

Selected Bibliography on the History of the Ontological Argument from Anselm of Canterbury to Duns Scotus

Pages on the History of the Ontological Proof

- History of the Ontological Argument. Introductory Remarks
 - Bibliography of General and Introductory Studies
- The Medieval Period from Anselm of Canterbury to Duns Scotus
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A SELECTION OF PRIMARY AUTHORS

Legenda: P = Pro (accept the proof); C = Contra (rejected the proof); I = indifferent (take no position on the proof); ca. = circa; fl = flourished; d. died.

References are to the most important works where ontological argument is discussed.

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- P Anselm of Canterbury [Anselmus Cantuariensis, Doctor Angelicus]
- C Gaunilo of Marmoutiers [Gaunilo, monachus]
- P William of Auxerre [Guillelmi Altissiodorensis]
- P Alexander of Hales [Alexander Halensis, Doctor Irrefragabilis]
- P Richard Fishacre [Richardus Flamesburensis]
- C Richard Rufus of Cornwall [Richaruds Rufus Cornubiensis]
- P Bonaventure of Bagnorea [Bonaventurae, Johannes Fianza, Doctor Seraphicus]
- I Albert the Great [Albertus Magnus, Doctor Universalis]
- C Thomas Aquinas [Thomae Aquinatis, Doctor Angelicus]
- I Peter of Tarentaise [Petrus a Tarentasia, Pope Innocent V]
- P John Peckham [Johannis Packham, Doctor Ingeniosus]
- I Henry of Ghent [Henrici de Gandavo, Doctor Solemnis]
- P Nicolaus of Ockham [Nicolaus de Ockham]
- P Matthew of Aquasparta [Matthaei ab Aquasparta]
- P Giles of Rome [Aegidius Romanus, Egidio Colonna]

- C Richard of Middletown [Richardus of Mediavilla]
- P William of Ware [Gulielmi Guarae]
- P John Duns Scotus [Johannes Duns Scotus, Doctor Subtilis]

Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109)

Texts and translations

The standard critical edition of Anselm's works is the *Opera omnia* prepared by Fr. F. S. Schmitt: *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi opera omnia, ad fidem codicum recensuit*, 6 vols [the first printed at Seckau, 1938, the second at Rome in 1940, all reset for the Nelson edition], (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1946-1961).

Reprinted with new editorial material as: *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi opera omnia, ad fidem codicum recensuit*, 2 vols (Stuttgart-Bad-Cannstatt: Frommann, 1968-1984)

1. Anselm of Canterbury. *Proslogion*. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons 1938.
Written in 1077-1078. Critical edition of Latin text in the first volume of: Sancti Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia ad fides codicum recensuit Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, OSB - 6 voll. (1938-1961); reprinted in two volumes, Stuttgart (Bad Cannstatt) Friedrich Frommann Verlag 1968 with an introduction by Schmitt drawing together his articles on Anselm. *Proslogion* vol. I pp. 93-122.
2. Anselm of Canterbury. *Responsio Anselmi (Quid ad haec respondeat editor ipsius libelli)*. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons 1938.
Reply to Gaunilo written in 1078.
Critical edition of Latin text in the first volume of: *Sancti Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia*, vol. I pp. 130-139.
3. Anselm of Canterbury. *A new, interpretive translation of St. Anselm's Monologion and Proslogion*. Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning Press 1986.
Translated by Jasper Hopkins
4. Anselm of Canterbury. *Complete philosophical and theological treatises of Anselm of Canterbury*. Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning Press 2000.
Translated by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson.
Proslogion pp. 88-112.
5. Anselm of Canterbury. *Proslogion, with the Replies of Gaunilo and Anselm*. Indianapolis: Hackett 2001.
Translated, with introduction, by Thomas Williams.

Studies

1. Adams Robert Merrihew, "The logical structure of Anselm's argument," *Philosophical Review* 80: 28-54 (1971).
Reprinted in: R. M. Adams - *The virtue of faith and other essays in philosophical theology* - New York, Oxford University Press, 1987 pp. 221-242.

"In this essay I offer a formal analysis of Anselm's arguments for the existence of God in the *Proslogion* and in his reply to Gaunilo. I do not attempt to show here that the arguments are compelling, or that they are not. What I try to do is discover in each argument, so far as possible, a valid logical form, to exhibit the relations of the arguments to each other, and to show how they depend on certain doctrines in logic or the philosophy of logic. Anselm's arguments are far from dead, and in this paper I hope to provide a logical map, so to speak, of some ground that is still very much fought over.

The first two sections of the paper are concerned with the most famous of Anselm's arguments, the argument of Chapter 2 of the *Proslogion*. In Section I, I formulate a version of the argument in modern logical symbolism, and state the assumptions about existence and predication on which the

argument seems to me to depend. Gaunilo's criticism of Anselm was directed very largely against the ontological presuppositions of the Proslogion 2 argument; and in Section II I try to show how Gaunilo's famous "lost island" counterexample proves that the assumptions stated in Section I must be modified, if not rejected. In his reply to Gaunilo Anselm introduced two new arguments for the existence of God, which do not depend on assumptions about predication.

I discuss one of these arguments in Section III; it seems to me to be at least a better argument than the argument of Proslogion 2. Analysis of this argument from the reply to Gaunilo leads to the conclusion that the crucial question about logically necessary divine existence is whether it is possible. Section IV is devoted to an analysis of Anselm's argument in the third chapter of the Proslogion and its relation to the other arguments."

2. Anscombe Gertrude Elizabeth, "Why Anselm's proof in the Proslogion is not an ontological argument," *Thoreau Quarterly* 17: 32-40 (1985).
3. Armour Leslie. Anselm's proof and some problems of meaning and reference. In *God and argument*. Edited by Sweet Wiliam. Ottawa: Ottawa University Press 1999. pp. 97-113
 "In *Proslogion IV*, Anselm addresses the peculiar referring power of the expression "God". In the light of the idea of determinates and determinables (used by W.E. Johnson and others) one can read what Anselm says here, supplemented perhaps by *De Grammatico*, as making a case for the belief that "God" refers not to a thing in the world but to the highest member of the system of determinates and determinables, and that this hierarchy is essential to meaning. The highest order determinable can plausibly be identified with God. Denying that God exists, therefore, is denying the possibility of meaningfulness."
4. Bäck Allan, "Existential import in Anselm's ontological argument," *Franciscan Studies* 41: 97-109 (1981).
 "The ontological argument of Saint Anselm has attracted a great deal of attention. There has been considerable discussion of whether the argument begs the question, by assuming the existence of God in the premises of the argument. But, although the theological, Augustinian context of Anselm's argument has been dealt with, and although the argument has been extensively treated in modern logical terms, little attention has been paid to how the argument fares in terms of traditional logic. In this article I shall analyze the argument of *Proslogion 2* in traditional terms. I shall then argue that to a great extent the debate between Anselm and Gaunilon can be viewed as depending on attitudes toward the Aristotelian syllogistic.¹ In short, the standard for the validity and soundness of arguments in medieval philosophy was the syllogistic. It was apparently assumed that all terms used in the syllogistic have existential import. So Anselm's argument is suspect in that it employs a term, 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived,' which cannot be assumed to have existential import. I then shall offer a solution of this difficulty. I shall argue that the success of the argument of *Proslogion 2* depends on the modal character of 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived.' That modal character suggests that the argument of *Proslogion 2* is modal as well. I shall show that there are grounds in theology and in the Aristotelian modal syllogistic for rejecting the existential import assumption, and shall suggest that Anselm does not make such an assumption, at least in the ontological argument. Rather, despite its assertoric appearance, the argument in *Proslogion 2* is modal."
5. Bäck Allan, "Anselm on perfect islands," *Franciscan Studies* 43: 188-204 (1983).
6. Bencivenga Ermanno. *Logic and other nonsense. The case of Anselm and his God*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993.
7. Brecher Robert, "Greatness in Anselm's ontological argument," *Philosophical Quarterly* 24: 97-105 (1974).
 "Examination of Anselm's Proslogion shows that he carefully distinguishes 'greater' from 'better' or 'more perfect'. He says that God 'most truly exists', that he exists 'in the highest degree'; the Neo-platonist metaphysical framework suggested by this is confirmed by examining Anselm's Augustinian background, and the *Monologion*. 'Greatness' is an ontological concept. This both makes good sense of Anselm's argument, and justifies his refutation of the 'Lost Island' objection: it is nonsense to say of any island, or dollar, that it is ontologically superior to another, or to anything else."
8. Brecher Robert, "Gremlins and parodies," *Philosophical Studies (Ireland)* 29: 48-54 (1983).

"The paper aims to show that parody-based critiques of Anselm's ontological argument fail to do damage because there is a crucial disanalogy between 'God' and for example, Gaunilean 'Islands'. the basis of the disanalogy is God's alleged uniqueness in terms of necessary existence. It is this rather than the structure of Anselm's argument which constitutes the real problem in attempting to assert that there is a God."

9. Brecher Robert. *Anselm's argument. The logic of divine existence*. Aldershot: Gower 1985.
10. Brunner Fernad. Questions sur l'interprétation du "Proslogion" par Jules Vuillemin. In *Saint Anselme ses précurseurs et ses contemporains*. Edited by Kohlenberger Helmut. Frankfurt: Minerva 1976. pp. 65-83
11. Campbell Richard James. *From belief to understanding. A study of Anselm's Proslogion argument on the existence of God*. Canberra: The Australian National University 1976.
12. Cappuyns Maieul D., "L'argument de saint Anselme," *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale* 6: 313-330 (1934).
13. Cattin Yves. *La preuve de Dieu. Introduction à la lecture du Proslogion d'Anselme de Canterbury*. Paris: Vrin 1986.
14. Chambers Timothy, "On behalf of the Devil: a parody of Anselm revisited," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 100: 93-113 (2000).
 "This paper treats a question which first arose in these *Proceedings*: Can Anselm's ontological argument be inverted so as to yield parallel proofs for the existence (or nonexistence) of a *least* (or *worst* conceivable being? Such "devil parodies" strike some commentators as innocuous curiosities, or redundant challenges which are no more troubling than other parodies found in the literature (e.g., Gaunilo's Island). I take issue with both of these allegations; devil parodies, I argue, have the potential to pose substantive, and novel, challenges to Anselm's ontological argument."
15. Chandler Hugh S., "Some ontological arguments," *Faith and Philosophy* 10: 18-32 (1993).
 "The principal arguments considered are in some ways similar to those offered in Anselm's *Proslogium*, Chapters II and III. In addition, two quick' versions of the ontological argument are examined. Finally, I worry a bit about the ineffable One. The general line of attack is similar to a procedure employed by David Lewis in discussing *Proslogium II*. My approach to *Proslogium III* is based upon the idea that the appropriate modal logic for these matters is much weaker than the standard S5. The hope is that this alternative perspective reveals features worthy of notice."
16. Corbin Michel, "Nul n'a plus grand amour que de donner sa vie pour ses amis (Jn 15,13)". La signification de l'unum argumentum du Proslogion," *Anselm Studies. An Occasional Journal* 2: 201-228 (1988).
17. Davies Brian. Anselm and the ontological argument. In *The Cambridge Companion to Anselm*. Edited by Davies Brian and Leftow Brian. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004. pp. 157-178
18. Delgado Antolin Salvador. *El argumento anselmiano*. Sevilla: Publicaciones de la Universidad 1988.
19. Devine Philip, "'Exists' and Saint Anselm's argument," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 3: 59-70 (1977).
 "This paper examines interpretations of the doctrine that "exists" is not a predicate (existence is not a property). None, it is concluded, is both true and a refutation of st Anselm's "ontological" argument for the existence of God."
20. Dicker Georges, "A refutation of Rowe's critique of Anselm's ontological argument," *Faith and Philosophy* 5: 193-202 (1988).
21. Evans Gillian Rosemary. *Anselm and talking about God*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1978.
22. Evdokimov Paul. L'aspect apophatique de l'argument de Saint Anselme. In *Spicilegium Beccense (vol. I)*. Paris: 1959. pp. 233-258
23. Forest A. Remarques sur l'argument du Proslogion. In *Scritti in onore di Carlo Giacon*. Padova: 1972. pp. 147-172
24. Galvan Sergio, "Una variante deontica dell'argomento modale di S. Anselmo," *Epistemologia* 12: 135-144 (1989).
25. Galvan Sergio, "Aspetti problematici dell'argomento modale di Anselmo," *Rivista di Storia della Filosofia*: 587-609 (1993).
26. Ghisalberti Alessandro, "Per una rilettura dell'argomento ontologico di Anselmo d'Aosta," *Vita e*

Pensiero (7-8): 543-549 (1990).

27. Gilbert Paul, "Unum argumentum et Unum necessarium," *Archivio di Filosofia*: 81-94 (1990).
28. Gilbert Paul. *Le Proslogion de S. Anselme. Silence de Dieu et joie de l'homme*. Roma: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana 1990.
Bibliographie Anselmienne: pp. 249-279. Sur l'argument ontologique: livres pp. 253-255, articles pp. 267-273.
29. Gilson Etienne, "Sens et nature de l'argument de saint Anselme," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 9: 5-51 (1934).
30. Gogacz Mieczyslaw, "La "ratio Anselmi" en face du problème des relations entre métaphysique et mystique," *Analecta Anselmiana* 2: 169-185 (1970).
31. Gombocz Wolfgang. *Über E! Zur Semantik der Existenzprädikates und des ontologischen Arguments für Gottes Existenz von Anselm von Canterbury*. Wien: Verband der Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft 1974.
Dissertation der Universität Graz
32. Gombocz Wolfgang. Zur Zwei-Argument-Hypothese bezüglich Anselms Proslogion. In *Saint Anselme ses précurseurs et ses contemporains*. Edited by Kohlenberger Helmut. Frankfurt: Minerva 1976. pp. 85-98
33. Grappone Arturo Graziano, "Anselm's ontological proof: consequences in system theory," *Metalogicon* 12: 33-40 (1999).
34. Hartman Robert S., "Prolegomena to a meta-Anselmian axiomatic," *Review of Metaphysics* 14: 637-675 (1961).
"The author argues that Anselm's proof of God in the *Proslogion* is the first and so far the last example of an entirely new philosophical method which is neither categorial not analytic but axiomatic and synthetic: the method of mathematics validly applied to the highest possible subject of human thought. With particular reference to Karl Barth's 1958 study, *Fides quaerens intellectum*, he first reconstructs Anselm's theological program. He then discusses Anselm's notions of rationality and proof and presents his axiomatic concept of the name of God. Finally, the author examines the argument between Anselm and Gaunilon step by step."
35. Hendley B. Anselm's "Proslogion" argument. In *Sprache und Erkenntnis in Mittelalter (vol. II)*. Berlin, New York: 1981. pp. 838-846
36. Henry Desmond Paul. Proslogion Chapter III. In *Analecta Anselmiana (vol. I)*. 1969. pp. 101-105
37. Henry Desmond Paul, "*Aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit* counterpart of *homo mortuus*," *Rivista di Storia della Filosofia*: 513-525 (1993).
38. Herrera Robert A. *Anselm's Proslogion: an introduction*. Washington: University Press of America 1979.
39. Herrera Robert A. The "Proslogion Argument" viewed from the perspective of "De casu diaboli". In *Spicilegium Beccense (vol II)*. 1984. pp. 623-629
40. Hochberg Herbert, "Anselm's ontological argument and Russell's theory of descriptions," *New Scholasticism*: 319-330 (1959).
41. Holopainen Toivo, "Anselm's *argumentum* and the early medieval theory of argument," *Vivarium* 47: 1-29 (2007).
"The article aims at elucidating the argumentation in Anselm's *Proslogion* by relating some aspects of it to the early medieval theory of argument. The focus of the analysis is on the "single argument" (*unum argumentum*), the discovery of which Anselm announces in the Preface to the *Proslogion*. Part 1 of the article offers a preliminary description of the single argument by describing the *reductio ad absurdum* technique based on the notion "that than which a greater cannot be thought". Part 2 discusses the ideas about arguments and argumentation that Boethius presents in Book One of his *In Ciceronis Topica*. Part 3 draws attention to some early medieval sources (Abelard, Lanfranc, Anselm) that are witness to the importance of the Boethian ideas in Anselm's time. Finally, Part 4 argues that Anselm looked at his single argument in the Boethian framework and that the term "that than which a greater cannot be thought" should be identified as his single argument."
42. Hopkins Jasper, "On understanding and preunderstanding St. Anselm," *New Scholasticism* 52: 243-284 (1978).
43. Huber Carlo. Considerazioni semantiche e logiche sul cosiddetto argomento ontologico di Anselmo

d'Aosta nel *Proslogium*. In *l'attualità filosofica di Anselmo d'Aosta*. Edited by Hoegen M. Roma: 1990. pp. 11-23

44. Jarmuzek Tomasz, Nowicki Maciej, and Pietruszczak Andrzej. An outline of the Anselmian theory of God. In *Essays in logic and ontology*. Edited by Malinowski Jacek and Pietruszczak Andrzej. Amsterdam: Rodopi 2006. pp. 317-330
 "The article presents a formalization of Anselm's so-called 'ontological arguments' from *Proslogion*. The main idea of our research is to stay to the original text as close as is possible. We show, against some common opinions, that (i) the logic necessary for the formalization must be neither a purely sentential modal calculus, nor just non-modal first-order logic, but a modal first-order theory; (ii) such logic cannot contain logical axiom *A right arrow implies that A is possible*; (iii) none of Anselm's reasoning requires the assumptions that God is a consistent object or that existence of God is possible; (iv) no such thing as the so-called Anselm's principle is involved in any of the proofs; (v) Anselm's claims (that God exists in reality and that God necessarily exists in reality) can be obtained independently, hence, there is no need for presenting them in an opposite order than Anselm did."
45. Kelly Charles J., "Circularity and amphiboly in some Anselmian ontological proofs: a syllogistic inquiry," *Noûs* 28: 482-504 (1994).
46. Kenny Anthony. Anselm on the conceivability of God. In *L'argomento ontologico*. Edited by Olivetti Marco M. Padova: 1990. pp. 71-79
47. Kienzler Klaus. Das Proslogion-Argument. Anselm's und die *Confessiones* des Augustinus. In *The European dimension of St. Anselm's thinking*. 1993. pp. 137-161
48. Kienzler Klaus. *International bibliography - Anselm of Canterbury*. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press 1999.
 In cooperation with Eduardo Brinacesco, Walter Fröhlich, Helmut Kohleberger, Frederick Van Flaten, Coloman Viola.
 Contains 3.784 references up to 1996.
 Contents: I. Text and editions 12 (items 1-441); II. Alphabetical Table 33 (items 442-3784); III. Systematic Table 158-201.

Introduction: "With this International Bibliography of Anselm of Canterbury we intend to lay out a comprehensive list of works and sources of Anselm of Canterbury as well as the relevant research literature. The systematic presentation takes into consideration the time period from the first manuscripts until 1996. The bibliography includes all together three thousand, seven hundred, and eighty four individual citations.

Part I: For a manual of this kind, not only a presentation of secondary literature, but also a presentation of texts, manuscripts, omnia opera, editions, and translations, ordered according to the most important languages, should be useful. This latter collection is presented in the first part of the bibliography, entitled 'Texts and Editions'. We have undertaken no new studies of sources and manuscripts, but have taken the references of F. S. Schmitt's *Omnia Opera* and F. S. Schmitt's and R. Southern's *Memorial*, and have reprinted the most important bibliographical information.

Part II: The 'Alphabetical Table' presents alphabetically all the relevant secondary literature in detail. This second section is the heart of the bibliography. It serves as the foundation for Part III. The systematic presentation of the literature extends to the year 1996. The final references were to the contributions in the collection of D. E. Luscombe and G. R. Evans, *Aosta, Bec, and Canterbury. Papers in Commemoration of the Nine-hundredth Anniversary of Anselm's Enthronement as Archbishop, 25 September 1093* (1996). After that, particular titles appear only sporadically.

Part III: The 'Systematic Table' is conceived as an aid for research into the works of Anselm of Canterbury. In a systematic reference word table, developed especially for this purpose, relevant research contributions are presented in short form. It should be possible quickly to find citations in the 'Alphabetical Table' through the presentation of references of Author (Year) in the 'Systematic Table'."

49. King Peter, "Anselm's intentional argument," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 1: 147-166 (1984).
 "Anselm's Ontological Argument is an *ad hominem* argument against the Foole, part of which is a *reductio ad absurdum*, designed to prove the existence of God. The actual argument offered by St. Anselm has seventeen premisses; the heart of the argument is a careful distinction among intentional

objects-and the Ontological Argument *cannot* be formalized by modal logic. It is not a modal argument at all, but rather relies on certain intuitive principles of intentional logic, which Anselm applies throughout the *Proslogion*. The Ontological Argument is valid, if one accepts these principles; insofar as an *ad hominem* argument may be sound, it is sound as well. It is not a demonstration, for the key premiss granted by the Foole is highly implausible. Those who agree with the Foole, however, may justifiably assert God's existence.

These claims only apply to Anselm's *actual* argument, not to other Ontological Arguments, no matter how distinguished the pedigree, no matter how careful the formalization. Other Ontological Arguments only interest me insofar as they shed light on, or claim to accurately represent, Anselm's Ontological Argument. Other Ontological Arguments must be judged on their own merits. Anselm's actual argument, unlike most versions, is an exercise in intentional logic, a fact that has eluded commentators from the time of Gaunilo. That Ontological Argument is the subject of this article, and henceforth I shall call it *the* Ontological Argument."

50. Klima Gyula. Saint Anselm's Proof: a problem of reference, intentional identity and mutual understanding. In *Medieval philosophy and modern times*. Edited by Holmström-Hintikka Ghita. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2000. pp. 69-87
51. Klima Gyula, "Conceptual closure in Anselm's Proof: reply to Professor Roark," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 24: 131-134 (2003).
 "This paper provides replies to the objections Tony Roark presented (Roark, T. 2003. 'Conceptual closure in Anselm's proof', *History and Philosophy of Logic* 24) to my reconstruction of Anselm's famous argument in the *Proslogion* (Klima, G. 2000. 'Saint Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding', in G. Holmström-Hintikka, *Medieval Philosophy and Modern Times*, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 69-87). The replies argue that Roark's objections actually strengthen the general conclusion of my original paper concerning the different attitudes one can take toward Anselm's argument, depending on whether one refers to that than which nothing greater can be thought 'constitutively' or 'parasitically'. In agreement with Roark, however, at the end of the paper I also indicate some of the broader implications of this distinction worthy of further exploration."
52. Kopper Joachim. *Reflexion und Raisonement im ontologischen Gottesbeweis*. Köln: Universitätsverlag 1962.
53. Koyré Alexandre. *L'idée de Dieu dans la philosophie de St. Anselme*. Paris: 1923.
54. La Croix Richard R. *Proslogion II and III. A third interpretation of Anselm's argument*. Leiden: E. J. Brill 1972.
55. Losoncy Thomas, "Anselm's response to Gaunilo's Dilemma. An insight into the notion of 'Being' operative in the *Proslogion*," *New Scholasticism* 56: 207-216 (1982).
56. Losoncy Thomas. Chapter 1 of St. Anselm's *Proslogion*: its preliminaries to proving God's existence as paradigmatic for subsequent proofs of God's existence. In *Greek and medieval studies in honor of Leo Sweeney, S.J.* Edited by Carroll William J. and Furlong John J. New York: Peter Lang 1994. pp. 171-180
57. Losoncy Thomas. Language and Saint Anselm's *Proslogion* argument. In *Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Bononiensis*. Edited by Schoeck Richard J. Binghamton: State University of New York Press 2008. pp.
 Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress of Neo-Latin Studies: Bologna, 26 August to 1 September 1979.

"In the over nine hundred years since Saint Anselm wrote the *Proslogion* steadfast disagreement over what he meant, and sometimes over what he said, functions as an unbroken principle of interpretation among its readers and commentators alike. How to explain this phenomenon has proven equally controversial. However, two explanations of the long embattled history of the *Proslogion* are feasible.

One is that access to the complete *Proslogion* was impossible for many of Anselm's successors, including such renowned reviewers of the work as Aquinas, Scotus, and the noted modern critic of the ontological argument, Immanuel Kant. A second, applying more to recent times, appears to be a failure to exercise due regard for the language of the work. (1) This is further evidenced by a

tendency to concentrate only on part of the *Proslogion*, principally chapters two-four."

(1) Two recent discussions of the *Proslogion* deserve notice in this regard. Professor G. R. Evans, *Anselm and Talking about God* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), devotes more time to talking about the interpretation a large tradition has placed upon the *Proslogion* argument than to an analysis of the argument's language as such. See, especially, chapters two and three, pp. 39-75. On the other hand, Professor Gregory Schufreider's study, "The Identity of Anselm's Argument," *The Modern Schoolman*, LIV (1977), pp. 345-61, breaks genuinely new ground in its search for the argument in Anselm's *Proslogion* instead of a new search for confirmation of an old rendition. In arguing that Saint Anselm has a single argument in the *Proslogion* Schufreider provides a careful analysis of Anselm's use of "vere esse" in chapter eleven's heading and chapter three's text (pp. 349-52); of "absolute" in chapters twenty-two and twenty-eight of the *Monologion* (pp. 353-58) and the modal quality of the *Proslogion*'s "vere esse" (p. 360). The conclusion Schufreider reaches reinforces the argument of this paper from a different perspective.

58. Makin Stephen, "The ontological argument," *Philosophy* 63: 83-91 (1988).

"I offer a defence of the ontological argument. I argue for the principle that if *F* is a necessarily exemplified concept and *G* is not, then *F*s are a greater kind of thing than *G*s. This principle is defended on the basis of two other principles concerning such attitudes as total reliance, which it is appropriate to take to *F*s if *f* is a necessarily exemplified concept."

59. Makin Stephen, "The ontological argument defended," *Philosophy* 67: 247-255 (1992).

60. Mann William E., "The ontological presuppositions of the ontological argument," *Review of Metaphysics*: 260-277 (1972).

"I present a semi-formal analysis of St. Anselm's version of the ontological argument from *Proslogion* II, with two purposes in mind. First, I show that some contemporary analyses of the argument, in terms of the apparatus of modal logic, neglect the conceptual framework within which Anselm worked. I then display three ingredients of that framework: the distinction between beings 'in intellectu' and beings 'in re', the distinction between one's conceiving of a thing and one's conceiving it to exist, and the doctrine that existence is a property of things. Second, I argue that even if Anselm is granted all three of these presuppositions, he still cannot produce a convincing argument for the existence of God."

61. Matthews Scott, "Arguments, texts, and contexts: Anselm's argument and the Friars," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 8: 83-104 (1999).

"The contrast between the reception of Anselm's *Proslogion* in the work of Bonaventure and in the work of Thomas Aquinas is often held up as a classic example of their competing intellectual assumptions. Some have located the intellectual prerequisites for the acceptance or rejection of Anselm's argument in the prior acceptance of univocal or analogical accounts of being. (1) P. A. Daniels argued that the prerequisites for Bonaventure's acceptance of the argument were not his "ontological" mode of thought, or a doctrine of the innate idea of God within the soul, but in his acceptance of exemplar causality. (2) Half a century later, Jean Chatillon, following Étienne Gilson, affirmed the more common view of the issue, that the acceptance or rejection of Anselm's argument among the first scholastics of the thirteenth century depended upon their allegiance to Augustinian or Aristotelian traditions. (3) Anton Pegis did the same when he insisted that recovery of the Anselmian argument in its original form involved stripping away the Aristotelian framework in terms of which the *Proslogion* has been read since Thomas. (4)"

(1) In general terms, the interpretation of Bonaventure as leader of an Augustinian tradition, and of Thomas as representative of Aristotelianism, can be found in the work of E. Gilson, *A History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (London, 1978). On Bonaventure's refinement of Anselm in the context of the Augustinian tradition, see H. R. Klockner, S.J. "Bonaventure's Refinement of the Ontological Argument," *Mediaevilla* 4 (1978): 209-23. On analogical and univocal accounts of being as factors determining attitudes to Anselm's argument, see H. J. Johnson, "Contra Anselm But Contra Gentiles: Aquinas's Rejection of the Ontological Argument," *Schede Medievali* 13 (1986): 18-27.

(2) P. A. Daniels, *Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im*

Dreizehnten Jahrhundert (Münster, 1909), pp. 131, 156.

(3) Jean Chattillon, "De Guillaume d'Auxerre à Saint Thomas d'Aquin: L'Argument de Saint Anselme Chez Les Premiers Scolastiques du XIIIe Siècle," *Spicilegium Beccense* 1 (1959): 209-31.

(4) Anton C. Pegis, "St. Anselm and the Argument of the 'Proslogion'," *Mediaeval Studies* 28 (1966): 228-67.

62. McGrath P.J., "The ontological argument revisited," *Philosophy* 63: 529-533 (1988).

63. McGrath P.J., "The refutation of the ontological argument," *Philosophical Quarterly* 40: 195-212 (1990).

64. McGrath P.J., "Does the ontological argument beg the question?," *Religious Studies* 30: 305-310 (1994).

"In his paper *Has the Ontological Argument Been Refuted?*' (*Religious Studies*, 29 (1993), 97-110) William F. Vallicella argues that my attempt to show that the Ontological Argument begs the question is unsuccessful. I believe he is wrong about this, but before endeavouring to vindicate my position I must first make clear what precisely is the point at issue between us. The Ontological Argument is not a single argument, but a family of arguments. Newly devised formulations of the argument are frequently put forward by philosophers in an effort to avoid difficulties that have been pointed out in previous versions. As a consequence there is no possibility of a conclusive proof that every form of the argument embodies the same fallacy. Nevertheless, one can, I believe, prove that all the standard versions of the argument embody a certain fallacy and that, given the nature of the argument, it is therefore unlikely that the argument can be formulated in such a way as to avoid this difficulty. What I tried to show in my paper is that the six best-known versions of the argument (the non-modal versions of Anselm, Descartes and Leibniz and the modal versions of Malcolm, Hartshorne and Plantinga) all beg the question and that they do so at the same point in the argument, namely when it is asserted that it is possible, that an absolutely perfect being exists. It is difficult to see how an ontological argument could be formulated without, including this claim as one of its premises, since the distinguishing badge of the argument is the inference from the possibility of an absolutely perfect being to its actuality. It must be unlikely then, if my criticism of these six versions is correct, that there is any way of formulating the argument that avoids this fallacy."

65. Millican Peter, "The one fatal flaw in Anselm's argument," *Mind* (113): 437-476 (2004).

"Anselm's Ontological Argument fails, but not for any of the various reasons commonly adduced. In particular, its failure has nothing to do with violating deep Kantian principles by treating 'exists' as a predicate or making reference to 'Meinongian' entities. Its one fatal flaw, so far from being metaphysically deep, is in fact logically shallow, deriving from a subtle scope ambiguity in Anselm's key phrase. If we avoid this ambiguity, and the indeterminacy of reference to which it gives rise, then his argument is blocked *even if his supposed Meinongian extravagances are permitted*. Moreover it is blocked in a way which is straightforward and compelling (by contrast with the Kantian objections), and which generalizes easily to other versions of the Ontological Argument. A significant moral follows. Fear of Anselm's argument has been hugely influential in motivating ontological fastidiousness and widespread reluctance to countenance talk of potentially non-existing entities. But if this paper is correct, then the Ontological Argument cannot properly provide any such motivation. Some of the most influential contributions to ontology, from Kant to Russell and beyond, rest on a mistake."

66. Moreau Joseph. *Pour ou contre l'insensé? Essai sur la preuve anselmienne*. Paris: 1967.

67. Moreau Joseph, "Inintelligible et impensable (Anselm, *Liber Apologeticus*, IV)," *Anselm Studies. An Occasional Journal* 1: 85-93 (1983).

68. Morscher Edgar, "Anselm's argument -- Once again," *Logique et Analyse* 158: 175-188 (1997).

"The kernel of Anselm's famous argument in chapter II of his *Proslogion* consists of a few lines. Thousands of pages have been written about them, but nevertheless they have resisted final clarification, though the literature about them still grows.

Most of what has allegedly been written about Anselm's argument is concerned more with phantasies than with Anselm's original text. In fact most authors take Anselm's argument as an excuse for doing quite different things and developing their own ideas.

Anselm's brilliant text does not deserve such a treatment. Accordingly I will focus on Anselm's own

words and will display the ingenuity of his argument as well as where it fails."

69. Nef Frédéric. Perfection divine et propriétés positives. *L'argumentum unicum* d'Anselme et la preuve ontologique de Leibniz à la lumière de la preuve gödelienne de l'existence de Dieu. In *Analyse et théologie. Croyances religieuses et rationalité*. Edited by Bourgeois-Gironde Sacha, Gnassounou Bruno, and Pouivet Roger. Paris: Vrin 2002. pp. 95-124
70. Pearl Leon, "A puzzle about Necessary Being," *Philosophy* 65: 229-231 (1990).
"I argue contrary to Stephen Makin's "The Ontological Argument" (*Philosophy* 63, No. 243) that one can't show that necessary being is a meaningful concept by the use of modal notions involving the exemplification of concepts. For conceptual coherence provides, at best, a necessary condition for necessary exemplification, not a sufficient one. What then could there possibly be about a concept beyond its coherence that would necessitate its exemplification. I suspect there is none."
71. Pegis Anton Charles, "St. Anselm and the argument of the *Proslogion*," *Mediaeval Studies* 28: 228-267 (1966).
"This study is a reexamination of the *Proslogion*, aiming, in the light of the interpretations of K. Barth, E. Gilson and especially H. Bouillard, to determine the nature of its argument for God as a rational construction. St. Anselm believes that the believing reason is both believing in itself and rationally visible to an unbeliever. The argument in chapters 2-4 is not from thought to existence, but from God as designated by and in things to God as posited in his transcendence. There is no reason for thinking that the so-called ontological argument originates in the *Proslogion*."
72. Priest Stephen, "Reality and existence in Anselm," *Heythrop Journal. A Bimonthly Review of Philosophy and Theology* 41: 461-462 (2000).
"Although 'exists' has the superficial appearance of a predicate in the *Proslogion*, Anselm does not rely on the premise that 'exists' is a logical predicate (or that existing is a property) in the ontological proof. Anselm argues that God exists not only as a mental object (*in intellectu*) but also exists in extramental reality (*in re*). Whether 'exists' is a predicate is irrelevant to this inference. It follows that many putative refutations of the argument fail."
73. Read Stephen, "Reflections on Anselm and Gaunilo," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 21: 437-438 (1981).
"In Anselm's ontological argument, the phrase 'to exist (only) in the understanding' needs explanation; so also does the claim that something which exists only in the understanding, and so does not exist, is less great than something that does exist. What this means is that, if it were to exist, it would be less great than the other. But it could not then be less great than itself. So Anselm's argument collapses."
74. Roark Tony, "Tarski and Klima: conceptual closure in Anselm's Proof," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 24: 1-14 (2003).
"Gyula Klima maintains that Anselm's ontological argument is best understood in terms of a theory of reference that was made fully explicit only by later medievals. I accept the interpretative claim but offer here two objections to the argument so interpreted. The first points up a certain ambiguity in Klima's formulation of the argument, the correction of which requires a substantive revision of the argument's conclusion. The second exploits the notion of semantic closure introduced by Tarski. Klima offers the atheist an 'out' by drawing a distinction between constitutive and parasitic reference. I argue that using Klima's preferred description ('the thought object than which no thought object can be thought to be greater') to refer constitutively to God results in conceptual closure, a condition analogous to semantic closure that renders the instant conceptual scheme inconsistent and subject to paradox. Although the proof ultimately fails, Klima's development of the notions of constitutive and parasitic reference has important and far-reaching implications."
75. Sagal Paul, "Anselm's refutation of Anselm's ontological argument," *Franciscan Studies*: 285-291 (1973).
76. Schmitt Franciscus Salesius, "Der ontologische Gottesbeweis Anselms," *Theologische Revue* 32: 217-223 (1933).
77. Schnepf Robert, "Sein als Ereignis: Zu einigen Voraussetzungen des Gottesbeweises bei Anselm von Canterbury," *Patristica et Mediaevalia* 19: 3-22 (1998).
"In recent discussions on Anselm's ontological argument, the assumption is made, that Anselm holds "existence" to be a first order predicate.

However, there is no explicit statement in Anselm's texts that confirms this interpretation. In Thomas Aquinas and his predecessors, the logic of subject and predicate is applied on Anselm's argument.

Anselm himself has no logic of "existence". The exact meaning and function of the expression "existence" is, therefore, to be investigated by an interpretation of its actual use in the argument itself. I propose, that Anselm views existence to be an event, and that the term "maius" can best be interpreted as a relation between different kinds of events."

78. Schufreider Gregory, "The identity of Anselm's argument," *Modern Schoolman* 54: 345-361 (1977).
79. Schufreider Gregory. *An introduction to Anselm's argument*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1978.
80. Schufreider Gregory, "A classical misunderstanding of Anselm's argument," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 66 (4): 489-499 (1992).
81. Tichy Pavel, "Existence and God," *Journal of Philosophy* 76: 403-420 (1979).
"The article presents an analysis of Anselm's ontological argument for the existence of God, based on Transparent Intensional Logic. Section I consists of general considerations on denotation and existence. In section II, two fallacies flawing Descartes's proof are exposed. Anselm's argument is reconstructed and assessed in section III, it is found logically sound, but doubt is cast on one of its premises."
82. Vallicella William, "Has the ontological argument been refuted?," *Religious Studies* 29: 97-110 (1993).
"Suppose we say that a deductive argument is probative just in case it is (i) valid in point of logical form, (ii) possesses true premises, and (iii) is free of informal fallacy. We can then say that an argument is normatively persuasive for a person if and only if it is both probative and has premises that can be accepted, without any breach of epistemic propriety, by the person in question. If the premises of a probative argument would be accepted by any reasonable person, I will call such an argument demonstrative.
Now it seems that a reasonable position to take with respect to the Ontological Argument for the existence of God (hereafter, OA) is that none of its versions is demonstrative, though some of the versions are normatively persuasive. If so, the OA in at least one version is a 'good' argument although not a successful piece of natural theology'. To show that the OA is 'bad' in all versions one would have to show, for each version, either that it is not probative, by showing that it is either invalid, or possessed of one or more false premises, or guilty of informal fallacy, or such that its premises are more rationally rejected than accepted by the person who considers the argument. To show a version 'bad', then, it does not suffice to show that it fails to establish its conclusion in some incontrovertible manner. Precious few philosophical arguments get the length of that." (Notes omitted).
83. Viola Coloman E., "Origine et portée du principe dialectique du 'Proslogion' de Saint Anselme. De l' 'argument ontologique' à l' 'argument mégalogique'," *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 83: 339-384 (1992).
84. Viola Coloman E. Saint Anselme est-il le 'père de l'argument ontologique'? Le Proslogion confronté à Kant. In *Saint Anselm - Thinker for yesterday and today. Anselm's thought viewed by our contemporaries*. Edited by Viola Coloman E. and Van Fleteren Frederick. Evanston: Edwin Mellen Press 1996. pp.
85. Vuillemin Jules. *Le Dieu d'Anselme et les apparences de la raison*. Paris: Aubier 1971.

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Gaunilo of Marmoutiers (fl. XI century)

Texts and translations

1. Gaunilo of Marmoutiers. *Liber Pro insipiente (Quid ad haec respondeat quidam pro insipiente)*. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons 1938.

Written in 1078.

Printed in the *Opera Omnia* by Anselm of Canterbury, edited by Franciscus Salesius Schmitt - Vol. I pp. 123-129.

For the translations, see the editions of Anselm's *Proslogion*.

Studies

1. Bencivenga Ermanno, "A note on Gaunilo's lost Island," *Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review* 46: 583-587 (2007).
"Gaunilo's "Lost Island" argument is his most famous objection to Anselm's ontological proof, and Anselm is known to provide quite an unsatisfactory response to it. So someone sympathetic to Anselm might ask: is there something that Anselm is not saying, some point he has perhaps made elsewhere and he might be implicitly appealing to which would give substance to his disappointing statement? I believe there is, and this paper provides my answer."
2. Burgess-Jackson Keith, "Anselm, Gaunilo, and Lost Island," *Philosophy and Theology* 8: 243-249 (1994).
"The received view is that Gaunilo's attempted refutation of Anselm's ontological argument fails. But those who believe this do not agree as to why it fails. The aim of this essay is to show that "whether" the attempted refutation succeeds depends crucially on how one formulates the so-called greatmaking principle on which Anselm's argument rests. This principle has largely been ignored by contemporary philosophers, who have chosen to focus on other aspects of the argument. I sketch two analyses of metaphysical greatness and suggest that on one of them, which Anselm may have held, his argument avoids Gaunilo's criticism."
3. Davis Stephen T., "Anselm and Gaunilo on the Lost Island," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 13: 435-448 (1975).
4. Hopkins Jasper. Anselm's debate with Gaunilo. In *Saint Anselme ses précurseurs et ses contemporains*. Edited by Kohlenberger Helmut. Frankfurt: Minerva 1976. pp. 25-33
Journées internationales d'étude Aoste-Turin, 28-30 juin 1973.
5. Imbrisevic Miroslav, "Gaunilo's *Cogito* argument," *Saint Anselm Journal* 5: 50-56 (2007).
"Gaunilo presents Anselm with a dilemma in section 7 of his *Responsio*: I know most certainly that I exist. But If I cannot think my non-existence at the same time, then Anselm's claim in *Proslogion* 3 (that my inability to think God's non-existence, while knowing most certainly that He exists, is a unique property of God) would be false. If I can do so, however, then I should also be able to know most certainly that God exists and, at the same time, think his non-existence. I will show that Anselm's response to Gaunilo's attack is not adequate because it does not address the issue of certainty, which is at the heart of Gaunilo's objection."
6. Losoncy Thomas. The Anselm-Gaunilo dispute about Mans's knowledge of God's existence: an examination. In *Twenty-five years (1969-1994) of Anselm studies*. Edited by Van Fleteren Frederick and Schnaubelt Joseph C. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press 1996. pp. 161-181
"The existence of major disagreement between Saint Anselm and Gaunilo concerning reason's ability (unaided by faith) to attain any knowledge of God's hence is easily recognized by reading their famous exchanges. What has received minimal notice is the extent of this disagreement and its significance for interpreting Anselm's argument in the *Proslogion*. This study will seek to establish to what extent knowledge of God's existence is / is not attainable and what said knowledge includes according to these two thinkers. The method for conducting this endeavor will be to examine the kinds, range, and origins of human knowledge of existence as variously held and disputed by Anselm and Gaunilo. Such a survey should help to place this aspect of the two protagonists' thought in sharper relief. Moreover, expanding the parameters of our consideration of Anselm's argument in this fashion will free us from the, for many, enslaving fascination of Anselm's logic in *Proslogion* II-IV and allow a clearer insight into the metaphysics at work in these three chapters and the work as a whole. Additionally, such freedom of inquiry will permit a due recognition of chapter one's role in posing the problematic according to Anselm.
Finally, the metaphysical notions stated obliquely in *Proslogion* II-IV, and especially in III, will be better heard by examining their elaboration in later chapters of *Proslogion* and the subsequent exchanges between Anselm and Gaunilo.

It is necessary, then, to turn to the originals to see if, indeed, such insights are forthcoming."

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William of Auxerre (ca. 1140-1231)

Texts

1. William of Auxerre. *Summa Aurea*. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique 1980.
Written ca. 1215-1229.
Magistri Guillelmi Altissiodorensis *Summa aurea* - Cura et studio Jean Ribailier - Grottaferrata, Romae: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1980-1987 (4 v. in 6) + 1 volume titled: *Introduction générale*.
Prologue 15-23;
Daniels (1909) pp. 25-27: *Liber I. Quid sit fides et propter quid ad probationem fidei adducantur rationes naturales*. Solère Jean-Luc. Présentation, traduction et annotation de Guillaume d'Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, I, traité XI (extraits). In *La Puissance et son ombre. De Pierre Lombard à Luther*. Edited by Boulnois Olivier. Paris: Aubier 2008. pp. 99-127

Studies

1. Ottaviano Carmelo. *Guglielmo D'Auxerre (+1231). La vita, le opere, il pensiero*. Roma: L'universale Tipografia Poliglotta 1929.
2. Principe Walter Henry. *William of Auxerre's theology of the hypostatic union*. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1963.

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Alexander of Hales (1185-1245)

Texts

1. Alexander of Hales. *Summa Theologica seu sic ab origine dicta 'Summa fratris Alexandri*. Quaracchi: Editiones Collegii s. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas 1924.
Written after 1245.
Studio et cura PP. Collegii s. Bonaventurae ad fidem codicum edita (reprinted 1979)
The *Summa Alexandri*, attributed to Alexander, is a compilation put together by his students after his death.
Daniels (1909) pp. 28-35): *Pars I Quaestio III. De essentialitate divinae Substantie* Membrum. I, II et III.

Studies

1. Gál Gideon. Alexander of Hales. In *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edited by Craig Edward. New York: Routledge 1998. pp. 176-178
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Richard Fishacre (ca. 1205-1248)

Texts

1. Richard Fishacre. *Commentarias super I-IV Sententiam*.

Written ca. 1240, this work, the first Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard written at Oxford, is unpublished; a critical edition is in preparation.

Daniels (1909) pp. 21-24: *Liber I, Distinctio III*.

2. Long Raymond James, "The science of theology according to Richard Fishacre: Edition of the Prologue to the *Commentary on the Sentences*," *Medieval Studies* 34: 71-98 (1972).
3. Richard Fishacre. *In tertium Librum Sententiarum*. Edited by Rodler Klaus. München: Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 2003.
Vol. II Dist. 23-40.

Studies

1. Long Raymond James. Richard Fishacre's way to God. In *A straight path. Studies in medieval philosophy and culture. Essays in honor of Arthur Hyman*. Edited by Link-Salinger Ruth et al. Washington: Catholic University of America Press 1987. pp. 174-182
2. Long Raymond James. *The life and works of Richard Fishacre OP. Prolegomena to the edition of his Commentary on the Sentences*. München: Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 1999.
3. Long Raymond James, "The significance of Richard Fishacre's Sentences-Commentary," *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 6: 214-216 (2002).

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Richard Rufus of Cornwall (fl. 1231-1256)

Texts

1. Richard Rufus of Cornwall. *Sententia Oxoniensis I-III*. 1250.

Unpublished text (ca. 1250), available in only one manuscript: *Oxford, Balliol College 62 (B62)*.

Studies

1. Gál Gideon, "Viae ad existentiam Dei probandam in doctrina Richardi Rufi," *Franziskanische Studien* 38: 177-202 (1956).
"Publishes substantial excerpts from Rufus' Oxford theology lectures and brief excerpts from Assisi 138. Shows that Rufus anticipated both Thomas' criticism of Anselm's Proslogion proof for God's existence and Scotus' modal proof for the existence of God." Rega Wood - *The Richard Rufus of Cornwall Project. Bibliography*: <http://rrp.stanford.edu/bibliography.html>.
2. Long Raymond James and DeWitt Richard, "Richard Rufus's reformulations of Anselm's Proslogion argument," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 47: 329-340 (2007).
3. Raedts Peter. *Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the tradition of Oxford theology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1987.
4. Wood Rega. Richard Rufus of Cornwall. In *A Companion to philosophy in the Middle Ages*. Edited by Gracia Jorge J.E. and Noone Timothy B. Malden: Blackwell 2003. pp. 579-587
5. Wood Rega. Richard Rufus' response to Saint Anselm. In *Anselm and Abelard. Investigations and juxtapositions*. Edited by Gasper Giles and Kohlenberger Helmut. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 2006. pp. 87-102
"In previous articles, Fr. Gedeon Gál and I have shown that after rejecting Anselm's argument in its original form, Rufus, like John Duns Scotus, and like the modern American analytical philosopher, Norman Malcolm, proposed another ontological argument in its place. To oversimplify: either as a gloss on Anselm or as a substitute for his argument, they claimed that God's existence, or rather the existence of a per se being, could be inferred by modus tollens: a per se being is necessary if possible, a variety of arguments show that a per se being is possible, therefore a per se being is necessary. (3) Here, I want to look at Rufus' criticism and very briefly at another proposed

substitute argument for God's existence." p. 88

(3) G. Gàl, 'Viae ad existentiam Dei probandum in doctrina Richardi' *Franziskanische Studien*, 38 (1956), 183-186, 194-196. R. Wood, 'Scotus's Argument for the Existence of God,' *Franciscan Studies*, 47 (1987), 270-274 and an unpublished paper, 'Scotus' Ontological Argument'. In Appendix (pp. 99-102) is given the Latin text of Rufus (*Sententia Oxoniensis* 1.2, B62.20ra-va).

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Bonaventure of Bagnorea (1221-1274)

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Written in 1251-1253.
Edita studio et cura PP. Collegii a S. Bonaventura.
See also the *Editio Minor* Quaracchi, Firenze, Ex typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae (1934).
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2. Bonaventure of Bagnorea. *Quaestionum Disputatarum. De mysterio Trinitatis*. Roma: Città Nuova 1993.
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Sancti Bonaventurae Opuscula theologica (Opera V/1) - Latin text and Italian translation.
Daniels (1909) pp. 39-40: *Quaestio I, Articulo I. Utrum Deum esse sit verum.*
3. Bonaventure of Bagnorea. *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*. Saint Bonaventure NY: Franciscan Institute 2003.
Written in 1259.
Latin text and English translation by Zachary Hayes; introduction and commentary by Philotheus Boehner.
4. Saint Bonaventure. *Disputed Questions on the Mystery of Trinity*. St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute 1979.
Works of Saint Bonaventure Vol. III.
Introduction and translation by Zachary Hayes (reprinted 2000).
5. Saint Bonaventura. *The mind's road to God*. New York: Macmillan 1953.
Translated with an introduction by George Boas.

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2. Doyle John Patrick, "Saint Bonaventure and the ontological argument," *Modern Schoolman* 52: 27-48 (1974).
3. Mathias Thomas, "Bonaventurian ways to God through reason (First part)," *Franciscan Studies* 36: 192-232 (1976).
4. Mathias Thomas, "Bonaventurian ways to God through reason (Second part)," *Franciscan Studies* 37: 153-206 (1977).
5. Oeing-Hanhoff Ludger, "Note sur l'argument ontologique chez Descartes et Bonaventure," *Archives de Philosophie* 36: 643-655 (1973).
6. Oeing-Hanhoff Ludger. Der sogenannte ontologische Gottesbeweis bei Descartes und Bonaventura. In *Analecta anselmiana*. Frankfurt: 1975. pp.
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7. Pegis Anton, "The Bonaventurian way to God," *Mediaeval Studies* 29: 206-242 (1967).
8. Platzek E.W. Die Verwendung der 'via Anselmiana' bei Bonaventura. In *Analecta anselmiana*. Frankfurt: 1975. pp.
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9. Rivera de Ventosa Enrique. Supuestos filosofico-religiosos de la pruebas de la existencia de Dios en San Bonaventura. In *S. Bonaventura 1274-1974*. Edited by Bougerol Jacques. Grottaferrata: Collegio S. Bonaventura 1974. pp. 201-258
10. Seifert Josef, "'Si Deus est Deus, Deus est': reflections on St. Bonaventure's interpretation of St. Anselm's ontological argument," *Franciscan Studies* 52: 215-231 (1992).

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Albert the Great (ca. 1200-1280)

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Thomas Aquinas (1225/6-1274)

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Written ca. 1257-1273.
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Texts selected by Daniels (1909) pp. 64-67:
 - 1) *In librum Boethii de Trinitate Expositio*: Quaestio I Articulus III: Utrum Deus sit primum quod a mente cognoscitur.
 - 2) *Sententiarum* Liber I Distinctio III Quaestio I Articulus II Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum.
 - 3) *Summa Contra Gentiles* Liber I Capitulo X et Capitulo XI.
 - 4) *De Veritate* Quaestio X Articulus XII. Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum menti humanae sicut prima principia demonstrationis quae non possunt cogitari non esse.
 - 5) *Summa Theologica* Pars I. Quaestio II Articulus I. Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum.
2. Thomas Aquinas. *Summa theologiae*. Torino: Marietti 1962.
Written ca. 1266-1273.
S. Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici *Summa theologiae*, cura et studio Petri Caramello, cum textu ex recensione leonina.
(3 vols. I: Pars prima et Prima secundae; II: Pars Secunda secundae; III: Tertia pars et Supplementum, 1962-1963).

Studies

1. Bassler Wolfgang. *Die Kritik des Thomas von Aquin am ontologischen Gottesbeweis*. Köln: Walter Kleikamp 1970.
2. Dutton Blake D., "The ontological argument: Aquinas's objection and Descartes' reply," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 67: 431-450 (1993).
3. Matthews Gareth B., "Aquinas on saying that God doesn't exist," *Monist. An International*

Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry: 472-477 (1963).

"The article discusses inadequacies in Aquinas' criticism of Anselm's ontological argument. Aquinas is commonly credited with criticizing Anselm by distinguishing two kinds of self-evidence, a distinction which for the purpose of criticizing Anselm, is not very helpful, and instead of an effective rebuttal of Anselm, Aquinas provides mostly a mere denial that his argument is cogent. The article attempts to show how Anselm's ontological argument can be defeated."

4. Rikhof Herwi. Aquinas and the "ratio Anselmi". A theo-logical analysis of Aquinas' criticism. In *L'argomento Ontologico*. Edited by Olivetti Marco M. Padova: CEDAM 1990. pp. 137-202
5. Wippel John, "Thomas Aquinas on what philosophers can know about God," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 66 (3): 279-297 (1992).

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Peter of Tarentaise (1225-1276)

Texts

1. Peter of Tarentaise. *Innocentii Quinti in IV libros Sententiarum Commentaria*. 1259.
Written ca 1259.
The last printed edition is that of Toulouse: Vol. I. (1652); Vol. II (1649); Vol. III. (1652); Vol. IV. (1651).
Daniels (1909): *Sententiarum I Distinctio III. Quaestio I. De cognitine Dei. Articulus I. An Deus a creatura sit cognoscibilis. Articulus II. Qualiter possit cognosci et probari Deum esse* (pp. 68-71).

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John Peckham (ca. 1230-1292)

Texts

1. John Peckham. *Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum*. 1260.

Unpublished; a manuscript of Book I (written ca. 1260-1270): Biblioteca Nazionale di Firenze *Conv. G. 854*.
Daniels (1909) pp. 41-50: *Liber I Distinctio II, Quaestio I. Quaesitum primum. Circa primum quaeritur an Deus sit, et ostenditur*.

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Henry of Ghent (ca. 1217-1293)

Texts and translations

1. Henry of Ghent. *Henry of Ghent's Summa. The Questions on God's existence and essence (Articles 21-24)*. Leuven: Peeters 2005.
Written 1280-1293.
Latin text, introduction, and notes by Roland J. Teske; translation by Jos Decorte and Roland J. Teske.

N.B. Daniels (1909) edition of: *Summae Quaestionum Ordianrium Tous I. Articulus XXI. De Deo an sit in se absolute. Quaestio I. Utrum Deus habest esse. Articulus XXII. De Deo an sit in comparatione ad nostram notitiam. Questio II. Utrum Deum esse sit homini notum naturaliter per se* (pp. 79-81) is now superseded by the new edition by R. J. Teske.

- Henry of Ghent. *Henry of Ghent's Summa. The Questions on God's unity and simplicity (Articles 25-30)*. Leuven: Peeters 2006.

Written 1280-1293.

Latin text, introduction, translation and notes by Roland J. Teske.

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- Latzer Michael, "The proofs for the existence of God: Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus as precursors of Leibniz," *Modern Schoolman* 74: 143-160 (1997).
- Pegis Anton Charles, "Toward a new way to God: Henry of Ghent," *Mediaeval Studies* 30: 226-247 (1968).
- Pegis Anton Charles, "A new way to God: Henry of Ghent (II)," *Mediaeval Studies* 31: 93-116 (1969).
- Pegis Anton Charles, "Four medieval ways to God," *Monist. An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry* 54: 317-358 (1970).
"St. Anselm, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent represent three medieval philosophical traditions in proving the existence of God, namely, the Platonic, the Aristotelian and the Avicennian. Platonic hierarchy and participation, leading to a supreme term, govern the proof of God in St. Bonaventure and St. Anselm. St. Thomas, beginning with data in nature (e.g. motion), reaches God as the cause of these data before reaching him as he is in his own absoluteness. St. Thomas' argumentation and method are Aristotelian. The proofs of God in St. Anselm (specifically, in the *Proslogion*), in St. Bonaventure and in St. Thomas are all empirical and "a posteriori". but the proof of God in Henry of Ghent, Avicennian in origin, is "a priori" and seeks to reach God in his unity as the necessary being. Henry's proof is the model and perhaps the origin of the ontological argument."
- Pegis Anton Charles, "A new way to God: Henry of Ghent (III)," *Mediaeval Studies* 33: 158-179 (1971).
- Teske Roland J., "Henry of Ghent's metaphysical argument for the existence of God," *Modern Schoolman* 83: 19-38 (2005).
- Paulus Jean, "Henri de Gand et l'argument ontologique," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 10-11: 265-323 (1936).

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Nicolaus of Ockham (fl. XII century)

Texts

- Nicolaus of Ockham. *Commentaria in Sententiarum*. 1260.

Unpublished manuscript (ca. 1260-1270) - Biblioteca Nazionale di Firenze *Conv. G5, 858*.

Daniels (1909) pp. 82-83: *Sententiarum Libro I Distinctio III. Quaestio II. Quaeritur secundo an Deum esse sit per se notum*.

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Matthew of Aquasparta (ca. 1240-1302)

Texts

1. Matthew of Aquasparta. *Commentarius in Primum, Secundum et Quartum Librum Sententiarum*.

Written ca. 1271-1280; unpublished.

See the introduction by Victorin Doucet to *Fr. Matthaei ab Aquasparta, O.F.M. ... Quaestiones disputatae de gratia ... cum introductione critica de magisterio et scriptis eiusdem doctoris*, Quaracchi, Florence, 1935, pp. LVIII-CLV (on the *Commentarius* see pp.LXXI-CVII).

Daniels (1909) pp. 51-63: *Liber I Distinctio II Articulus Primus. De Unitate divina. Quaestio I: Utrum Deum esse sit verum; Quaestio III: Utrum Deum esse sit verum indubitabile*.

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INDEX**Giles of Rome (ca. 1243-1316)**

Texts

1. Giles of Rome. *Super Librum I Sententiarum (Reportatio)*. 1492.

Written ca. 1280-1290; last printed edition: Venezia (1492).

Daniels (1909) pp. 72-78: *Sententiarum Liber I Distinctio III. Quaestio I. De cognitione Dei in se. Articulus I. Utrum Deum possium cognoscere in vita ista (*); Articulus II. Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum. Articulus III. Utrum Deum esse possit demonstrari*.

2. Luna Concetta, "Fragments d'une reportation du commentaire de Gilles de Rome sur le premier livre des Sentences. Les extraits des mss. Clm. 8005 et Paris, B. N. Lat. 15819 (First Part)," *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 74: 205-254 (1990).
3. Luna Concetta, "Fragments d'une reportation du commentaire de Gilles de Rome sur le premier livre des Sentences. Les extraits des mss. Clm. 8005 et Paris, B. N. Lat. 15819 (Second Part)," *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 74: 437-456 (1990).

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INDEX**Richard of Middletown (1249-1308)**

Texts

1. Richard of Middleton. *Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi quaestiones subtilissimae*.

Written ca. 1290-1300; last printed edition Bussels, 1591.

Daniels (1909) pp. 84-88: *Sententiarum I. Distinctio III. Articulus I. DE cognitione Dei a creatura. Quaestio II. Utrum Deum esse sit nobis per se notum. Quaestio III: Utrum Deum esse possit demonstrari*.

Studies

INDEX**William of Ware (fl. 1290-1305)**

Texts

1. William of Ware. *Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum*. 1424.

Written ca. 1290-1300; available only in manuscript.

Daniels (1909) pp. 89-104: *Quaestio XIV. Quaeritur utrum Deus sit. Questio XXI. Quaeritur utrum Deum esse per se sit notum.*

Studies

INDEX**John Duns Scotus (1265/6-1308)**

Texts and translations

1. John Duns Scotus. *Lectura in librum primum Sententiarum*. Civitas Vaticana: Typis Poliglottis Vaticanis 1960.
Written 1298-1299.
Opera Omnia. ("The Vatican edition"), vol. XVI: *Librum I Distinctio II, Quaestio I*, nn. 38-135.
2. John Duns Scotus. *Opus Oxoniense*.
Written 1300-1306.
Opera Omnia. ("The Vatican edition") Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950-.
Vol. I Librum I, Distinctio II, Quaestio I, nn. 39-190.
3. John Duns Scotus. *A treatise on God as first principle*. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press 1982.
Written in 1308.
A Latin text and English translation of the *De Primo Principio*. Second edition, revised, with a commentary by Allan B. Wolter.
First edition 1966.

Studies

1. Bonansea Bernardino, "Duns Scotus and St. Anselm's ontological argument," *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy* 4: 128-141 (1967).
2. Doyle John Patrick, "Some thoughts on Duns Scotus and the ontological argument," *New Scholasticism* 53: 234-241 (1979).
"Duns Scotus has substituted the notion of a "highest thinkable" for Anselm's "that than which a greater cannot be thought." For Scotus, the touchstone of "thinkability" is non-contradiction. He resumes the non-contradictory and therefore the thinkable character of God. He then shows God's existence in two steps: (1) from thinkability to essential reality, and (2) from essence to existence. The first step involves Scotus in some inconsistency and also comes close to making man's mind the very rule of reality. The second step entails a confusion of internal possibility with total possibility, which ordinarily, beyond internal possibility, includes an external potency."
3. Grabst Harmut, "Johannes Duns Scotus' Rezeption des Anselmianischen Arguments," *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 2: 105-125 (1997).
"In his "Ordinatio", Scotus disregards the constitutive function of thinking inherent to Anselm's "ratio". Scotus's representation of the argument in "Ordinatio" I d. 2 p. 1 q. 2, which lays no claim to "coloratio", eliminates this constitutive function, proving instead by means of a syllogism containing the terms "being", "non-being" and "the highest" the existence of the highest. In the "coloratio" ("Ord." I d. 2 p. 1 q. 1), then, Scotus replaces Anselm's expression "that than which nothing greater can be thought" with the concept "the highest thinkable", by which he means an infinite being. The introduction of an infinite being taken as the highest thinkable, however, destroys the structure of Anselm's argument with its innate coherence. In fact, Scotus proves the existence of the highest thinkable not by means of this argumentative structure, but instead on the basis of his own analysis of certain ontological structures. This proof has no real connection in content to Anselm's argument

and does not foster its comprehension; instead, Scotus merely couches his argument in Anselm's terms, so that it is more appropriate to talk about a "coloration rationum Scoti". "

4. Kielkopf Charles, "Duns Scotus's rejection of 'Necessarily Exists' as a predicate," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 16: 13-21 (1978).
"The paper begins with a reconstruction of Scotus's argument in chapter three (3.23) of his *Treatise about the first principle* that there can be at most one necessary being. This argument is shown to presuppose that 'necessarily exists' is not a predicate. Scotus' argument is modified to show that he also has to accept that 'exists' is not a predicate. The remaining problem is, then, to explain how Scotus can still accept a "colored" ontological argument. This problem is met by suggesting that the nature of an existing being has more perfections than any nature of a non-existing being but that, still, existence is not one of the features - let alone anything which can be called a perfection -- making up the nature."
5. Martinich Aloysius P., "Scotus and Anselm on the existence of God," *Franciscan Studies* 37: 139-152 (1977).
6. Wolter Allan and Adams McCord Marilyn, "Duns Scotus Parisian proof for the existence of God," *Franciscan Studies* 42: 248-321 (1982).
7. Wood Rega, "Scotus argument for the existence of God," *Franciscan Studies* 47: 259-277 (1987).

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GENERAL STUDIES ON THE ANCIENT PERIOD (BEFORE ANSELM OF CANTERBURY)

1. Baldassarri Mariano, "Lo stoicismo antico e l'argomento ontologico," *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 63: 391-418 (1971).
2. Brunschwig Jacques. Did Diogenes of Babylon invent the ontological argument? In *Papers in Hellenistic philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994. pp. 170-189
Translated by Janet Lloyd
3. Burrell David. *Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1986.
4. Davidson Herbert A. *Proofs for eternity, creation and the existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press 1987.
5. Dumont Jean-Paul, "Diogène de Babylone et la preuve ontologique," *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger*: 391-395 (1982).
6. Fakhry Majid, "The ontological argument in the Arabic tradition: the case of Alfarabi," *Studia Islamica* 64: 5-17 (1968).
7. Halfwassen Jens, "Sein als uneingeschränkte Fülle. Zur Vorgeschichte des ontologischen Gottesbeweises im antiken Platonismus," *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* 56 (2002).
8. Held K., "Zur Vorgeschichte des ontologischen Gottesbeweis. Anselm und Parmenides," *Perspektiven der Philosophie* 9: 217-234 (1983).
9. Mayer Tony, "Ibn Sina's 'Burhan Al-Siddiqin'," *Journal of Islamic Studies* 12: 18-39 (2001).
"Ibn Sina (d.429/1037) gave a distinctive argument for the existence of God in his works. Scholars disagree on the exact structure and character of his argument (admittedly, Ibn Sina gives it in more than one form). This paper tries to determine the argument's precise shape and classify it in relation to other such proofs. It attempts this through a detailed analysis of one of the best known presentations of the proof, in Ibn Sina's *Isharat*, which is cross-checked with other versions and the commentaries. The argument is found to build on the proposition that existence occurs in the mind dichotomically, as either necessary or contingent. Ibn Sina claims that an extramental Necessary Existent follows from both modes. In the first case, it is contradictory to posit 'necessary existence' in the mind and deny it outside the mind. In the second case 'contingent existence' is such that it could not be self-explanatory. Most space in Ibn Sina's argument is taken up with showing that

contingent existence, even if temporally infinite, ultimately implies necessary existence. On these grounds, it is concluded that Ibn Sina's proof must be classified as both ontological and cosmological, without paradox. It is ontological insofar as 'necessary existence' in intellect is the first basis for arguing for a Necessary Existent in re. It is, however, also cosmological insofar as most of it is taken up with arguing that contingent existents cannot stand alone and must end up in a Necessary Existent."

10. Morewedge Parviz. A third version of the ontological argument in the Ibn Sinian metaphysics. In *Islamic philosophical theology*. Edited by Morewedge Parviz. New York: State University of New York Press 1979. pp. 182-222
Reprinted in: Parviz Morewedge - *The mystical philosophy of Avicenna* - Binghamton, Global Publications, 2001 pp. 117-163

GENERAL STUDIES ON THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD

1. "Anselm Studies," *Anselm Studies. An Occasional Journal* 1 (1983).
From the Note by Helmut Kohlenberger (p. VII): "Anselm Studies is an international journal, launched in connection with the Third Anselm Conference which was held under the auspices of the International Anselm Committee at Canterbury, 2-5 July 1979.
The journal will carry both a selection of conference papers from this and future International Anselm Conferences, and articles submitted directly to the editors. Contributions may be in English, French, German or Italian and may be concerned with any aspect of Anselm's life and work, whether philosophy, religion, theology or history, or with his influence throughout the centuries."

Contents: Note VII; Abbreviations VIII; Michael Ramsey: Anselm of Bec and Canterbury. Address given at the Conference Service, 4 July 1979, of the Third International Anselm Conference p. 1; I. Anselm in the world; Richard William Southern: Anselm at Canterbury p. 7; Marjorie Chibnall: From Bec to Canterbury: Anselm and monastic privilege p. 23; C: Holdsworth: The posthumous Anselm p. 45; II. The Proslogion argument; Charles Hartshorne: Anselm and Aristotle's first law of modality p. 51; Michel Corbin: Cela dont plus grand ne puisse être pensé p. 59; Joseph Moreau: Inintelligible et impensable (Anselme, *Liber Apologeticus*, IV) p. 85; Pietro Scapin: Argomento ontologico e ateismo semantico p. 95; Desirée Park: Berkeley's rejection of Anselm's argument p. 103; III. Anselm and language; Marcia L. Colish: St. Anselm's philosophy of language reconsidered p. 113; Wolfgang Gombocz: Anselm über Sinn und Bedeutung p. 125; Eileen F. Serene: Anselmian agency in the *Lambeth Fragments*: a medieval perspective on the theory of action p. 143; IV. Anselm's later writings. Alasdair Heron: Anselm and the *Filioque*: a responsio pro Graecis p. 159; Paul A. Streveler: Anselm on future contingencies: a critical analysis of the argument of the *De Concordia* p. 165; V. The devotional works; Benedicta Ward: 'Inward feeling and deep thinking': the Prayers and Meditations of St. Anselm revisited p. 177; Thomas H. Bestul: St. Anselm, the monastic community at Canterbury, and devotional writing in late Anglo-Saxon England p. 185; VI. Anselm's influence; Helmut Kohlenberger: Ratio bei Rodulfus Monachus: Ein Versuch aus der Sicht der historischen Anthropologie p. 201; David E. Luscombe: St. Anselm and Abelard p. 207; A. R. Lee: Anselm and Thomas of Buckingham: an examination of the *Questiones super Sententias* p. 231; VII. The Texts; Gilliam R. Evans: The Hereford *Proslogion* p. 253-273.
2. Bettoni Efrem. *Il problema della conoscibilità di Dio nella scuola francescana*. Padova: Cedam 1950.
3. Bonansea Bernardino, "The ontological argument: proponents and opponents," *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy* 6: 135-192 (1973).
4. Boutin Maurice, "L'argument d'Anselme et la règle de foi selon Rudolf Bultmann," *Archivio di Filosofia*: 471-481 (1990).
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6. Gómez Caffarena José, "Review of: *Die ontologische Gottesbeweis* by Dieter Henrich," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 3: 617-624 (1963).
7. Javelet Robert. L'argument dit ontologique et la *speculatio*. In *Spicilegium Beccense (vol. II)*. Paris: 1984. pp. 501-510
8. Johnson H.J. The ontological argument and the languages of "being". In *Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter (vol. II)*. Berlin, New York: 1981. pp. 724-737
9. Pegis Anton, "Four medieval ways to God," *Monist* 54: 317-358 (1970).
About St. Anselm, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent
10. Streveler Paul. Two "new" critiques of the ontological argument. In *Saint Anselme ses précurseurs et ses contemporains*. Edited by Kohlenberger Helmut. Frankfurt: Minerva 1976. pp. 55-64
11. Varisco Novella, "La 'Ratio Anselmi' nell'interpretazione di alcuni pensatori medievali," *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 90: 5-27 (1998).

EXTERNAL LINKS

Gyuka Klima - [St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding](#)

Gyula Klima - [On whether *id quo nihil maius cogitari potest* is in the understanding](#)

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