

# Parmenides of Elea. Annotated Bibliography: H - Mes

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## BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Hankinson R.Jim. Parmenides and the metaphysics of changelessness. In *Presocratic philosophy. Essays in honour of Alexander Mourelatos*. Edited by Caston Victor and Graham Daniel W. Aldershot: Ashgate 2002. pp. 65-80  
 "Conclusions.  
 Parmenides seeks to demonstrate the impossibility of generation (and hence change) dilemmatically: on the one hand the notion of caused generation turns out to be incoherent, while the supposition of uncaused generation, on the other, makes it inexplicable. Neither arm of the dilemma is successful. One cannot simply invoke PSR [Principle of Sufficient Reason] in order to rule out uncaused change, since PSR is at best an empirical hypothesis and not some Leibnizian *a priori* law of thought; (53) and a suitably sophisticated analysis of the logical form of change, one which

recognizes the ambiguity of 'from' in propositions such as 'x comes to be from y,' will dispose of Parmenides' bomb. But it needed an Aristotle to disarm it.

The basic principle involved, namely:

P1 Nothing comes to be from nothing,

is not original to Parmenides (it first occurs in a fragment of the sixth-century lyric poet Alcaeus, although we do not know in what context; (54) its early history has been ably traced by Alex Mourelatos (55) but its use in destructive argument certainly is. P1 is ambiguous between the causal principle

P1a Nothing comes to be causelessly,

and the conservation principle

P1b Nothing comes to be except from pre-existing matter;

and that ambiguity is not always patent. Indeed, distinguishing (P1a) from (P1b) is the first step towards solving the Eleatic puzzle, as Aristotle (certainly: *Ph. I.7*, 190a14-31; cf. *Metaph. V.24*; *GA* 1.18, 724a20-34) and Plato (possibly: *Phd.* 103b) realized. Moreover, as Hume was to show, neither version can be accepted as an *a priori* truth: both the causal principle and the conservation principle (at any rate crudely interpreted as asserting the conservation of matter) are rejected by the standard interpretation of quantum physics; and whatever else may be true of quantum physics, it is not logically incoherent.

53 Cf. Leibniz, *Monadology* §32; on the status of the principle, see Kant, *Prolegomena* §4.

54 Alcaeus, fr. 76 Bergk; Mourelatos 1981 [*Pre-socratics origins of the principle that there are no origins of nothing*, (*Journal of Philosophy*, 78, 1981, pp. 649-665)] pp. 132-3 discusses this text.

55 Mourelatos, 1981.

2. Heidegger Martin. 'Moira' (Parmenides, fr. 8,34-41). In *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Pfullingen: G. Neske 1954. pp. 231-256

English translation in: *Early Greek thinking* - Edited and translated by David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi - New York, Harper & Row, 1975 pp. 79-101.

"The topic under discussion is the relation between thinking and Being. In the first place we ought to observe that the text (VIII, 34-41) which ponders this relation more thoroughly speaks of *eon* and not -- as in Fragment III -- about *einai*. Immediately, and with some justification, one concludes from this that Fragment VIII concerns beings rather than Being. But in saying *eon* Parmenides is in no way thinking "beings in themselves," understood as the whole to which thinking, insofar as it is some kind of entity, also belongs. Just as little does *eon* mean *einai* in the sense of "Being for itself," as though it were incumbent upon the thinker to set the nonsensible essential nature of Being apart from, and in opposition to, beings which are sensible. Rather *eon*, being, is thought here in its duality as Being and beings, and is participially expressed -- although the grammatical concept has not yet come explicitly into the grasp of linguistic science. This duality is at least intimated by such nuances of phrasing as "the Being of beings" and "beings in Being." In its essence, however, what unfolds is obscured more than clarified through the "in" and the "of " These expressions are far from thinking the duality as such, or from seriously questioning its unfolding.

"Being itself," so frequently invoked, is held to be true so long as it is experienced as Being, consistently understood as the Being of beings. Meanwhile the beginning of Western thinking was fated to catch an appropriate glimpse of what the word *einai*, to be, says -- in *Physis*, *Logos*, *En*. Since the gathering that reigns within Being unites all beings, an inevitable and continually more stubborn semblance arises from the contemplation of this gathering, namely, the illusion that Being (of beings) is not only identical with the totality of beings, but that, as identical, it is at the same time that which unifies and is even most in being [*das Seiendste*]. For representational thinking

everything comes to be a being.

The duality of Being and beings, as something twofold, seems to melt away into nonexistence, albeit thinking, from its Greek beginnings onward, has moved within the unfolding of this duality, though without considering its situation or at all taking note of the unfolding of the twofold. What takes place at the beginning of Western thought is the unobserved decline of the duality. But this decline is not nothing. Indeed it imparts to Greek thinking the character of a beginning, in that the lighting of the Being of beings, as a lighting, is concealed. The hiddenness of this decline of the duality reigns in essentially the same way as that into which the duality itself falls. Into what does it fall? Into oblivion, whose lasting dominance conceals itself as *Lethe* to which *Aletheia* belongs so immediately that the former can withdraw in its favor and can relinquish to it pure disclosure in the modes of *Physis*, *Logos*, and *En* as though this had no need of concealment.

But the apparently futile lighting is riddled with darkness. In it the unfolding of the twofold remains as concealed as its decline for beginning thought. However, we must be alert to the duality of Being and beings in the *eon* in order to follow the discussion Parmenides devotes to the relation between thinking and Being." pp. 86-87

3. Heidegger Martin. *Parmenides*. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann 1982.

*Gesamtausgabe* Vol. 54. Lecture course from the winter semester 1942-43, first published in 1982. Translated in English by André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz as: *Parmenides* (Lecture course 1942-43) - Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1992.

"We are attempting to follow the path of thought of two thinkers, Parmenides and Heraclitus. Both belong, historiographically calculated, to the early period of Western thought. With regard to this early thinking in the Occident, among the Greeks, we are distinguishing between *outset* and *beginning*. Outset refers to the coming forth of this thinking at a definite "time." Thinking does not mean here the course of psychologically represented acts of thought but the historical process in which a thinker arises, says his word, and so provides to truth a place within a historical humanity. As for time, it signifies here less the point of time calculated according to year and day than it means "age," the situation of human things and man's dwelling place therein. "Outset" has to do with the debut and the emergence of thinking. But we are using "beginning" in a quite different sense. The "beginning" is what, in his early thinking, is to be thought and what is thought. Here we are still leaving unclarified the essence of this thought. But supposing that the thinking of a thinker is distinct from the knowledge of the "sciences" and from every kind of practical cognition in all respects, shall we have to say that the relation of thinking to its thought is essentially other than the relation of ordinary "technical-practical" and "moral-practical" thinking to what it thinks. Ordinary thinking, whether scientific or prescientific or unscientific, thinks beings, and does so in every case according to their individual regions, separate strata, and circumscribed aspects. This thinking is an acquaintance with beings, a knowledge that masters and dominates beings in various ways. In distinction from the mastering of beings, the thinking of thinkers is the *thinking of Being*. Their thinking is a *retreating in face of Being*. We name what is thought in the thinking of the thinkers the beginning. Which hence now means: Being is the beginning. Nevertheless, not every thinker, who has to think Being, thinks the beginning. Not every thinker, not even every one at the outset of Western thought, is a primordial thinker, i.e., a thinker who expressly thinks the beginning. Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus are the only primordial thinkers. They are this, however, not because they open up Western thought and initiate it. Already before them there were thinkers. They are primordial thinkers because they think the beginning. The beginning is what is thought in their thinking. This sounds as if "the beginning" were something like an "object" the thinkers take up for themselves in order to think it through. But we have already said in general about the thinking of thinkers that it is a retreating in face of Being. If, within truly thoughtful thinking, the primordial thinking is the highest one, then there must occur here a retreating of a special kind. For these thinkers do not "take up" the beginning in the way a scientist "attacks" something. Neither do these thinkers come up with the beginning as a self-produced construction of thought. The beginning is not something dependent on the favor of these thinkers, where they are active in such and such a way, but, rather, the reverse: the beginning is that which begins something with these thinkers -- by laying a claim on them in such a way that from them is demanded an extreme retreating in the face

of Being. The thinkers are begun by the beginning, "in-cepted" [*An-gefangenen*] by the in-ception [*An-fang*]; they are taken up by it and are gathered into it.

It is already a wrong-headed idea that leads us to speak of the "work" of these thinkers. But if for the moment, and for the lack of a better expression, we do talk that way, then we must note that their "work," even if it had been preserved for us intact, would be quite small in "bulk" compared with the "work" of Plato or Aristotle and especially in comparison with the "work" of a modern thinker. Plato and Aristotle and subsequent thinkers have thought far "more," have traversed more regions and strata of thinking, and have questioned out of a richer knowledge of things and man. And yet all these thinkers think "less" than the primordial thinkers." pp. 7-8

4. Heidegger Martin. Seminar in Zähringen 1973. In *Four seminars*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2003. pp. 64-84

"In the silence that follows, Jean Beaufret notes: The text we just heard completes, as it were, the long meditation in which you have turned first towards Parmenides and then Heraclitus. One could even say that your thinking has engaged differently with Heraclitus and Parmenides. Indeed, in *Vorträge and Aufsätze*, the primacy seemed to be given to Heraclitus. Today what place would Heraclitus take with respect to Parmenides?

*Heidegger*: From a mere historical perspective, Heraclitus signified the first step towards dialectic. From this perspective, then, Parmenides is more profound and essential (if it is the case that dialectic, as is said in *Being and Time*, is "a genuine philosophic embarrassment") In this regard, we must thoroughly recognize that tautology is the only possibility for thinking what dialectic can only veil.

However, if one is able to read Heraclitus on the basis of the Parmenidean tautology, he himself then appears in the closest vicinity to that same tautology, he himself then appears in the course of an exclusive approach presenting access to being." p. 81

5. Heitsch Ernst. *Gegenwart und Evidenz bei Parmenides. Aus der Problemgeschichte der Aequivokation*. Wiesbaden: Steiner 1970.
6. Heitsch Ernst. *Parmenides und die Anfänge der Ontologie, Logik und Naturwissenschaft*. München: Tusculum 1974.
7. Heitsch Ernst. *Parmenides und die Anfänge der Erkenntniskritik und Logik*. Donauwörth: L. Auer 1979.  
Contents: Einführung 7; I. Parmenides (1977) 15; II. Der Ort der Wahrheit. Aus der Frühgeschichte des Wahrheitsbegriffs 33; III. Evidenz und Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen bei Parmenides (1974) 71; IV. Logischer Zwang und die Anfänge der Beweistechnik (1975) 81; V. Die Erkenntniskritik des Xenophanes (1966) 102; VI. Ein Buchtitel des Protagoras (1969) 132-136.
8. Held Klaus. *Heraklit, Parmenides und die Anfang von Philosophie und Wissenschaft. Eine phänomenologische Besinnung*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1980.
9. Hermann Arnold. *To think like God: Pythagoras and Parmenides, the origins of philosophy*. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing 2004.
10. Hershbell Jackson P., "Parmenides' Way of Truth and B16," *Apeiron. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* 4: 1-23 (1970).  
Reprinted in: J. P. Anton, A. Preus (eds.) - *Essays in ancient Greek philosophy* (Volume Two) - Albany, State University of New York Press, 1983, pp. 41-58.  
"An attempt to show that Parmenides' B16 is neither a theory of knowledge nor of sense perception, but an affirmation of the close relationship between thought and being: "you cannot recognize that which is not" (B2,7) and without "that which is" there can be no thought. The fragment probably belongs to the way of truth, and the interpretations of Aristotle and Theophrastus (Theophrastus is dependent on Aristotle) are mistaken."
11. Hintikka Jaakko, "Parmenides' Cogito argument," *Ancient Philosophy* 1: 5-16 (1980).  
"Parmenides held that the only thing we can truly say in philosophy is "is" or, in a more idiomatic but also more misleading English, "it is," *éstin*. Even though this main thesis of Parmenides turns out to have more consequences and more interesting consequences than it might at first seem to promise, our first reaction to it is likely to be one of puzzlement. How can a major philosopher hold such an incredible, paradoxical view? The purpose of this paper is to make Parmenides' thesis understandable. I shall argue that, notwithstanding the paradoxical appearance of Parmenides'

thesis, it is in reality an eminently natural consequence of certain assumptions which are all understandable and which can all be shown to have been actually subscribed to by Parmenides. Furthermore, Parmenides' assumptions are arguably not incorrect, either, with one exception. They are all of considerable historical and systematic interest." p. 5.

12. Hoy Ronald, "Parmenides' complete rejection of time," *Journal of Philosophy* 9: 573-598 (1994). "How should Parmenides' rejection of time be understood? It is common (amongst thinkers as different as Russell and Heidegger) to try to explain this rejection in terms of his alleged semantic aversion to "what is not". I argue such semantic interpretations do not do justice to Parmenides' worries, and more justice can be done by reading him as proscribing the "contradictions" which infect becoming. Indeed, these problems are more basic than his alleged cosmogonic aversion to genesis from nothing. The contradictions stem from needing to talk about temporal entities as both what is and what is not. I propose and discuss an interpretation in terms of the current debate between "tensed" and "tenseless" theories of time. Though I urge that the tenseless view (but not the tensed view) can avoid these contradictions, one can find other reasons why Parmenides would reject tenseless time. One can also find reasons for avoiding interpretations which view Parmenides as advancing some concept of an "eternal present" or "timeless present"."
13. Hölscher Uvo, "Grammatisches zu Parmenides," *Hermes. Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie* 84: 385-397 (1956). "Analyzes the poem of Parmenides from the point of view of its linguistic usages and grammatical structure. Observes that its stylistic techniques reflects the influence of epic literary construction. Focuses on an examination of Frag. 4." [N.]
14. Jameson G., "Well-Rounded Truth' and Circular Thought in Parmenides," *Phronesis* 3: 15-30 (1958).
15. Jantzen Jörg. *Parmenides zum verhältnis von Sprache und Wirklichkeit*. München: C. H. Beck 1976. Presents an analysis of the relationship between language and reality in the philosophy of Parmenides, focusing on the way in which the two parts of his poem stand related to each other. Maintains that *both* parts have the same object, namely, Being or reality, although, it insists, Being as the object of opinion becomes inevitably falsified and deformed by the human language of predication. Regards Parmenides more as a philosopher of language (comparable to Frege, Russell, and the early Wittgenstein) than as a metaphysician in the platonic tradition." [N.]
16. Jones Barrington, "Parmenides 'The way of Truth'," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 11: 287-298 (1973). "Recent years have produced a number of distinct interpretations of Parmenides' philosophical poem. Of these, one of the most interesting is that of Montgomery Furth's "Elements of Eleatic Ontology," and I shall use his treatment of the poem as the basis for the development of a different interpretation, an interpretation which, hopefully, can preserve the explanatory power of Furth's exposition while avoiding certain of its difficulties."
17. Jünger Eberhard. *Zum Ursprung der Analogie bei Parmenides und Heraklit*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1964.
18. Kahn Charles H., "The Greek verb 'to be' and the concept of Being," *Foundations of Language* 2: 245-265 (1966). Reprinted in C. H. Kahn - *Essays on Being* - New York, Oxford University Press, 2009 pp. 16-40.
19. Kahn Charles H., "More on Parmenides. A response to Stein and Mourelatos," *Review of Metaphysics* 23: 333-340 (1969). A reply to Stein (1969) and Mourelatos (1969).

"For Burnet and for many scholars of his generation, Parmenides was essentially a critic of earlier physical theories and the author of a challenge which provoked the atomist theory of matter as a response. Commentators today are more inclined to see him either as a philosopher of language in the style of Frege or Wittgenstein or, in the Continental tradition, as a metaphysician of Being in the manner of Hegel or Heidegger. It seems to me that Burnet was closer to the truth (even if his interpretation in detail is absurdly narrow), and that he and Meyerson were faithful to the deeper spirit of Eleatic philosophy in insisting upon a close connection between Parmenides' argument and the physical science of his day and ours. At all events, any interpretation must take account of the

fact that his doctrine seems permanently relevant not only to speculative metaphysics and abstract ontology but also to critical reflection on the structure of natural science.

Hence I am happy that Howard Stein was willing to publish his comments on the poem, since his unusual command of modern physical theory makes it possible for him to formulate a plausible reinterpretation of Eleatic doctrine within the framework of post-Newtonian or Einsteinian physics. I fully agree with him as to the historical and philosophical value of such a reconstruction, even if it cannot square with every facet of the archaic text under discussion. Simply as a commentary on the text, however, a one-sided interpretation fully worked out will often be more illuminating than a carefully balanced synthesis of different points of view.

Once such an interpretation has been presented, it is the ungrateful task of the interlocutor to insist upon the appropriate qualifications. Stein's reconstruction gains in coherence by taking Parmenides' Being as "truth" rather than "thing," as "discernible structure in the world" or *alles, was der Fall ist*: the unique Sachverhalt but not the unique Gegenstand. But Parmenides himself is not so coherent, and part of the creative influence of his theory was due precisely to the fact that it can also be understood-and was presumably also intended-as an account of the only thing or entity or object that can be rationally understood. Hence it was that, the atomists could define the concept of indestructible solid body as their new version of Being (*on*), and empty space as the new form of Non-being (*ouk on* or *oudén*). In general, the Greek philosophers never succeeded in formulating a systematic distinction between thing and fact, between individual object and structure (although Plato's self-criticism and later development of the theory of Forms may involve a conscious shift, from one category to the, other).

(...)

I am grateful to Alexander Mourelatos for having tried to formulate my interpretation more precisely, and if he has not entirely succeeded that no doubt. shows that my own exposition was not clear enough. I confess that. I do not recognize my view in the complicated reduction sentences which he offers as a semi-formalization of my version of thesis and antithesis in fragment 2. I agree with him that any reading of the first and second Ways must construe them as contradictory, so that "the reason which compels rejection of the second route is the reason which enjoins strict and faithful adherence to the first route" (p. 736). I think my view can be shown to satisfy this condition, and to this end I shall indulge in a bit of rudimentary formalization."

20. Kahn Charles H., "The thesis of Parmenides," *Review of Metaphysics* 22: 700-724 (1969).  
Reprinted in C. H. Kahn - *Essays on Being* - New York, Oxford University Press, 2009 pp. 143-166.

"If we except Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, Parmenides is perhaps the most important and influential of all the Greek philosophers. And considered as a metaphysician, he is perhaps the most original figure in the western tradition. At any rate, if ontology is the study of Being, or what there is, and metaphysics the study of ultimate Reality, or what there is in the most fundamental way, then Parmenides may reasonably be regarded as the founder of ontology and metaphysics at once. For he is the first to have articulated the concept of Being or Reality as a distinct topic for philosophic discussion.

The poem of Parmenides is the earliest philosophic text which is preserved with sufficient completeness and continuity to permit us to follow a sustained line of argument. It is surely one of the most interesting arguments in the history of philosophy, and we are lucky to have this early text, perhaps a whole century older than the first dialogues of Plato. But the price we must pay for our good fortune is to face up to a vipers' nest of problems, concerning details of the text and the archaic language but also concerning major questions of philosophic interpretation. These problems are so fundamental that, unless we solve them correctly, we cannot even be clear as to what Parmenides is arguing for, or why. And they are so knotted that we can scarcely unravel a single problem without finding the whole nest on our hands.

I am primarily concerned here to elucidate Parmenides' thesis: to see what he meant by the philosophic claim which is compressed into the one-word sentence "it is." I take this to be the premiss (or one of them), from which he derives his famous denial of all change and plurality. I shall thus consider the nature of this premiss, and why he thought it plausible or self-evident. I shall also look briefly at the structure of his argument which concludes that change is impossible, in order to

see a bit more clearly how such a paradoxical conclusion might also seem plausible to Parmenides, and how it could be taken seriously by his successors. Finally, I shall say a word about the Parmenidean identification of Thinking and Being."

21. Kahn Charles H. *The verb 'be' in ancient Greek*. Dordrecht: Reidel 1973.  
Volume 6 of: John W. M. Verhaar (ed.) - *The verb 'be' and its synonyms: philosophical and grammatical studies* - Dordrecht, Reidel  
Reprinted by Hackett Publishing, 2003 with new introduction and discussion of relation between predicative and existential uses of the verb *einai*.

Reviews:

by George B. Kerferd in: *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 58, 1976 pp. 60-64.

22. Kahn Charles H., "Being in Parmenides and Plato," *Parola del Passato* 43: 237-261 (1988).  
Reprinted in C. H. Kahn - *Essays on Being* - New York, Oxford University Press, 2009 pp. 167-191.

"Despite the silence of Aristotle, there can be little doubt of the importance of Parmenides as an influence on Plato's thought. If it was the encounter with Socrates that made Plato a philosopher, it was the poem of Parmenides that made him a metaphysician. In the first place it was Parmenides' distinction between Being and Becoming that provided Plato with the ontological basis for his theory of Forms. When he decided to submit this theory to searching criticism, he chose as critic no other than Parmenides himself. And when the time came for Socrates to be replaced as principal speaker in the dialogues, Plato introduced as his new spokesman a visitor from Elea. Even in the *Timaeus*, where the chief speaker is neither Socrates nor the Eleatic Stranger, the exposition takes as its starting-point the Parmenidean dichotomy. (1) From the *Symposium* and *Phaedo* to the *Sophist* and *Timaeus*, the language of Platonic metaphysics is largely the language of Parmenides. One imagines that Plato had studied the poem of Parmenides with considerable care. He had the advantage of a complete text, an immediate knowledge of the language, and perhaps even an Eleatic tradition of oral commentary. So he was in a better position than we are to understand what Parmenides had in mind. Since Plato has given us a much fuller and more explicit statement of his own conception of Being, this conception, if used with care, may help us interpret the more lapidary and puzzling utterances of Parmenides himself."

(1) *Timaeus* 27D 5: 'The first distinction to be made is this: what is the Being that is forever and has no becoming, and what is that which is always becoming but never being?'

23. Kahn Charles H. Parmenides and Plato. In *Presocratic philosophy. Essays in honour of Alexander Mourelatos*. Edited by Caston Victor and Graham Daniel W. Aldershot: Ashgate 2002. pp. 81-94  
Reprinted as *Pamenides and Plato once more* in C. H. Kahn - *Essays on Being* - New York, Oxford University Press, 2009 pp. 192-206.

"This seems a happy occasion to return to Parmenides, in order both to clarify my own interpretation of Parmenidean Being and also to emphasize the affinity between what I have called the veridical reading and the account in terms of predication that Alex Mourelatos gave in his monumental *The Route of Parmenides*.) It is good to have this opportunity to acknowledge how much our views have in common, even if they do not coincide. And perhaps I may indulge here in a moment of nostalgia, since Alex and I are both old Parmenideans. My article '*The Thesis of Parmenides*' was published in 1969, just a year before Alex's book appeared. That was nearly thirty years ago, and it was not the beginning of the story for either of us. My own Eleatic obsession had taken hold even earlier, with an unpublished Master's dissertation on Parmenides, just as Alex had begun with a doctoral dissertation on the same subject. So, for both of us, returning to Parmenides may have some of the charm of returning to the days of our youth." p. 81

"I want to defend Parmenides' positive account of Being as a coherent, unified vision.

And I think his refutation of coming-to-be if formally impeccable, once one accepts the premise (which Plato will deny) that *esti* and *ouk esti* are mutually exclusive, like p and not-p. And it is precisely this assimilation of the '*is* or *is-not*' dichotomy to the law of non-contradiction -- to p or

not-p' - that accounts for the extraordinary effectiveness of Parmenides' argument, its acceptance by the fifth-century cosmologists, and the difficulty that Plato encountered in answering it.

However, if the rich, positive account of Being that results from Parmenides' amalgamation of the entire range of uses and meanings of *einai* turns out to be a long-term success (as the fruitful ancestor of ancient atomism, Platonic Forms, and the metaphysics of eternal Being in western theology), the corresponding negation in Not-Being is a conceptual nightmare. Depending on which function of *einai* is being denied, *to mê on* can represent either negative predication, falsehood, non-identity, non-existence, or non-entity, that is to say, nothing at all. The fallacy in Parmenides' argument lies not in the cumulation of positive attributes for Being but in the confused union of these various modes of negation in the single conception of 'what-is-not.' That is why Plato saw fit to criticize his great predecessor in respect to the notion of Not-Being, while making positive use of the Parmenidean notion of Being." (pp. 89-90)

24. Kahn Charles H. Parmenides and Being. In *Frühgriechisches Denken*. Edited by Rechenauer Georg. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2005. pp. 217-226
25. Kerferd George. Aristotle's treatment of the doctrine of Parmenides. In *Aristotle and the later tradition*. Edited by Blumenthal Henry and Robinson Howard. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1991. pp. 1-7
26. Ketchum Richard, "Parmenides on what there is," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 20: 167-190 (1990).  
 "Part I provides an original interpretation of the fragments dealing with the way of truth. I interpret "It is," as "What can be thought of is something or other," and "It is not," as "What can be thought of is nothing at all." Thus, the equivalence of "nothing" with "what is not" is sustained and all of fragments 2-7 are either true or highly plausible. Parmenides' mistake occurs in fragment 8 where he confuses "x is not something (or other)," with "x is not anything," in the arguments for changelessness and continuity. In Part II, I compare my interpretation with those of others."
27. Ketchum Richard, "A note on Barnes' Parmenides," *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 38: 95-97 (1993).  
 "I argue that the formalized version of Jonathan Barnes' reconstruction of Parmenides argument for the conclusion that whatever any student studies exists (*The Presocratic Philosophers*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1982, pp 155-175.) confuses the claim, "it is not the case that everything that anyone studies exists" with "nothing anyone studies exists." I then provide an alternative reconstruction which saves most of what Barnes has to say about the argument including the claim that the argument is valid. I respond to an objection to the reformulation."
28. Kélessidou Anna. Dire et savoir (*legein - eidenai*) chez Xénophane et Parménide. In *Philosophie du langage et grammaire dans l'Antiquité*. Bruxelles: Ousia 1986. pp. 29-46
29. Kingsley Peter. *In the dark places of wisdom*. Inverness: Golden Sufi Center 1999.
30. Kingsley Peter. *Reality*. Inverness: Golden Sufi Center 2003.
31. Klowski Joachim, "Die konstitution der Begriffe Nichts und Sein durch Parmenides," *Kant-Studien* 60: 404-416 (1969).
32. Korab-Karkowicz Wlodimierz, "Heidegger's reading of Parmenides: on Being and Thinking the Same," *Existential. An International Journal of Philosophy* 13: 27-52 (2003).  
 "The purpose of this article is to provide a unity to Heidegger's interpretations of Parmenides. I examine his interpretations from *An introduction to metaphysics*, *What is called thinking?*, *Parmenides*, *Moira*, *Principle of identity*, *The end of philosophy and the task of thinking*, and *Seminar in Zähringen* (1973). I argue that Heidegger's reading of Parmenides which comes from his later works is embedded in his original philosophy of history -- the history of being. It is a repetition that happens as the listening which opens itself out to the Parmenidean words from within our modern age marked by the forgetfulness of being."
33. Kraus Manfred. *Name und Sache: ein Problem im frühgriechischen Denken*. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner 1988.  
 See Chapter III: *Sein und Name - Parmenides von Elea*, pp. 57-97.
34. Kraus Manfred. *Nun estin homou pan*. Sein, Raum und Zeit im Leergedicht des Parmenides. In *Frühgriechisches Denken*. Edited by Rechenauer Georg. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2005. pp. 252-269

35. Lafrance Yves, "Les multiples lectures du Poème de Parménide," *Dialogue* 32: 117-127 (1993).  
"Following the publication of *Études sur Parménide*, (edited by Pierre Aubenque), this study is concerned with the analytical interpretation of the Parmenides' Poem by G. E. L. Owen as well as the conventional interpretation by P. Aubenque. In both cases, the author shows that there is a failure in the historical reconstruction of the context of the Poem. These interpreters haven't forgotten the cosmological context of the Presocratic thought. A longer version of this study was published in Spanish in the review *Methexis* (5, 1992)."
36. Lafrance Yves, "Le sujet du Poème de Parménide: l'être ou l'univers?," *Elenchos*: 265-308 (1999).
37. Latona Max J., "Reining in the passions: the allegorical interpretation of Parmenides B fragment 1," *American Journal of Philology* 129: 199-230 (2008).  
"On whether Parmenides intended the chariot imagery of fr. 1 DK to be construed allegorically, as argued by Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 7, 111-114. Modern interpreters have rejected the allegorical reading, arguing that Sextus was biased by Plato, the allegory's true author (*Phdr.* 246ff.). There are, however, reasons to believe that a tradition (either native or imported) of employing the chariot image allegorically preexisted Plato and Parmenides. It can be argued that Parmenides was drawing upon such a tradition and did portray mind as a charioteer upon a path of knowledge, and impulse as the horses, requiring guidance in order to reach the destination."
38. Leshner James H., "Parmenides' critique of thinking: the *poludêris elenchos* of Fragment 7," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 2: 1-30 (1984).  
"It is reasonable to suppose that Parmenides' primary objective in writing his famous poem was to provide a correct account of what exists. Much of the long argument of Fragment 8 is aimed at establishing the attributes of 'the real' (to eon), and it is the teaching of Fragment 6 that all thinking and speaking must be about the real. Yet we should remember that the goddess who delivers Parmenides' message announces in Fragment 1 that we will learn also about 'mortal beliefs' (brotôn doxas) and 'the things believed' (ta dokounta). The argument of Fragment 2 begins by listing the ways of enquiry that are 'available for thinking' (noesai). Parmenides' poem is therefore both an enquiry into being and an enquiry into thinking, and his positive theory is both about being and about thinking. In what follows, I offer an account of Parmenides' critique of human thinking, focusing on the crucial, but largely misunderstood, idea of the *poludêris elenchos* mentioned briefly at the end of Fragment 7. I shall argue that in the motif of the *deris* Parmenides expressed a view of the human capacities for independent thinking that departed from an older and derogatory view, and that by adapting the older idea of the *elenchos* to a new, philosophical, use, he introduced an influential decision procedure into philosophical enquiry." p. 1
39. Leshner James H., "The significance of *kata pant' a<s>tê* in Parmenides fr. 1.3," *Ancient Philosophy* 14: 1-20 (1994).  
"I argue that the phrase *kata pant' a<s>tê* ('down all cities') can be defended as an emendation to the text of Parmenides' Fr 1. After criticizing recent accounts given by Coxon and Renehan I defend the appositeness of the phrase in connection with traditional references to the powers of inspiration invoked by the Greek lyric poet. After demonstrating how virtually every feature in the first five lines of Fr 1 contributes to this objective I argue that Parmenides could have consistently invoked the muses while embracing a view of knowledge as grounded in well-reasoned argument."
40. Leshner James H. *Parmenidean Elenchos*. In *Does Socrates have a method? Rethinking the Elenchos in Plato's Dialogues and beyond*. Edited by Scott Gary Alan. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 2002. pp. 19-35  
This paper is a revised version of [Leshner 1984]  
"The present account differs from the 1984 paper in (1) omitting any discussion of the novelty of Parmenides' view of thought as subject to the control of the individual and (2) offering a different analysis of the structure of Parmenides' main argument. My view of the development of the meaning of *elenchos* from Homer to the fourth century and its meaning in Parmenides' poem remains unchanged. In the sixteen years since the *oxford Studies* paper appeared, there has been relatively little discussion of the meaning of *elenchos* in Parmenides' poem (and a great deal about the Socratic *elenchos*), but the view of *elenchos* as a "test" or "examination" has been endorsed in several accounts: Coxon (1986) David J. Furley, *Cosmic problems: essays in Greek and Roman philosophy* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Patricia Curd (1998)."

41. Leszl Walter, "Un approccio 'epistemologico' all'ontologia parmenidea," *Parola del Passato* 43: 281-311 (1988).  
"Maintains that an epistemological approach to Parmenides' metaphysics can yield more meaningful results than a strictly semantical interpretation of the language of his poem. Explores various themes related to Parmenides' ontology: the relationship between language, thought, and reality; the eternity of Being; and the epistemological conditions which render knowledge true and genuine."  
[N.]
42. Lewis Frank A., "Parmenides' Modal Fallacy," *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 54: 1-8 (2009).  
"In his great poem, Parmenides uses an argument by elimination to select the correct "way of inquiry" from a pool of two, the ways of is and of is not, joined later by a third, "mixed" way of is and is not. Parmenides' first two ways are soon given modal upgrades - is becomes cannot not be, and is not becomes necessarily is not (B2, 3-6) - and these are no longer contradictories of one another. And is the common view right, that Parmenides rejects the "mixed" way because it is a contradiction? I argue that the modal upgrades are the product of an illicit modal shift. This same shift, built into two Exclusion Arguments, gives Parmenides a novel argument to show that the "mixed" way fails. Given the independent failure of the way of is not, Parmenides' argument by elimination is complete."
43. Loenen Johannes Hubertus. *Parmenides, Melissus, Gorgias. A Reinterpretation of Eleatic Philosophy*. Assen: Van Gorcum 1959.  
Reprinted New York, Humanities Press, 1961.  
"Presents a comprehensive review of Eleatic philosophy as developed by Parmenides and Melissus, and as interpreted by Gorgias. identifies the ideas which are common in Parmenides' and Melissus' philosophical positions, as well as the themes (which are deemed substantial) that separate them. Observes that Gorgias' attack of Eleatic ideas must be understood from the point of view given to those ideas by Melissus. Speaks of Eleatic philosophy as a metaphysics of absolute reality, in which dualism (rather than monism) and epistemological rationalism are the fundamental ideas. Observes that Parmenides "must not be looked upon as the father either of materialism or of idealism, but that he may indeed be considered the first representative of dualistic metaphysics and a realistic form of epistemological realism" (p. 5)." [N.]
44. Long Anthony Arthur, "The principles of Parmenides' cosmogony," *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 8: 90-107 (1963).  
Reprinted in: D. J. Furley and R. E. Allen (eds.) - *Studies in Presocratic philosophy*. Vol. II: *The Eleatic and the Pluralists* - London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975, pp. 82-101.

"The significance claimed by Parmenides for the cosmogony which forms the second half of his poem continues to be highly controversial. The interpretations offered by Owen and Chalmers, to name two recent criticisms, are so widely divergent that one might despair of arriving at any measure of agreement. (2) But since the significance of The Way of Truth must itself remain in some doubt until the status of the cosmogony is determined, further examinations of the evidence are justified. The purpose of this article is to discuss the passages throughout the poem which are concerned with mortal beliefs, and to suggest an interpretation of the fundamental lines 50-61 of B 8. (3) In this way the function of the cosmogony may, I believe, become clearer.

Of the solutions to the problem suggested by ancient and modern critics, four main trends can be discerned:

1. The cosmogony is not Parmenides' own but a systematized account of contemporary beliefs.
2. The cosmogony is an extension of The Way of Truth.
3. The cosmogony has relative validity as a second-best explanation of the world.
4. Parmenides claims no truth for the cosmogony.

The first view, canvassed by Zeller and modified by Burnet to a 'sketch of contemporary Pythagorean cosmology', finds few adherents among modern scholars. (4) It has never been explained, on this interpretation, why the goddess should be made to expound in detail a critique of fallacious theories. Bowra (5) has taught us to see the poem as demonstrably apocalyptic, and Parmenides

needed no goddess's patronage to set forth his contemporaries' cosmological systems. Moreover, there is nothing in the later part of the poem which can be explicitly attributed to any attested philosopher. The doxographers in general, from Aristotle, assign the cosmogony to Parmenides himself.

The second and third views above have received much support. It is argued, following Aristotle, (6) that Parmenides cannot have countenanced absolute denial of phenomena. Such an explanation, however, fails entirely to account for the later activity of the Eleatics, and is quite at variance with the evidence of the poem. It belittles the achievement of Parmenides, and fails to take into account the evidence in favour of 4., even when this is equivocal. I shall argue that the cosmogony gives a totally false picture of reality; that it is the detailed exposition of the false way mentioned in The Way of Truth (B 6.4-9) and promised by the goddess in the proem (B 1. 30-32); that it takes its starting point from the premise of that false way, the admission of Not-being alongside Being, not from the introduction of two opposites, Fire and Night; and finally, that its function is entirely ancillary to the Way of Truth, in the sense of offering the exemplar, par excellence, of all erroneous systems, as a criterion for future measurement."

(2) G. E. L. Owen, '*Eleatic Questions*', *Classical Quarterly* NS X (1960), pp. 84-102, above, pp. 48-81; W. R. Chalmers, '*Parmenides and the Beliefs of Mortals*', *Phronesis* V (1960), pp. 5-22.

(3) All fragments of Parmenides are quoted from Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin 1951).

(4) J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* (London 1930), p. 185.

(5) C. M. Bowra, '*The Proem of Parmenides*', *Classical Philology* XXXII, 2 (1937), pp. 97-112.

(6) Cf. Aristotle, *Met.* A5 986 b 18.

45. Long Anthony Arthur, "Parmenides on Thinking Being," *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 12: 125-151 (1996).

With a commentary by Stanley Rose, pp. 152-162.

Reprinted in: G. Reschnauer (ed.) - *Frü griechisches Denken* - Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Rprecht, 2005, pp. 227-251.

"This paper challenges the standard opinion that Parmenides posits being as simply the object of veridical thought. Evidence from within and outside Parmenides' fragments indicates his concern to endow being itself with mind or thinking. His poem is an investigation of the subject as well as the object of veridical thought. Parmenides argues that being and thinking are "identical," in the sense that they are coextensive. Were he to withhold thinking from being (which includes all that there is), thinking could not exist. Parmenides situates thinking in a realm whence not-being is firmly excluded because it is the same thing to think and to be."

46. Loux Michael J., "Aristotle and Parmenides: An Interpretation of *Physics* A.8," *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 8: 281-319 (1992).

With a commentary by Arthur Madigan, pp. 320-326.

47. Lowit Alexandre, "Le principe de la lecture heideggerienne de Parménide," *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* 4: 163-210 (1986).

48. MacKenzie Mary Margaret, "Parmenides' dilemma," *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 27: 1-12 (1982).

"Emphasizes the dialectical elements of Parmenides' poem, elements which manifest the tension inherent in the necessity to having to choose either the Way of Truth or the Way of Opinion.

Observes that either alternative entails tremendous philosophical difficulties which cannot be easily overcome: the Way of Truth seems to deny the very reality of our human existence which is unavoidably laden with contradictions and shortcomings, and the Way of Opinion appears to destine us to be forever barred from grasping and understanding true Being." [N.]

49. Malcolm John, "On avoiding the void," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 19: 75-94 (1991).

"Several prominent scholars have maintained that a denial of empty space, or the void, is crucial to Parmenides' rejection of plurality and locomotion.' Plurality, for example, implies divisibility but there is no *what is not* (or void) to separate one supposed portion of *what is* from another. Hence *what is* is one. Locomotion, also, might well appear to need some (empty) room for manoeuvre, but such is precluded by the proclaimed 'fullness' of *what is*.

Recently, however, interpreters of Parmenides have not been convinced that an appeal to the non-existence of a void plays a role in his denial of locomotion and plurality. The void is in fact never explicitly mentioned in his poem. More importantly, to introduce the void weakens Parmenides' position, for a *plenum* may be regarded as permitting both locomotion and plurality -- a situation adopted by his successors Empedocles and Anaxagoras. Moreover, at B 8. 22 Parmenides asserts that there cannot be any distinctions within *what is* and this principle *is* strong enough to preclude *any* locomotion or plurality. This renders an appeal to the absence of the void unnecessary as well as insufficient.

Let me expand on this latter point with regard to both locomotion and plurality. In so doing I shall accept certain assumptions which shall require (and receive) subsequent identification and defence." pp. 75-76 (notes omitted)

50. Malcolm John, "Some cautionary remarks on the 'is'/'teaches' analogy," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 31: 281-296 (2006).

"Lesley Brown suggests that Parmenides and Plato were not guilty of an oft-alleged existence/predication confusion since the relevant Greek verb, when used as a copula, had a built-in existential connotation, just as the same use of "teaches" can be understood both completely and incompletely. I challenge this approach on the grounds that it implies that the ancient Greeks were in the impossible position of not being able unproblematically to attribute properties to subjects recognized not to exist. I attempt to show that the evidence Brown presents for her thesis from Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle is inconclusive."

51. Maly Kenneth, "Parmenides: circle of disclosure, circle of possibility," *Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien* 1: 5-23 (1985).

"This essay attempts to present Heidegger's reading of Parmenides, focusing on the lecture course of 1942-43, the lecture *The end of philosophy and the task of thinking* (1966), and the Zahringen Seminar (1973). It shows (a) Heidegger's dealing seriously with the texts of Greek philosophy, (b) his grappling with the issue of metaphysics, (c) the new possibility for philosophical thinking that his reading of the Greeks offers, and (d) his engagement in the difficult task of dismantling the history of Western thought (i.e., metaphysics) towards a new possibility for thinking. In dismantling the philosophy of Parmenides, Heidegger's work takes Parmenides' text deeper than the simplistic issue of "static being" over against "becoming"."

52. Manchester Peter B., "Parmenides and the need for eternity," *Monist* 62: 81-106 (1979).

"Analyzes the structure and content of Parmenides' Frag. 8, attempting thereby to resolve the issue as to whether the Parmenidean metaphysics advanced in it implies the concept of eternity as a non-durational or non-temporal reality, or whether it allows for time as a component of eternity. Observes the difficulties in resolving the issue, difficulties which arise in part from the defective condition of the text. Advances a textual reinterpretation of the fragment's opening lines in order to render the body of Parmenides' statements more readable, and in order to shed light on his impact on the development of later attempts to understand the nature of time." [N.]

53. Mansfeld Jaap. *Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschliche Welt*. Assen: Van Gorcum 1964.

"Mansfeld has given us one of the most penetrating and original discussions of Parmenides' poem since Fränkel's *Parmenidesstudien* in 1930. The book consists of four chapters, each one of which might stand alone as an independent essay, but which together aim at a unified view of Parmenides' thought. Mansfeld develops his interpretation with a wealth of detail, a careful, nearly complete, and on the whole judicious discussion of other views, which makes his book at once a commentary on the poem and a valuable survey of earlier scholarship.

Chapter I ('*Die Vorgeschichte des dritten Wegs*') is a brilliant study of the literary and historical background of fragment 6, designed to clarify the question whether or not Parmenides is referring to Heraclitus in his polemic against ignorant mortals (...). Mansfeld's answer to this question is, I think, the correct one: the evidence of fragment 6 and of the poem generally is *compatible* with a reference to Heraclitus but does not *require* it (pp. 41 and 204-208). The parallels are perfectly intelligible without the assumption that Parmenides has Heraclitus in mind. Since there is no relevant external evidence, we are faced with a question of historical fact which we have no historical means of deciding. What we can say is that *if* Parmenides was familiar with Heraclitus'

work, he may have seen in it simply "die modernste Formulierung der archaischen Bestimmungen des Menschen" (41), and thus made use of Heraclitean terms in fr. 6 to characterize human folly as such. Certainly fr. 6 does not refer uniquely or primarily to the folly of Heraclitus.

(...)

Chapter II ('Die Logik des Parmenides: Disjunktion und Implikation') is a stimulating but on the whole unsatisfactory analysis of the argument in the section on Truth. Mansfeld here attempts to identify Parmenides as the originator of the Megaric-Stoic tradition of ancient propositional logic, in contrast with the Aristotelian logic of terms. Mansfeld is certainly correct in insisting upon the careful structure of Parmenides' argument and upon the logical character of the fundamental *krisis* as an exclusive disjunction. This disjunction, *éstin mé ouk éstin*, is in fact a compressed statement of the law of contradiction and the law of excluded middle at once. But Mansfeld is much less successful in his reconstruction of various syllogisms of the Stoic type in fr. 2 (pp. 56-62). And in presenting Parmenides and Zeno as 'logicians' he fails to distinguish between skill in constructing particular arguments, which the two Eleatics exhibit to a remarkable degree, and the analysis of forms of valid argument, which is the proper achievement of the logician and of which there is really no evidence before Aristotle, except for a few remarks in the Platonic dialogues. Mansfeld also fails to distinguish between implication understood as a conditional proposition ('If *p*, then *q*') and implication as entailment between propositions (*p*. Therefore *q*'). (For Mansfeld's use of implication in the former sense, see e. g. pp. 100. 102 ; for the latter, confusedly, pp. 59. 68. Thus the arrow, which symbolizes inference to a conclusion on p. 59 is used to represent the propositional connective 'if ... then. . on p. 108.)"

From: Charles H. Kahn - Review of the book in: *Gnomon. Kritische Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Klassische Altertumswissenschaft* - 42, 1970, pp. 113-118

54. Mansfeld Jaap, "Hesiod and Parmenides in Nag Hammadi," *Vigiliae Christianae* 35: 174-182 (1981).
55. Mansfeld Jaap. The rhetoric in the Proem of Parmenides. In *Filosofia, politica, retorica. Intersezioni possibili*. Edited by Bertelli Lucio and Donini Pierluigi. Milano: Franco Angeli 1994. pp. 1-11
56. Mansfeld Jaap, "Parménide et Héraclite avaient-ils une théorie de la perception?," *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 44: 326-346 (1999).
57. Mansfeld Jaap, "Minima Parmenidea," *Mnemosyne* 58: 554-560 (2005).  
Critical and exegetical notes on Fragments B 1.22-3a, B 2.1-5, B 6.3, B 8.38-41 (DK).
58. Marcinkowska-Rosól Maria, "Zur Syntax von Parmenides Fr. 1. 31-32," *Hermes. Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie* 135: 134-148 (2007).
59. Marcinkowska-Rosól Maria. *Die Konzeption des "noein" bei Parmenides von Elea*. Berlin: de Gruyter 2010.
60. Marsoner Agostino, "La struttura del Proemio di Parmenide," *Annali dell'Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici* 5: 127-181 (1978).

"Il fr. 1 di Parmenide, trascurato da Zeller, ma rimesso successivamente in luce da ulteriori studi, appare meritevole di attenzione particolare in quanto sembra racchiudere in forma metaforica l'enunciazione dei principi dottrinari del sistema parmenideo. La corretta esegesi del frammento deve tuttavia scaturire da un esame preliminare riguardante la struttura secondo la quale viene allegoricamente espressa la concezione metafisica esposta nel prosieguo del poema. Una prima analisi rivela una composizione 'ad anello' che abbraccia quasi l'intero proemio." p. 127.

(...)

"A base della struttura del proemio è dunque posta una concezione triadica, che scaturisce dalla dialettica della antitesi fondamentale tra essere e non essere. Da un'indistinta molteplicità iniziale, simboleggiata nel primo anello dal numero imprecisato delle cavalle, si passa, nel secondo anello, ad un primo riconoscimento della natura dell'essere in quanto eterna extratemporalità. Il terzo anello rappresenta la sistematica classificazione delle antitesi, metodo che conduce ad una precisa definizione del non essere, tema del quarto anello. Nel quinto anello si riconosce la suprema antitesi metafisica essere-non essere, mediante la quale si giunge, nel centro, all'affermazione definitiva della realtà assoluta dell'Essere, del quale sono predicabili soltanto talune determinazioni." p. 179.

(Note omesse).

61. Martineau Emmanuel, "Le 'coeur' de l' *alétheia*," *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* 4: 33-86 (1986).
62. Martinelli Flaminia. Fra Omero e Pindaro: Parmenide poeta. In *Forme del sapere nei presocratici*. Edited by Capizzi Antonio and Casertano Giovanni. Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo 1987. pp. 169-186
63. Mason Richard, "Parmenides and language," *Ancient Philosophy* 8: 149-166 (1988).  
"Parmenides says very little about language. Yet what he says is important, both in the interpretation of his philosophy and more widely. This paper will aim to fit together a coherent understanding and to explain why his views have a wider interest. Four themes will be considered: the nature and extent of his critique of the use of language by mortals; his alleged position as a primordial philosopher of reference; the status of the utterances he puts into the mouth of his Goddess; and his apparent identification of speaking with existing or being."
64. Matsui Yoshiyasu, "Der Bann des Seins," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 114: 265-278 (2007).
65. Matthen Mohan, "Greek ontology and the 'Is' of truth," *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 28: 113-135 (1983).
66. Matthen Mohan, "A note on Parmenides' denial of past and future," *Dialogue* 25: 553-557 (1986).  
"Parmenides bans non-being and construes non-being so widely that change, and the past and future are banned too. This note complains about careless ways of construing the scope of the Parmenidean conception of non-being." Reply to L. Groarke's *Parmenides' timeless universe*
67. Mckirahan Richard. Signs and arguments in Parmenides B8. In *The Oxford handbook of Presocratic philosophy*. Edited by Curd Patricia and Graham Daniel W. New York: Oxford University Press 2008. pp. 189-229

"David Sedley recently complained (1) that despite the enormous amount of work on Parmenides in the past generation, the details of Parmenides' arguments have received insufficient attention. (2) It is universally recognized that Parmenides' introduction of argument into philosophy was a move of paramount importance. It is also recognized that the arguments of fragment B8 are closely related. At the beginning of B8, Parmenides asserts that what-is (3) has several attributes; he offers a series of proofs that what-is indeed has those attributes. Some (4) hold that the proofs form a deductive chain in which the conclusion of one argument or series of arguments forms a premise of the next. Others (5) hold that the series of inferences is so tightly connected that their conclusions are logically equivalent, a feature supposedly announced in B5: "For me it is the same where I am to begin from: for that is where I will arrive back again." In act, close study of the fragments reveals that neither claim is correct. Here I offer a new translation of B8, lines 2-51, with an analysis of the arguments, their structure, their success, and their importance.(6)

I begin with a caution. Many of Parmenides' arguments are hard to make out: even on the best arrangement of the available sentences and clauses they are incomplete. Since Parmenides lived before canons of deductive inference had been formalized, he may not have thought that there is need to supply what we regard as missing premises. The interpreter's job is not to aim for formal validity, but to attempt a reconstruction of Parmenides' train of thought, showing how he might have supposed that the conclusion follows from premises he gives. This is a matter of sensitivity and sympathy as much as of logic, depending on how we understand other arguments of his as well, and requires willingness to give him the benefit of the doubt -- up to a certain point." p. 189

(1) Sedley, "Parmenides and Melissus," 113. Sedley's complaint applies to antiquity as well.

(2) Jonathan Barnes is a notable exception to this tendency. I am indebted to his analysis in *Presocratic Philosophers*, chaps. 9-11.

(3) So far as possible, I translate to eon by "what-is"; I avoid "being." The expression denotes anything that is (see note 18 here).

(4) Notably Kirk & Raven 268

(5) Owen, "Eleatic Questions."

(6) In some places my discussion depends on interpretations of B2, B6, and B7 that are not presented here for want of space. I sketch my justification for controversial views in the notes.

(18) Parmenides argues here that the second road of investigation, "is not," cannot be pursued, on

the grounds that you cannot succeed in knowing or declaring what-is-not. The minimal complete thought characteristic of the first road is *eon* (or *to eon*) *estin* ("what-is is"), with "what-is" being a blank subject with no definite reference: anything that is, whatever it may turn out to be and however it may be appropriate to describe it or refer to it. Likewise for the second road: the blank subject of *ouk estin* ("is not") is *to me eon* (or *mé eon*) ("what-is-not"), and the minimal complete thought characteristic of the second road is *to me eon ouk estin* ("what-is-not is not"). The argument is not a refutation of "is not" as such. Nor is it a refutation of "what-is-not is not" in the sense of proving that that claim or thought is false. Instead Parmenides undermines "what-is-not is not" as a possible claim or thought. Since what-is-not cannot be known or declared, then a fortiori no claim about what-is-not can be known or declared (for instance, that it is not). Therefore, not even the theoretically minimum thought or assertion about the second road is coherent; no one can manage to think (much less know) it or declare it. On Owen's view ("Eleatic Questions"), the second road is eliminated not at 2.7-8 but at 6.1-2, which establishes the subject of "is" to be not the blank subject I am proposing but whatever can be spoken and thought of. In my view, the second part of 6.1 (*esti gar einai*: "for it is the case that it is," which Owen translates "for it is possible for it to be") repeats the content of the first road (2.3), while the first part of 6.2 (*meden d' ouk estin*: "but nothing is not," which Owen translates "but it is not possible for nothing to be") repeats the content of the second road (2.5). with the appropriate "minimal" subjects supplied. Given these premises, it follows that it is false (and therefore not right) to think that what-is-not is or that what-is is not, but true (right) to do what the first part of line 6.1 says: "it is right both to say and to think that it [namely, the subject of "is" "I is what-is." The importance of 6.1-2 thus consists in the introduction of minimal subjects for "is" and "is not" together with the associated truisms that what-is is and what-is-not (namely, nothing) is not. This prepares the way for the discussion of the first road in B8, exploring the nature of what-is.

68. Meijer Pieter Ane. *Parmenides beyond the gates: the divine revelation on being, thinking and the doxa*. Amsterdam: Gieben 1997.  
 Contents: Part I: Being and Thinking; Chapter I. The relation of Being and Thinking 3; Chapter II. Being and temporality 15; Chapter III. Being and spatiality 29; Chapter IV. Being and Matter 44; Chapter V. Tensions of a spatial and material Being and of Thinking within the identity of Being and Thinking 47; Chapter IV. Fragment 4 of the identity of Being and Thinking 54; Appendix: Parmenides and the previous history of the concept of Being 85; Part II. Being and Logic; Chapter I. The logical circle:98; Chapter II. The subject of *estin* 114; Chapter III. The logical procedure again 123; Part III. Doxa and Mortals; Chapter I. Ways and 'Doxa?' 144; Chapter II. Scholarly views of the 'Doxa' 166; Chapter III. The basic error of fr. 8, 53,54 190; Chapter IV. Negative qualifications of the Doxa 208; Chapter V. A plea for the existence of the Doxa 217; Part IV. A panoramic survey of results 234; Bibliography 252-257; Indices 258-274.

"In Part I of this book the problems which arise from the identification of Being and thinking are examined. In Part II it is the issue of the relation of logic and Being that comes to the fore. In Part III I attempt to catalogue and assess the scholarly explanations given of the Doxa so far in order to clarify the problems and arrive at a view of my own. Many publications in this field are lacking in confrontation with other already existing opinions. In presenting my own views I confront the views of other scholars. Therefore, a panoramic survey of my results may facilitate the reading of this book. This is the reason why I added Part IV to provide a summary of my views and conclusions."

69. Meixner Uwe, "Parmenides und die Logik der Existenz," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 47: 59-75 (1994).
70. Merlan Philip, "Neues Licht auf Parmenides," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*: 267-276 (1966).  
 "Comments on one of the inscriptions found at Velia, an inscription which establishes a relationship between Parmenides and the cult of Apollo the Healer. Discusses the text of Diogenes Laertius IX,22) in which the medical aspects of Parmenides' philosophy appear to be underlined, and concludes that if the healing or medical components of Parmenides' activities are kept in mind, it is possible to cast a new light on his relationship with the Pythagoreans." [N.]
71. Messina Gaetano. *Index Parmenideus. Auctore qui Parmenidis fragment tradunt. Fontium*

*conceptus. Index verborum.* Genova: Bozzi Editore 1987.

Provides the Greek text of the Parmenidean fragments and testimonies (based on the Diels-Kranz edition), an account of the sources, and an exhaustive textual index.

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