

Annotated Bibliography on the Metaphysics of Francisco Suárez

Index of the Section "Ontology in the Seventeenth Century"

- Birth of a New Science: the History of Ontology from Suárez to Kant
 - Annotated Bibliography on the History of Continental Ontology from Suárez to Kant
 - Annotated Bibliography on the History of British Ontology from Hobbes to Hume
- A Selection of Ontologists from Fonseca to Crusius (1560-1770)
- Jacob Lorhard (1561-1609): The Creation of the Term "Ontologia"
- Francisco Suárez on Metaphysics as the Science of Real Beings
 - Annotated Bibliography on the Metaphysics of Francisco Suárez
- Christian Wolff's Ontology: Existence as "Complement of Possibility"
 - Annotated Bibliography on the Ontology of Christian Wolff
- Kant from the Critique of Metaphysics to Transcendental Philosophy

METAPHYSICAL WORKS BY FRANCISCO SUÁREZ

a) *Disputationes Metaphysicae*: The first edition was published in Salamanca (Spain) in 1597 (two volumes) with the title *Metaphysicarum disputationum, in quibus et universa naturalis theologia ordinate traditur, et quaestiones omnes ad duodecim Aristotelis libros pertinentes accurate disputantur*, and reprinted Mainz 1605.

The standard edition, edited by Charles Berton who adopted the current title, is part of the edition of the complete works (voll. 25-26, reprinted by Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1965) edited by Louis Vivés: R. P. Francisci Suárez e societate Jesu, *Opera omnia* - in 26 volumes (1856-1861) with two additional volumes of indexes (27-28).

b) *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis "De anima"* - Introduction and critical edition by Salvador Castellote, Spanish translation by C. Baciero and L. Baciero: vol. I (Disputations I-II) Madrid, Labor, 1978; vol. II (Disputations III-VII) 1981, vol. III (Disputations VIII-XIV), Fundación Xavier Zubiri, 1981.

c) *De essentia. existentia et subsistentia* in: Jesús Iturrioz, "Un primer opúsculo de Suárez, desconocido hasta ahora," *Estudios eclesiásticos* 18: 330-359 (1944).

The Latin text of the *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, *De anima* and of the commentary to *De Generatione et Corruptione* (first edition in: Jacob Schmutz (ed.) - Francisco Suárez. "Der ist der Mann". Apéndice Francisco Suárez *De generatione et corruptione*. Homenaje al Prof. Salvador Castellote - Valencia, Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer, 2004, pp. 433-682) are available on the site of Prof. [Salvador Castellote](#).

PARTIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF THE *DISPUTATIONES METAPHYSICAE*

1. *A commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics (Index locupletissimus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis)*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 2004.
Translated with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle.
2. *Suárez on individuation. Metaphysical Disputation V: Individual unity and its principle (De unitate individuali, elusque principio)*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 1982.
Translated from the Latin with introduction, notes, glossary, and bibliography by Jorge J. E. Gracia.
3. *On formal and universal unity (Disputatio VI: De Unitate Formali et Universali)*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 1964.
Disputation VI. Translated from the Latin with an introduction by James F. Ross.
4. *On the various kinds of distinctions (Disputatio VII: De variis distinctionum generibus)*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 1947.
Translation from the Latin, with an introduction, by Cyril Vollert (reprinted 1976).
5. *The metaphysics of good and evil according to Suárez. Metaphysical disputations X and XI and selected passages from Disputation XXIII and other works*. München: Philosophia Verlag 1989.
X: *De Bono seu bonitate transcendentali*; XI: *De Malo*; XXXIII: *De substantia creata in communi*.
Also contains translations of: *Tractatus de divina substantia ejusque attributis*, book III chapter 3, 9-11; chapter 7 10 and *De divina praedestinatione et reprobatione*, book1, chapter 5, 2-3; book 3, chapter 8, .1-2; book 5, chapter 4, 1-3.
Translation, with introduction, notes and glossary by Jorge J. E. Gracia, Douglas Davis.
6. *On the formal cause of substance. Metaphysical Disputation XV (De Causa formali substantiali)*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 2000.
Translated by John Kronen and Jeremiah Reedy.
7. *On efficient causality. Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19*. New Haven: Yale University Press 1994.
XVII: *De causa efficiente in communi*; XVIII: *De causa proxima efficiente, ejusque causalitate, et omnibus quae ad causandum requirit*; XIX: *De causis necessario, et libere seu contingenter agentibus, ubi etiam de fato, fortuna et casu*.
Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso.
8. *On creation, conservation, and concurrence. Metaphysical Disputations 20, 21, and 22*. South Bend: St. Augustine Press 2002.
XX: *De Prima Causa efficiente, primaque ejus actione quae est creatio*; XXI: *De Prima Causa efficiente, et alter ejus actione, quae est conservatio*; XXII: *De prima Causa, et alia ejus actone, quae est cooperatio, seu concursus cum causis secundis*.
Translation, notes, and introduction by Alfred J. Freddoso.
9. *The metaphysical demonstration of the existence of God. Metaphysical Disputations 28-29*. South Bend: St. Augustine Press 2004.
XXVIII: *De divisione entis in infinitum et finitum*; XXIX: *De Primo et increato Ente, an sit*.
Translated and edited by John P. Doyle.
10. *On the essence of finite Being as such, on the existence of that essence and their distinction (Disputatio XXXI)*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 1983.
XXXI. *De essentia entis finiti ut tale est, et de illius Esse, eorumque distinctione*.
Translated from the Latin with an introduction by Norman J. Wells.
11. *On Real relation (Disputatio Metaphysica XLVII)*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 2006.
XLVII: *De relationibus realis creatis*.
A translation from the Latin, with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle.
12. *On Beings of Reason. (De Entibus Rationis). Metaphysical Disputation LIV*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 1995.
Translated from the Latin with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle.

PARTIAL FRENCH TRANSLATIONS

1. *Suárez et la refondation de la métaphysique comme ontologie*. Paris: Éditions Peeters 1999.
Étude et traduction de l'*Index détaillé de la métaphysique d'Aristote* de F. Suárez par Jean-Paul Coujou.
2. *Dispute Métaphysique I, II, III*. Paris: Vrin 1998.
I: *De natura primae philosophiae seu metaphysicae*; II: *De ratione essentiali seu conceptu entis*;
III: *De passionibus entis in communi, et principiis ejus*.
Text intégral présenté, traduit et annoté par Jean-Paul Coujou.
Introduction: *Suárez et la Renaissance de la métaphysique* pp. 7-45.
3. *La distinction de l'étant fini et de son être. Dispute Métaphysique XXXI*. Paris: Vrin 1999.
XXXI: *De essentia entis finiti ut tale est, et illius esse, eorumque distinctione*.
Texte intégral, présenté, traduit et annoté par Jean-Paul Coujou.
4. *Les êtres de raison. Dispute Métaphysique LIV*. Paris: Vrin 2001.

PARTIAL ITALIAN TRANSLATION

1. *Disputazioni Metafisiche I-III*. Milano: Bompiani 2007.
Introduzione, traduzione e note di Costantino Esposito. In appendice *Le "disputazioni Metafisiche" nella critica contemporanea*. Nuova edizione riveduta e ampliata (prima edizione, Milano, Rusconi, 1996).

PARTIAL GERMAN TRANSLATION

1. *Über die Individualität und das Individuationsprinzip. Fünfe metaphysische Disputaton*. Hamburg: Meiner 1976.
Translated with an Introduction by R. von Specht.

COMPLETE SPANISH TRANSLATION

1. *Disputaciones metafísicas*. Madrid: Editorial Gredos 1960.
Seven volumes edited and translated by Sergio Rabade Romeo, Salvador Caballero Sánchez, Antonio Piucerver Zanón (1960-1966)

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

A complete bibliography can be found on the excellent French site [Scholasticon](#) by Jacob Schmutz; this is a selection of studies about Suárez's *Metaphysical Disputations*.

1. Suárez en el cuarto centenario de su nacimiento (1548-1948). *Pensamiento* 4 1948.
2. "Francisco Suárez," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 65 (3) (1991).
Table of contents: Jorge J. E. Gracia: Francisco Suárez: The Man in history pp. 259-266; Carlos Noreña: Suárez and the Jesuits pp. 267-286; Jorge J. E. Gracia: Suárez's conception of metaphysics: a step in the direction of mentalism? pp. 287-310; John P. Doyle: Suárez on the unity of a scientific habit pp. 311-334; John D. Kronen: The importance of the concept of substantial unity in Suárez argument for hylomorphism pp. 335-360; Douglas P. Davis: Suárez and the problem of positive evil

- pp. 361-372; T. D. Sullivan and Jeremiah Reedy: The ontology of Eucharist pp. 373-386; John L. Treloar, S. J. Moral virtue and the demise of prudence in the thought of Francis Suárez pp. 387-400.
3. *Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradição e Modernidade*. Edited by Cardoso Adelino, Martins Antonio Manuel, and Dos Santos Leonel Ribeiro. Lisboa: Edições Colibri 1999.
 4. *Francisco Suárez and His Legacy. The Impact of Suárezian Metaphysics and Epistemology on Modern Philosophy*. Edited by Sgarbi Marco. Milano: Vita e Pensiero 2010.
 5. Agostini Igor. *L'infinità di Dio. Il dibattito da Suárez a Caterus (1597-1641)*. Roma: Editori Riuniti 2008.
 6. Ashworth Earline Jennifer, "Suárez on the analogy of Being. Some historical background," *Vivarium* 33: 50-75 (1995).
 "I argue that Suárez is best read as part of a tradition which predates Cajetan with respect to the classification of types of analogy, and which to some extent predates Scotus in its insistence on a concept of being which is both one and analogical. I draw on three Fifteenth century philosophers and theologians, Capreolus, Dominic of Flanders, and Soncinas, and one Sixteenth century writer, Domingo de Soto."
 7. Aubenque Pierre. Suárez et l'avènement du concept d'être. In *Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradição e Modernidade*. Edited by Cardoso Adelino, Martins Antonio Manuel, and Dos Santos Leonel Ribeiro. Lisboa: Edições Colibri 1999. pp. 11-20
 Réimprimé dans: P. Aubenque - *Problèmes aristotéliens. I. Philosophie théorique* - Paris, Vrin 2009 pp. 331-340
 8. Barroso Fernández Óscar, "Suárez, filósofo de encrucijada o del nacimiento de la ontología," *Pensamiento* 232: 121-138 (2006).
 "The present work studies the different interpretations proposed in the 20th century concerning the metaphysics of Francisco Suárez. They are divided in three groups: essentialist, existentialist, and objectivist. The essentialist interpretation has been maintained fundamentally by Thomist authors, the most outstanding scholar among them being E. Gilson. The existentialist interpretation, headed by J. Hellín, can be analyzed as a reaction to the essentialist interpretation. The noetic-objectivist interpretation finds its inspiration in M. Heidegger, and its definitive impetus in the works of J. F. Courtine.
 With Courtine, we will maintain that Suárez cannot be classified either as an essentialist or as an existentialist. Efforts to classify him as such will encounter concrete difficulties, since Suárez opens up a new realm for metaphysics, the ontological, situated within the perspective of intentionality and beyond the perspective of effectivity and creation within which medieval metaphysics moves."
 9. Barrón Jorge Uscatescu, "El concepto de metafísica en Suárez: su objeto y dominio," *Pensamiento* 200: 215-236 (1995).
 "Se trata de una interpretación de la primera disputation de las *Disputationes metaphysicae* de Suárez. El objeto de la metafísica es el ser real en general con exclusion del ente de razon y del ente "per accidens". Asi pues, el dominio de la metafísica es la totalidad de los entes reales por si. A continuacion se estudia cada uno de los temas que la metafísica debe tratar, lo cual se refleja en la estructura de la mencionada obra de Suárez: propiedades y principios del ser, etc. Al hacer de la inmaterialidad un rasgo del ser se desvirtua el caracter generalisimo de la metafísica, que de por si esta mas alla de la division del ser material e inmaterial. Por ultimo, se analiza la correspondencia entre los rasgos entresacados de la metafísica como ciencia y el ser real en general."
 10. Bastit Michel, "Interprétation analogique de la loi et analogie de l'être chez Suárez: de la similitude à l'identité," *Études Philosophiques* 44: 429-443 (1989).
 11. Beuchot Mauricio, "La esencia y la existencia en los escolásticos post-medievales. La lucha entre Francisco Suárez y Juan Martínez de Prado," *Doctor Communis* 45: 153-161 (1992).
 12. Blanchette Olivia, "Suárez and the latent essentialism of Heidegger's fundamental ontology," *Review of Metaphysics* 53: 3-19 (1999).
 "Suárez is viewed by Heidegger and others as having set ontological problems in a form that has marked the whole of modern metaphysics or ontology. It is in this context that Heidegger himself came to his idea of ontological difference as redefining the question of being in a way that had never been seen before. In his *Marburg lectures* of 1927 Heidegger traces Kant's essentialist conception of being, or rather of reality, back to the late Scholastics who separated essence from

existence, which he says was not the same as positing the ontological difference, but which could explain why Kant was unable to raise the question of being in the same way that Suárez would not allow for any real distinction between essence and existence. In his attempt to get beyond the essentialism of modern ontology as found in Kant as well as Suárez, however, Heidegger falls short because he continues to think of "Sein" in essentialist terms as different from being, without ever getting back to the ancient idea of being as act understood as transcending essence in finite being."

13. Burlando Giannina. Suárez on Intrinsic Representationalism. In *Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale. Actes du XIe Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale de la Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M), Porto, du 26 au 31 août 2002. Vol. III*. Edited by Pacheco Maria Cândida and Meirinhos José F. Turnhout: Brepols 2006. pp. 1941-1957
 "Does Suárez avoid the criticisms about nonintrinsic representations?
 This paper tries to show how the ontological moves that avoid the Danto-Dennett (D-D) charges of circularity and regress are the ones Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) makes. The author argues that the rejection of the agent intellect, particularly its transduction function and, in general, his conception of *conceptus objectivus* constitutes Suárez's recognition of the D-D problems. Hence, the real issue about representations turns out to be over causation. Suárez's doctrines of harmony, and intrinsic representations are necessarily connected. Secondly, the article also shows that Dennett is confused at a certain point."
14. Cantens Bernardo J., "Suárez and Meinong on Beings of reason and non-existent objects", University of Miami, 1999.
 Available at ProQuest Dissertation Express. Order number: 9938315.
15. Cantens Bernardo J., "The relationship between God and essences and the notion of eternal Truths according to Francisco Suárez," *Modern Schoolman* 77: 127-143 (2000).
 "An understanding of the relationship between God and the essences of His creatures is of vital importance for any contemporary theist in understanding the nature of God and the created world. Historically, this concern received a great deal of attention and has been an essential component of many philosophical systems (e.g. St. Augustine's, St. Thomas' and Ockham's). In contemporary circles, philosophers such as Plantinga have revived the discussion. The difficulties that have permeated the historical and contemporary discussions of this topic are: (1) the nature of essences (i.e. Are they eternal? Are they necessary? What is their ontological status? Do non-existent beings have essences?) and (2) how are essences related to God (i.e. Are they necessary because God willed them as such or is their necessity independent of God's will? Are they ontologically independent of God or are they part of God's intellect?). In this paper, I want to explore the notion of essence and its relation to God in the philosophy of Francisco Suárez and establish three conclusions. First, the major one is that Suárez presents an original doctrine, which differs from the more popular Thomistic doctrine, and can serve as a springboard for new thoughts on this topic. Second, I want to demonstrate that Suárez is able to reconcile the seemingly contradictory position of maintaining the special character of the necessity of essences while not delimiting God's freedom. Finally, I will point out the similarity between Suárez's notion of the necessity of essences, entailed in his doctrine of eternal truths, and Plantinga's "necessity of nature"."
16. Cantens Bernardo J., "Ultimate reality in the metaphysics of Francisco Suárez," *Ultimate Reality and Meaning. Interdisciplinary Studies in the Philosophy of Understanding* 25: 73-92 (2002).
 "In this paper I examine Francisco Suárez's conception of ultimate reality in his metaphysics. First, I present a succinct biography on Francisco Suárez. Second, I discuss the structure, organization, style and influence of his major philosophical work, the *Metaphysical Disputations*. Finally, I explore Suárez's view on ultimate reality as real being (*ens reale*). I discuss Suárez's view on the relationship between real being (*ens reale*) and possible being (*ens possibile*) and how these relate to being (*esse*). I conclude by discussing God's place in Suárez's conception of reality."
17. Cantens Bernardo J., "Suárez on Beings of reason: what kinds of beings (*entia*) are Beings of reason, and what kind of Being (*esse*) do they have?," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 77: 171-187 (2003).
 "Beings of reason or non-existent objects have always been a source of mind-boggling paradoxes that have vexed philosophers and thinkers in the past and present. Consider Bertrand Russell's

paradox: 'if A and B are not different, then the difference between A and B does not subsist. But how can a non-entity be the subject of a proposition?' Or Meinong's paradox: 'There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects.' At the root of these troubling conundrums are two basic questions: What are beings of reason? What kind of existence do they have? Francisco Suárez was well aware that a solution to the metaphysical questions concerning the essential character of beings of reason and their ontological status would serve as the key to solving the puzzles and paradoxes just described. A solution to these metaphysical questions would also bring about an understanding of how we talk about beings of reason and other problems that they give rise to in the philosophy of language. In this paper, I present Suárez's view on the nature and ontological status of beings of reason and clarify some of the following questions: What kind of beings (*entia*) are beings of reason? What kind of being (*esse*) do beings of reason have? This latter concern is related to the following metaphysical issues: What are real beings? What is the nature and ontological status of possible beings? What is the distinction between real beings, actual beings, and possible beings?"

18. Carraud Vincent. *Causa sine ratio. La raison de la cause de Suárez à Leibniz*. Paris: Press Universitaires de France 2002.
Chapter I pp. 103-166.
19. Cerqueira Gonçalves Joaquim. Francisco Suárez e a modernidade filosófica - a distinção essência-existência. In *Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradição e Modernidade*. Edited by Cardoso Adelino, Martins Antonio Manuel, and Dos Santos Leonel Ribeiro. Lisboa: Edições Colibri 1999. pp. 121-132
20. Conze Eberhard. *Der Begriff der Metaphysik bei Franciscus Suarez*. Leipzig: Felix Meiner 1928.
Einleitung 1-4; I. Der Gegenstand der Metaphysik 5
1. Die Metaphysik als Wissenschaft vom *ens inquantum ens reale* 5; 2. Die Metaphysik als die Wissenschaft von dem Sein, das dem Sein nach von der Materie abstrahiert 16; 3. Die Gliederung des Gegenstandsbereichs der Metaphysik 22; a. Schema der Gliederung 24; b. Einige Bemerkungen über die Einteilung der Metaphysik an einigen Wendepunkten des Peripatetismus 25;
II. Die Aufgaben der Metaphysik den Einzelwissenschaften gegenüber 28; 1. Der Primat der Metaphysik 28; 2. Die Metaphysik und die Prinzipien 38; 3. Die Metaphysik und die Objekte der Einzelwissenschaften 45; 4. Die Metaphysik und die Theologie 51;
III. Die literarische Form der *Disputationes Metaphysicae* 57; c. Angabe der Fragen, die Duns Scotus und Javellus an das Buch *Theta* der Aristotelischen *Metaphysik* knüpfen 61; Schluss: Der Gegenstandsbereich der Metaphysik bei Suarez und bei Wolff 64; Namenverzeichnis 71-72.
21. Copleston Frederick Charles. *A history of philosophy. Vol. III: Ockham to Suárez*. London: Burns Oates & Washbourne 1953.
See Chapter XXII and XXIII pp. 353-405.
22. Coujou Jean-Paul. *Suárez et la refondation de la métaphysique comme ontologie. Étude et traduction de l'Index détaillé de la Métaphysique d'Aristote de F. Suárez*. Louvain-Paris: Éditions Peeters 1999.
23. Coujou Jean-Paul. *Le vocabulaire de Suárez*. Pris : Ellipses 2001.
24. Courtine Jean-François, "Nominalisme et pensée classique. La situation privilégiée de l'oeuvre de F. Suárez," *Recherches sur le XVIIe siècle* 1: 21-34 (1976).
25. Courtine Jean-François, "Le projet suarézien de la métaphysique. Pour une étude de la thèse suarézienne du néant," *Archives de Philosophie* 42: 253-274 (1979).
"The ultimate aim of the present study is the determination of the sense of the being as "objectivity" in Suárez's *Disputationes Metaphysicae*. However the question is not directly approached, but by bringing to light a non-thematic thesis upon nothingness. The *Disputationes* in their ontological intention itself and through their architectonic point out in direction of a metaphysics of the yet undetermined object (*aliquid-nihil*), metaphysics that will find its full development through the German *Schulmetaphysik* until Kant."
26. Courtine Jean-François, "Le statut ontologique du possible selon Suarez," *Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia* 7: 247-268 (1980).
27. Courtine Jean-François, "Le principe d'individuation chez Suárez et chez Leibniz," *Studia Leibnitiana* 23: 174-190 (1983).
Supplementary volume

28. Courtine Jean-François, "Ontologie ou métaphysique?," *Giornale di Metafisica* 7: 3-24 (1985).
29. Courtine Jean-François. Suárez et la Tradition Aristotelicienne de la Métaphysique. In *Aristotelismus und Renaissance. In memoriam Charles B. Schmitt*. Edited by Kessler Eckhard, Lohr Charles H., and Sparrn Walter. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz 1988. pp. 101-126
30. Courtine Jean-François, "Différence ontologique et analogie de l'être. Le tournant suárezien," *Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie*: 41-76 (1989).
31. Courtine Jean-François. *Suárez et le système de la métaphysique*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1990.
32. Courtine Jean-François. *Nature et empire de la loi: études suarésiennes*. Paris: Vrin 1999.
33. Courtine Jean-François. *Inventio analogiae. Métaphysique et ontothéologie*. Paris: Vrin 2005. Part III, chap. 2: *L'analogia entis et sa situation dans la métaphysique de Suárez* pp. 291-336; Part III, chap. 3: *Cajétan - Suárez* pp. 337-357.
34. Cronin Timothy J., "Eternal truths in the thought of Suárez and Descartes (first part)," *Modern Schoolman* 38: 269-288 (1960).
35. Cronin Timothy J., "Eternal truths in the thought of Suárez and Descartes (second part)," *Modern Schoolman* 39: 23-38 (1961).
36. Cronin Timothy J. *Objective Being in Descartes and in Suárez*. Roma: Gregorian University Press 1966.
37. Cronin Timothy J. Objective reality of human ideas: Descartes and Suarez. In *Wisdom in depth. Essays in honor of Henri Renard, S. J.* Edited by Daves Vincent, Holloway Maurice, and Sweeney Leo. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co. 1966. pp. 68-79
38. Cross Richard. Duns Scotus and Suárez at the origins of modernity. In *Deconstructing radical orthodoxy. Postmodern theology, rhetoric and truth*. Edited by Hankey Wayne J. Aldershot: Ashgate 2005. pp. 65-80
39. Daniel Stephen H., "Berkeley, Suárez, and the "esse-existere" distinction," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 74: 621-636 (2000).
"For Berkeley, a thing's existence "esse" is nothing more than its being perceived "as that thing". It makes no sense to ask (with Samuel Johnson) about the "esse" of the mind or the specific act of perception, for that would be like asking what it means for existence to exist. Berkeley's "existere is percipi or percipere" thus carefully adopts the scholastic distinction between "esse" and "existere" ignored by Locke and others committed to a substantialist notion of mind. Following the Stoics, Berkeley proposes that, "as" the existence of ideas, minds "subsist" rather than "exist" and, accordingly, cannot be identified as independently existing things."
40. Darge Rolf, "Grundthese und ontologische Bedeutung der Lehre von der Analogie des Seienden nach F. Suárez," *Philosophische Jahrbuch* 166: 312-333 (1999).
41. Darge Rolf, "*Ens inquantum ens*. Die Erklärung des Subjekts der Metaphysik bei F. Suarez," *Recherches de Théologie et de Philosophie Médiévales* 66: 335-361 (1999).
42. Darge Rolf, "'*Ens intime transcendit omnia*': Suárez' Modell der transzendentalen Analyse und die mittelalterlichen Transzendentalienlehren," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 47: 150-172 (2000).
"The study seeks an approach to the proper outlines of Suárez's ontology in the context of the scholastic tradition of metaphysics. It shows, that Suárez synthesizes elements from different ontological traditions in a new explanation of the transcendental of being. This explanation does not follow -- as the prevailing interpretation of Suárez's position suggests -- the 'via Scoti'; rather it is unfolded as a countermove to it on a common ground. In consequence of it Suárez replaces Scotus's model of the transcendental analysis by another conception, which takes up the pre-Scotistic doctrine of the transcendentals."
43. Darge Rolf, "Suárez' Analyse der Transzendentalien 'Ding' und 'Etwas' im Kontext der scholastischen Metaphysiktradition," *Theologie und Philosophie* 75: 339-358 (2000).
"Some scholastic authors count 'thing' and 'something' amongst the transcendental attributes of being. The study seeks to explain Suárez's analysis of these attributes with regard to the scholastic debate on the number of the *passiones entis*. It shows that Suárez integrates different traditions on the basis of an original understanding of 'being' or 'thing'. Recent interpretations of Suárez's ontological approach are questioned by the author's conclusion, that Suárez does not take up Henry

of Ghent's and Scotus's scheme of the first conceptions and excludes from metaphysics the reduction of being to "res" in the sense of the mere thinkable or *possibile logicum*."

44. Darge Rolf, "Die Grundlegung einer allgemeinen Theorie der transzendentalen Eigenschaften des Seienden bei F. Suárez," *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* 54: 341-364 (2000).
"The study seeks to explain the central idea in Suárez's general theory of the transcendental properties of being with regard to its background in the medieval doctrine of the transcendentals. It questions the prevailing view that Suárez adopts Scotus's doctrine of the *passiones entis* and leads to the conclusion that Suárez -- within the new framework of his explanation of real being -- rather takes up and reshapes the pre-Scotist doctrine of the transcendentals."
45. Darge Rolf, "Suárez' Begriff der transzendentalen Einheit," *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 43: 37-57 (2001).
46. Darge Rolf. Seinswahrheit und Erkenntniswahrheit. Francisco Suárez und die thomistische Lehre von der analogia veri. In *Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag*. Edited by Pickavé Martin. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2003. pp. 246-265
"According to Thomas Aquinas 'true' is predicated essentially of things with reference to truth in the intellect. His reflections on the relation between transcendental and cognitive truth raise questions which in later scholasticism -- in connection with difficulties within the doctrine of analogy -- give rise to controversies on the structure and ontological meaning of the *analogia veri*. In the Thomistic tradition Cajetan's solution had a strong influence, although it reduces ontological truth to a mere extrinsic denomination of things.
Against this solution Suárez develops a new interpretation of the order of predication of 'true'. It confirms both (a) the Aristotelian doctrine according to which the original place of truth is the intellect, and (b) the traditional doctrine of the transcendentals according to which true is not an extrinsic denomination of things, but their inner entity under a certain respect. The study seeks to explain Suárez's solution against its historical background."
47. Darge Rolf, "Eines oder Vieles. Zu einem Grundproblem der scholastischen Theorien über das Eine," *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* 57: 27-52 (2003).
"On the background of the Aristotelian doctrine of the One which is convertible with being, scholastic theories of the One meet with a difficulty that challenges their underlying ontological principles: how can the doctrine of the convertibility of 'one' and 'being' be reconciled with the Aristotelian doctrine, according to which 'one' and 'many' are first differences or opposites of the first division of being? If one divides being, it cannot be converted with 'being' in a proposition, and vice versa. Among the attempts to solve the problem on the basis of the conception of an essential identity of being and one, two main types of solutions may be distinguished. The study seeks to characterize their outlines and ontological implications and explains, how the different approaches emerge within the framework of the Aristotelian tradition of metaphysics."
48. Darge Rolf. *Suárez' transzendente Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition*. Leiden: Brill 2004.
49. Darge Rolf, "Suárez' Theorie der ontischen Wahrheit und die Metaphysiktradition," *Theologie und Philosophie* 79: 31-54 (2004).
50. Darge Rolf. Vom Guten der Dinge. Suárez' Theorie des ontischen Guten und die Metaphysiktradition. In *Francisco Suárez. "Der ist der Mann". Apéndice Francisco Suárez De generatione et corruptione. Homenaje al Prof. Salvador Castellote*. Edited by Schmutz Jacob. Valencia: Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer 2004. pp. 133-159
51. Darge Rolf. Kognitive und ontologische Wahrheit bei Suárez. In *Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale. Actes du XIe Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale de la Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M), Porto, du 26 au 31 août 2002. Vol. III*. Edited by Pacheco Maria Cândida and Meirinhos José F. Turnhout: Brepols 2006. pp. 1929-1940
52. Di Vona Piero. *Studi sulla scolastica della Controriforma. L'esistenza e la sua distinzione metafisica dell'essenza*. Firenze: La Nuova Italia 1968.
53. Doig James C., "Suárez, Descartes, and the objective reality of ideas," *New Scholasticism* 51: 350-371 (1977).
54. Doyle John Patrick, "Suárez on the reality of the possibles," *Modern Schoolman* 44: 29-48 (1967).

"This article shows that for Francisco Suárez the core reality of possible beings is their non-self-contradiction. Their intrinsic claim to inclusion under the common concept of Being and the suárezian analogy of Being resides in the fact that as non-repugnant they are not non-being. So understood, they are actually nothing but still more than mere beings of reason. Of themselves, they are eternally true and apt to be known, even if there were no God. Far beyond this, their reality is such that if they were not what they are, there would be no God and, 'a fortiori', none of the actual creatures which depend upon him."

55. Doyle John Patrick, "Suárez on the analogy of Being (First part)," *Modern Schoolman* 46: 219-249 (1969).

"Francis Suarez's doctrine of the analogy of being requires that one common character of being be found intrinsically but unequally, according to an order of prior and posterior, in those inferiors of which the one, common, objective concept of being as a noun is predicated.

Problems are that the requirement of intrinsicality has forced Suarez to give a shadow reality to merely possible things while the need for inequality has militated against the all important unity of the common character or concept of being."

56. Doyle John Patrick, "Suárez on the analogy of Being (Second part)," *Modern Schoolman* 46: 323-341 (1969).

57. Doyle John Patrick, "Heidegger and Scholastic metaphysics," *Modern Schoolman* 49: 201-220 (1972).

"Regarding Heidegger's appraisal of Scholastic metaphysics, we have asked: (1) is he right about the sort of metaphysics represented by Scotus and Suárez? and (2) is he correct in equating all medieval metaphysics with this type of Scotistic-Suárezian metaphysics?

We have answered the first question in the affirmative and have replied negatively to the second."

58. Doyle John Patrick, "Prolegomena to a study of extrinsic denomination in the work of Francis Suárez S.J.," *Vivarium* 22: 121-160 (1984).

"At times, extrinsic denomination for Suarez seems close to, if not synonymous with, a mere naming from the outside. But at other times, it is regarded as a feature of things themselves. In this article, there is some description and some examples of extrinsic denomination according to Suarez.

Following this, are some of his reasons for and sources of such denomination. Special attention is paid to his use of extrinsic denomination in connection with the properties and categories of being. Finally, there are listed conventions and other items observed in Suarez's use of extrinsic denomination."

59. Doyle John Patrick, "Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth (First part)," *Vivarium* 25: 47-75 (1987).

"From Parmenides on, it has been a commonplace in the Western philosophical tradition that truth is a function of being. One need only remember the general Platonic doctrine of Forms, which are at once 'really real' and the locus of intelligibility of truth. Francis Suarez has passed on the common teaching of the Schoolmen that truth is threefold. (1) There is a truth in words, in writing, and in what he calls 'non-ultimate concepts' which is termed truth 'in signifying'. (2) There is a truth in the intellect knowing things, which is called truth 'in knowing'. And (3) there is a truth in things, which is a truth 'in being'."

60. Doyle John Patrick. Suárez on truth and mind-dependent Beings: implications for a unified semiotic. In *Semiotics 1983*. Edited by Evans Jonathan and Deely John. New York: University Press of America 1987. pp. 121-133

61. Doyle John Patrick, "Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth (Second part)," *Vivarium* 26: 51-72 (1988).

"This is the completion of a two-part article which considers Suarez's reply to the question of truth where there is no real being independent of the mind. That reply turns upon the significative cast of the words expressing beings of reason, especially "impossible" beings. Because such words, unlike nonsense syllables, have signification, there is in their regard, and in regard to the beings of reason they express, the possibility of some statements being true even as others are false."

62. Doyle John Patrick, "Suárez on the unity of a scientific habit," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 65: 311-334 (1991).

"Despite the fact that it is made up of many different conclusions and despite the fact that it

undergoes development, how does a science such as geometry have and retain its unity? That is to say, how is it somehow undivided in itself and divided off from arithmetic, or from other speculative sciences such as physics and metaphysics? Is there a basic in things themselves for such indivision and division? Is it something entirely supplied by the knower? Or can it be in some way partly from things and partly from knowers? In any event, how should it be explained in detail?"

63. Doyle John Patrick, *Collected Studies on Francisco Suárez SJ (1548-1617)*. Edited by Salas Víctor M. Leuven: Leuven University Press 2010.
 Contents: Editor's Foreword VII-IX; Introduction: The Theme of this Collection, its Contents, its Character and Rationale XIII-XVI; 1. Francisco Suárez, His Life, His Works, His Doctrine, and Some of His Influence 1; 2. Suárez on the Reality of the Possibles 21; 3. Suárez on the Analogy of Being 41; 4. Suarezian and Thomistic Metaphysics before the Judgment of Heidegger 89; 5. The Suarezian Proof for God's Existence 109; 6. Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Work of Francis Suárez, S.J. 123; 7. Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth 161; 8. Suárez on the Unity of a Scientific Habit 209; 9. Suárez on the Truth of the Proposition, "This is My Body" 235; 10. Suárez on Preaching the Gospel to People like the American Indians 257; 11. Francisco Suárez on the Law of Nations 315; 12. Suárez on Human Rights 333; 13. Francisco Suárez on the Interpretation of Laws 357; 14. Postscript and Prospectus 389; Bibliography 393; Index of Names 409; Index of Terms 413-416.
 "As was said early on, in this volume I am attempting to give an overview of Suárez the man, his published writings, some items of his philosophical, theological, legal, and political thought, as well as noting some of his influence. With more space, I would have extended discussion to further items such as Suárez's teaching on relations in Metaphysical Disputation 47 and extrinsic denomination as connected with relation and other categories, plus the intentionality doctrine found in his 54th Disputation, as well as given increased attention to different epistemological and semiotic themes in his doctrine. Not far away would have been a fuller treatment of his psychology, especially the relations between imagination and intellection. This all would have opened doors to remarks about seventeenth century Jesuit and other inheritors of his doctrine on *beings of reason* plus further comments on his moral and political thought.
 Developments within and from the essays in the present collection might still include the following. Moving out from "Suárez on the Possibles" to relations between God and the possibles, I have in mind an expansion in the direction of someone like Suárez's disciple, Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, S.J. (1578-1651), who, along with a number of fellow Jesuits, will speak, against a background of growing nominalism, even of categorial relations of God to creatures, both possible and actual. Again, while "Suarezian and Thomistic Metaphysics before the Judgment of Heidegger" and "The Suarezian Proof for God's Existence" criticize the abstract ontological character of Suarezian metaphysics and its central proof for God's existence, they leave unstated the question of whether such an approach will work with a different epistemology." (p. 389).
64. Esposito Costantino. Ritorno a Suárez. Le *Disputationes Metaphysicae* nella critica contemporanea. In *La filosofia nel Siglo de Oro. Studi sul Tardo Rinascimento spagnolo*. Edited by Lamacchia Ada. Bari: Levante Editori 1995. pp. 465-573
 Reprinted with additions as *Le "disputazioni Meetafisiche" nella critica contemporanea* - in the Italian translation of the three first *Metaphysical Meditations: Francisco Suárez - Disputazioni metafisiche* - Milano, Bompiani, 2007. pp. 747-853 (with a detailed bibliography pp. 711-744).
65. Esposito Costantino. Das Seiende und das Gute. Francisco Suárez zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Martin Heidegger. In *Vom Rätsel des Begriffs. Festschrift für F.-W. von Herrmann zum 65. Geburtstag*. Edited by Coriando Paola-Ludovika. Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt 1999. pp. 341-356
66. Esposito Costantino. The concept of time in the metaphysics of Suárez. In *The medieval concept of time. The Scholastic debate and its reception in early modern philosophy*. Edited by Porro Pasquale. Leiden: Brill 2001. pp. 383-398
67. Esposito Costantino, "Heidegger, Suárez e la storia dell'ontologia," *Quaestio. Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics* 1: 407-430 (2001).
 Volume titled: *Heidegger and the medievals*.
68. Esposito Costantino, "Existence, relation, effieience. Le noeud suarézien entre métaphysique et théologie," *Quaestio. Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics* 3: 139-161 (2003).

Volume titled: *Existence*.

69. Fernandez Burillo Santiago, "Introducción a la teoría del conocimiento de Francisco Suárez," *Pensamiento* 48: 211-230 (1992).
70. Fernandez Burillo Santiago, "Las *Disputaciones metafísicas* de F. Suárez S .J., su inspiracion y algunas de sus lineas maestras. En el IV centenario de la primera edicion (1597-1997)," *Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval* 4: 65-86 (1997).
 "Four centuries after the first edition of "Disputationes Metaphysicae" (1597), that vast work is still the greatest issue from the Spanish philosophy. F. Suárez is the author of one of the most important synthesis of the scholar philosophy. The key of everything he means and also of "Disputationes", can be found in the idea of freedom in causality and action. From this concept, some topics are shown: act and potentiality, cause, creation, etc. We explain Suárez's metaphysics from an existential point of view and refuse the accusation of abstractism."
71. Ferrater Mora José, "Suárez and modern philosophy," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 14: 528-547 (1953).
72. Forlivesi Marco, "La distinction entre concept formal et concept objectif: Suárez, Pasqualigo, Mastri," *Études Philosophiques* 60: 3-30 (2002).
 "This study shows how a theory of object, and of "objectivity" is elaborated, from XIIIth century's scholasticism to the XVIIth century, through a series of conceptual creations and interpretative breaks. It runs into the opposition between formal and objective concept in the XVIIth century. From this rediscovered story follows a new assessment on the cartesian argument for God's existence."
73. Forlivesi Marco. *Ontologia impura. La natura della metafisica secondo Francisco Suárez. In Francisco Suárez. "Der ist der Mann". Apéndice Francisco Suárez De generatione et corruptione. Homenaje al Prof. Salvador Castellote*. Edited by Schmutz Jacob. Valencia: Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer 2004. pp. 161-207
74. Forlivesi Marco, "Impure ontology. The nature of metaphysics and its object in Francisco Suarez's texts," *Quaestio. Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics* 5: 559-686 (2006).
75. Gnemmi Angelo. *Il fondamento metafisico. Analisi di struttura sulle Disputationes metaphysicae di F. Suárez*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero 1969.
76. Goudriaan Aza. *Philosophische Gotteserkenntnis bei Suárez und Descartes im Zusammenhang mit der niederländischen reformierten Theologie und philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts*. Leiden: Brill 1999.
 "This volume deals with basic questions regarding the philosophical knowledge of God in Suarez and Descartes, two very different, but historically linked early-modern philosophers. It has two parts devoted to Suarez and Descartes respectively. Each section examines the path along which philosophy can acquire knowledge of God, the adequacy which is ascribed to this knowledge, as well as selected topics of the doctrine of God's attributes.
 Special attention has been given to both critical and positive reactions to Suarez and Descartes on the part of seventeenth-century Dutch Reformed theologians.
 The author argues that Descartes, in comparison with Suarez, reduced the theological interests of philosophy and also limited the starting points for attaining to a philosophical knowledge of God. On the other hand, Descartes elevated the presumed adequacy of this knowledge."
77. Gómez Caffarena José, "Sentido de la composición de ser y esencia en Suárez," *Pensamiento* 15: 135-154 (1959).
78. Gracia Jorge J.E., "What the individual adds to the common nature according to Suárez," *New Scholasticism* 53: 221-233 (1979).
 "In *Metaphysical Disputation V*, section 2, Suárez criticizes the views of Thomas, Ockham and Scotus on what the individual adds to the common nature. Then he proceeds to state his own view as follows: (1) the individual adds something real to the common nature, (2) nonetheless, what the individual adds is not really or modally distinct from the common nature, (3) rather, it is conceptually distinct from it, since (4) a conceptual distinction does not require that what is added be conceptual. In this paper I examine briefly the nature of the problem at stake, Suárez's view, and the apparent inconsistency between (1), (2), (3) and (4) above. As a conclusion I submit (a) that Suárez's position is fully consistent, (b) although different from those of Thomas, Scotus and

Ockham, with which it has been compared often and (c) that the apparent inconsistency is due to an ambiguity in the use of the term 'addition'."

79. Gracia Jorge J.E., "Suárez conception of metaphysics: a step in the direction of mentalism?," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 65: 287-309 (1991).
"Mentalism in metaphysics is the view that the object of study of metaphysics is something mental rather than something real. Suárez has been identified as a key figure in the development of mentalism in early modern philosophy. Contrary to this view I argue that Suárez did not take any unambiguous steps toward mentalism and that his position is concordant with the medieval Aristotelian tradition of realism. In the article I examine Suárez's view of the nature of metaphysics, its object, and the ontological status of that object."
80. Gracia Jorge J.E., "Francisco Suárez: the man in history," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 65: 259-266 (1991).
"This article presents a short summary of Suárez's life, works, and place in history. It argues that, contrary to widespread interpretations, which portray Suárez exclusively as a medieval theologian or a modern philosopher, he is best seen as both."
81. Gracia Jorge J.E., "Suárez and the doctrine of the Transcendentals," *Topoi* 11: 121-134 (1992).
"This article discusses Suárez's views concerning the transcendentals, that is, being and those attributes of it that extend to everything. In particular it explores Suárez's notion of transcendental unity and the way in which he conceived the transcendental attributes of being are related to it. It makes two claims: first, that Suárez has an intensional rather than an extensional understanding of transcendental unity; and, second, that Suárez's understanding of truth and goodness, as expressing real extrinsic denominations based on real relations, appears to contain an inconsistency."
82. Gracia Jorge J.E., "Suárez and metaphysical mentalism: the last visit," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 67: 349-354 (1993).
"This article is a reply to N. J. Wells' article "Esse Cognitum and Suárez revisited" ("ACPQ" 67, 3 (1993): 339-348) prompted in turn by my article "Suárez's conception of metaphysics: a step in the direction of mentalism?" ("ACPQ" 65 (1991): 287-309). I argue that, contrary to what Professor Wells' believes: first, he has not clarified the status of the objective concept, and, second, he must accept that, if his interpretation were correct, metaphysics, for Suárez, would be concerned with what is in the mind, rather than with what is outside it."
83. Gracia Jorge J.E. Francis Suárez (b. 1548; d. 1617). In *Individuation in Scholasticism. The later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation (1150-1650)*. Edited by Gracia Jorge J.E. New York: State University of New York Press 1994. pp. 475-510
"This article presents an analysis of Suárez's position on individuation. It discusses Suárez's views of transcendental unity and individual unity and their relations, the ontological status of individuality, the individuation of substances (by designated matter, form, existence, and entity), the individuation of accidents (by substance), and the presence of accidents differing only numerically in the same subject. It claims that Suárez's accomplishment is not only to be found in his systematic approach, but also in his abandonment of a reliance on faith in matters philosophical and in the introduction of various precisions which clarify the issues surrounding individuation."
84. Gracia Jorge J.E. Suarez (and later scholasticism). In *Routledge history of medieval philosophy*. Edited by Marenbon John. New York: Routledge 1998. pp. 452-474
85. Gracia Jorge J.E. The Ontological Status of the Transcendental Attributes of Being in Scholasticism and Modernity: Suarez and Kant. In *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?, Qu'est-ce que la philosophie au Moyen Age? What is Philosophy in the Middle Ages?. Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, 25. Bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt*. Edited by Aertsen Jan and Speer Andreas. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1998. pp. 213-225
86. Gracia Jorge J.E. The language of Categories: from Aristotle to Ryle, via Suárez and Kant. In *L'élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Âge*. Edited by Hamesse Jacqueline and Steel Carlos. Leuven: Leuven University Press 2003. pp. 337-355
87. Grosso Giuseppe. Sulla distinzione di essenza ed esistenza in Suárez. In *La filosofia nel Siglo de Oro. Studi sul Tardo Rinascimento spagnolo*. Edited by Lamacchia Ada. Bari: Levante Editori

1995. pp. 415-427

88. Guy Alain, "L'analogie de l'être selon Suárez," *Archives de Philosophie* 42: 275-294 (1979).
"Counter to Scotus (who affirms the universality of the being) and Peter Aureol (who sustains its equivocality), also against saint Thomas (who defends only the analogy of proportion), Suárez, in the 28th of the *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (third section), pleads for "the analogy of intrinsic attribution of the being." His realism is mixed with some Occamism."
89. Heider Daniel, "Is Suarez's concept of Being analogical or univocal?," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 81: 21-42 (2007).
"This article deals with the question of Suárez's conception of being, which *prima facie* seems to oscillate between a Scotistic univocal conception and a conception of being according to the analogy of intrinsic attribution. The paper intends to show that Suárez's doctrine can in no way be interpreted as representative of the univocal conception, and proceeds in six steps. First, it highlights the importance of the "uncommon doctor"'s theory of the unity of both the formal and the objective concepts of being. In the second part, the paper asks how the concept of being can, without any internal differentiation and structure, give rise to the different relations that it has to the natures subordinated to it. In the second and the third parts, this question receives an answer against the background of Suárez's critique of Scotus's conception, and with the help of his theory of the radical intimate transcendence of being. In the fourth section, there follows an exposition of Suárez's doctrine on the explication of the concept of being. The fifth section offers a brief presentation of the significance of *esse* for *ratio entis*.
In the last section, the author places his interpretation in the general context of the *Metaphysical Disputations*."
90. Hellin José, "El concepto formal en Suárez," *Pensamiento* 18: 407-432 (1962).
91. Hurtado Guillermo. Entes e modos en la *Disputationes Metafisicas*. In *Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradição e Modernidade*. Edited by Cardoso Adelino, Martins Antonio Manuel, and Dos Santos Leonel Ribeiro. Lisboa: Edições Colibri 1999. pp. 99-117
92. Iturroz Jesús, "Fuentes de la metafísica de Suárez," *Pensamiento* 4: 31-89 (1948).
93. Iturroz Jesús. *Estudios sobre la metafísica de Francisco Suárez, S.I.* Madrid: Ediciones Fax 1949.
94. Kainz Howard P., "The Suárezian position on Being and the Real Distinction: a analytic and comparative study," *Thomist* 34: 289-305 (1970).
"In elucidating the relationship between "existence" and "essence", it seems that two fundamental options are open: 1) to ground existence in existence itself; or 2) to ground existence in nothingness. Thomas Aquinas, in his doctrine on essence as potentiality, chooses the latter option, for all practical purposes. Suárez, in order to avoid grounding existence in nothingness, chooses the former option. One result of his choice is the purely mental "distinction" between essence and existence."
95. Karofsky Amy D., "Suárez's doctrine of eternal truths," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 39: 23-47 (2001).
"In this paper, I offer an interpretation of Suárez's doctrine of eternal truths expounded in *Metaphysical Disputation XXXI*, Chapter XII, Sections 38-47. There, Suárez considers and rejects several theories before developing his own. Because it is somewhat difficult to determine what view Suárez ultimately adopts, interpretations of this passage tend to vary. I argue that the interpretations of Norman Wells, Armand Maurer and John P. Doyle are inadequate, since Suárez wants a solution to the problem of eternal truths that does not depend upon the will of the divine being and one that avoids any ontological commitment to unactualized, possible success."
96. Karofsky Amy D., "Suárez's influence on Descartes's theory of eternal truths," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 10: 241-262 (2001).
"There is a philosophical problem, what I will call the problem of eternal truths, that can be stated as follows: If an unactualized, possible essence has no being and is, hence, absolutely nothing, then what grounds the eternal and necessary truth of propositions that purport to be about them? If there were no men, what would ground the necessary truth, "Man is a rational animal"? And what grounded the truth of that proposition prior to the creation of the world? (If it was in fact true at that moment?)"
97. Kronen John, "Essentialism old and new: Suárez and Brody," *Modern Schoolman*: 123-151 (1991).
"A revived interest in essentialism characterizes much recent Anglo-American philosophy. In this

article I compare and contrast one of the most articulate and well-argued recent versions of essentialism, that of Baruch Brody, with that of the last great system builder of the Schoolmen, Francis Suárez. I argue that Suárez's account of essentialism has advantages over Brody's because in positing a form that is entitative or thing-like as the chief constituent of the essences of substances Suárez's account is better able to explain the substantial unity of substances."

98. Kronen John, "Substances are not windowless: a Suárezian critique of monadism," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 71: 5-81 (1997).
 "Recently, Thomas Huffman has defended Leibniz's metaphysics of substance. In this paper I offer a critique of that metaphysics from the point of view of the metaphysics of Leibniz's near contemporary, Francis Suárez. In my critique I show that Suárez's Aristotelianism is better able to account for the existence of composite substances than is Leibniz's metaphysics and that Leibniz's implicit arguments against the Suárezian account of substance fail. I conclude, based upon this, that Suárez's metaphysics should be preferred to Leibniz's since it better accords with the common sense notion that things such as humans and cats are true substances and not mere aggregates."
99. Larrainzar Carlos. *Una introducción a Francisco Suárez*. Pamplona: EUNSA 1977.
100. Lohr Charles H. Possibility and Reality in Suárez's *Disputationes metaphysicae*. In *Res et verba in der Renaissance. Proceedings of a Colloquium held at Herzog August Bibliothek Wolfenbüttel in 1998*. Edited by Kessler Eckhard and Maclean Ian. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag 2002. pp. 273-286
101. Lombardo Mario Gaetano. *La forma che dà l'essere alle cose. Enti di ragione e bene trascendentale in Suarez, Leibniz, Kant*. Milano: Istituto Propaganda Libreria 1995.
102. Lopez Jesus Garcia, "La concepcion suarista del ente y sus implicaciones metafisicas," *Anuario Filosofico* 2: 137-167 (1969).
103. Marion Jean-Luc, "A propos de Suárez et Descartes," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 50: 109-131 (1996).
 "Étude de la conception cartésienne de la substance à la lumière d'un rapprochement avec la définition de la substance comme subsistance chez Suarez. Soulevant le problème de l'indétermination entre univocité et analogie, selon que le concept concerne le fini ou l'infini, l'Auteur examine le double paradoxe de la définition épistémologique et de la définition ontique de la substance."
104. Marion Jean-Luc. Substance et subsistance. Suárez et le traité de la *substantia* dans les *Principia I*, § 51-54. In *Questions cartésiennes II*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1996. pp. 91-99
 Italian translation: *Sostanza e sussistenza. Suárez e il trattato della substantia nei Principia I, 51-54* - in: Jean-Robert Armogathe, Giulia Belgioioso (eds.) - *Descartes: Principia Philosophiae (1644-1994)* - atti del convegno per il 350° anniversario della pubblicazione dell'opera, Parigi, 5-6 maggio 1994, Lecce 10-12 novembre 1994 - Napoli, Vivarium.
105. Martins Antonio Manuel. Tópica metafísica: de Fonseca à Suárez. In *Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradição e Modernidade*. Edited by Cardoso Adelino, Martins Antonio Manuel, and Dos Santos Leonel Ribeiro. Lisboa: Edições Colibri 1999. pp. 157-168
106. Menn Stephen. Suárez, nominalism, and modes. In *Hispanic philosophy in the Age of Discovery*. Edited by White Kevin. Washington: Catholic University of America Press 1997. pp. 226-256
107. Miner Robert C., "Suárez as founder of modernity: reflections on a "topos" in recent historiography," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 18: 17-36 (2001).
 "The aim of this paper is to query a notion that appears with increasing frequency in recent narratives of modern philosophy. The notion is that the secret founder of modernity is not Bacon, Descartes or Hobbes, but Francisco Suárez. This paper examines three attempts to make the case of Suárez as the founder of modern philosophy and finds each of them deficient. First, I examine the treatment of Suárez in Etienne Gilson's *Being and Some Philosophers*. Secondly, I consider Alasdair MacIntyre's characterization of Suárez as an essentially antihistorical thinker in *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry*. Thirdly, I attempt to disambiguate several claims about Suárez that are characteristically bundled together by post-Heideggerian readings of Suárez as the founder of a new science of ontology. The conclusion is that while it would be premature to reject the possibility that Suárez is the founder of modern philosophy, the precise sense in which he would fit this description has not been persuasively delineated."

108. Noreña Carlos G., "Ockham and Suárez on the ontological status of universal concepts," *New Scholasticism* 55: 348-362 (1981).
"Ockham's failure to explain the ontological conditions for the possibility of universal predication partially justifies the traditional view of him as a nominalist. Ockham rejected the basic aristotelian and Thomistic doctrines about common natures, the principle of individuation and relations. Suárez avoided both the Platonizing realism of Scotus and the nominalistic leanings of Ockham with his carefully articulated theories on the limitation of the act, the principle of individuation, and the difference between essence and existence. Scholastic thought on the ontological status of universal concepts centers on issues which are fundamental to the interpretation of Plato and Aristotle and which a comprehensive theory of knowledge cannot avoid."
109. Noreña Carlos G., "Heidegger on Suárez: the 1927 Marburg Lectures," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 23: 407-424 (1983).
"The author summarizes Heidegger's analysis of Scholastic distinction between essence and existence in the Marburg Lectures of 1927 to suggest the importance of such distinction and the shortcomings of Heidegger's own analysis. Some of these shortcomings seem to be due to some of the most controversial features of Heidegger's early philosophical thought."
110. Noreña Carlos G., "Suárez and Spinoza: the metaphysics of modal Being," *Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía* 12: 163-182 (1985).
111. Olivo Gilles. L'homme en personne. Descartes, Suarez, et la question de l'ens per se. In *Descartes et Regius. Autour de l'explication de l'esprit humain*. Edited by Verbeek Theo. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1993. pp. 69-91
112. Olivo Gilles. L'impossibilité de la puissance: les conditions de la pensée de l'individu chez Suarez. In *L'individu dans la pensée moderne XVIe-XVIIIe siècles / L'individuo nel pensiero moderno. Secoli XVI-XVIII*. Edited by Cazzaniga Gian Mario and Zarka Yves Charles. Firenze: ETS 1995. pp.
113. Owens Joseph, "The number of terms in the Suárezian discussion on essence and being," *Modern Schoolman* 34: 147-191 (1957).
114. Peccorini Francisco, "Suárez's struggle with the problem of the one and the many," *Thomist* 36: 433-471 (1972).
"The purpose of this article is to find out whether Suárez's attempt to reconcile analogy with the thesis of the perfect unity of the concept of 'ens' was successful. To this effect, Suárez's basic premises - his theory of the universals and his conception of existence as such - are discussed. The former is dismissed on the grounds that in it the would be link between conceptualism and realism is no link at all because it rests only on an inductive abstraction which in turn is unworkable inasmuch as it is incompatible with the basic Suárezian tenet that the first direct concept is of the individual only. It is shown also how Suárez nullifies his claims of analogy by accounting for the genesis of his concept of 'ens' in terms of his theory of the universals which necessarily opens up to a univocal format. Finally, the article tackles the second premise - Suárez's conception of existence as such understood as a thing and points to its equivocating effect on the concept of 'ens'."
115. Peccorini Francisco, "Knowledge of the singular: Aquinas, Suárez, and recent interpreters," *Thomist* 38 (606): 655 (1974).
"Given the decisive influence of Suárez's conception on modern and contemporary nominalism, a thorough criticism is carried out on different levels: (1) through a 'prima facie' logical analysis of his arguments; (2) through an exhaustive criticism of José M. Alejandro's interpretation of Suárez's position, which is bent upon updating his mentor's foundation; and finally (3) on the basis of an 'ad hominem' dialogue centered on Suárez's Thomistic claims. It is the contention of this article that through his eclectic solution Suárez jeopardized both the nature of the agent intellect -- by hollowing out its whole ontological value -- and the thesis of the primacy of the individual in epistemology -- by leaving our knowledge unexplained in its most fundamental respects and providing it only with unrealistic grounds. This makes it incumbent upon the author to show that the Thomistic thesis of indirect knowledge of the singular proves to be fully satisfactory if examined in the light of Bernard J Lonergan and Karl Rahner's writings."
116. Pereira José, "John of St. Thomas and Suárez," *Acta Philosophica* 5: 115-136 (1996).
"Classical Thomism, originated by Aquinas, developed by Cajetan and consummated by John of St. Thomas (1589-1644), had many critics, chief among them Francisco Suárez, the prime thinker of

Baroque Scholasticism. His critique initiated changes in Thomism, leading John, among other Thomists, to abandon the commentarial method followed by the older Scholastics; to occasionally substitute the Suárezian metaphysical distinction for the real distinction characteristic of Thomism; to concede that the foundational Thomist tenet of the limitation of existence by essence is debatable; and to accept Suárez's definition of God as "ipsum intelligere subsistens" rather than as "ipsum esse subsistens". "

117. Pereira José. The achievement of Suárez and the suarezianisation of Thomism. In *Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradição e Modernidade*. Edited by Cardoso Adelino, Martins Antonio Manuel, and Dos Santos Leonel Ribeiro. Lisboa: Edições Colibri 1999. pp. 133-156

118. Pereira José, "The existential integralism of Suárez, reevaluation of Gilson's allegation of Suárezian essentialism," *Gregorianum* 85: 660-688 (2004).

"In declaring that 'existence as existence corresponds to being as such, and pertains to its intrinsic significance', Suárez accords to existence a preeminence perhaps not ascribed to it by any Scholastic philosopher. Conceptually distinct, existence and essence are really identical, their identity indicated by the term *essentia realis*, or 'existent essence'. Being (*ens*) is at once unitary in meaning and dyadic; it denotes existence that is both actual (*ens ut participium*) and aptitudinal (*ens ut nomen*). 'Actual' existence is realized extra-mentally, while the 'aptitudinal' is existence insofar it is intelligible to the mind, prescinding from but not denying any extra-mental realization. The terminology that Suárez employs is distinctly his own. Gilson, however, reads him Thomistically, and so interprets his *essentia realis* as a kind of Thomist reified concept affirming the preeminence of essence. More recent commentators, influenced by Heidegger, see in the Suarezian *essentia realis* no more than *cogitabilitas*."

119. Pereira José. *Suarez. Between Scholasticism and Modernity*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 2007.

120. Pérez San Martín Héctor, "Determinación del objeto y estudio de la metafísica, sus límites y su correlato con el nombre de esta ciencia según el pensamiento del P. Francisco Suárez," *Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía* 26: 5-39 (1999).

121. Rinaldi Teresa. *Francisco Suarez. Cognitio singularis materialis: De Anima*. Bari: Levante 1998.

122. Riva Franco, "La dottrina Suáreziana del concetto e le sue fonti storiche," *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 71: 686-699 (1979).

"Suárez's doctrine of concept while historically accepting the contribution of the major philosophical traditions of Middle Ages, has its own originality as it proceeds from the metaphysical fundamental, i.e., from the constant reference to the doctrine of power and act which is only typical of Suárez. Theoretically, Suárez (whom Descartes read at La Flèche) definitely reaffirms the intention of knowledge supporting the form of immediate realism. Beyond any gnosiological dualism he demonstrates by exclusion the identity of *verbum* and high intellective and proposes (differing in opinion with Thomas Aquinas) to define "the concept of id quo res concipitur", reducing it to pure instrument or mere sign, the reality of which all lies in the significance."

123. Robinet André, "Suárez dans l'oeuvre de Leibniz," *Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía* 7: 191-209 (1980).

"Statistiquement, Suárez est l'un des auteurs les moins cités par Leibniz (quatorze mentions). Aucune étude directe ne lui est consacrée dans les manuscrits connus. Les références de Leibniz à Suárez sont étudiées autour de sept concepts (métaphysique, principe d'individuation, causalité, harmonie préétablie, *de vinculo substantiale*, eucharistie, *scientia media*) une étude comparative "fondée en réalité textuelle" devient alors édifiable."

124. Roig Gironella Juan, "La síntesis metafísica de Suárez," *Pensamiento* 4: 169-213 (1948).

125. Roig Gironella Juan, "La analogía del ser en Suárez," *Espíritu Cuadernos del Instituto Filosófico de Balmesiana* 36: 5-48 (1987).

126. Ross James F., "Suárez on "universals"," *Journal of Philosophy* 59: 736-747 (1962).

"This is an exposition of Francis Suárez's treatment of the following two questions: (1) what sort of "community" obtains among things that are properly said to be of the same sort? (2) in what sense can any "reality" be correctly called universal? The paper explains Suárez's claims that there are real universals and that there is fundamentally but not formally a real community in reality. The pivotal problem is seen to concern the meaning of 'similarity', since it does "not" mean having

something in common. The paper offers the only resolution of the problem reconcilable with Suárez's own statements, indicating that it commits him to a very novel (in his time) form of conceptualism."

127. Sanz Victor. *La teoría de la posibilidad en Francisco Suárez*. Pamplona: EUNSA 1989.
128. Sanz Victor, "La reducción suáreziana de los trascendentales," *Anuario Filosófico* 25: 403-420 (1992).
"The notion of *aliquid* and *res*, excluded by Suárez from the transcendentals, nevertheless are of primary importance in the understanding of the notion of being, a key aspect of suárezian ontology."
129. Schmutz Jacob. Un Dieu indifférent. La crise de la science divine dans la scolastique moderne. In *Le Contemplateur et les idées. Modèles de la science divine du néoplatonisme aux Temps modernes*. Edited by Boulnois Olivier, Schmutz Jacob, and Solère Jean-Luc. Paris: Vrin 2002. pp. 185-221
130. Schmutz Jacob. ¿Abatir o ensalzar a Francisco Suárez? In *Francisco Suárez. "Der ist der Mann". Apéndice Francisco Suárez De generatione et corruptione. Homenaje al Prof. Salvador Castellote*. Valencia: Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer 2004. pp. 5-16
Preface to the volume.
131. Schmutz Jacob. Science divine et métaphysique chez Francisco Suárez. In *Francisco Suárez. "Der ist der Mann". Apéndice Francisco Suárez De generatione et corruptione. Homenaje al Prof. Salvador Castellote*. Edited by Schmutz Jacob. Valencia: Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer 2004. pp. 347-379
132. Schöndorf Harald. La nada real. La doctrina de los entes posibles en la *Disputaciones Metafísicas* de Francisco Suárez. In *Francisco Suárez. "Der ist der Mann". Apéndice Francisco Suárez De generatione et corruptione. Homenaje al Prof. Salvador Castellote*. Edited by Schmutz Jacob. Valencia: Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer 2004. pp. 381-403
133. Seigfried Hans. Kant's thesis about being anticipated by Suárez? In *Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress*. Edited by Beck Lewis White. Dordrecht: Reidel 1972. pp. 510-520
"The paper attempts to clarify a notion in Kant's philosophy which is much discussed today, by referring back to the doctrine of Suárez, an historically influential representative of traditional ontology. It tries to give a rational account of the Suárezian doctrine of possibility and reality by making explicit those assumptions which make it comprehensible and which were still, after some important modifications, the presuppositions underlying Kant's thesis that being is obviously not a real predicate or (a predicate which stands for) something real but merely the positing of a thing."
134. Siewerth Gustav. *Das Schicksal der Metaphysik von Thomas zu Heidegger*. Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag 1959.
Reprinted in G. Siewerth - *Gesammelte Werke* - vol. 4 - Düsseldorf, Patmos.

See Chapter IX: *Die Objektivierung des Denkens*.

135. South James B., "Francisco Suárez on imagination," *Vivarium* 39: 119-158 (2001).
"I discuss two themes in Suárez's account of internal sensation: the number of internal sense powers and the activities of the internal sense. I show that Suárez rejects a plurality of internal sense powers arguing that there need be only one such power. I then explore his account of the act of internal sensation showing its relation to both external sensation and intellectual knowledge. Most notably, I show why Suárez was compelled to posit an "agent internal sense" and how he manages to remain consistent with his view that there is only one internal sense power."
136. South James B., "Suárez and the problem of external sensation," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 10: 217-240 (2001).
137. Specht Rainer. Aspects 'cartésiens' de la théorie suarezienne de la matière. In *Lire Descartes aujourd'hui*. Edited by Depré Olivier and Lories Danielle. Louvain: Peeters 1997. pp. 21-45
138. Stone Martin W.F. Scholastic Schools and early modern philosophy. In *The Cambridge companion to early modern philosophy*. Edited by Rutherford Donald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006. pp. 299-327
139. Teixeira António Braz. Suárez e o objecto e a natureza da metafísica. In *Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradição e Modernidade*. Edited by Cardoso Adelino, Martins Antonio Manuel, and Dos Santos Leonel Ribeiro. Lisboa: Edições Colibri 1999. pp. 37-44
140. Thompson Augustine, "Francisco Suarez's theory of analogy and the metaphysics of St. Thomas

Aquinas," *Angelicum* 72: 353-362 (1995).

141. Uscatescu Barron Jorge, "El concepto de metafísica en Suárez: su objeto y dominio," *Pensamiento* 51: 215-236 (1995).
 "Se trata de una interpretación de la Primera Disputación de las *Disputationes metaphysicae* de Suárez. El objeto de la metafísica es el ser real en general con exclusión del ente de razón y del ente *per accidens*. Así pues, el dominio de la metafísica es la totalidad de los entes reales por sí. A continuación se estudia cada uno de los temas que la metafísica debe tratar, lo cual se refleja en la estructura de la mencionada obra de Suárez: propiedades y principios del ser, etc. Al hacer de la inmaterialidad un rasgo del ser se desvirtúa el carácter generalísimo de la metafísica, que de por sí está más allá de la división del ser material e inmaterial. Por último, se analiza la correspondencia entre los rasgos entresacados de la metafísica como ciencia y el ser real en general."
142. Vela Utrilla Juan F., "El Ente de Razón en Suárez," *Pensamiento* 4: 271-303 (1948).
143. Volpi Franco, "Suárez et le problème de la métaphysique," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 98: 395-411 (1993).
 "L'article attire l'attention sur l'importance du "tournant" Suárezien dans l'histoire de la métaphysique conçue comme onto - theo - logie, mettant en lumière les décisions qui sont prises par Suárez par rapport aux "topoi" les plus importants de la pensée scolastique et de la pensée moderne. L'extraordinaire fortune de Suárez s'explique par le fait qu'il n'est pas seulement le dernier scolastique, mais aussi le premier moderne."
144. Wells Norman J., "The number of terms in the Suarezian discussion on essence and Being," *Modern Schoolman* 34: 147-191 (1957).
145. Wells Norman J., "Suárez, historian and critic of the modal distinction between essential being and existential being," *New Scholasticism* 36: 419-444 (1962).
146. Wells Norman J., "Objective being: Descartes and his sources," *Modern Schoolman* 45: 49-61 (1967).
147. Wells Norman J., "Old bottles and new wine: a rejoinder to J. C. Doig," *New Scholasticism* 53: 515-523 (1979).
 "This paper is a criticism of an article in the same journal by J. C. Doig, *Suárez, Descartes and the objective reality of ideas*. On the basis of primary and secondary source materials, it is made clear that Doig's exclusively extramental interpretation of Suárez's objective concept is insensitive to the obvious intramental dimensions of that teaching. Thus Doig's claim of a doctrinal discontinuity between Suárez and Descartes is found wanting due to a failure to consider Suárez's position on the realism of the possibles, their role in scientific knowledge in general, and the part they play in metaphysics."
148. Wells Norman J., "Suárez on the eternal truths (Part I)," *Modern Schoolman* 58: 73-106 (1981).
149. Wells Norman J., "Suárez on the eternal truths (Part II)," *Modern Schoolman* 58: 159-174 (1981).
150. Wells Norman J., "Objective reality of ideas in Descartes, Caterus, and Suárez," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 28: 33-61 (1990).
151. Wells Norman J., "Descartes' "Idea" and its sources," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 67: 513-535 (1993).
 "An examination of the sources of Descartes' remark to Hobbes that his use of the term "idea" derives from the use of it by the philosophers to designate the "forms of perception" in the divine mind. The texts of Fonseca and Suárez on exemplary causality on both human and divine levels are analyzed and presented as available proximate sources of Descartes' allusion. The role played by the distinction between the formal and objective concepts in both sources is examined and related to Descartes' use of the same distinction."
152. Wells Norman J., "'Esse Cognitum" and Suárez revisited," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 67: 339-348 (1993).
 "The purpose of the work is to clarify the ambiguous use, in Suárez, of the terms "esse cognitum/esse objectivum" so that no charge of "mentalism" can be brought while, at the same time, it can be acknowledged that "res" enjoys an intramental mode of using, i.e., "objectively" ("conceptus objectivus") as well as an intramental "normal" mode of being ("conceptus formulis")."
153. Wells Norman J., "Javelli and Suárez on the eternal truths," *Modern Schoolman* 72: 13-35 (1994).
 "An examination of Suárez's position on the Eternal Truths by bringing to bear upon it a controversy

between Chrysostomus Javelli, O. P. (+1538) (who is defending Harvey Nedellec, a.k.a. Hervaeus Natalis, O. P. (+1323) and Paulus Barbus Soncinas, O. P. (+1494) on the issue of efficient causality with respect to necessary essential propositions and the distinction between a non-existential use of the copula "est" vs an existential use thereof."

154. Wells Norman J., "John Poinsot on created Eternal Truths vs Vasquez, Suárez and Descartes," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 68: 425-446 (1994).
"An examination of John Poinsot's discussion of created eternal truths wherein he criticizes Gabriel Vasquez's interpretation of Aquinas' position on the eternal truths. What is taken to task is Vasquez's insistence upon a positive eternal aptitudinal truth on the part of necessary as well as contingent truths with regard to creatures. This is such that these truths are not eternal because known by God's eternal intellect. Rather, they are eternally true (aptitudinally) in themselves apart from the divine intellect. Linkage to Suárez's and Descartes' positions on created eternal truths is also considered."
155. Wells Norman J. Objective reality of ideas in Arnauld, Descartes, and Suárez. In *The Great Arnauld and some of his philosophical correspondents*. Edited by Kremer Elmer J. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1994. pp. 138-163
156. Wells Norman J., "Descartes and Suárez on secondary qualities: A tale of two readings," *Review of Metaphysics* 51: 565-604 (1998).
157. Wells Norman J., "Eustache of St. Paul and eternal essences," *Modern Schoolman* 74: 277-304 (2002).
158. Zubimendi Martínez Julián, "La teoría de las distinciones de Suárez y Descartes," *Pensamiento* 40: 179-202 (1984).

Last updated: Friday, November 25, 2011