

# The Ontology of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*.

## Selected bibliography

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### The Ontology of Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. Critical Judgements

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4. *Ludwig Wittgenstein. Critical assessments*. Edited by Shanker Stuart. London: Croom Helm 1986.  
Vol. 1: From the *Notebooks* to *Philosophical Grammar*. The construction and dismantling of the *Tractatus*; Vol. 2: From *Philosophical investigations* to *On certainty*: Wittgenstein's later philosophy; Vol. 3: From the *Tractatus* to *Remarks on the foundations of mathematics*: Wittgenstein on the philosophy of mathematics; Vol. 4: From theology to sociology: Wittgenstein's impact on contemporary thought.
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15. Bloom Stephen L., "A completeness theorem of 'theories of kind Wittgenstein'," *Studia Logica* 27: 43-56 (1971).
16. Bogen James. *Wittgenstein's philosophy of language: some aspects of its development*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1972.  
Chapter 1: The picture theory and the *Tractatus'* ontology pp. 14-101.
17. Bonino Guido, "Russell, Frege e la forma logica nel *Tractatus*," *Rivista di Estetica* 44: 47-59 (2004).  
"The main aim of this paper is that of suggesting that Wittgenstein's notion of logical form -- as it appears in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* -- is better understood if it is conceived of as deriving from Russell's notion of logical form -- as put forth, for instance, in *Theory of Knowledge* --, rather than from Frege's notion of function. Such a prevalingly historical aim is associated with a second one, theoretical-exegetical in character: trying to understand what exactly the logical form is in the *Tractatus*, and what its role is in the context of the picture theory of language."
18. Bradley Raymond, "Wittgenstein's Tractarian essentialism," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 67: 43-55 (1987).
19. Bradley Raymond. *The nature of all Being: A Study of Wittgenstein's modal atomism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992.
20. Bremer Manuel, "Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 57: 111-131 (1999).
21. Brosch Annette. *Die Logik des Tractatus: eine logisch-semantische Untersuchung dessen, "was der Fall" sein kann*. New York: Peter Lang 1995.
22. Candiotti Maurizio, "I concetti tra proprietà e funzioni. Modelli per l'incompletezza ontologica: Frege, Husserl, Wittgenstein," *Rivista di Filosofia* 22: 69-94 (2002).  
"The Fregean notion of concept -- i.e., of the reference (vs. the sense) of a predicate -- is here compared with cognate notions in Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. Their common trait is unsaturatedness or existential dependency: the different treatment of this chief notion of formal ontology is in turn examined comparatively, with regard to the conflicts and the alliances taking tacitly place between the three. In Frege's notion of concept, at any rate, an inner tension arises from its twofold nature of property and of truth-function: saturation and function/argument are too heterogeneous models. Hints for a way out."
23. Canfield John V., "A model *Tractatus* language," *The Philosophical Forum* 4: 199-217 (1972).  
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Reprinted in: John V. Canfield (ed.) - *The philosophy of Wittgenstein. A fifteen volume collection* - New York, Garland, 1986 - Vol. II - *Logic and ontology*.  
"Universals such as red are plausible examples of *Tractatus* objects, despite 6.3751. This view is linked to the *Tractatus'* conception of analysis and to its phenomenalism. Facts are composed of universals bound together. The totality of facts forms the solipsistic universe; the universe as it appears. There is no subject to whom it appears; there are only the constituent atomic facts. Appearances change; what was the case is no longer the case. What does not change are the eternally subsisting universals whose changing combinations constitute reality."
25. Carruthers Peter. *Tractarian semantics: finding sense in Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1989.
26. Carruthers Peter. *The metaphysics of the Tractatus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990.
27. Cerezo Maria. Does a proposition affirm every proposition that follows from it? In *Studies on the history of logic. Proceedings of the Third Symposium on the history of logic*. Edited by Angelelli Ignacio and Cerezo Maria. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1996. pp. 357-368

"The problem of the relations between the orders of signification, truth and logical consequence is central to logic. The way in which these relationships are established goes some way towards determining the logical theory to which the writer subscribes. This problem has been a major issue in the history of logic. In this essay, I propose to show that the problem of these relations is present in the course of the historical development of logic, and that there is no one solution to it. My aim is thus not to offer an answer to the question posed, but to highlight the contrast between different solutions, approaching this issue from the standpoint defended by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.<sup>2</sup> Nor do I intend to provide a detailed explanation of Wittgenstein's view, but only to outline it and bring out the contrasts with other possible solutions, solutions which predate it by some considerable time." (Notes omitted)

28. Cerezo María, "Nombrar kripkeano versus nombrar tractariano: un intento de demarcación," *Theoria.Revista de Teoria, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia* 13: 427-444 (1998).  
"Raymond Bradley, in his book *The Nature of All Being*, has put forward an essentialist interpretation of the ontology of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* and aims to develop the modal dimensions that, in his opinion, are implicit in that work. The aim of this paper is to reassess Bradley's interpretation of tractarian names as rigid designators, by examining the tractarian notion of *name* and the Kripkean concept of *rigid designator* in *Naming and Necessity*, with a view to answering the question as to whether an interpretation of tractarian names as rigid designators is possible, and to bringing to light some similarities and differences between the two theories of meaning."
29. Cerezo María, "La nociones de *Sachverhalt*, *Tatsache* y *Sachlage* en el *Tractatus* de Wittgenstein," *Anuario Filosófico* 37: 455-479 (2004).  
"In this paper, I develop some reflections on the interpretation of the notion of *Sachverhalt* in the *Tractatus*, with a view to show the complexity of the tractarian view and to point out some tensions. I intend to elucidate this notion in the context of its relation to the notions of *Tatsache* and *Sachlage*, and in its relation to the two main theories of the *Tractatus*, the truth-functions theory and the picture theory. I hope that this elucidation sheds some light on a possible comparison between Wittgenstein's and Husserl's views and I point out some suggestions in this sense in the last part of the paper."
30. Cerezo María. *The possibility of language. Internal tensions in Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. Stanford: CSLI Publications 2005.
31. Cheung Leo K.C., "Showing, analysis and the truth-functionality of logical necessity in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*," *Synthese* 139: 81-105 (2004).  
"This paper aims to explain how the *Tractatus* attempts to unify logic by deriving the truth-functionality of logical necessity from the thesis that a proposition shows its sense. I first interpret the Tractarian notion of showing as the displaying of what is intrinsic to an expression. Then I argue that, according to the *Tractatus*, the thesis that a proposition shows its sense implies the determinacy of sense, the possibility of the complete elimination of nonprimitive symbols, the analyticity thesis and the strong analyticity thesis. The picture theory emerges as what provides the only acceptable account of an elementary proposition, subject to the constraint that a proposition must show its sense. The picture theory and the analyticity thesis then entail the contingency thesis and the independence thesis which, together with the strong analyticity thesis, imply that all logical propositions are tautologies."
32. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz, "Contentless syntax, ineffable semantics, and transcendental ontology: reflections on Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*," *Kriterion.Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 17: 1-6 (2003).  
"Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* contains some very striking theses. We read, e.g., that "in a sense" we could not be wrong in logic, and that the whole subject matter of the theory of modalities could be reconstructed on the ground of the insights in the mechanism of the linguistic reference. Yet in the light of the last sentences of *Tractatus* the whole semantics turns out to be principally ineffable. In our paper we will try to clarify these matters. We show how these theses could be made plausible in the context of the *transcendental* method of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*."
33. Cocchiarella Nino B., "Logical Atomism and modal logic," *Philosophia.Philosophical Quarterly of Israel* 4: 41-66 (1974).
34. Cocchiarella Nino B., "Logical Atomism, nominalism, and modal logic," *Synthese* 31: 23-62 (1975).

35. Copi Irving M., "Objects, properties and relations in the *Tractatus*," *Mind* 67: 145-165 (1958). Reprinted in: Irving M. Copi and Robert W. Beard (eds.) - *Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus* - pp. 167-186.
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39. Daniels Charles B. and Davison John, "Ontology and method in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*," *Noûs* 7: 233-247 (1973).  
 "Wittgenstein's method is that of showing the categories of being through a perspicuous language that mirrors the world. For Wittgenstein there are two categories of being, the category of objects and the category of facts. These categories are radically disjoint: no object is a fact, no fact an object. In a perspicuous language facts cannot be named and objects cannot be asserted. A perspicuous language has one and only one name for each object and one and only one proposition for each possible (and in addition one not-so-possible) fact. Material properties and generality are shown to be analyzable; formal properties are seen as not expressible. The unity of reality shows in the general form of a proposition that is given in a manner far clearer and much less ambiguous than Wittgenstein's own version. The Tractarian view of logic and mathematics is developed, and questions are raised concerning it that can be seen to occupy Wittgenstein in his later writings."
40. Dayton Eric, "*Tractatus* 5.54 - 5.5422," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 6: 275-285 (1976).
41. Dejnozka Jan. *The ontology of the analytic tradition and its origins. Realism and identity in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine*. Lanham: Littlefield Adams Books 1996.  
 Paperback edition reprinted with corrections, 2002; reprinted with further corrections, 2003.
- "While many books discuss the individual achievements of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine, few books consider how the thought of all four thinkers bears on the fundamental questions of twentieth century philosophy. This book is about existence-identity connections in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine. The thesis of the book is that there is a general form of ontology, modified realism, which these great analysts share not only with each other, but with most great philosophers in the Western tradition. Modified realism is the view that in some sense there are both real identities and conceptual (or linguistic) identities. In more familiar language, it is the view that there are both real distinctions and distinctions in reason (or in language). Thus in modified realism, there are *some* real beings which can serve as a basis for accommodating possibly huge amounts of conceptual or linguistic relativity, or objectual identities' 'shifting' as sortal concepts or sortal terms 'shift.' Therefore, on the fundamental level of ontology, the linguistic turn was not a radical break from traditional substance theory. Dejnozka also holds that the conflict in all four analysts between private language arguments (which imply various kinds of realism) and conceptual "shifting" (which suggests conceptual relativism) is best resolved by, and is in fact implicitly resolved by, their respective kinds of modified realism. Frege and Russell, not Wittgenstein and Quine, emerge as the true analytic progenitors of 'no entity without identity,' offering between them at least twenty-nine private language arguments and fifty-eight 'no entity without identity' theories."
42. Elgin Catherine, "The impossibility of saying what is shown," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 16: 617-627 (1978).
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44. Finch Henry Le Roy. *Wittgenstein. The early philosophy. An exposition of the Tractatus*. New York: Humanities Press 1971.

45. Fogelin Robert J. *Wittgenstein*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1976. Second revised edition 1987.
46. Frascolla Pasquale, "On the nature of *Tractatus* objects," *Dialectica* 58: 369-382 (2004).  
"A conjecture on the metaphysical nature of Tractatus objects is put forward and its interpretative adequacy is tested. The clarification of the true import of the metaphor of logical space and the recognition of the theoretical role played by Wittgenstein's explicit claim that the emptiness of logical space is conceivable enable us to account for the thesis that objects are the substance of the world. Once objects are identified with those universal abstract entities which are qualia, and complexes or states of affairs with their concrete instances, some statements of the Tractatus become liable to a consistent reading: that objects are colourless (TLP 2.0232); that space, time and colour are forms of objects (TLP 2.0251); that Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, though still holding for complexes, does not apply to objects (TLP 2.0233). Lastly, it is shown how the interpretation of objects as qualia sheds a vivid light on the theme of the relation between objects and time."
- Italian version: *Sulla natura degli oggetti nel Tractatus* - Rivista di estetica. 44, 2004, pp. 61-73.
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51. Geach Thomas Peter, "Wittgenstein's operator *N*," *Analysis* 41: 168-171 (1981).
52. Glock Hans-Johann. *A Wittgenstein dictionary*. London: Blackwell 1996.
53. Glock Hans-Johann, "Truth in the *Tractatus*," *Synthese* 148: 345-368 (2006).
54. Goddard Leonard and Judge Brenda. *The metaphysics of Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. Bundoora (Victoria): Australasian Association of Philosophy 1982.  
"The ontology of the *Tractatus*, in terms of which objects are characterized as property-less simples, is coherent provided Wittgenstein is not mistakenly taken to be a constructive atomist building complexes from simples. A geometrical model is given to illustrate this. It is also shown that an ontology like that of the *Tractatus* removes much of the conceptual puzzlement of modern particle physics and has implications for current debates about realism, possible worlds and rigid designators."
55. Granger Gilles-Gaston, "Le problème de l'espace logique dans le Tractatus de Wittgenstein," *L'Age de la Science*: 181-195 (1968).
56. Griffin James Patrick. *Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1964.
57. Grossmann Reinhardt, "Wittgenstein and the problem of non-existent states of affairs," *Acta Analytica*: 139-146 (1998).  
"The history of philosophy is full of amazing quirks. One of them is the fact that just two basic ontologies have ruled the roost for the last two thousand years, namely, the Platonic system and the Aristotelian system. But it is even more peculiar that neither system contains the category of state of affairs. The main reason for this neglect seems to be a consideration which has plagued philosophy to this day. There can be no such things as states of affairs, because there simply are no states of affairs for false sentences. Russell, influenced by Wittgenstein's criticism, tried to escape from this conclusion with his so-called multiple relation theory of judgment. But he does not succeed. Wittgenstein claimed to have avoided Russell's mistake and to have presented a correct view about the nature of judgment in the Tractatus. But a study of the few references in the Tractatus to the ontological status of states of affairs represented by false sentences does not show this."
58. Hadot Pierre, "Réflexions sur les limites du langage. A propos du Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,"

*Europe* 905: 12-30 (2004).

59. Hadot Pierre. *Wittgenstein et les limites du langage*. Paris: Vrin 2004.
60. Hamilton Kelly Ann, "Darstellungen in the *Principles of Mechanics* and the *Tractatus*: the representation of objects in relation in Hertz and Wittgenstein," *Perspectives on Science: Historical, Philosophical, Social* 10: 28-68 (2002).  
 "Ludwig Wittgenstein's conception of the role of objects in our philosophical understanding of the logic of our language is critical for his early philosophy in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. While the important connections between Heinrich Hertz's *Principles of Mechanics* and Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* have long been recognized, recent work by Jed Buchwald has deepened our knowledge of the importance of the object-orientation of Hertz's scientific work in a manner that should also deepen our understanding of the nature of objects in the *Tractatus*. I will argue that there are important ontological links, involving "a certain physical scheme, one that had powerful implications for thinking as well as doing," between Hertz's work and Wittgenstein's early philosophy."
61. Hieke Alexander and Maier Maria. A formal approach to the ontology and the picture-theory of the *Tractatus*. In *Wittgenstein. Towards a re-evaluation. Proceedings of the 14th International Wittgenstein-Symposium, centenary celebration, 13th to 20th August 1989, Kirchberg am Wechsel (Austria)*. Edited by Haller Rudolf and Brandl Johannes. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1990. pp.
62. Hintikka Jaakko, "Quantification and the picture theory of language," *The Monist* 53: 204-230 (1969).  
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63. Hintikka Merrill B. and Hintikka Jaakko. *Investigating Wittgenstein*. Oxford: Blackwell 1986.
64. Hochberg Herbert, "Negation and generality," *Noûs* 3: 325-343 (1969).  
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68. Horn Patrick Rogers. *Gadamer and Wittgenstein on the unity of language. Reality and discourse without metaphysics*. Aldershot: Ashgate 2005.
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70. Ishiguro Hide. The so-called Picture Theory: language and the world in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. In *Wittgenstein: a critical reader*. Edited by Glock Hans-Johann. Malden: Blackwell Publishers 2001. pp. 26-46
71. Jacqueline Dale, "Analysis of quantifiers in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*: a critical survey," *Logic Analysis and History of Philosophy* 4: 191-202 (2001).  
 "In the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, Wittgenstein distinguishes between what can and cannot be said in any language by the general form of propositions. I explain Wittgenstein's method and discuss Robert J. Fogelin's criticism of what he takes to be the incompleteness of Wittgenstein's general form of propositions in his exposition of the 'Naive Constructivism of the *Tractatus*.' [Chapter 6 of: Robert J. Fogelin - *Wittgenstein* pp. 78-85]. I argue that Fogelin's objection is mistaken, and that, contrary to Fogelin's claim, Wittgenstein's method when properly applied produces all of the well-formed formulas with mixed multiple quantification that Fogelin maintains it cannot provide. I conclude by offering a critical comparison of similar solutions proposed, among others, by P.T. Geach, Scott Soames, and Matthias Varga von Kibéd."
72. Jacqueline Dale. Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and the logic of fiction. In *Wittgenstein and philosophy of literature*. Edited by Gibson John and Huemer Wolfgang. London: Routledge 2004. pp. 305-317  
 "Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* articulates a logic and semantics for all possible languages in which states of affairs (*Sachverhalten, Tatsachen*) as truth-makers are pictured in

sentences under analysis. Wittgenstein considers both existent and nonexistent states of affairs as pictured, respectively, by true and false sentences. This raises the question as to whether the *Tractatus* constitutes or provides the formal basis for a logic of fiction. I identify four criteria for a logic of fiction, and argue that the *Tractatus* satisfies only the first three. The remaining criterion has to do with logical analysis of a fictional character's psychology internal narration. These are excluded by Wittgenstein's application of Occam's razor in defense of the general form of proposition in the case of fiction just as they are in nonfictional discourse."

73. Kannisto Heikki. *Thoughts and their subject. A study of Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica 1986.
74. Kaplan David, "Foundations of intensional logic", 1964.  
Unpublished Ph. D. thesis; available at ProQuest Dissertation Express, reference number: 6408563.
75. Kenny Anthony John Patrick. *Wittgenstein*. London: Allen Lane 1973.  
Second revised edition: Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 2006.
76. Klement Kevin C., "Putting form before function: logical grammar in Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein," *Philosopher's Imprint* 4: 1-47 (2004).  
"The positions of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on the priority of complexes over (propositional) functions are sketched, challenging those who take the "judgment centered" aspects of the *Tractatus* to be inherited from Frege not Russell. Frege's views on the priority of judgments are problematic, and unlike Wittgenstein's. Russell's views on these matters, and their development, are discussed in detail, and shown to be more sophisticated than usually supposed.  
Certain misreadings of Russell, including those regarding the relationship between propositional functions and universals, are exposed. Wittgenstein's and Russell's views on logical grammar are shown to be very similar. Russell's type theory does not countenance types of genuine entities nor metaphysical truths that cannot be put into words, contrary to conventional wisdom. I relate this to the debate over "inexpressible truths" in the *Tractatus*. I lastly comment on the changes to Russell's views brought about by Wittgenstein's influence."
77. Klemke Elmer D. The ontology of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. In *Essays on Wittgenstein*. Edited by Klemke Elmer D. Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1971. pp. 104-119
78. Kluge Eike Henner, "Objects as universals: a re-appraisal of the *Tractatus*," *Dialogue* 12: 64-77 (1973).
79. Küng Guido. *Ontology and the logistic analysis of language. an enquiry Into the contemporary views on universals*. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company 1967.  
Translated from German by E. C. M. Mays, and revised by the author]
80. Küng Guido, "The difficulty with the well-formedness of ontological statements," *Topoi* 2: 111-119 (1983).
81. Latraverse François, "Signe, proposition, situation: éléments pour une lecture du *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 56: 125-140 (2002).
82. Levvis Gary, "The so-called (and actual!) Realism of the *Tractatus*," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 54: 45-70 (1998).  
"David Pears's contention that the *Tractatus* [in: *The false prison* - vol. 1 - Chapter 6: *The basic Realism of the Tractatus*] is to be understood as advancing a form of metaphysical realism is defended against McGuinness's view that *Tractatus* 1-2.063 is to be treated just as introducing a metaphysical myth that may be employed to bring into prominence salient features of propositions. Starting with a discussion of the involved difficulties, e.g., determining (1) whether Wittgenstein does, in fact, provide an argument for the existence of simple objects, (2) what this object is, and (3) what role the existence of simple objects plays within the Picture Theory of the Proposition, Wittgenstein's argument for the existence of simple objects is reconstructed, augmenting Pears's existing account by providing further details of why Wittgenstein held that determinacy of sense requires the existence of simple objects."
83. Lokhorst Gert-Jan C., "Ontology, semantics, and philosophy of mind in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. A formal reconstruction," *Erkenntnis* 29: 35-75 (1988).  
"The paper presents a formal explication of the early Wittgenstein's views on ontology, the syntax and semantics of an ideal logical language, and the propositional attitudes. It will be shown that Wittgenstein gave a 'language of thought' analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions, and that his

ontological views imply that such ascriptions are truth-functions of (and supervenient upon) elementary sentences. Finally, an axiomatization of a quantified doxastic modal logic corresponding to Tractarian semantics will be given."

84. Lombardi Olimpia Iris, "¿Qué son los objetos del Tractatus?," *Revista de Filosofía (Spain)* 12: 55-76 (1999).  
 "In this paper we provide an interpretation of the concept "object", in the context of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. We argue that (1) "objects" are logical entities, the nodes of the logical net which is common to all possible worlds; (2) general words are not "names" and, therefore, "objects" are particulars."
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 From the Preface: "This study in Wittgenstein *Tractatus* is substantially as it was written in 1933". Reprinted by Thoemmes Press in 1997.
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 " It is argued that the *Tractatus* notion of propositional sense contains an irreducible modal element. An interpretation of Wittgenstein's early notion of "bipolarity" is given. It is further argued that explicit recognition of the modal element helps us to understand the particular form of the *Tractatus* ontology. Wittgenstein's early views on sense and modality are contrasted with Frege's and Russell's views. Part II is a defense of the view that the *Tractatus* objects include predicates. The argument is backed up by reference to later unpublished writings by Wittgenstein. The development of his views on names and predicates are examined."
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92. McGuinness Brian. The so-called realism of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. In *Perspectives on the philosophy of Wittgenstein*. Edited by Block I. Oxford: Balckwell 1981. pp. 60-73  
 Reprinted in: B. F. McGuinness - *Approaches to Wittgenstein. Collected papers* - pp. 82-94.
93. McGuinness Brian. *Approaches to Wittgenstein. Collected papers*. London: Routledge 2002.
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95. Milkov Nikolay, "Tractarian scaffoldings," *Prima Philosophia* 14: 399-414 (2001).  
 "Wittgenstein's Tractarian ontology has its historical roots in Russell's programme for constructionalism. There is an essential difference between the constructionalism of Russell and that of Wittgenstein though. Whereas Tractarian ontology is approximately Aristotelian, Russell's logical atomism accepts a Platonic penetration of the autonomous world of logical forms into the autonomous world of facts. Russell's logical constructionalism, more precisely, uses the metaphor of a 'logical skeleton' on which the data of experience are fleshed out. In opposition, in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein doesn't speak of a skeleton but introduces the concept of 'logical scaffolding' and also of the 'scaffolding of the world' instead. This terminology reflects a new type of ontology, as well as a new type of logic, radically different from that of Russell. Its most important concepts are that of 'object' and 'state of affairs', both of them used in new, idiosyncratic sense."
96. Miller III High, "Tractarian semantics for predicate logic," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 16: 197-215 (1995).  
 "It is a little understood fact that the system of formal logic presented in Wittgenstein's' *Tractano*

provides the basis for an alternative general semantics for a predicate calculus that is consistent and coherent. essentially independent of the metaphysics of logical atomism. and philosophically illuminating in its own right. The purpose of this paper is threefold: to describe the general characteristics of a Tractarian-style semantics, to defend the 'Fulcrums system against the charge of expressive incompleteness as levelled by Robert Fogelin, and to give a semantics for a formal language that is the Tractarian equivalent of a first-order predicate calculus. Of note in regard to the latter is the fact that a Tractarian-style truth-definition makes no appeal to the technical trick of defining truth in terms of the satisfaction of predicates by infinite sequences of objects, yet is materially equivalent to the usual Tarski-style truth-definitions."

97. Morrison James C. *Meaning and truth in Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. The Hague: Mouton 1968.
98. Mounce Howard O. *Wittgenstein's Tractatus. An introduction*. London: Basil Blackwell 1981.
99. Mounce Howard O. The logical system of the *Tractatus*. In *Wittgenstein: a critical reader*. Edited by Glock Hans-Johann. Malden: Blackwell Publishers 2001. pp. 59-93
100. Mundersbach Klaus. A tentative axiomatization of the ontology of the *Tractatus*. In *Wittgenstein and his impact on contemporary thought. Proceedings of the Second International Wittgenstein Symposium, 29th August to 4th September 1977, Kirchberg/Wechsel (Austria)*. Edited by Leinfellner Elisabeth. Wien: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky 1978. pp. 159-161
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103. Noonan H.W., "*Tractatus* 2.0211 - 2.0212," *Analysis* 36: 147-149 (1975).  
"The existence of objects as substances. *Tractatus's* relationship to the theory of the proposition in Frege."
104. Nordmann Alfred. *Wittgenstein's Tractatus. An introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005.
105. Oaklander Nathan L. and Miracchi Silvano, "Russell, negative facts, and ontology," *Philosophy of Science* 47: 434-455 (1980).  
"Russell's introduction of negative facts to account for the truth of "negative" sentences or beliefs rests on his collaboration with Wittgenstein in such efforts as the characterization of formal necessity, the theory of logical atomism, and the use of the ideal language. In examining their views we arrive at two conclusions. First, that the issue of negative facts is distinct from questions of meaning or intentionality; what a sentence or belief means or is about rather than what makes it true or false. Second, that the ontological use of the ideal language is incompatible with the requirements of its employment in the logical study of inferences. On this basis we conclude that despite elaborations by recent proponents, the doctrine of negative facts lacks adequate support, and perhaps more importantly, it is proper ontological method to free the ideal language from the exigencies of a symbolism constructed for logical investigation."
106. Omyla Mieczyslaw. *Zarys logiki niefregeowskiej (An outline of non-Fregean logic)*. Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe 1986.  
Book written in Polish
107. Ostrow Matthew B. *Wittgenstein's Tractatus. A dialectical interpretation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002.
108. Page James, "Unconfigured Tractarian objects," *Philosophical Investigations* 20: 39-50 (1997).  
"According to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, the world consists of atomic objects arranged in various configurations and the ways the world might be are determined by the ways these objects can be configured. I question whether these very objects can be unconfigured as well. Black and Fogelin are nearly alone in their attention to this issue but reach opposite conclusions. Black asserts, essentially without argument, that atomic objects can be configured, while Fogelin is committed to the view that they cannot. I think Black is right and my aim is to show why."
109. Pears David Francis. *Wittgenstein*. New York: Viking Press 1970.
110. Pears David Francis, "The ontology of the *Tractatus*," *Teorema*: 49-58 (1972).  
"The article is concerned with the status of the ontology of the *Tractatus*. In it I argue 1) that, although the ontology of the *Tractatus* is a metaphysic of language like Kant's metaphysic of experience, it is supposed to set the standard of objectivity, and to yield the firmest conclusions

about reality; 2) that Wittgenstein abandoned this ontology when he abandoned the theory of language from which it had been deduced, because it expressed too narrow a view of the possible forms that language may take. The article is an attempt to establish in what way Wittgenstein's later philosophy is more anthropocentric than his early philosophy."

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Reprinted in: S. G. Shanker (ed.) - *Ludwig Wittgenstein. Critical assessments - Vol. 1 - From the Notebooks to Philosophical grammar: the construction and dismantling of the Tractatus* (1986) - pp. 92-107.
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Contents of the first volume: Abbreviations XI; Part I: Introduction 1; 1. Wide-angle view 3; 2. Close-up: the early system 20; 3. Close-up: the late system 34; Part II: Inside the early system 61; 4. Logical Atomism 63; 5. The basic realism of the *Tractatus* 88; 6. Sentences as pictures 115; 7. Solipsism 153; 8. Review and prospect 192; Bibliography 197; Index 201.
113. Perszyk Kenneth, "The ontology of the *Tractatus*," *Philosophia. Philosophical Quarterly of Israel* 18: 39-59 (1988).  
" Reading Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* as an extended answer to the question "what must the world be like for the symbolic logic developed by Frege, Russell, and Whitehead to apply to it?" helps elucidate the connection between its theory of language and its ontology. My main argument is to show that the ontology is derived from the logic of *Principia mathematica* taken to its completion. throughout the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein takes a stance on a number of traditional problems in the history of philosophy, and my aim in discussing some of these is to place the *Tractatus* in broader historical perspective."
114. Perzanowski Jerzy. Some ontological and semantical puzzles of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. In *Aesthetics. Proceedings of the 8th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 15th - 21st August 1983, Kirchberg am Wessel (Österreich)*. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Wien: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky 1984. pp. 224-230
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118. Perzanowski Jerzy. Ce qu'il y a de non Fregean dans la sémantique du Tractatus de Wittgenstein et pourquoi? In *Wittgenstein et la philosophie aujourd'hui: Journées internationales Créteil-Paris, 16-21 juin 1989 à l'occasion du centenaire de la naissance de Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)*. Edited by Sebestik Jan and Soulez Antonia. Paris: Klincksieck 1992. pp. 163-177  
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119. Piana Giovanni. *Interpretazione del Tractatus di Wittgenstein*. Milano: Il Saggiatore 1973.
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"Un des principaux enjeux de la théorie du jugement de Russell consistait à élaborer une théorie qui n'engage pas à admettre des entités complexes vraies, fausses ou inexistantes tels que les objectifs

meinongiens. Dans l'étude du débat entre Russell et Wittgenstein sur cette théorie, on n'a jamais sérieusement envisagé que Wittgenstein n'ait pas suivi Russell sur cette question et qu'il ait plutôt adopté une position plus proche de celle de Meinong. Dans cet article, j'aborde cette question et soutiens que Wittgenstein a trouvé la solution aux problèmes posés par la théorie du jugement de Russell dans la théorie de l'image et qu'il a longuement hésité dans les Carnets entre des versions de la théorie de l'image en accord avec la position de Russell et des versions en accord avec celle de Meinong. Enfin, je soutiens qu'il a finalement tranché la question dans le Tractatus en optant pour une théorie du type de celle privilégiée par Meinong."

124. Poulain Jacques, "La possibilité des propositions ontologiques dans le *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*," *Les Études Philosophiques*: 529-552 (1973).
125. Proops Ian. *Logic and language in Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. New York: Garland Publishers 2000.  
"This work is a minimally revised version of my Harvard doctoral thesis, which was written during the years 1994-1998. My understanding of Wittgenstein's early philosophy has, of course, continued to evolve since completing the thesis, but because the attempt to incorporate these new ideas seemed likely to result in a wholly new work, I have decided to present the dissertation in its original form, with the exception of a few minor and mostly stylistic changes."
126. Proops Ian, "Wittgenstein on the substance of the world," *European Journal of Philosophy* 12: 106-126 (2004).  
"A reading is offered of Wittgenstein's argument for substance in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Wittgenstein's talk of "substance" is an allusion to Kant's conception of substance in the "First Analogy" of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, namely, the concept of some stuff that exists at all times and such that all existence changes are alterations of it. Tractarian substance is the modal analogue of Kantian substance. It is that which "endures," not literally through time, but figuratively through a "space" of possible worlds. To argue for substance is therefore to argue for necessary existents. From this starting point, a detailed reconstruction of the argument for substance is developed and its coherence (if not soundness) defended."
127. Ramsey Frank Plumpton, "Critical notice of the *Tractatus*," *Mind* 32: 465-478 (1923).  
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134. Simons Peter, "Tractatus mereologico-philosophicus? A Brentanian look at Wittgenstein, and a moral," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 28: 165-186 (1986).
135. Skyrms Brian, "Tractarian nominalism (for Wilfrid Sellars)," *Philosophical Studies* 40: 199-206 (1981).

136. Skyrms Bryan, "Tractarian nominalism," *Philosophical Studies* 40: 199-206 (1981).
137. Soames Scott, "Generality, truth functions, and expressive capacity in the *Tractatus*," *The Philosophical Review* 92: 573-589 (1983).  
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Original edition: *Die sprachphilosophischen und ontologischen Grundlagen im Spätwerk Ludwig Wittgensteins* - Cologne, Kölner Universitäts-Verlag, 1963.  
The first two chapters are about the *Tractatus*.
139. Stegmüller Wolfgang, "Eine modelltheoretische Präzisierung der Wittgensteinschen Bildtheorie.," *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 7: 181-195 (1966).
140. Stenius Erik. *Wittgenstein's Tractatus. A critical exposition of its main lines of thought*. Oxford: Blackwell 1960.
141. Stenius Erik. The sentence as a function of its constituents in Frege and in the *Tractatus*. In *Essays on Wittgenstein in honour of G. H. von Wright*. Edited by Hintikka Jaakko. Amsterdam: North-Holland 1976. pp. 71-84
142. Stevens Graham, "From Russell's Paradox to the theory of judgement: Wittgenstein and Russell on the unity of the proposition," *Theoria. A Swedish Journal of Philosophy* 70: 28-61 (2007).  
"It is fairly well known that Wittgenstein's criticisms of Russell's multiple-relation theory of judgment has a devastating effect on the latter's philosophical enterprise. The exact nature of those criticisms, however, and the explanation for the severity of their consequences, has been a source of confusion and disagreement amongst both Russell and Wittgenstein scholars. In this paper, I offer an interpretation of those criticisms which shows them to be consonant with Wittgenstein's general critique of Russell's conception of logic and which serves to elucidate some of the notoriously enigmatic passages of the *Tractatus*. In particular, I seek to show the continuity of Wittgenstein's criticisms of the theory of judgment with his remarks on Russell's paradox and the theory of types."
143. Stokhof Martin J.B. *World and life as one. Ethics and ontology in Wittgenstein's early thought*. Stanford: Stanford University Press 2002.  
"The book's main thesis is twofold. It argues that the ontological theory of the *Tractatus* is fundamentally dependent on its logical and linguistic doctrines: the tractarian world is the world as it appears in language and thought. It also maintains that this interpretation of the ontology of the *Tractatus* can be argued for not only on systematic grounds, but also via the contents of the ethical theory that it offers. Wittgenstein's views on ethics presuppose that language and thought are but one way in which we interact with reality."
144. Sullivan Peter M., "The totality of facts," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 100: 175-192 (2000).  
"Wittgenstein, in the *Tractatus*, conceives the world as "the totality of facts." Type-stratification threatens that conception: the totality of facts is an obvious example of an illegitimate totality. Wittgenstein's notion of truth-operation evidently has some role to play in avoiding that threat, allowing propositions, and so facts, to constitute a single type. The paper seeks to explain that role in a way that integrates the "philosophical" and "technical" pressures on the notion of an operation."
145. Suszko Roman, "Ontologia w 'Traktacie' L. Wittgenstein" (Ontology in the *Tractatus* by L. Wittgenstein)," *Studia Filozoficzne*: 97-120 (1968).  
Paper written in Polish
146. Suszko Roman, "Ontology in the *Tractatus* of L. Wittgenstein," *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 9: 7-33 (1968).
147. Suszko Roman, "Definitions in theories of kind W," *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* 1: 14-19 (1972).  
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148. Suszko Roman, "Description in theories of kind W," *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* 1: 8-13 (1972).  
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150. Tejedor Chon, "Sense and simplicity: Wittgenstein's argument for simple objects," *Ratio. An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy* 16: 272-289 (2003).  
"This paper puts forward an alternative interpretation of the argument for simple objects advanced in the 2.0s of the *Tractatus*. In my view, Wittgenstein derives the simplicity of objects directly from his account of possible states, complex objects and senseful propositions. The key to Wittgenstein's argument is the idea that, if there were no simple objects, possible states would not be necessarily possible. If this were the case, however, there would be no senseful language, in Wittgenstein's view. One of the subsidiary aims of this paper is to question the idea that Wittgenstein posits simples because, without them, language would be infinitely analyzable."
151. Voltolini Alberto, "Possibilia, qualia e sensibilia," *Rivista di Estetica* 43: 127-137 (2003).  
"In this paper I will try to show the following two things. First, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* semantically exiges that Tractarian objects be conceived of as possibilia in the sense of Russell (1903), namely as objects that may exist as well not exist. Second, the *Tractatus's* general ontological framework suggests to integrate this onto-semantical conception with a view of such objects not as *qualia* but rather as *sensibilia* in the sense of Russell (1914), namely as *possible sense-data*."
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153. White Roger M. *Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Readers' guide*. New York: Continuum 2006.
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"The notion of fact:  $FP = 'It is a fact that P'$  is characterized axiomatically, and the ensuing modal systems shown to be equivalent to T, S4 and S5 respectively."
161. Wolniewicz Boguslaw. Zur Semantik des Satzalküls: Frege und Wittgenstein. In *Der Mensch - Subjekt und Objekt (Festschrift für Adam Schaff)*. Edited by Borbé Tasso. Wien: Europaverl. 1973. pp.
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164. Wolniewicz Boguslaw, "A formal ontology of situations," *Studia Logica* 41: 381-413 (1982).  
 "A generalized Wittgensteinian semantics for propositional languages is presented, based on a lattice of elementary situations. Of these, maximal ones are possible worlds, constituting a logical space; minimal ones are logical atoms, partitioned into its dimensions. A verifier of a proposition is an elementary situation such that if real it makes true. The reference (or objective) of a proposition is a situation, which is the set of all its minimal verifiers. (Maximal ones constitute its locus.) Situations are shown to form a Boolean algebra, and the Boolean set algebra of loci is its representation. Wittgenstein's is a special case, admitting binary dimensions only."
- Contents:  
 0. Preliminaries;  
 1. Elementary Situations  
 1.1. The Axioms; 1.2. Some Consequences; 1.3. W-Independence; 1.4. States of Affairs;  
 2. Sets of Elementary Situations  
 2.1. The Semigroup of SE"-Sets; 2.2. The Lattice of Minimal SE"-Sets; 2.3. Q-Spaces and V-Sets;  
 2.4. V-Equivalence and Q-Equivalence; 2.4. V-Classes and V-Sets;  
 3. Objectives of Propositions  
 3.1. Verifiers of Propositions; 3.2. Verifying and Forcing; 3.3. Situations and Logical Loci; 3.4. Loci and Objectives of Compound Propositions 3.5. The Boolean Algebra of Situations;  
 4. References
165. Wolniewicz Boguslaw, "Logical space and metaphysical systems," *Studia Logica* 42: 269-284 (1983).  
 "The paper applies the theory presented in "A formal ontology of situations" (*Studia Logica*, vol. 41 (1982), no. 4) to obtain a typology of metaphysical systems by interpreting them as different ontologies of situations.  
 Four are treated in some detail: Hume's diachronic atomism, Laplacean determinism, Hume's synchronic atomism, and Wittgenstein's logical atomism. Moreover, the relation of that theory to the "situation semantics" of Perry and Barwise is discussed."
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169. Wright Georg Henrik von. Historical introduction. The origin of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. In *Prototractatus. An early version of Tractatus logico-philosophicus*. Edited by McGuinness Brian. London: Routledge 1971. pp.  
 Revised and expanded in G. H. von Wright - *Wittgenstein* - Oxford, Blackwell, 1982.
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172. Zemach Eddy M., "*Sachverhalte, Tatsachen* and properties," *Ratio. An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy* 17: 49-51 (1976).
173. Zheng Yiwei, "Les configurations et les propriétés des objets dans le *Tractacus* de Wittgenstein," *Philosophical Investigations* 22: 136-165 (1999).  
"In this paper I approach some central problems concerning the Tractarian objects, e.g., the picture theory, the internal and external properties of objects, and the debate whether properties and relations should be included as the Tractarian objects, from a study of configurations of objects. I argue that a detailed study of configurations of objects offers us new insights and helps us reach solutions to some of the important disputes concerning the characteristics of objects, e.g., the dispute whether the Tractarian objects include properties and relations."

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