

Living Ontologists - Bibliographical Guide: T - Z

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These pages will give some essential bibliographical information about some of the most important living ontologists; only a few titles will be cited for every author.

The Authors to which I devoted an entire page are marked with an asterisk (*)

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Amie L. Thomasson

Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Miami

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Books

1. Thomasson Amie L. *Fiction and metaphysics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999.
2. Thomasson Amie L. *Ordinary objects*. New York: Oxford University Press 2007.

Articles

1. Thomasson Amie L., "Fiction, modality and dependent abstracta," *Philosophical Studies* 84: 295-320 (1996).

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[Amie L. Thomasson](#)

William Vallicella

American Philosopher

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1. Vallicella William. *A paradigm theory of existence. Onto-theology vindicated*. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002.

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1. Vallicella William, "A critique of the quantificational account of existence," *Thomist* 47: 242-267 (1983).

Links

Maverick Philosopher

Peter van Inwagen

John Cardinal O'Hara Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame

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Books

1. van Inwagen Peter. *Ontology, identity, and modality. Essays in metaphysics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001.

Articles

1. van Inwagen Peter, "When are objects parts?," *Philosophical Perspectives* 1: 21-47 (1987).
2. van Inwagen Peter, "Why is there anything at all?," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 70: 95-110 (1996).
3. van Inwagen Peter, "Meta-ontology," *Erkenntnis* 48: 233-250 (1998).

Links

Personal page at the University of Notre Dame

Achille C. Varzi

Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University

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Books

1. Varzi Achille. *Parts and places. The structures of spatial representation*. Cambridge: The MIT Press 1999.
With Roberto Casat

Articles

1. Varzi Achille. Truth, falsehood and beyond. In *Topics in philosophy and artificial intelligence*. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana and Poli Roberto. Bozen: Istituto Mitteleuropeo di Cultura 1991. pp. 39-50
Papers from the International Summer Schools in Bozen - 1989-1990.
"1. Introduction
Always in the background and sometimes in the foreground of any semantic approach to cognitive reasoning is a straight, twofold assumption on the admissible state representations:
[1] Every sentence must be *either true or false*
[2] No sentence can be *both true and false*.
Arguably, such a standard course is intuitively well-grounded, and the resulting accounts have generally proved to be not only simple, but formally powerful as well. As things are, however, some concern arises in connection with their range of application. For on the one hand, it appears that any

but the most artificial set-ups may violate [1], while on the other hand, any but the most simplistic situations are liable to violate [2]. In fact, even if we assume that the *purpose* of a language's sentences is to be always true or false, there is no a priori reason to suppose that the underlying conditions will be always *completely* fulfilled (for instance, ordinary language sentences may involve expressions whose intended reference is only partially defined, or vaguely defined, or not defined at all). And since there is no general syntactic criterion for incompleteness, there is no general way that incompletenesses can be ruled out without ruling out a variety of unproblematic cases as well. Conversely, even if we assume that the *intention* of a language's sentences is never to be true and false, there is in fact no a priori guarantee that the underlying conditions can be always *consistently* fulfilled (for example, ordinary language sentences may, in unfavourable circumstances, turn out to be self-referential, thus leading to such well-known troubles as the liar paradox). And again, since there is no general decision procedure for inconsistency, there is no general and effective way that inconsistencies can be ruled out without rendering a great deal of perfectly unproblematic reasoning impossible.

For these reasons, a more general semantic framework, where representational gaps and/or gluts are admitted *bona fide*, is arguably desirable. Of course the task is by no means straightforward. Dropping [1] and [2] from the foundations of semantics is a true "revolution", and it might be difficult to keep it under logical control. Nevertheless it can be done. My purpose here is to outline a concrete proposal in this direction."

2. Varzi Achille, "Inconsistency without contradiction," *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 38: 621-639 (1997).

Links

[Achille C. Varzi's Home Page](#)

David Weissman

Professor of philosophy at City College of New York

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Books

1. Weissman David. *A social ontology*. New Haven: Yale University Press 2000.

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Jan Westerhoff

Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Durham

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Books

1. Westerhoff Jan. *Ontological categories. Their nature and significance*. New York: Oxford University Press 2005.

Articles

1. Westerhoff Jan, "Defining "ontological category", " *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 102: 287-293 (2002).

Abstract: "Although a considerable degree of precision has been introduced both into the formulation and the discussion of ontological theories by the use of formal methods there is still a remarkable indefiniteness about foundational issues. In particular it is not clear *what* an ontological category is and *why* we regard something as an ontological category. This is amazing given that the notion of ontological category is in fact the most basic of the whole of ontology: it is what this discipline is about."

2. Westerhoff Jan, "The construction of ontological categories," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 82: 595-620 (2004).

Links

[Jan Westerhoff' Home Page](#)

David Wiggins

Wykeham Professor, Emeritus, at Oxford University

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Books

1. Wiggins David. *Sameness and substance renewed*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001. Revised edition of: *Sameness and substance* - Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1980

Articles

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Stephen Yablo

Professor of Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

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Articles

1. Yablo Stephen, "Does ontology rest on a mistake? (First Part)," *Supplement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society* 72: 229-262 (1998).
Abstract: "The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction between statements made within make-believe games and those made outside them-or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To determine our ontological commitments, we have to ferret out all traces of non-literality in our assertions; if there is no sensible project of doing that, there is no sensible project of Quinean ontology."
2. Yablo Stephen. A paradox of existence. In *Empty names, fiction, and the puzzles of non-existence*. Edited by Everett Anthony and Hofweber Thomas. Stanford: CSLI Publications 2000. pp. 275-312
3. Yablo Stephen. Abstract objects. A case study. In *Individuals, essence, and identity. Themes of analytic metaphysics*. Edited by Bottani Andrea, Carrara Massimiliano, and Giarretta Pierdaniele. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002. pp. 189-206

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Edward N. Zalta

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Books

1. Zalta Edward. *Abstract objects. An introduction to axiomatic metaphysics*. Dordrecht: Reidel 1983.
2. Zalta Edward. *Intentional logic and the metaphysics of intentionality*. Cambridge: The MIT Press 1988.

Articles

1. Zalta Edward and McMichael Alan, "An alternative theory of nonexistent objects," *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 9: 297-313 (1980).
2. Zalta Edward, "Lambert, Mally and the Principle of Independence," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 25/26: 447-460 (1986).
"In a recent book [*Meinong and the Principle of Independence*, Cambridge 1983], K. Lambert argues that philosophers should adopt Mally's Principle of Independence (the principle that an object can have properties even though it lacks being of any kind) by abandoning a constraint on true predications, namely, that all of the singular terms in a true predication denote objects which have being. The constraint may be abandoned either by supposing there is a true predication in which one of the terms denotes a beingless object (Meinong) or by supposing there is a true predication in which one of the terms denotes nothing at all (free logic). However, Lambert's conclusions can be undermined by showing that the data he produces in support of his position can be explained by either of two recent theories of abstract and nonexistent objects, both of which are couched in languages which conform to the traditional constraint."
3. Zalta Edward, "A comparison of two intensional logics," *Linguistics and Philosophy* 11: 59-89 (1988).
4. Zalta Edward, "On Mally's alleged heresy: a reply," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 13: 59-68 (1992).
5. Zalta Edward, "Twenty-five basic theorems in situation and world theory," *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 22: 385-428 (1993).
6. Zalta Edward and Linsky Bernard, "Naturalized Platonism versus Platonized naturalism," *Journal of Philosophy* 92: 525-555 (1995)
7. Zalta Edward, "Two (related) world views," *Noûs* 29: 189-211 (1995).
8. Zalta Edward and Linsky Leonard, "In defense of the contingently nonconcrete," *Philosophical Studies* 84: 283-294 (1996).
9. Zalta Edward, "A classically-based theory of impossible worlds," *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 38: 640-660 (1997).
10. Zalta Edward. Mally's determinates and Husserl's noemata. In *Ernst Mally - Versuch einer Neubewertung*. Edited by Hieke Alexander. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 1998. pp. 9-28
11. Zalta Edward, "A common ground and some surprising connections," *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 40: 1-25 (2002).
"This paper serves as a field guide to certain passages in the literature which bear upon the foundational theory of objects I have developed over the years. The foundational theory assimilates ideas from key philosophers in both the analytical and phenomenological traditions. The ideas of Plato, Leibniz, Frege, Russell, Gödel and even Kripke become connected through those of Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, and Mally. The foundational theory thereby serves as a common ground where analytic and phenomenological concerns meet. It is couched in a precise logic and systematizes a well-known phenomenological kind of entity, one which has played an important role in analytic philosophy."

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