russell believed he had simultaneously found a way to deal with apparent reference to nonexistents in ordinary grammar and a new analysis of classes. It seems that the two difficulties of paradoxical classes and nonexistent objects plagued Russell's sense of consistency in a parallel manner.

In this paper I focus on giving an internal analysis of the objections and replies exchanged by Russell and Meinong to show that Russell's objections failed to be decisive and that the standoff between them came down to fundamentally different frameworks. Some scholarly evidence supports this interpretation as well. Russell's 1904 letter to Meinong emphasizes that what Meinong called "Theory of Objects" Russell had been accustomed to calling "Logic." [See Appendix] In pressing his contradiction charge, Russell continued to evaluate Meinong's object theory by the standards of his own view of "logic." Lastly, evidence of a more circumstantial nature points to the parallelism of Russell's worries over nonexistent objects and classes."

(1) See the newly published *Theory of Knowledge, The 1913 Manuscript*, Vol. 7 of Russell's Collected papers, edited by Elizabeth Eames and Kenneth Blackwell (Allen and Unwin, 1983). This manuscript, which contains many accurate references to Meinong's theories, was never published by Russell. He was apparently discouraged by Wittgenstein's criticism of his theory of judgment.

(2) The Appendix contains translations of Russell's three letters to Meinong. See also the chronological Bibliography at the end of this paper.

(3) See Roderick Chisholm, *Brentano and Meinong Studies* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982.), and *The First Person, An Essay on Reference and Intentionality* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981).

(4) Some issues are treated in my "Meinong's Theory of Objects and Assumptions," in *Phenomenology: Dialogues and Bridges*, ed. R. Bruzina and B. Wilshire (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982). In a longer study of book length I explore these and other issues in greater depth.

127. Smith Janet Farrell, "Russell's re-evaluation of Meinong, 1913-14: an analysis of acquaintance," *Russell. The Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives* 8: 179-194 (1988).
128. Smith Janet Farrell. Russell's "On denoting", the laws of logic and the refutation of Meinong. In *On denoting 1905-2005*. Edited by Imaguire Guido and Linsky Bernard. München: Philosophia Verlag 2005. pp. 137-166
129. Stepanians Markus S., "Russells Kritik an Meinongs Begriff des Annahmenschlusses," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 50: 415-432 (1995).
130. Stock Wolfgang G., "Wissenschaftstheorie der Grazer Schule: Meinong und Frankl," *Axiomathes*: 61-74 (1996).
131. Suter Ronald, "Russell's 'refutation' of Meinong in 'On Denoting'," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 27: 512-516 (1967).
132. Swanson Carolyn. *Reburial of Nonexistents. Reconsidering the Meinong-Russell Debate*. Amsterdam: Rodopi 2011.

"Alexius Meinong claimed to uncover a brave new world of nonexistent objects. He contended that unreal objects, such as the golden mountain and the round square, genuinely had properties (such as nonexistence itself) and therefore, deserved a place in an all-inclusive science. Meinong's notion of nonexistents was initially not well-received, largely due to the influence and criticisms of Bertrand Russell. However, it has gained considerable popularity in more recent years as academics have uncovered shortfalls in Russell's philosophy and strived to explain apparent "facts" about the beingless. Some philosophers have continued Meinong's project, further explaining nonexistent objects or formulating logic systems that incorporate them.

The more recent developments beg for a re-examination of Meinongianism. This book does just that, putting the theory on trial. Part One considers if Russell truly defeated Meinongianism. It addresses Meinongian rejoinders in response to Russell's main criticisms and further defends Russell's alternative solution, his Theory of Descriptions. Part Two explores the rationale for nonexistents and their use in interpreting three types of statements: characterization, negative existential, and intentional. The book argues that, despite appearances, Meinongianism cannot

plausibly account for its own paradigm claims, whereas Russell's framework, with some further elucidation, can explain these statements quite well. Part Three primarily addresses claims about fiction, exploring the short-comings of Meinongian and Russellian frameworks in interpreting them. The book introduces a contextualization solution and symbolic method for capturing the logical form of such claims – one with the complexity to handle cross-contextual statements, including negative existential and intentional ones. It finally considers where that leaves nonexistent objects, ultimately rejecting such so-called entities."

133. Sweet Dennis J., "The *Gestalt* controversy: the development of objects of higher order in Meinong's ontology," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 53: 553-575 (1993).
 "To show how Meinong's ontology developed from the stark "Hume Studies" to the richness of his mature thought, I trace his analysis of complexes in light of the views of Ehrenfels, Cornelius, and Twardowski. Through their influences Meinong was compelled to modify his ontology in two ways. First, he developed a variety of reism that acknowledged ontological heterogeneity within perceptual complexes.
 Second, he endorsed the view of perceptual realism. With these modifications Meinong was able to introduce objects of higher order'."
134. Tegtmeier Erwin, "Meinong's complexes," *Monist* 83: 89-100 (2000).
 " The ontological problem of complexity is a most difficult one and has not been solved satisfactorily until the 20th century. Meinong came as close as any philosopher in the 19th century to a solution. Meinong's view of complexes changed. He kept to the principle that there is a relation where there is a complex. But only in his later view does the relation have the role of connector of the complex. The article argues (also against Bergmann and Grossmann) that relational connectors would not be sufficient without facts, that facts connect without connectors though and that facts are the only genuine complexes. Meinong's Objektive are very similar to facts, yet in a crucial respect more like things than like facts."
135. Tegtmeier Erwin, "Object-theoretic foundations of logic," *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* 1: 297-308 (2005).
 "Logical semantics is not ontology. Meinong's and Mally's application of their object theory to logic must not be understood as a contribution to logical semantics but as an ontological grounding of logic. The object-theoretical grounding relates logic to the world though it is accompanied by a rationalist interpretation of logical laws. Meinong's and Mally's realist analysis of logic has been revived and continued by Gustav Bergmann and Reinhardt Grossmann. Both adopt Meinong's category of objective in a more or less modified version. This category is pivotal for Meinong's view of logic."
136. Thrush Michael, "Do Meinong's impossible objects entail contradictions?," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 62: 157-173 (2001).
 Abstract: "Meinong's theory of objects commits him to impossibilia: objects which have contradictory properties. Russell famously objected that these impossibilia were apt to infringe the law of noncontradiction. Meinong's defenders have often relied upon the distinction between internal and external negation, a defense that only works against less exotic impossibilia. The more exotic impossibilia fall victim to an argument that uses an intuitively attractive logical principle similar to the abstraction principle, but which is not subject to Russell's paradox. The upshot is that things are not as bad as Russell claims. Some impossibilia don't entail contradictions. Nevertheless, things are still disastrous for Meinong. Some of his impossibilia do entail contradictions."
137. Vasyukov Vladimir, "A Lesniewskian guide to Husserl's and Meinong's jungles," *Axiomathes*: 59 (1993).
138. Vax Louis, "Meinong et les *impossibilia*: avec une appendice de Gaston Thoma," *Philosophia Scientiae* 4: 1-66 (2000).
139. Velarde-Mayol Victor, "La teoria de los objetos en Alexius Meinong," *Pensamiento* 45: 461-475 (1989).
140. Velarde-Mayol Victor, "La teoria del objeto en Alexius Meinong", Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1989.
 Available at UMI Dissertation Express. Order number: 9323758
141. Voltolini Alberto, "Is meaning without actually existing reference naturalizable?," *Grazer*

Philosophische Studien 50: 397-414 (1995).

"According to Jerry Fodor, meaningful expressions denoting no actual entity, like "unicorn", do not constitute an exception to his project of semantic naturalization based on the notion of asymmetrical dependence between causal relations. But Fodor does not give any principled reason in order to show that, say, a non-unicorn caused "unicorn"-token means Unicorn, as he on the contrary does regarding a non-X caused "X"-token for any existing X. Nevertheless, his claim that one such expression has a mere denotational meaning can be accounted for, though in a non-naturalistic way. Suffice it that one appeals to the weak Meinongianism contained in the thesis that one can directly refer to possible entities by means of suitable fixing reference description."

142. Voltolini Alberto. What is alive and what is dead in Russell's critique of Meinong. In *The School of Alexius Meinong*. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana, Jacqueline Dale, and Poli Roberto. Aldershot: Ashgate 2001. pp. 489-516
143. Voltolini Alberto, "Being, existence, and having instances," *Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien* 2: 161-180 (2006).
144. Weiberger Ota. Ideen zur logischen Normesemantik. In *Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein*. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 295-312
145. Weingartner Paul. Die Fraglichkeit der Extensionalitäts these und die Probleme einer intensionalen Logik. In *Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein*. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 127-178
146. Witherall Arthur, "Meinongian metaphysics and subjectivity," *Journal of Philosophical Research* 23: 29-49 (1998).
147. Wolf Karl, "Die Grazer Schule. Gegenstandstheorie und Wertlehre," *Wissenschaft und Weltbild. Zeitschrift für grundfragen der forschung und weltanschauung* 21: 31-56 (1968).
148. Wolf Karl. Ernst Mallys Destruktion des Meinongschen "Gegenstandes". In *Akten des XIV. Internationalen Kongresses für Philosophie, Wien, 2-9 Sept. 1968*. Wien: Herder 1971. pp. 584-591
149. Wolf Karl. Der Bedeutungswandel von 'Gegenstand' in der Schule Meinongs. In *Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein*. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 63-68
150. Zalta Edward, "Meinongian type theory and its applications," *Studia Logica* 41: 297-307 (1982).
"In this paper I propose a fundamental modification of standard type theory, produce a new kind of type theoretic language, and couch in this language a comprehensive theory of abstract individuals and abstract properties and relations of every type. I then suggest how to employ the theory to solve the four following philosophical problems: (a) the identification and ontological status of Frege's senses; (b) the deviant behavior of terms in propositional attitude contexts; c) the non-identity of necessarily equivalent propositions, and (d) the "paradox" of analysis."
151. Zalta Edward, "Lambert, Mally, and the Principle of Independence," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 25/26: 447-459 (1986).
152. Zalta Edward, "On Mally's alleged heresy: a reply," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 13: 59-68 (1992).
153. Zecha Gerhard. Meinongs moralische Wertklassen und die deontischen Operatoren. In *Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein*. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 271-286
154. Zeglen Ursula, "Meinong and Ingarden on negative judgments," *Axiomathes*: 267-278 (1996).

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