

Selected Bibliography on the Theory of Categories of Charles S. Peirce

Index of the Section: "The Rediscovery of Ontology in Contemporary Thought"

- [Table of Formal and Descriptivists Ontologists](#) (PDF - from Bernard Bolzano to present time)
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- [Living Ontologists](#) (a list of authors with an interest in ontology, with synthetic Bibliographies)

Main Publications

1. *Principles of philosophy*. Edited by Hartshorne Charles and Weiss Paul. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1931.
Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce - vol. I
2. *Elements of logic*. Edited by Hartshorne Charles and Weiss Paul. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1932.
Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce - vol. II
3. *Exact logic (published papers)*. Edited by Hartshorne Charles and Weiss Paul. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1933.
Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce - vol. III
4. *The simplest mathematics*. Edited by Hartshorne Charles and Weiss Paul. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1933.
Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce - vol. IV
5. *Pragmatism and pragmaticism*. Edited by Hartshorne Charles and Weiss Paul. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1934.
Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce - vol. V
6. *Scientific metaphysics*. Edited by Hartshorne Charles and Weiss Paul. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1935.
Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce - vol. VI
7. *Science and philosophy*. Edited by Burks William A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1958.
Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce - vol. VII
8. *Reviews, correspondence and bibliography*. Edited by Burks William A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1958.
Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce - vol. VIII
9. *Writings of Charles S. Peirce. A chronological edition - Vol. I 1857-1866*. Edited by Fisch Max. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1982.
10. *Writings of Charles S. Peirce. A chronological edition - Vol. II 1867-1871*. Edited by Moore Edward C. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1984.
11. *Writings of Charles S. Peirce. A chronological edition - Vol. III 1872-1878*. Edited by Kloesel Christian. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1986.
12. *Writings of Charles S. Peirce. A chronological edition - Vol. IV 1879-1884*. Edited by Kloesel Christian. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1986.
13. *Writings of Charles S. Peirce. A chronological edition - Vol. V 1884-1886*. Edited by Kloesel Christian. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1993.
14. *Writings of Charles S. Peirce. A chronological edition - Vol. VI 1886-1890*. Edited by Houser Nathan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1993.

15. *The essential Peirce. Selected philosophical writings. Vol. I 1867-1893.* Edited by Houser Nathan and Kloesel Christian. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1992.
16. *The essential Peirce. Selected philosophical writings. Vol. II 1893-1913.* Edited by Peirce Edition Project. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1992.
17. *Chance, love, and logic. Philosophical essays.* Edited by Cohen Morris R. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company 1923.
Edited with an introduction by Morris R. Cohen; with a supplementary essay on *The pragmatism of Peirce*, by John Dewey
18. *The philosophy of Peirce. Selected writings.* Edited by Buchler Justus. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company 1940.
Reprinted as: *Philosophical writings of Peirce. Selected and edited with an introduction by Justus Buchler* - New York, Dover Publications, 1955
19. *Selected writings.* New York: Dover Publications 1958.
Edited, with an introduction and notes, by Philip P. Wiener (Originally published under title: *Values in a universe of chance*)
20. *Charles S. Peirce: the essential writings.* Edited by Moore Edward C. New York: Harper & Row 1972.
21. *Arithmetic - New elements of mathematics - Vol. I.* Edited by Eisele Carolyn. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press 1976.
22. *Algebra and geometry - New elements of mathematics - Vol. II.* Edited by Eisele Carolyn. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press 1976.
23. *Mathematical miscellanea - New elements of mathematics - Vol. III.* Edited by Eisele Carolyn. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press 1976.
24. *Mathematical philosophy - New elements of mathematics - Vol. IV.* Edited by Eisele Carolyn. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press 1976.
25. *Contributions to The Nation: Part One: 1869-1893.* Edited by Ketner Kenneth Laine and Cook James Edward. Lubbock: Texas Tech Press 1975.
26. *Contributions to The Nation: Part Two: 1894-1900.* Edited by Ketner Kenneth Laine and Cook James Edward. Lubbock: Texas Tech Press 1975.
27. *Contributions to The Nation: Part Three: 1901-1908.* Edited by Ketner Kenneth Laine and Cook James Edward. Lubbock: Texas Tech Press 1979.
28. *Contributions to The Nation: Part Four: Index.* Edited by Ketner Kenneth Laine and Cook James Edward. Lubbock: Texas Tech Press 1987.
29. *Essays in the philosophy of science.* Edited by Tomas Vincent. New York: Liberal Arts Press 1957.
30. *Peirce on signs. Writings on semiotic.* Edited by Hoopes James. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1991.
31. *Semiotic and signfics. The correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby.* Edited by Hardwick Charles S. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1977.
32. *Studies in logic. By members of the Johns Hopkins University.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company 1983.
First edition 1883.
With an introduction by Max H. Fisch and a preface by Achim Eschbach
33. *Reasoning and the logic of things. The Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898.* Edited by Ketner Kenneth Laine. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1992.
With an introduction by Kenneth Laine Ketner and Hilary Putnam
34. *Pragmatism as a principle and method of right thinking. The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism.* Edited by Turrisi Patricia Ann. New York: State University of New York Press 1997.
Edited and introduced with a commentary

EXCERPTS FROM HIS PUBLICATIONS (in preparation)

STUDIES ABOUT HIS WORK

1. *Perspective on Peirce: critical essays on Charles Sanders Peirce*. Edited by Bernstein Richard J. New Haven: Yale University Press 1980.
Reprinted: Westport, Greenwood Press, 1980
2. *Proceedings of the C. S. Peirce Bicentennial International Congress*. Edited by Ketner Kenneth Laine et al. Lubbock: Texas Tech University 1981.
3. *A comprehensive bibliography of the published works of Charles Sanders Peirce with a bibliography of secondary studies*. Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center 1986.
Second revised edition (First edition 1977).
Edited by Kenneth Laine Ketner with the assistance of Arthur Franklin Stewart and Claude V. Bridges
4. *Peirce and contemporary thought: philosophical inquiries*. Edited by Ketner Kenneth Laine. New York: Fordham University Press 1995.
5. *Peirce's Doctrine of Signs. Theory, Applications, and Connections*. Edited by Colapietro Vincent M. and Olshewsky Thomas M. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter 1996.
6. *The Cambridge companion to Peirce*. Edited by Mysak Cheryl. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004.
7. *The relevance of Charles Peirce*. Edited by Freeman Eugene. La Salle: The Hegeler Institute 2005.
8. Almeder Robert. *The philosophy of Charles S. Peirce. A critical introduction*. Oxford : Blackwell 1980.
9. Apel Karl-Otto. *Charles S. Peirce. From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism*. New Jersey: Humanities Press 1981.
Paperback edition 1995 with a new Introduction by the Author. Translated by John Michael Krois.
Original German edition: *Der Denkweg von Charles S. Peirce: Eine Einführung in frn amerikanischen Pragmatismus* - Frankfurt am Main, Surkhamp Verlag, 1967.

Contents: Introduction to the Paperback Edition; Author's Preface to the English Edition VII; Translator's Preface XIII; Introduction by Richard . Bernstein XIX;
Part I. The philosophical background of the rise of Pragmatism in the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce.

1. Peirce and the contemporary function of Pragmatism; 2. The problem of an introduction to Peirce's work as a whole: the four periods of the development of his thought 14; 3. The first period: Peirce and the Tradition, or, from the critique of knowledge to the critique of meaning 19; 4. The second period: The genesis of meaning-critical Pragmatism (1871-78);
Part II. Peirce's development from Pragmatism to Pragmaticism.
6. The later Peirce: the last two periods in the development of his thought 80; 6. Peirce's late conception of his system 84; 7. The third period: From Pragmatism to the metaphysics of Evolution (ca. 1885-98) 134; 8. The fourth period: from Pragmatism to Pragmaticism (ca. 1898-1914) 158; 9. Conclusion: Peirce and the future of the philosophy of science 191;
Notes 197; Bibliography 249; Index 251-253.

"We can derive a division of the development of Peirce's philosophy into four periods from the above characterization of the development of his thought. These four periods are also distinctly discernible in the history of his publications: a series of essays in a particular journal is found in the middle of each. In addition, the four periods correspond to the decisive turns of events in Peirce's life.

The first period (from 1855 to 1871) embraces Peirce's early years, from the beginning of his study of Kant, undertaken when he was sixteen years old, to the temporary conclusion of his critical study of the philosophical tradition. Besides a series of five essays on formal logic and the doctrine of the categories in the *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* in 1867, publications falling into this period include three essays on the theory of cognition in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* in 1868-69 and the Berkeley review in the *North American Review* in 1871, where the pragmatic maxim for making meanings clear is anticipated. I have chosen to unite this first period

under the heading "From the Critique of Knowledge to the Critique of Meaning."

The second period (from 1871 to 1883) encompasses the time of Peirce's public success, from the founding of the Metaphysical Club in Cambridge to the tragic turn of his life, which is signified by his dismissal from his teaching post at Johns Hopkins University." Numerous geodetic and astronomic investigations, expeditions, and participation in congresses in the service of the United States Coast Survey, and the Photometric Researches at the Harvard Observatory, fall into this period, as well as the series of six "Illustrations of the Logic of Science" in *Popular Science Monthly* in 1877-78. The first two articles in this series, "The Fixation of Belief" and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," are considered the birth certificates of "Pragmatism." The fruits of Peirce's teaching at Johns Hopkins from 1879 to 1883 appeared in 1883 in the volume *Studies in Logic*, which contains works by Peirce and his students of mathematical logic." This period may be termed the classic epoch of the development of Pragmatism and "American philosophy." The third period (from 1883 to 1893 or 1902) spans the time in which Peirce -- particularly after moving to Milford, Pennsylvania -- worked alone on studies in logic and metaphysics and, circa 1901-2, achieved the final architectonic of his philosophical system. The central philosophical publication of this period is the series of six essays on metaphysics in *The Monist* between 1891 and 1893, in which the aspects of evolutionary cosmology, "Tychism," "Synechism," and "Agapism," are presented. During this period Peirce also made repeated attempts to put a large philosophical work up for subscription, all of which failed (the last attempt was his application to the Carnegie Foundation, which was unsuccessful because his work dealt with "logic" and not with "natural science")." As a result, Peirce was forced after his discharge from the Coast Survey in 1891 to earn his income through miscellaneous work for journals and dictionaries.

The fourth period (from 1898 or 1902 to 1914) embraces the time in which Pragmatism was discussed internationally, following William James's "California Address," which gave Peirce a last chance to win an audience for his philosophy. This period ends in 1914 with the death of the philosopher, who had been supported by a fund from his friends since 1906 and who had suffered from cancer since 1909. At the center of this period stand, first, the difficult but significant ("architectonic") Harvard lectures of 1903 on Pragmatism, in which Peirce made the first attempt to connect all aspects of his "system" of 1901-2 with the concept of Pragmatism, and second, the series of three essays on Pragmatism in *The Monist* in 1905-6, as well as numerous additions to this series that remained unpublished in his lifetime. Here Peirce attained the completion of his conception of Pragmatism." pp. 17-18 (Notes omitted).

10. Boler John. *Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism. A study of Peirce's relations to John Duns Scotus*. Seattle: University of Washington Press 1963.
11. Brent Joseph. *Charles Sanders Peirce. A life*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1993.
12. Buchler Justus. *Charles Peirce's empiricism*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1939. Reprinted: New York, Octagon Books, Inc. 1966
13. Calvet de Magalhaes Theresa. *Signe ou symbole: introduction à la théorie sémiotique de C. S. Peirce*. Louvain-la-Neuve: Cabay 1981.
14. Chauviré Christiane. *Peirce et la signification: introduction à la logique du vague*. Paris: Presses Univesitaires de France 1995.
15. Colapietro Vincent. *Peirce's approach to the Self. A semiotic perspective on human subjectivity*. Albany: State University of New York Press 1989.
16. De Tienne André. *L'analytique de la représentation chez Peirce. La genèse de la Théorie des Catégories*. Bruxelles: Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis 1996.
17. Debrock Guy. Peirce's concept of truth within the context of his conception of logic. In *Studies on the history of logic. Proceedings of the Third Symposium on the history of logic*. Edited by Angelelli Ignacio and Cerezo Maria. Berlin: de Gruyter 1996. pp. 241-256
 "The issue of realism in its most general form concerns the question whether and how we know whatever it is that we call reality. In this form, the issue of realism touches upon virtually every area of contemporary philosophical discussion. And because the question regarding the possibility of knowing reality has traditionally been linked to the problem of truth, clearly the problem of truth is and remains a burning question.
 More specifically, the relevance of the problem of truth is related to two painful dilemmas that face

anyone who raises a philosophical question. The first dilemma concerns the status of knowledge and may be stated as follows: Either, whatever it is that knows is *different* from whatever it is that is known, or whatever it is that knows is *not* different from whatever it is that is known. If the knower differs from the known, the question arises how the knower can possibly have access to the known. In this form, the dilemma may be called the dilemma of dualism, provided it be understood that the dilemma does not limit itself to the Cartesian duality of matter and mind. Whatever one's conception of the knower and of the known may be, one is faced with the question of the relationship between the two.

The second dilemma may be called the dilemma of evolution. Indeed, if we do accept the concept of evolution, then: either whatever it is that we call reality is part of an ongoing process of change, or nothing changes. If everything changes, what can it possibly mean to say that we have *real* knowledge? If nothing *really* changes, what possible meaning can be given to the term 'evolution'? The two dilemma's have an immediate impact on the question of truth, since, so we are told, *real* knowledge is knowledge of the truth.

In this respect, the philosophy of C. S. Peirce (1837-1914), who both held an explicitly *philosophical* theory of evolution and a *theory* of truth may provide us with interesting insights. The immediate purpose of this paper is to trace the evolution of Peirce's conception of truth within the perspective of his conception of Logic. It will be shown that, although there is every indication that this conception was born from his keen awareness of the two dilemma's stated above, he paradoxically failed to see that his theory implied the impossibility of a meaningful conception of truth." pp. 241-242

18. Deledalle Gérard. *Théorie et pratique du signe: introduction à la sémiotique de Charles S. Peirce*. Paris: Payot 1979.
19. Deledalle Gérard. *Charles S. Peirce phénoménologue et sémioticien*. Philadelphia: John Benjamins 1987.
20. Deledalle Gérard. *Charles Sanders Peirce. An intellectual biography*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins 1990.
Translation of: Gérard Deledalle - *Charles S. Peirce, phénoménologue et sémioticien* - Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1987
21. Deledalle Gérard, "Peirce's "Sign": its concept and its use," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 28: 289-301 (1992).
22. Deledalle Gérard. A philosopher's reply to questions concerning Peirce's Theory of Signs. In *In the world of signs. Essays in honour of Professor Jerzy Pelc*. Edited by Jadacki Jacek Juliusz and Strawinski Witold. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1998. pp. 169-178
23. Deledalle Gérard. *Charles S. Peirce's philosophy of Signs. Essays in comparative semiotics*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2000.
24. Deledalle-Rhodes Janice. The transposition of the linguistic sign in Peirce's contributions to *The Nation*. In *In the world of signs. Essays in honour of Professor Jerzy Pelc*. Edited by Jadacki Jacek Juliusz and Strawinski Witold. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1998. pp. 179-188
25. Eisele Carolyn. *Studies in the scientific and mathematical philosophy of Charles S. Peirce. Essays by Carolyn Eisele*. The Hague : Mouton & Co. 1979.
26. Eisele Carolyn. *Historical perspectives on Peirce's logic of science: a history of science*. Berlin: Mouton Publishers 1985.
Two volumes
27. Esposito Joseph L. *Evolutionary metaphysics. The development of Peirce's theory of Categories*. Athens : Ohio University Press 1980.
28. Fabbrichesi Leo Rossella. *Il concetto di relazione in Peirce: dalla genesi categoriale alla notazione logico-diagrammatica*. Milano: Jaca Book 1992.
29. Fabbrichesi Leo Rossella. *Introduzione a Peirce*. Bari: Laterza 1993.
30. Feibleman James K. *An introduction to Peirce's philosophy. Interpreted as a system*. London: George Allen & Unwin 1969.
31. Fisch Max Harold. Peirce's general theory of Signs. In *Sight, sound and sense*. Edited by Sebeok Thomas A. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1978. pp. 31-70
Reprinted in: Max H. Fisch - *Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism: essays* - Bloomington, Indiana

University Press, 1986 pp. 321-355

32. Fisch Max Harold, Ketner Kenneth Laine, and Kloesel Christian J.W., "The new tools of Peirce scholarship, with particular reference to semiotic," *Peirce Studies* 1: 1-19 (1979).
33. Fisch Max Harold. *Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism. Essays by Max H. Fisch*. Edited by Ketner Kenneth Laine and Kloesel Christian J.W. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1986.
34. Fisette Jean. *Introduction à la sémiotique de C. S. Peirce*. Montreal: XYZ 1990.
35. Fitzgerald John J. *Peirce's theory of signs as foundation for pragmatism*. The Hague: Mouton & Co. 1966.
36. Greenlee Douglas. *Peirce's concept of Sign*. The Hague : Mouton 1973.
37. Hausman Carl R., "Peirce's evolutionary Realism," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 27: 475-500 (1991).
38. Hausman Carl R. *Charles S. Peirce's evolutionary philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993.
39. Hilpinen Risto, "On Peirce's philosophical logic: propositions and their objects," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 28: 467-488 (2005).
Abstract: "According to C. S. Peirce, every proposition consists of two signs, 1) a subject, an indexical sign which "indicates" some object or objects (the objects of the proposition), and 2) a predicate, an iconic sign whose function is to represent the object (or objects) indicated by the subject. This paper analyzes the ways in which the subject of a proposition indicates its object or objects in simple (atomic) propositions, their truth-functional compounds, quantified propositions, and modal propositions, and discusses Peirce's view of the objects of fictional discourse."
40. Hookway Christopher. *Peirce*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1985.
Contents: Preface IX; Note on references XI; Introduction 1; Part One. Peirce's project: the pursuit of truth; I. Logic, mind and reality: early thoughts 13; II. Truth and the aims of inquiry 41; III. Categories 80; IV. Assertion and interpretation: the theory of signs 118; Conclusion to Part One 145; Part Two. Knowledge and reality 149; V. Perceptions and the outward clash 151; VI: Mathematical reasoning and the *a priori* 181; VII. The growth of knowledge: induction and abduction 208; VIII. Pragmatism 234; IX. Evolutionary cosmology and objective idealism 262; Motes 289; References 292; Index 297-301.
41. Hookway Christopher. *Truth, rationality, and pragmatism: themes from Peirce*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2000.
42. Houser Nathan, "On Peirce's theory of propositions: a response to Hilpinen," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 28: 489-504 (1992).
43. Ketner Kenneth Laine. *Elements of logic: an introduction to Peirce's existential graphs*. Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press 1990.
44. Kvelson Roberta. *Peirce, science, signs*. New York: Peter Lang 1996.
45. Kruse Felicia, "Genuineness and degeneracy in Peirce's categories," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 27: 267-298 (1991).
46. Liska James Jakób. *A general introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles Sanders Peirce*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1996.
Contents: Preface IX-XI; 1. The discipline of Semeiotic 1; 2. Semeiotic grammar 18; 3. Critical logic 53; 4. Universal rhetoric 78; Notes 109; References 140; Index 147-151.
47. Martin Richard Milton. *Peirce's logic of relations and other studies*. Dordrecht: Foris Publications 1980.
48. Merrell Floyd. *Peirce, signs, and meaning*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1997.
49. Meyers Robert G., "Peirce's new way of Signs," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 28: 505-521 (1992).
Abstract: "The paper argues that Peirce's theory of signs was an attempt to replace the medieval theory of language as perfected by Locke. Peirce rejects the distinction between simple and complex ideas, and holds that every (mental or linguistic) sign refers to its object by virtue of another sign it implies, viz its interpretant. The paper explains how the resulting theory implies a rejection of analyticity and the doctrine of the determinacy of thought. It is suggested that the theory assumes the intentionality of signs and, contrary to Peirce's intentions, does not explain intentionality."

50. Misak Cheryl J. *Truth and the end of inquiry: a Peircean account of truth*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1991.
Paperback expanded edition 2004
51. Murphey Murray G. *The development of Peirce's philosophy*. Harvard: Harvard University Press 1961.
Reprinted by Hackett, 1993 with a new preface and a new appendix with footnotes keyed to the manuscript classifications by Max Fisch.
52. Oehler Klaus. Peirce contra Aristotle. Two forms of the theory of categories. In *Proceedings of the C. S. Peirce Bicentennial international Congress*. Edited by Ketner Kenneth Laine. Lubbock: Texas Tech Press 1976. pp. 335-342
53. Oehler Klaus. *Charles Sanders Peirce*. München: Beck 1993.
54. Pape Helmut. *Erfahrung und Wirklichkeit als Zeichenprozess: Charles S. Peirces Entwurf einer Spekultativen Grammatik des Seins*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1989.
55. Pape Helmut, "Not every object of a sign has Being," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 27: 141-177 (1991).
Abstract: "Peirce has a theory of proper names which likens proper names to common nouns and assigns to them the function of picking out the internal objects of our thought. The univocity of reference is not explained by the semantical role of organising thought contents but is achieved by their "use". Peirce's view of proper names is compared with H. N. Castaneda's restricted variable/retrieval theory of proper names. A Sameness Principle for objects of thought and signs is introduced.
The Meinongian thesis that there are objects which have neither existence nor being is a mere consequence of the functional meaning of all expressions which are purely referential."
56. Parker Kelly, "Peirce's semeiotic and ontology," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 30: 51-75 (1994).
57. Parker Kelly. *The continuity of Peirce's thought*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press 1998.
58. Perreiah Alan Richard, "Peirce's semeiotic and Scholastic logic," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 25: 41-49 (1989).
"This paper examines sources for Peirce's ideas on medieval logic. Several stages in the development of semeiotic are reviewed and related to the medieval trivium. Semeiotic is understood as the theory of signs including formal grammar (study of the significations of signs), logic (study of the interpretants of signs). Medieval concepts of signification ("significatio"), supposition ("suppositio"), and inference ("consequentia") are introduced and related to Peirce's work."
59. Pharies David. *Charles S. Peirce and the linguistic sign*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins 1985.
60. Proni Giampaolo. *Introduzione a Peirce*. Milano: Bompiani 1990.
61. Roberts Don David. *The existential graphs of Charles S. Peirce*. The Hague: Mouton 1973.
62. Robin Richard. *Annotated catalogue of the papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press 1967.
63. Rosensohn William L. *The Phenomenology of Charles S. Peirce. From the Doctrine of Categories to Phaneroscopy*. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner 1974.
Contents: Part. I. The elements of Phenomenology. Foreword VII; I. The beginnings of Phenomenology - Introductory 1; II. The birth of Phenomenology (1867-1868) 19; III. The same subject concluded 53; Part II. IV: Phenomenology and Nature (1867-1904) 59; V. Phaneroscopy: the description of the phaneron 77; Appendix 103; Bibliography 105, Index 107-109.
From the Foreword: "To trace the development of Peirce's phenomenology from a doctrine of Categories to the ground on which philosophy and science rest is the purpose of this book. Although parallels with Husserl's thought are inevitable, it has seemed proper to this writer to emphasize the growth of Peirce's own ideas and the scientific-philosophical background out of which they emerged. Thus Peirce's most original contributions, viz., a set of universal categories appearing in thought, nature and experience, the method of their discovery, and Phaneroscopy, the science that describes the *phaneron*, or the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, are shown in the context of a single, evolving body of thought - a comprehensive philosophy shaped by Peirce's lifelong interest in logic, the sciences, ethics, aesthetics and metaphysics."
64. Savan David. *An introduction to C. S. Peirce full system of Semeiotic*. Toronto: Toronto Semiotic

Circle 1988.

65. Shin Sun-Joo. *The iconic logic of Peirce's graphs*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002.
66. Short Thomas L. *Peirce's theory of signs*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007.
67. Skagestad Peter. *The road of inquiry. Charles Peirce's Pragmatic Realism*. New York: Columbia University Press 1981.
68. Thibaud Pierre. *La logique de Charles Sanders Peirce: de l'algèbre aux graphes*. Aix-en-Provence: Éditions de l'Université de Provence 1975.
69. Thibaud Pierre, "La thèse peircienne de l'identité de la pensée et du signe," *Archives de Philosophie* 55: 437-460 (1992).
70. Thibaud Pierre. Peirce's concept of proposition. In *Studies on the history of logic. Proceedings of the Third Symposium on the history of logic*. Edited by Angelelli Ignacio and Cerezo Maria. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1996. pp. 257-280

Abstract: "Resisting any sort of hierarchy between thought and expression, which usually leads to supremacy of thought, sometimes of expression, as will be shown, Peirce proposes a theory that strongly asserts absolute identity of thought and signs and seems to be the very clue towards the determination of the meaning of his own view of pragmatism."

"Writing that "no sign of a thing or kind of thing . . . can arise except in a proposition; and no logical operation upon a proposition can result in anything but a proposition; so that non-propositional signs can only exist as constituents of propositions" (4.583; cf. 4.56, 4.551), (1) Peirce seems to define, after Bentham, (2) a principle of contextuality (similar to Frege's) which tends to see the proposition, if not as the "measure" (to use C. Chauviré's expression (3)), at least as the horizon of any sign. This proves the importance, for the logician, of the elucidation of the concept of proposition, especially if one remembers that, for Peirce, logic principally seeks to describe the behavior of what he calls "scientific intelligence" (2.227), that is to say, a type of intelligence incapable of intuition and which has no other means of operating except inferentially (cf. 2.444, n.1) and therefore propositionally. (4) In the context of a pragmatist philosophy of knowledge defining the meaning of a sign by its practical effects (cf. 5.402), one can expect to find, in the articulation of saying and doing, one of the essential features of any proposition. That is what we should like to attempt to verify in this study in which, after distinguishing proposition as "saying" and assertion as "doing" and characterizing the latter, we shall try to outline some consequences of a theory of assertion conceived as that towards which any proposition tends." p. 257

(1) The decimal notation n.m will refer to paragraph m of volume n of *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce* (Peirce 1931-35 and 1958); NEM, X, p. y in which X represents the volume and y the page will refer to Eisele's edition of *The New Elements of Mathematics by C. S. Peirce* (Peirce 1956); MS x in which x refers to the number of the manuscript will refer to Robin's edition of manuscripts in Harvard Houghton Library.

(2) Bentham *Works*, 1843, vol. VIII, p. 188.

(3) Chauviré *La logique du vague chez C. S. Peirce*, typed thesis, 1988, p. 380.

(4) Engel *Le problème des Universaux chez C. S. Peirce*, typed thesis, 1991, pp. 577-578.

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