

Selected Bibliography on the Logic and Ontology of Bertrand Russell

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Bertrand Russell's Ontological Development

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"Russell's account of existence as satisfaction of a propositional function presupposes a more fundamental notion of existence, which we would employ in deciding what to allow as arguments satisfying a function, a notion he never elucidates. Jan Dejnozka has distinguished three ways Russell used the term "exists," one being the phenomenalist's, in which it refers to correlations of sense-data. I argue that this phenomenalist notion cannot be the one Russell needs, since he explicitly held that existence be understood broadly, so that, e.g., the nonexistence of God would not follow by definition."
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"What is logical relevance? Anderson and Belnap say that the "modern classical tradition [,] stemming from Frege and Whitehead-Russell, gave no consideration whatsoever to the classical notion of relevance." But just what is this classical notion? I argue that the relevance tradition is implicitly most deeply concerned with the containment of truth-grounds, less deeply with the containment of classes, and least of all with variable sharing in the Anderson-Belnap manner. Thus

modern classical logicians such as Peirce, Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine are implicit relevantists on the deepest level. In showing this, I reunite two fields of logic which, strangely from the traditional point of view, have become basically separated from each other: relevance logic and diagram logic. I argue that there are two main concepts of relevance, intensional and extensional. The first is that of the relevantists, who overlook the presence of the second in modern classical logic. The second is the concept of truth-ground containment as following from in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. I show that this second concept belongs to the diagram tradition of showing that the premisses contain the conclusion by the fact that the conclusion is diagrammed in the very act of diagramming the premisses. I argue that the extensional concept is primary, with at least five usable modern classical filters or constraints and indefinitely many secondary intensional filters or constraints. For the extensional concept is the genus of deductive relevance, and the filters define species. Also following the *Tractatus*, deductive relevance, or full truth-ground containment, is the limit of inductive relevance, or partial truth-ground containment. Purely extensional inductive or partial relevance has its filters or species too.

Thus extensional relevance is more properly a universal concept of relevance or summum genus with modern classical deductive logic, relevantist deductive logic, and inductive logic as its three main domains."

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"Russell brought three arguments forward against Meinong's theory of objects. None of them depend upon a misinterpretation of the theory as is often claimed. In particular, only one is based upon a clash between Meinong's theory and Russell's theory of descriptions, and that did not involve Russell's attributing to Meinong his own ontological assumption. The other two arguments were attempts to find internal inconsistencies in Meinong's theory. But neither was sufficient to refute the theory, though they do require some revisions, viz. a trade-off between freedom of assumption and unlimited characterization. Meinong himself worked out the essentials of the required revisions."
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Part Two: Conceptual clarity
Introduction 99; 6. Intensions and extensions 103; 7. Presentation and ideas 125; 8. Function and concept 137; 9. On denoting 147; Conclusion: The way *things* are 163; Notes 175; Bibliography 191; Index 215.
From the Introduction: "As a book by the founder of phenomenology that examines Frege's ideas from Brentano's empirical standpoint, Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* is both an early work of phenomenology and of logical empiricism. In it Husserl predicted the failure of Frege's attempt to logicize arithmetic and to mathematize logic two years before the publication of the *Basic Laws of Arithmetic* in 1893. I hope to show that Husserl did so in terms that would prefigure both the account Frege would give of his error after Russell encountered the paradoxes ten years later and the discussions of *Principia Mathematica*. Moreover, in locating the source of Frege's difficulties in the ambiguous theory of identity, meaning, and denotation that forms the basis of Frege's logical project and generates Russell's contradictions, Husserl's discussions indicate that these contradictions may have as serious consequences for twentieth century philosophy of language as they have had for the philosophy of mathematics.
This book is about these Austro-German roots of twentieth century philosophy. It is mainly about the origins of analytic philosophy, about the transmission of Frege's thought to the English speaking world, and about the relevance of Husserl's early criticism of Frege's *Foundations of Arithmetic* to some contemporary issues in philosophy. It is more about Husserl the philosopher of logic and mathematics than it is about Husserl the phenomenologist, and it is principally addressed to those members of the philosophical community who, via Russell, have been affected by Frege's logic. This makes it very different from work on Husserl and Frege that has focused on the importance of Frege's criticism of Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* and attendant issues. The goal of this book is quite the opposite. It studies the shortcomings in Frege's thought that Husserl flagged and Russell endeavored to overcome. One possible sequel to this book would be a thorough study of Husserl's successes and failures in remedying the philosophical ills he perceived all about him, but that goes beyond the scope of this work, which follows the issues discussed into the work of Russell and his successors." (pp. 3-4)
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 "Bertrand Russell is generally recognized as one of the most important English speaking philosophers, logicians and essayists of the twentieth century. Often cited along with G.E. Moore as one of the founders of modern analytic philosophy and along with Kurt Gödel as one of the most influential logicians of his time, Russell is also widely recognized for his sustained public contributions to many of the most controversial social, political and educational issues of his day. Even so, more than anything else, it is Russell's work in logic and the foundations of mathematics that serves as his core contribution to intellectual history and that makes Russell the seminal thinker he is. His most significant achievements include
 1. his refining and popularizing of Giuseppe Peano's and Gottlob Frege's first attempts at developing a modern mathematical logic,
 2. his discovery of the paradox that bears his name,
 3. his introduction of the theory of types (his way of avoiding the paradox),
 4. his defense of logicism, the view that mathematics is in some important sense reducible to logic, and his many detailed derivations supporting this view,
 5. his ground-breaking advances in technical philosophy, including both his theory of definite descriptions and his theory of logical constructions,
 6. his theory of logical relations, including his impressively general theory of relation arithmetic,
 7. his formalization of the reals,
 8. his theory of logical atomism, and
 9. his championing of the many connections between modern logic, mathematics, science, and

- knowledge in general." (p. 1)
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"Russell's introduction of negative facts to account for the truth of "negative" sentences or beliefs rests on his collaboration with Wittgenstein in such efforts as the characterization of formal necessity, the theory of logical atomism, and the use of the Ideal Language. In examining their views we arrive at two conclusions. First, that the issue of negative facts is distinct from questions of meaning or intentionality; what a sentence or belief means or is about rather than what makes it true or false. Second, that the ontological use of the Ideal Language is incompatible with the requirements of its employment in the logical study of inferences. On this basis we conclude that

despite elaboration by recent proponents, the doctrine of negative facts lacks adequate support, and perhaps more importantly, it is proper ontological method to free the Ideal Language from the exigencies of a symbolism constructed for logical investigation."

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