

Annotated Bibliography on Plato's *Sophist*: K - Z

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1. Kahn Charles, "Some philosophical uses of 'to be' in Plato," *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 26: 105-134 (1981).
2. Kahn Charles, "Being in Parmenides and Plato," *Parola del Passato* 43: 237-261 (1988).
3. Kahn Charles, "Why is the *Sophist* a sequel to the *Theaetetus*?" *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 52: 33-57 (2007).

"Interprets the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* as Plato's first move in the project of reshaping his metaphysics, with the double aim of avoiding problems raised in the *Parmenides* and applying his general theory to the philosophy of nature. The classical doctrine of Forms is subject to revision, but Plato's fundamental metaphysics is preserved in the *Philebus* as well as in the *Timaeus*. The most important change is the explicit enlargement of the notion of Being to include the nature of things that change. This reshaping of the metaphysics is prepared in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist* by an analysis of sensory phenomena in the former and, in the latter, a new account of Forms as a network

of mutual connections and exclusions. The *Theaetetus* deals with becoming and flux but not with being; that topic is reserved for Eleatic treatment in the *Sophist*. But the problems of falsity and Not-Being, formulated in the first dialogue, cannot be resolved without the considerations of truth and Being, reserved for the later dialogue. That is why there must be a sequel to the *Theaetetus*."

4. Kamlah Wilhelm. *Platons Selbstkritik im Sophistes*. München: C. H. Beck 1963.
5. Kerferd George, "Plato's noble art of sophistry (*Sophist* 226a-231b)," *Classical Quarterly* 4: 84-90 (1954).
6. Ketchum Richard. *Truth and being in Plato's Sophist*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1971.
7. Ketchum Richard, "Participation and Predication in the *Sophist* 251-260," *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 23: 42-62 (1978).
8. Keyt David, "Plato's paradox that the immutable is unknowable," *Philosophical Quarterly* 19: 1-14 (1969).
 "One of the great questions that Plato considers in the *Sophist* is that of the number and nature of real things (242C5-6). The protagonist of the dialogue, an Eleatic stranger, raises problems for both the pluralist (243D6-244B5) and the monist (244B6-246E5) without resolving them and then turns to the battle of gods and giants, the battle between those who hold that "body and being are the same" (246B1) and those who hold that "true being is certain intelligible and bodiless Forms" (246B7-8). What the one holds is the logical contrary, not the contradictory, of what the other holds; so it is possible that they are both wrong. This seems in fact to be the Eleatic's conclusion (249C10-D4), although by the time he gets to the friends of the Forms the property under examination has shifted from corporeality to mutability. The Eleatic stranger presents the friends of the Forms with an interesting paradox (248D1-E5). This is my subject. The friends of the Forms hold that real being "is always invariable and constant" (248A11-12). But being is known (248D2). And on the hypothesis that to know is to act on something, that which is known is acted upon (248D10-E1). Further, to be acted upon is to be changed (248E3-4). Therefore, since being is known, it is changed (248E3-4). But this conclusion contradicts their original contention." p. 1
9. Keyt David, "Plato on falsity: *Sophist* 263B," *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy*: 285-305 (1973).
 Supplementary vol. I: *Exegesis and argument*. Studies in Greek philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos - Edited by E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, R. M. Rorty - Assen, Van Gorcum
10. Kolb Peter. *Platons Sophistes. Theorie des Logos und Dialektik*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 1997.
11. Kostman James. False Logos and Not-Being in Plato's *Sophist*. In *Patterns in Plato's thought. Papers arising out of the 1971 West Coast Greek philosophy Conference*. Edited by Moravcsik Julius. Dordrecht: Reidel 1973. pp. 192-212
12. Kostman James, "The ambiguity of 'partaking' in Plato's *Sophist*," *Journal of The History of Philosophy* 27: 343-363 (1989).
 "In his *An ambiguity in the "Sophist,"* Gregory Vlastos showed that statements about Forms in the central section of the "Sophist" may be either 'ordinary' or 'Pauline' predications. This paper refutes Vlastos's claim that Plato was "utterly unaware" of this ambiguity. 255c-e is taken to be the crucial passage here. This paper adapts the interpretation given by Michael Frede of this passage and shows that the sense of Plato's partaking-terms (which are used to analyze statements about Forms) switches from a 'Pauline' to an 'ordinary' usage at a definite point in the text which falls at the end of the crucial passage. The context and content of the passage determine that the switch is deliberate on Plato's part. An analysis of an earlier passage, 250a-e, confirms this point."
13. Krohs Ulrich, "Platons Dialektik im *Sophistes* vor dem Hintergrund des *Parmenides*," *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* 52: 237-256 (1998).
 "In the *Sophist*, Plato demonstrates the application of two different types of dialectics: diairesis and the method to investigate the *megista gene*. The aim of this paper is to reveal the methodological unity behind this pronounced duality. The common origin of both methods can be found in the aporetic part of the *Parmenides*. The application of that type of dialectics is restricted in the *Sophist* to its adequate field and -- in the middle part of the dialogue-- a variation introduced to solve the paradoxes of the *Paramides*. Meinwald's non-aporetic interpretation of the *Parmenides* is discussed

but rejected."

14. Lacey Alan Robert, "Plato's *Sophist* and the Forms," *Classical Quarterly* 9: 43-52 (1959).
15. Lafrance Yvon, "Sur une lecture analytique des arguments concernant le non-être (*Sophiste* 237b10 - 239a12)," *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* 2: 41-76 (1984).
16. Lanigan Richard L., "Semiotic phenomenology in Plato's *Sophist*," *Semiotica* 41: 221-246 (1982).
Reprinted in: John Deely (ed.) - *Frontiers in semiotics* - Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1986, pp. 199-216
17. Lee Edward N., "Plato on negation and non-being in the *Sophist*," *Philosophical Review* 81: 267-304 (1966).
"(I) A close analysis of "Sophist" 257-259 yields a new interpretation for Plato's doctrine of the "parts of otherness" there. I show how it defines a sense of non-being different from, and stronger than, that earlier defined by otherness itself (in "Sophist" 251-257), and I claim that this explains why Plato twice specifies this doctrine, rather than that, as the explanation of non-being he needs to refute Parmenides (258b and 258e). Next I explore the philosophical force of this doctrine of "parts of otherness". First (II) I show its logical role in analyzing the sense of negative predication statements, using comparisons with Wittgenstein's early analysis of negation. Then (III) I treat its metaphysical role, defining that element of negativity in becoming that corresponds to Aristotle's principle of "privation" ("Physics" I). A brief addendum argues that Plotinus read Plato's doctrine of the "parts" in the same way as developed here."
18. Leigh Fiona, "The copula and semantic continuity in Plato's *Sophist*," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 34: 105-121 (2008).
19. Lema Hincapié Andrés, "¿Qué es el no-ser? La respuesta de Platón y de Parménides," *Praxis Filosófica* 8-9: 247-279 (1999).
"Firstly, this article presents through a minute analysis Parmenides' ontological doctrine on not-being taken from his Poem. Moreover, it handles with a period in Plato's thought that could be adequately qualified as a Parmenidean period of his not-being ontology.
Nevertheless, Plato, in his search for a precise and true definition of the sophist, is forced to abandon his former way of thinking about not-being. That is the main content of his dialogue entitled *The Sophist*. This dialogue defends another meaning of not-being. For Parmenides not-being just meant nothing. Besides not-being as nothing, now for Plato there is a positive sense of not-being, which is the different or the other."
20. Lentz William, "The problem of motion in the *Sophist*," *Apeiron* 30: 89-108 (1997).
21. Lewis Frank A., "Did Plato discover the *estin* of identity?," *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* 8: 113-143 (1976).
22. Lewis Frank A., "Plato on "not",," *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* 9: 89-115 (1976).
"The general analysis of negation in the *Sophist* and a detailed examination of *Sophist* 257b3-c3 show that Plato distinguished sentences that assert non-identity, e.g. "Motion is not identical" with assorted other Forms, from sentences of negative predication proper, e.g. "Helen is not wise". Plato is not concerned either with truth-conditions of negative sentences or with supplying the details that would give a materially adequate account of such sentences. Instead, he is concerned almost exclusively with stating what is required if we are to understand a negative predicate and if the negative predicate is to have a determinate meaning."
23. Li Volsi Rocco, "Il *Sofista* di Platone," *Giornale di Metafisica* 24: 177-234 (2002).
24. Malatesta Michele, "On one instance of the Chrysippean syllogism of the dog in Plato's *Sophista* 252e1-8," *Metalogicon* 11: 1-16 (1998).
25. Malcolm John, "Plato's analysis of *to on* and *to me on* in the *Sophist*," *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 12: 130-146 (1967).
26. Malcolm John, "Does Plato revise his ontology in *Sophist* 246c-249d?," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 65: 115-127 (1983).
"The best way to read the passage in question is not to assume that Plato is here categorically affirming metaphysical truths which he endorses, be they at the expense of his earlier views or otherwise. One cannot plausibly regard it as a source of any new commitments on his part as to the nature of the real."
27. Malcolm John, "Remarks on an incomplete rendering of Being in the *Sophist*," *Archiv für*

Geschichte der Philosophie 67: 162-165 (1985).

28. Malcolm John, "On 'what is not in any way' in the *Sophist*," *Classical Quarterly* 35: 520-523 (1985).
29. Malcolm John, "A way back for *Sophist* 255c12-13," *Ancient Philosophy* 26: 275-289 (2006).
"At *Sophist* 255c12-13 'being' and 'difference' are distinguished on the grounds that some things are what they are in themselves (*kath'hauta* - KH), others with reference to something else (*pros alla* - PA). Since 'difference' only obtains in this second way of being, it is distinct from 'being'. Recently scholars have challenged the traditional reading (non-relative/relative) of the KH/PA dichotomy on the grounds that it puts 'sameness' under "with reference to something else." I argue (1) that there are serious difficulties with their alternatives and (2) that something close to the traditional version may be adopted if we do not take the KH/PA division as exhaustive."
30. Marcos de Pinotti Graciela E., "Aporias del no-ser y aporias de lo falso en "Sofista" 237b-239c," *Revista Latino-Americana de Filosofia* 17: 259-274 (1991).
In *Sophist* 237b-239c Plato presents three puzzles designed to show that nothing can be thought or said about the not-being: what is not in any way ("*to medamos on*") cannot even be unthinkable or unsayable. This paper argues that these puzzles involving the not-being are parallel to those raised with respect to falsehood, which are exploited by Plato in order to prove that false statement is possible. While "what is not in any way" cannot be denied, because this negation forces us precisely to what we are trying to deny-the being of not-being, in denying the falsehood, the Sophist is bound to accept that the false in some respect is ("*einai pos*").
31. Marcos de Pinotti Graciela E., "Discurso y no ser en Platón (*Sofista* 260a-263d)," *Synthesis* 4: 61-83 (1997).
32. Marcos de Pinotti Graciela E. *Filosofía versus sofística en el Sofista de Platón*. In *Diálogo con los Griegos. Estudios sobre Platón, Aristóteles y Plotino*. Edited by Santa Cruz Maria Isabel, Di Camillo Silvana, and Marcos de Pinotti Graciela E. Buenos Aires: Colihue Universidad 2004. pp. 77-92
33. Marten Rainer. *Der Logos der Dialektik: eine Theorie zu Platon Sophistes*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1965.
34. Mattéi Jean-François. *L'Étranger et le Simulacre. Essai sur la fondation de l'ontologie platonicienne*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1983.
35. Mattéi Jean-François, "Les genres de l'être chez Platon et le système aristotélicien des quatre causes," *Cahiers de Philosophie Ancienne* 19: 228-251 (2004).
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38. Matthen Mohan, "Greek ontology and the 'is' of truth," *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 28: 113-135 (1983).
39. Másmela Arroyave Carlos, "Copia y simulacro en el *Sofista* de Platon," *Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía*: 163-173 (1997).
"Within the *Sophist*, Plato establishes a clear distinction between two types of mimetic art: the copy and the *simulacrum*.
Such a distinction avoids reducing the image to the faithful reproduction of a sensitive model. The present article aims at making visible the fact that the phantasma (*simulacrum*), and not the copy, constitutes the starting point of artistic creation."
40. Másmela Arroyave Carlos. *Dialéctica de la imagen: una interpretación del "Sofista" de Platón*. Rubí: Anthropos 2006.
41. McDowell John. Falsehood and not-being in Plato's *Sophist*. In *Language and Logos. Studies in ancient Greek philosophy presented to G. E. L. Owen*. Edited by Schofield Malcolm and Nussbaum Martha. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982. pp. 115-134
"For me, G. E. L. Owen's 'Plato on Not-Being' (1971) radically improved the prospects for a confident overall view of its topic. Hitherto, passage after passage had generated reasonable

disagreement over Plato's intentions, and the disputes were not subject to control by a satisfying picture of his large-scale strategy; so that the general impression, as one read the Sophist, was one of diffuseness and unclarity of purpose. By focusing discussion on the distinction between otherness and contrariety (257B1-C4), Owen showed how, at a stroke, a mass of confusing exegetical alternatives could be swept away, and the dialogue's treatment of not-being revealed as a sustained and tightly organised assault on a single error. In what follows, I take Owen's focusing of the issue for granted, and I accept many of his detailed conclusions. Where I diverge from Owen - in particular over the nature of the difficulty about falsehood that Plato tackles in the Sophist (5 and 6 below) - it is mainly to press further in the direction he indicated, in the interest of a conviction that the focus can and should be made even sharper." p. 115

42. McPherran Mark L., "Plato's reply to the 'worst difficulty' argument of the *Parmenides*: *Sophist* 248a- 249d," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 68: 233-252 (1986).
"This paper offers an interpretation of the 'worst difficulty' argument of the *Parmenides* (133a-135a) that allows it -- contrary to other popular accounts -- to live up to Plato's suggestion that it constitutes a significant challenge to the early theory of Forms (concluding, as it does, that knowledge of the Forms is impossible). In light of Plato's hint that the argument is nonetheless flawed (133b), the paper surveys various plausible rebuttals, and then contends that Plato recognizes the best one available to him in the *Sophist* (248a-249d). finally, the author examines the problem of actually attributing that solution to him."
43. Meinhardt Helmut. *Teilhabe bei Platon: ein Beitrag zum verständnis platonischen Prinzipien Denkens unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Sophistes*. München: Alber 1968.
44. Migliori Maurizio, "Verso il *Filosofo*: Dialettica e ontologia nel *Sofista* Platone," *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 91: 171-204 (1999).
45. Migliori Maurizio. *Plato's Sophist: value and limitation on ontology*. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 2007.
Five lessons followed by a discussion with Bruno Centrone, Arianna Fermani, Lucia Palpacelli, Diana Quarantotto.
Original Italian edition: *Il Sofista* di Platone. Valore e limiti dell'ontologia - Brescia, Morcelliana, 2006.
46. Mignucci Mario, "Platone e i relativi," *Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico* 9: 259-294 (1988).
47. Mignucci Mario, "Esistenza e verità nel *Sofista* di Platone," *Atti della Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche di Napoli* 100: 267-281 (1989).
48. Miller Dana, "Fast and loose about Being: criticism of competing ontologies in Plato's *Sophist*," *Ancient Philosophy* 24: 339-363 (2004).
"This paper examines Plato's arguments against competing ontologies in the *Sophist* (242b6-250e4). It argues that the purpose of these arguments is largely to expose a muddle about being. This muddle reifies being. But this conception of being produces a puzzle, namely, that being seems not to be anything. Therefore, some other conception of being must be sought."
49. Mojsisch Burkhard. *Platons Sprachphilosophie im 'Sophistes'*. In *Sprachphilosophie in Antike und Mittelalter*. Edited by Mojsisch Burkhard. Amsterdam: Verlag B. R. Grüner 1986. pp. 35-62
Bochumer Kolloquium, 2-4 Juni 1982
50. Mojsisch Burkhard, "Logos and Episteme. The constitutive role of language in Plato's theory of knowledge," *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 3: 19-28 (1998).
"This essay first differentiates the various meanings of the term *logos* as it appears in Plato's dialogues *Theaetetus* and *The Sophist*. These are: the colloque of the soul with itself, a single sentence, a proposing aloud, the enumeration of the constitutive elements of a whole and the giving of a specific difference; further, opinion and imagination. These meanings are then related to Plato's determination of knowledge (*episteme*) and therewith truth and falsity. One can be said to possess knowledge only when the universal contents of thought -- dialogical thought -- are set in relation to the perceivable, imagination or opinion. Reflections on the principle significance of possibility as such -- a thematic not addressed by Plato -- conclude the essay."
51. Mojsisch Burkhard. *Das Verschiedene als Nicht-Seiendes in Platons Sophistes*. In *Umbrüche: Historische Wendepunkte der Philosophie von der Antike bis zur Neuzeit*. Edited by Kahnert Klaus

and Mojsisch Burkhard. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner 2001. pp. 1-9

"Plato's dialogue *The Sophist* highlights the commonality of the most important *genera*: rest, being, identity, difference and dialogical thinking are necessarily implicated in movement. This essay explores how difference combines as not-being with these other *genera*.

It concludes that not-being makes possible the commonality of the *genera* in the first place, that dialogical thinking alone justifies the thought of motive not-being and, finally, that not-being allows of conceiving the idea of being as also not-being, as in motion and as mediated through language. In sum: In Plato's late philosophy, not-being is the most important of the most important *genera*.

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52. Moravcsik Julius, "Being and meaning in the *Sophist*," *Acta Philosophica Fennica* 14: 23-78 (1962).

From the Conclusion: "Communion and interweaving are the key concepts of the Sophist. They are used on two levels; the ontological and the semantic. The two are not sharply separated, and each helps to explain the other. The Communion of the Forms parallels the interwovenness of words, and thus 253-256 parallels 260-262. A similar parallel and relations of dependence are presented between the discussions of Not-being and falsehood. Thus 257-258 and 263 go together. This interrelatedness not only brings out the nature of Plato's philosophizing in this period, but it also presents the interpreter with the task of working out the whole passage as a unit, for the interpretations of the parts are interdependent. This justifies and necessitates my lengthy analysis.

Plato's arguments show that truth and falsehood are not matters of mental sight or blindness. Thus one should not conceive of the objects of knowledge as self-sufficient atomic units. Philosophical atomism is denied on all levels. The paradigm-case of how *not to* read Plato therefore is: "each element in the statement has now a meaning; and so the statement as a whole has meaning". (1) The notion of Communion and the analogy with vowels lead to the conception of the Forms as functions, as something incomplete, something which need arguments in order really to express something. At least some of the Forms are shown to be like functions in this dialogue. If we are willing to pursue Plato's line of thought beyond the point to which it is carried in the dialogue, we see that what Plato says leads to construing all Forms as functions. For what we know are truths and falsehoods, and these are complexes which contain Forms. The constituents of these complexes are not 'simples', or metaphysical atoms of some sort. In order to understand them we have to know into what complexes they fit. We do not grasp them prior to all completions.

It is small wonder that modern commentators of this dialogue have not made much progress with it. They approach it with the 'part-sum, division-collection, genus-species' distinctions in mind. Merely because one aspect of dialectic is said to be the method of division they identify all of Plato's methodology with this notion, and seek to explain the middle part of the *Sophist* within this framework. But these are the wrong tools and the wrong questions. When seen in proper light, the suggestions of the *Sophist* present themselves as topics the further exploration of which is one of the more important philosophical tasks today." p. 77-78.

(1) F. M. Cornford, op. cit. p. 315.

53. Morgenstern Amy S., "Leaving the verb 'to be' behind: an alternative reading of Plato's *Sophist*," *Dionysius* 19: 27-50 (2001).
54. Mourelatos Alexander. 'Nothing' as 'Not-Being': some literary contexts that bear on Plato. In *Arktouros. Hellenic studies presented to Bernard M. W. Knox on the occasion of his 65th birthday*. Edited by Glen Bowersock, Burkert Walter, and Michael Putnam. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1979. pp. 319-329
Reprinted in: J. P. Anton, A. Preus (eds.) - *Essays in ancient Greek philosophy* (Volume Two) - Albany, State University of New York Press, 1983, pp. 59-69.
55. Movia Giancarlo. *Apparenza essere e verità. Commentario storico-filosofico al Sofista di Platone*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero 1991.
56. Movia Giancarlo. *Il "Sofista" e le dottrine non scritte di Platone*. Napoli: Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa 1991.
57. Muckelbauer John, "Sophistic travel: inheriting the simulacrum through Plato's *The Sophist*," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 34: 225-244 (2001).

58. Naas Michael, "For the name's sake," *Epoché. A Journal for the History of Philosophy* 7: 199-221 (2003).
 "In Plato's later dialogues, and particularly in the *Sophist*, there is a general reinterpretation and rehabilitation of the name (*onoma*) in philosophy. No longer understood rather vaguely as one of potentially dangerous and deceptive elements of everyday language or of poetic language, the word *onoma* is recast in the *Sophist* and related dialogues into one of the essential elements of a philosophical language that aims to make claims or propositions about the way things are. *Onoma*, now understood as name, is thus coupled with *rhema*, or verb, to form the two essential elements of any *logos*, that is, any claim, statements, or proposition. This paper follows Plato's gradual rehabilitation and reinscription of the name from early dialogues through late ones in order to demonstrate the new role Plato fashions for language in these later works."
59. Nehamas Alexander, "Participation and predication in Plato's later thought," *Review of Metaphysics* 36: 343-374 (1982).
 Reprinted in: A. Nehamas - *Virtues of authenticity. Essays on Plato and Socrates* - Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 196-223.
 "In the later dialogues, especially the *Sophist*, Plato develops the idea that forms are capable of participating in one another and in themselves, and that to have a characteristic is not an imperfect way of being that characteristic. Plato thus offers the first solid understanding of the metaphysics of predication in Western philosophy."
60. Notomi Noburu. *The unity of Plato's Sophist. Between the Sophist and the Philosopher*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999.
61. Notomi Noburu. Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* 8 is about ambiguity. In *Maieusis. Essays in ancient philosophy in honour of Myles Burnyeat*. Edited by Scott Dominic. New York: Oxford University Press 2007. pp. 254-275
62. Notomi Noburu. Plato on what is not. In *Maieusis. Essays on ancient philosophy in honour of Myles Burnyeat*. Edited by Scott Dominic. New York: Oxford University Press 2007. pp. 254-275
63. Notomi Noburu. Plato against Parmenides: *Sophist* 236D-242B. In *Reading ancient texts: Vol. I: Presocratics and Plato. Essays in honour of Denis O'Brien*. Edited by Stern-Gillet Suzanne and Corrigan Kevin. Leiden: Brill 2008. pp. 167-187
64. O'Brien Denis. Le non-être dans la philosophie grecque: Parménide, Platon, Plotin. In *Études sur le Sophiste de Platon*. Edited by Aubenque Pierre. Napoli: Bibliopolis 1991. pp. 317-364
 Réimprimé dans: D. O'Brien - *Le non être. Deux études sur le Sophiste de Platon* pp. 3-39.
65. O'Brien Denis, "Il non-essere e la diversità nel *Sofista* di Platone," *Atti della Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche di Napoli* 102: 271-328 (1992).
 Version française dans: D. O'Brien: *Le non être. Deux études sur le Sophiste de Platon* pp. 43-165.
66. O'Brien Denis. *Le non-être. Deux études sur le Sophiste de Platon*. Sankt Augustin: Akademie Verlag 1995.
 Brings together two studies: *Le non-être dans la philosophie grecque* and *Le non-être et l'altérité dans le 'Sophiste' de Platon*, both published separately in 1991-1992.
 Sommaire: Avertissement XI-XII; Étude I: Le non-être dans la philosophie grecque: Parménide, Platon, Plotin 3; Étude II: Le non-être et l'altérité dans le *Sophiste* de Platon 43; Notes complémentaires 91; Index: I. Auteurs anciens 133; II. Auteurs modernes 139; III. Supplément bibliographique 151; English summaries: I. Non-Being in Parmenides, Plato and Plotinus 169; II. Non-Being and otherness in Plato's *Sophist* 176-181.
67. O'Brien Denis, "À propos du *Sophiste* de Platon," *Études Philosophiques*: 375-380 (1996).
68. O'Brien Denis. Théories de la proposition dans le *Sophiste* de Platon. In *Théories de la phrase et de la proposition. De Platon à Averroès*. Edited by Büttgen Philippe, Diebler Stéphane, and Rashed Marwan. Paris: Éditions Rue d'Ulm 1999. pp. 21-41
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70. O'Brien Denis. La forma del non essere nel *Sofista* di Platone. In *Eidos - Idea. Platone, Aristotele e la tradizione platonica*. Edited by Fronterotta Francesco and Leszl Walter. Sankt Augustin:

Academia Verlag 2005. pp. 115-159

71. O'Rourke Fran, "Plato's approach to Being in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*, and Heidegger's attribution of Aristotelian influence," *Diotima. Review of Philosophical Research* 31: 47-58 (2003). "Despite the state priority of the 'Good', Plato's thought is marked by a profound zeal for Being as the object and goal of all authentic thought and endeavor. Being is the most fundamental and universal concept, further articulated in the definition of being as 'Power'. The limits of this definition are clarified in light of the distinction between *potentia activa* and *potentia passiva*. Heidegger's suggestion that Plato was inspired by Aristotle is shown to be incorrect through analysis of dialogues written before Aristotle's arrival in Athens."
72. Oscanyan Frederick S., "On six definitions of the sophist: *Sophist* 221c-231e," *Philosophical Forum* 4: 241-259 (1973). "The paper shows that the definitions of the sophist on 221c-231e refer to specific contemporaries of Socrates: Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, Euthydemus and Thrasymachus. Produced by the method of divisions, each definition consists of a nesting class of attributes. An examination of the Platonic corpus reveals that these same characteristics are used to satirically describe the sophists listed above. As the final definition equally describes Thrasymachus and Socrates, it is shown why Plato viewed the method of divisions as inadequate for obtaining the proper definition of sophistry: a good Platonic definition must have ostensive truth as well as essential validity."
73. Owen Gwilym Ellis Lane, "Plato and Parmenides on the timeless present," *Monist*: 317-340 (1966). Reprinted in: Alexander Mourelatos (ed.) - *The Pre-Socratics; a collection of critical essays* - Garden City, Anchor Press, 1974 and in: G. E. L. Owen - *Logic, science, and dialectic. Collected papers in Greek philosophy* - Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1986 pp. 27-44.

Some statements couched in the present tense have no reference to time. They are, if you like, grammatically tensed but logically tenseless. Mathematical statements such as "twice two is four" or "there is a prime number between 125 and 128" are of this sort. So is the statement I have just made. To ask in good faith whether there is still the prime number there used to be between 125 and 128 would be to show that one did not understand the use of such statements, and so would any attempt to answer the question. It is tempting to take another step and talk of such timeless statements as statements about timeless entities. If the number 4 neither continues nor ceases to be twice two, this is, surely, because the number 4 has no history of any kind, not even the being a day older today than yesterday. Other timeless statements might shake our confidence in this inference: "Clocks are devices for measuring time" is a timeless statement, but it is not about a class of timeless clocks. But, given a preoccupation with a favored set of examples and a stage of thought at which men did not distinguish the properties of statements from the properties of the things they are about, we can expect timeless entities to appear as the natural proxies of timeless statements. Now the fact that a grammatical tense can be detached from its tense-affiliations and put to a tenseless use is something that must be discovered at some time by somebody or some set of people. So far as I know it was discovered by the Greeks. It is commonly credited to one Greek in particular, a pioneer from whose arguments most subsequent Greek troubles over time were to flow: Parmenides the Eleatic. Sometimes it is suggested that Parmenides took a hint from his alleged mentors, the Pythagoreans. "We may assume" says one writer "that he knew of the timeless present in mathematical statements." 2 But what Aristotle tells us of Pythagorean mathematics is enough to undermine this assumption. According to him (esp. *Metaph.* 1091a12-22) they confused the construction of the series of natural numbers with the generation of the world. So Parmenides is our earliest candidate. His claim too has been disputed, and I shall try to clear up this dispute as I go, but not before I have done what I can to sharpen it and widen the issues at stake." pp. 317-318.

74. Owen Gwilym Ellis Lane. Plato on Not-Being. In *Plato. A collection of critical essays. I: metaphysics and epistemology*. Edited by Vlastos Gregory. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press 1971. pp. 104-137
Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen - *Logic, science, and dialectic: collected papers in Greek philosophy* - edited by Martha Nussbaum - London, Duckworth (1986).
75. Pacitti Domenico. *The nature of the negative. Towards an understanding of negation and*

negativity. Pisa: Giardini editori e stampatori 1991.

Contents: Preface IX-X; On the nature of the Negative 1; Epilogue 77; Notes 79; Bibliographical references 103; Index nominum 115-118.

On Plato's *Sophist* see in particular pp. 63-75.

"The immensity of the 'tours de force' necessary in the *Parmenides* and *Sophist* for the admission of nonbeing on a par with being reflects the enormous hold that Parmenides must have exerted over the Greeks. His writing in verse, like the monotheist Xenophanes, reflects divine inspiration and the transcendent powers of thought. Thus it is not he but the goddess who speaks throughout.

The style of Parmenides fr. B8, 12-21 is strikingly reminiscent of the Vedic hymn and may easily be read as a solution to the anonymous poet's riddle. But his answer that there is only 'is' and no 'is not' cannot, I think, be understood as meaning that Parmenides wished to reject negative predication out, as Anscombe (*Parmenides, Mystery and Contradiction*, 1969) would have in the first place, Parmenides himself consistently uses negatives, which would be highly implausible if that was what he wished to outlaw, and secondly, his position on the illusory nature of 'opinion' and the nonexistence of what is not is quite compatible with the use of the negative.

For in Parmenides (fr. B2, B6, 1-2, & B8 34-36) thought and reality are probably even more closely bound together than in Plato, in that reality - or at least true reality - can be thought, and if 'opinion' is part of what is not, then the result of thinking *that* is what he calls a non-thought, which must be taken to mean something that is not a true or authentic thought. We find Aristotle (*Posterior Analytics* 89a) still pondering over this problem of how true knowledge and mere opinion could have the same object of reference.

Similarly, Parmenides' convincing rebuttal (fr. 3) of what is having been produced out of what is not, which would then mean what is being in some sense what is not, led Aristotle (*De Anima* 417a and *Metaphysics* 1051b) to his theory of potentiality in order to bridge the gap somehow between nonbeing and being.

And this is a radical challenge to the common concept of time: the unreality of past and future which are illusory, the present which is all there is, timeless and eternal.

For Parmenides, then, reason, namely the correct use of thought in contact with reality - not the world of appearance but the real world - will alone lead to truth." pp. 73-74 [the number Parmenides' fragments refers to Diels-Kranz - *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*].

76. Painter Corinne, "In defense of Socrates: The Stranger's role in Plato's *Sophist*," *Epoché. A Journal for the History of Philosophy* 9: 317-333 (2005).

"In this essay I argue that the Stranger's interest in keeping the Philosopher and the Sophist distinct is connected, primarily, to his assessment of the charges of Sophistry advanced against Socrates, which compels him to *defend* Socrates from these unduly advanced accusations. On this basis, I establish that the Stranger's task in the *Sophist*, namely to keep philosophy distinct from sophistry, is intimately tied to the project of securing justice and is therefore not merely of theoretical importance but is also -- and essentially - of political and ethical significance."

77. Palumbo Lidia. *Il non essere e l'apparenza. Sul Sofista di Platone*. Napoli: Loffredo Editore 1994.

78. Palumbo Lidia. Hegel interprete del *Sofista* nelle *Lezione sulla storia della filosofia*. In *Hegel e Platone*. Edited by Movia Giancarlo. Cagliari: Edizioni AV 2002. pp. 225-249

79. Papadis Dimitris, "The concept of truth in Parmenides," *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* 23: 77-96 (2005).

80. Partenie Catalin. Imprint: Heidegger interpretation of Platonic dialectic in the *Sophist* lectures (1924-25). In *Heidegger and Plato: toward dialogue*. Edited by Partenie Catalin and Rockmore Tom. Evanston: Northwestern University Press 2004. pp. 42-71

81. Peck Arthur Leslie, "Plato and the *megista genê* of the *Sophist*. A Reinterpretation," *Classical Quarterly* 2: 32-56 (1952).

82. Peck Arthur Leslie, "Plato's *Sophist*. The *symplokê tôn eidôn*," *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 7: 46-66 (1962).

83. Pelletier Francis Jeffrey, "'Incompatibility' in Plato's *Sophist*," *Dialogue* 14: 143-146 (1975).

"Contrary to the claims of Owen (1970), Frede (1967), and many other Platonic scholars, there is a straight forward way to explicate Plato's "Sophist" as having '*heteron*' first be understood as

"non-identical" and after 257b or so (transition area) be understood as "incompatible." This should encourage scholars who prefer the "incompatibility" reading but don't see how to get the required change of meaning. (Ackrill 1955, 1957; Wiggins 1970; Lorenz & Mittlestrauss 1966)."

84. Pelletier Francis Jeffry, "Plato on Not-Being: some interpretations of the *symploke eidon* (259E) and their relation to Parmenides problem," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 8: 35-65 (1983).
85. Pelletier Francis Jeffry. *Parmenides, Plato, and the semantics of not-being*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1990.
Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction XI-XXI; 1. Methodological preliminaries 1; 2. Parmenides' problem 8; 3. Plato's problems 22; 4. Some interpretations of the *symploke eidon* 45; 5. The Philosopher's language 94, Works cited 149; Index locorum 155; Name Index 159; Subject index 163-166.
86. Peron Barbara. *Mit Aristoteles zu Platon. Heideggers ontologische Ausdeutung der Dialektik im "Sophistes"*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang 2008.
87. Philip J.A., "The *megista gene* of the *Sophistes*," *Phoenix* 23: 89-103 (1969).
88. Pino Posada Juan Pablo, "La caza del filósofo: Comentarios al *Sofista* de Platón," *Estudios de Filosofía* 33: 123-141 (2006).
"The following passage illustrates the theme of this paper: "Or, perhaps, have we fallen inadvertently, by Zeus, in the science of free men, and, searching for the Sophist, run the risk of having found the philosopher first?" (253c5-10). The fact that the stranger from Elea surprisingly finds himself with the Philosopher in a conversation that pretends to offer a definition of the Sophist, makes one think how little unheeded the closeness between the "free man" and his imitator was for Plato. In the *Sophist*, the Platonic interest in centered in evincing this closeness and, at the same time, in defining the boundaries among them, making the first a hunter of the second. The present paper explores the sense of the hunt attending the following singularities: (1) the formal procedure that it follows; (2) the question that guides it; (3) the quality of spirit that asks; (4) the words with which the interlocutors name it; and (5) the "noble" game he finds at last."
89. Pippin Robert B., "Negation and not-being in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and Plato's *Sophist*," *Kant Studien* 70: 179-196 (1979).
90. Pirocacos Elly. *False belief and the Meno paradox*. Aldershot: Ashgate 1998.
"The philosophical concern of this book is epistemological in kind. It involves understanding the Socratic elentic method and how its structure introduces an important epistemological problem which is first raised in the *Meno* dialogue as a paradox. This paradox, named the *Meno* paradox, raises the problem of falsehood. Specifically the impossibility of falsehood. The *Theaetetus* dialogue is then analyzed in terms of how falsehood is there set up as a clearly epistemological problem. The *Sophist* dialogue is in turn discussed as offering a response to the problem of falsehood by revising it as a problem for semantics."
91. Politis Vasilis. The argument for the reality of change and changelessness in Plato's *Sophist* (248e7-249d5). In *New essays on Plato: language and thought in Fourth-century Greek philosophy*. Edited by Herrmann Fritz-Gregor. Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales 2006. pp. 149-175
92. Prior William J., "Plato's analysis of Being and Not-Being in the *Sophist*," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 18: 199-211 (1980).
"In this paper I argue that Plato does not, as most scholars believe, distinguish different senses or uses of the verb 'to be' in the "Sophist". He succeeds in differentiating existential statements from statements of identity and predications, but with the aid of a verb 'to be' which he takes to be univocal and to be equivalent to 'to participate in'. I offer an analysis of "Sophist" 251a-257c, and focus in particular on 255e-256e. This passage displays numerous parallels with the middle dialogues, and it is misleading to treat it as indicative of a change in Plato's metaphysics."
93. Prior William J. *Unity and development in Plato's metaphysics*. London: Croom Helm 1985.
Contents: Acknowledgments; Introduction: The problem of Plato's development 1; The metaphysics of the early and middle Platonic dialogues 9; 2. The challenge of the *Parmenides* 51; 3. The response of the *Timaeus* 87; 4. The *Sophist* 127; Appendix: The doctrinal maturity and chronological position of the *Tmaeus* 168; Bibliography 194; Index 199-201.
94. Przelecki Marian, "On what there is not," *Dialectics and Humanism* 8: 123-129 (1981).

"The paper refers to the famous discussion of the problems of falsehood and non-being contained in Plato's "Sophist" and tries to show that the difficulties which Plato is coping with and the solutions proposed by him have their close counterparts in modern logical semantics. The main outcome of the analysis is an explication of the concept of falsehood which does not resort to any kind of non-existent entities."

95. Ray Chadwick. *For images: an interpretation of Plato's Sophist*. Lanham: University Press of America 1984.
96. Roberts Jean, "The problem about Being in the *Sophist*," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 3: 229-243 (1986).
Reprinted in: Nicholas D. Smith (ed.) - *Plato. Critical Assessments - Plato's later works* - vol. IV - London, Routledge, 1998 - pp. 142-157
97. Robinson David B., "The phantom of the *Sophist*: to *ouk ontos ouk on* (240 A-C)," *Classical Quarterly* 51: 435-457 (2001).
98. Rosen Stanley. *Plato's Sophist. The drama of the original and image*. New Haven: Yale University Press 1983.
99. Rosen Stanley. Remarks on Heidegger's Plato. In *Heidegger and Plato: toward dialogue*. Edited by Partenie Catalin and Rockmore Tom. Evanston: Northwestern University Press 2004. pp. 178-191
100. Rossitto Cristina. La dialettica platonica nel *Sofista: elenchos o diairesis?* In *Platone e la dialettica*. Edited by Di Giovanni Piero. Bari: Laterza 1995. pp. 39-57
Ristampato in: C. Rossitto - *Studi sulla dialettica in Aristotele* - Napoli, Bibliopolis, 2000, pp. 327-346
101. Rousset Emmanuelle. *Les intermittences de l'être. Lecture du Sophiste de Platon*. Lagrasse: Verdier 2009.
102. Rudebusch George, "Does Plato think false speech is speech?," *Noûs* 24: 599-609 (1990).
"There is an unsolved puzzle about Plato's *Theaetetus* and *Sophist* which has been too little noticed. The *Sophist* develops and accepts an account of false speech and belief as saying what is "other." But the *Theaetetus* rejects such accounts. The standard solution is that the *Sophist* is somehow meant to overcome or avoid the problems seen as overwhelming in the *Theaetetus*. I argue that such a solution fails."
103. Runciman Walter. *Plato's later epistemology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1962.
Contents: Preface VII-VIII; 1. Introduction 1; 2. The 'Theaetetus': logic and knowledge 6; 3. The 'Sophist': ontology and logic 59; 4. Conclusion 127, Selected bibliography 134; Index 137.
104. Sallis John. *Being and Logos. The way of Platonic dialogue*. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International 1975.
Second edition with a new preface 1986; Third edition titled: *Being and Logos. Reading the Platonic dialogues* - Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1996.
Chapter VI. *The Way of Logos: Sophist* - pp. 456-532.
105. Sasso Gennaro. *L'essere e le differenze. Sul Sofista di Platone*. Bologna: Il Mulino 1991.
106. Sayre Kenneth, "Falsehood, forms and participation in the *Sophist*," *Noûs* 4: 81-91 (1970).
"Recapitulating what he takes to be Plato's analysis of true and false discourse in the 'Sophist', the author compares the conception of forms behind this analysis with that operating in the 'Phaedo' and the 'Republic'. On the basis of this comparison he then attempts to reconstruct the theory of participation which seems to be implicit in this later dialogue. In place of the earlier notion of resemblance between form and particular, participation in the 'Sophist' appears to be the relation by which an individual meets the criteria for being a thing of some given kind. These criteria are illustrated in the definitions of the angler and of the authentic Sophist, each of which gives necessary and sufficient conditions for being an instance of that specific kind."
107. Sayre Kenneth, "*Sophist* 263b revisited," *Mind* 85: 581-586 (1976).
"According to the interpretation of "Sophist" 263b in "Plato's analytic method", judgments of the forms 'X is a' and 'X is not a' are true and false respectively if and only if all forms in which X participates combine with a, false and true respectively if and only if all such forms combine with not-a. If not-a comprises all forms other than a, as is usually assumed, this definition leads to paradox. On the basis of Plato's use of *heteron* and *enantion*, it is shown that not-a instead comprises only forms in which X cannot participate while participating in a, in which case no

paradox arises."

108. Sayre Kenneth. *Plato's late ontology: a riddle resolved*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1983.
Second edition: Parmenides Publishing, 2005 with a new introduction and the essay "*Excess and deficiency at Statesman 283C-285C*."
109. Schipper Edith Watson, "The meaning of existence in Plato's *Sophist*," *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 9: 38-44 (1964).
110. Schüssler Ingeborg. *Le Sophiste de Platon dans l'interprétation de Heidegger*. In *Heidegger 1919-1929. De l'herméneutique de la facticité à la métaphysique du Dasein*. Edited by Courtine Jean-François. Paris: Vrin 1996. pp. 91-111
Actes du colloque organisé par Jean-François Marquet (Université de Paris-Sorbonne, novembre 1994).
Reprinted in: Ada Neschke-Hentschke (ed.) - *Images de Platon et lectures de ses oeuvres: les interprétations de Platon à travers les siècles* - Louvain-la-Neuve, Éditions Peeters, 1997, pp. 395-415.
111. Seligman Paul. *Being and not-being. An introduction to Plato's Sophist*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1974.
112. Serra Mauro. *Lectures du Sophiste analytiques et continentaux*. In *Actualité des anciens sur la théorie du langage*. Edited by Petrilli Raffaella and Gambarara Daniele. Münster: Nodus Publikationen 2004. pp. 97-109
113. Silverman Allan. *The dialectic of essence. A study of Plato's metaphysics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 2002.
See in particular Chapter Five: Forms and Language pp. 137-181 and Chapter Six: Not-beings pp. 182-217
114. Simon Derek, "The *Sophist*, 246a-259e: *Ousia* and *to on* in Plato's ontologies," *De Philosophia* 12: 155-177 (1996).
115. Soulez Antonia, "Aux sources grecques de la tradition sémantique: le thème platonicien des "liaisons premières", " *Archives de Philosophie* 50: 371-401 (1987).
"The aim in this paper is to follow the conceptual thread which leads from the early forerunners of the semantic tradition to Bolzano. Plato's "Sophist" could be seen as a semantic study of the sentence. When the meaning of false sentences is scrutinized, it becomes clear that the negation functor makes it possible to bring up the syntactical and semantical puzzle of the unity of complexes as constituted of parts."
116. Soulez Antonia. *La grammaire philosophique chez Platon*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1991.
117. Starr David E., "The sixth Sophist: comments on Frederick S. Oscanyan's "On six definitions of the Sophist: Sophist 221e-231e", " *Philosophical Forum* 5: 486-492 (1974).
"The sixth Sophist" attacks Oscanyan's identification of the last-defined Sophist in "Sophist" 221e-231e as Thrasymachus. It contends that the sixth Sophist is Socrates, citing parallels in other dialogues to the numerical structure of the passage, as well as the content of the definition, to show that such an identification is both characteristic of Plato and significant."
118. Stough Charlotte, "Two kinds of naming in the *Sophist*," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 20: 355-381 (1990).
119. Strycker Émile de. *Notes sur les relations entre la problématique du Sophiste de Platon et celle de la Métaphysique d'Aristote*. In *Études sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote. Actes du VI Symposium aristotelicum*. Edited by Aubenque Pierre. Paris: Vrin 1979. pp. 49-67
120. Stygermeer Moth. *Während Sokrates schweigt. Der zweite Anfang der Philosophie in Platons Dialog Sophistes*. Berlin : Tenea 2005.
121. Swiggers Pierre, "Théorie grammaticale et définition du discours dans le *Sophiste* de Platon," *Études Classiques* 52: 15-17 (1984).
122. Swindler James Kenneth. *Plato's Sophist and contemporary analytic ontology*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press 1978.
123. Swindler James Kenneth, "Parmenide's paradox," *Review of Metaphysics* 33: 727-744 (1980).
"This paper presents a survey of the Russellian, Strawsonian, and Donnellanian solutions to the

paradox of referring to what does not exist, Parmenides' paradox, and criticizes these for commitment to uninstantiated properties as the referents of general terms. The paper then shows that this difficulty is avoided by Plato's solution (in the *Sophist*), which rests on the definition of nonbeing as difference. Plato's solution preserves the referential function of subjects in negative existentials, it avoids uninstantiated properties, and it avoids all equivocal concepts of being."

124. Thom Paul, "Critical notice of F. J. Pelletier's *Parmenides, Plato, and the semantics of Not-Being*," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 22: 573-586 (1992).

"Parmenides was an Object-Monist (not a Fact-Monist), relying on an Argument by Ellipsis from "a" is not "b" to "a" is not; Plato's *Sophist* so interprets him. Both Parmenides and Plato aimed to forge a Philosopher's Language which does not recognize negative realities. They differed in that Parmenides accepted the Principle of Non-Contradiction while Plato rejected it as conflicting with the requirements of the Argument by Ellipsis; further, Plato's (but not Parmenides') Language of Inquiry allowed for "relative" statements of non-being."

125. Thorp John, "Forms, concepts and *to me on*," *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* 2: 77-92 (1984).
 126. Trevaskis J.R., "The Sophistry of noble lineage ("Sophist" 230a5-232b9)," *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 2: 36-49 (1955).
 127. Trevaskis J.R., "The *megista genê* and the vowel analogy of Plato, *Sophist* 253," *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 11: 99-116 (1966).
 128. Turnbull Robert G., "The argument of the "Sophist"," *Philosophical Quarterly* 14: 23-34 (1964).
 129. Van Fraassen Bas C., "Logical structure in Plato's *Sophist*," *Review of Metaphysics* 22: 482-498 (1969).

"In view of much recent discussion of the passage in the *Sophist* in which Plato discusses the relations among the forms, (*) it may not be inappropriate to examine this passage from the point of view of modern logical theory. There is indeed already one such study by Karl Dürr, (**) who attempts to represent the relations among the forms within the framework of classes in *Principia Mathematica*. Since we consider some of these relations to be modal in character, we cannot accept the adequacy of this framework for this purpose.

In what follows we shall examine the connection between relations among the forms and the relation of participation between forms and individuals (section 2), the peculiar character of forms corresponding to relative terms (section 3), and finally the formal representation of the described logical structures (section 4). The main point which emerges is that the problems discussed by Plato are closely related to difficult problems in current logical theory." p. 482

(*) 251A-259D. See for example J. B. Trevaskis, "The *megista genê* and the vowel analogy of Plato, *Sophist* 253," *Phronesis* 11 (1966), pp. 99-116, and the references therein.

(**) "Moderne Darstellung der platonischen Logik. Ein Beitrag zur Erklärung des Dialoges *Sophistes*," *Museum Helveticum* 2 (1945), pp. 166-194.

130. Vasiliu Anca. *Dire et voir. La parole visible du Sophiste*. Paris: Vrin 2008.
 131. Vlastos Gregory. An ambiguity in the *Sophist*. In *Platonic studies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1973. pp. 270-322
 Appendix I: On the interpretation of *Sph.* 248D4E4 pp. 309-317; Appendix II: More on Pualine prediction in Plato pp. 318-322
 132. Waletzki W., "Platons Ideenlehre und Dialektik im *Sophistes* 253d," *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 24: 241-252 (1979).
 133. Webb David, "Continuity and difference in Heidegger's *Sophist*," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 38: 145-169 (2000).
 134. Wedin Michael V., "Plato on what "being" is not," *Philosophia* 10-11: 265-295 (1981).
 "Three puzzles are raised at "Sophist" 243b-245e concerning theories that make claims about the number of things that are. I argue that they are preliminary to and reflect Plato's positive theory of being, in particular they indicate that it is a mistake to regard being as a standard first-order predicate and so support the thesis that for Plato being is a second-order or formal concept."
 135. Wiggins David. Sentence meaning, negation, and Plato's problem of non-being. In *Plato. A collection of critical essays. I: metaphysics and epistemology*. Edited by Vlastos Gregory. Notre

Dame: Indiana University Press 1971. pp. 268-303

136. Wiles Anne M. Forms and predication in the later Dialogues. In *Plato and Platonism*. Edited by Van Ophuijsen Johannes M. Washington: Catholic University of America Press 1999. pp. 179-197
137. Xenakis Jason, "Plato on statement and truth-value," *Mind* 66: 165-172 (1957).
"In this article the author analyses 'true', 'false', and 'statements' in Plato's "Sophist" 261e-3b. it is the author's thesis that this reference in Plato does not exemplify the theory of forms nor does it present the theory of forms as meanings. The analysis proceeds through a refutation of Crnford's thesis of the theory of forms, and the author offers alternative interpretations to the notions of true, false, and statements in Plato."
138. Xenakis Jason, "Plato's *Sophist*: a defense of negative expressions and a doctrine of sense and of truth," *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* 4: 29-43 (1959).
139. Zadro Attilio. *Ricerche sul linguaggio e sulla logica del Sofista*. Padova: Antenore 1961.
140. Ziermann Christoph. *Platons negative Dialektik. Eine Untersuchung der Dialoge "Sophistes" und "Parmenides"*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 2004.
141. Zuckert Catherine H., "Who's a Philosopher? Who's a Sophist? The Stranger v. Socrates," *Review of Metaphysics* 54: 65-97 (2000).
"Many readers have taken the Eleatic Stranger to represent a later stage of Plato's philosophical development because the arguments or doctrines the Stranger presents in the *Sophist* appear to be better than those Socrates articulates in earlier dialogues. When we examine the definition of the sophist to which the Stranger comes at the end of the dialogue, however, we find reasons to question the adequacy of his teaching and, consequently, his superiority to Socrates. Each or both might appear to be a pretender or sophist; each might also be seeking knowledge through dialectical sorting or a philosopher."
142. Zupi Massimiliano. *Incanto e incantesimo del dire. Logica e/o mistica nella filosofia del linguaggio di Platone (Cratilo e Sofista) e Gregorio di Nissa (Contro Eunomio)*. Roma: Pontificio Ateneo S. Anselmo 2007.

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